ALLEN W. DULLES NOTES FOR QUANTICO ADDRESS 20 JUNE 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520005-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 20, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/12 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520005-0
? NOTES FOR
QUANT ICO ADDRESS
20 lune 1958
LLEN W. DULLES
(1) Tough role of intelUg?e. With aworldbureting at sea
from Lebanon Indonesia. And trying at same time Selv
both terrestrial and outer space. (Trust can leave much of
latter to scientiats but we must stili monitor USSR activities)
(2) , High_ recogni
Have ch
-wares to President, NSC, etc.
ce to sell our
e such interest.
following
British chang ove to bring I C
our pattern.
(3) Intelligence
a
Radar -- Electronic Intelligence intercepts.
Electronic computers can't prepare a nattonal estimate or
gauge our dangers.
Sifting and appraisal process.
(4) I.A.C. --Watch Committee -- Indications Center. increasing
need of rapid communication Intelligence Info. (Cooperation
Military HOS abroad needed).
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?t,14111',
(5) Intelligence team includes 'ate Military Services if ICS;
C.I.A. with assist from AEC and FBI.
(6). Vital role of MU. Services -- Service attaches
in military coma abroad make great conu
MU.. attaches(not merely for battle
? and training
? and personal
rd
officers
order
Burden of ?empire ..thout.an empire
Need corps .pro. .011.(n. t to eerc e.:.autiority of the old
t or not--
but to help guide inefficient, intornPet at new gov*ts).
Mil, men w
They often r
Mil. attaches and chiefs of MAAG misitons - Now working
with military men of other countries who will be Lutur?eaders.
Must help build up leaders of free world -- (lost two Magaayaay
and Castillo Arma
.overlarger: role in these new countries
resent element of stability
troubled areas.
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?.;
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/12 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520005-0
3.
Intelligence appraisal. Past year
A. In the political field:-
SCA/On regained much of ground lost In Hungary,
consolidated position in most of satellites and East
(erraany by ruthless methods (smacking of Stalinism).
Slowly trying bring Po and back into Communist fold.
(But this remains a tti4erboz as Poles may resist total
loss of liberties they gained).
In Europe: NATO allies divided by issues such as Cyprus,
Algeria. As to latter deCraulle first two weeks encouragin
Also Soy. over a barrel).
Also pubite opinion problem re
base
In Middle East Communists are backing
and Nsarlsm which has wide popular support even in
countries, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia where govt* pro-West.
Lebanon -- undoubtedly backing Syria in its covert support
of the rebels in the fighting which partly a civil war
partly covert external
ggre
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/12/12 : CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520005-0
SECIlt.1
4.
In the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa the Soviet
trade and subversive offensive is taking advantage of the
weak and inefficient governments which with inadequate
preparation, experience and skill are trying to make the
democratic processes work. '
In Indonesia -- the Communists are partly taking
advantage of a civil war to strengthen their grasp on
the Island of Java. But in some ,of these areas (and
this is beginning in Indonesia) there is some realization
that Communists more effective in wrecking an economy
than in making it work.
B.- In the economic field, at home,,
Soviet reorganizing and decentralizing its control of
industry and maintaining a high rate of national growth --
rate almost double that of ours but on a lower base.
Our absolute increase greater. But still their gross
national product is less than one-half of our own.
SEOVI