ALLEN W. DULLES NOTES FOR QUANTICO ADDRESS 20 JUNE 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 20, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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ALLEN W. DULLES
NOTES FOR
QUANTICO ADDRESS
20 June 1958
(1) Tough role of Intelligence. With a world bursting .at seams --
from Lebanon - Indonesia. And trying at same time solve
both terrestrial and outer space. (Trust can leave much of
latter to scientists but we must still monitor USSR activities
(2)
High recognition of Intelligence -- Have chance to sell our
wares to President, NSC, etc. Never before such interest.
British change-over to bring JIG under Cabinet -- following
our pattern.
(3) Intelligence mechanism -- From Mata Hari to machine age --
Radar -- Electronic Intelligence Intercepts.
Electronic computers can't prepare a national estimate or
gauge our dangers.
Sifting and appraisal process.
(4) I.A.C. -- Watch Committee -- Indications Center. Increasing
need of rapid communication Intelligence Info. (Cooperation
Military HQS abroad needed).
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(5) Intelligence team includes -- State - Military Services & JCS;
C.I.A. with assist from AEC and FBI.
(6) Vital role of Mil. Services -- Service attaches and Int. officers
in military commands abroad make great contribution.
Mil. attaches -- (not merely for battle order or disorder
and training) - Opportunity to learn about foreign countries
and personalities.
Burden of empire (without an empire) -- whether like it or not --
Need corps of pro-consuls (not to exercise authority of the old
but to help guide inefficient, incompetent new gov'ts).
Mil, men will take over larger role in these new countries.
They often represent element of stability in troubled areas.
Mil, attaches_ a.n:d. chiefs of MAAG missions -- Now working
with military men of other countries .who will be future leaders.
Must help build up leaders of free world -- (lost two - Magsaysay
and Castillo Armas).
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SECRET
(7) Intelligence appraisal. Past year a difficult one.
A. In the political field:- -
Soviet regained much of ground lost in Hungary,
consolidated position in most of satellites and East
Germany by ruthless methods (smacking of Stalinism).
Slowly trying bring Poland back into Communist fold.
(But this remains a tinderbox as Poles may resist total
loss of liberties they gained).
3.
In Europe: NATO allies divided by issues such as Cyprus,
Algeria. As to latter deGaulle first two weeks encouraging.
(Also Sov, over a barrel).
Also public opinion problem re missile bases.
In Middle East -- Communists are; backing nationalism
and Nasrism which has wide popular support even in
countries, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia where govts pro-West.
Lebanon -- undoubtedly backing _Syria in its covert support
of the rebels in the fighting. which partly a civil war and
partly covert external aggression.
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4.
In the uncommitted areas of Asia and Africa the Soviet
trade and subversive offensive is taking advantage of the
weak and inefficient governments which with inadequate
preparation, experience and skill are trying to make the
democratic processes work.
In Indonesia -- the Communists are partly taking
advantage of a civil war to strengthen their grasp on
the Island of Java. But in some of these areas (and
this is beginning in Indonesia) there is some realization
that Communists more effective in wrecking an economy
than in making it work.
B. In the economic field, at home,
Soviet reorganizing and decentralizing its control of
industry and maintaining a high rate of national growth --
rate almost double that of ours but on a lower base.
Our absolute increase greater. But still their gross
national product is less than one-half of our own.
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5.
C. In the agricultural field -- still suffering from the effects
of collectivization and has low rate of efficiency in comparison
with us. New measures ?-- make farmers into capitalists!!
D. In the military field -- estimate that with a GNP only, about
40% of ours they are nevertheless putting out an effort
roughly equivalent in value to our own in terms of
investment, manpower, materiel and research.
(EXPLAIN)
Emphasis on heavy industry and military hardware means
that although they have been able to increase somewhat
their standard of living, their per capita consumption
is only about one-fifth of our own - how long will the
Russian people tolerate this situation? Effect of
education and greater knowledge of outside world --
Can they return to Stalinism -- Y. S. situation.
Fj:
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6.
E. Basic Soviet aim in military field is to create a deterrent
as effective as the one we have possessed; to develop a
military capacity which would inhibit the U.S. from
using its military power.
Soviet leaders probably believe that, after long period
of inferiority during past decade, this goal in sight:
(a) They possess adequate nuclear weapons capability
but substantially less than our own.
Between now and mid-1960 they expect to have an
initial ICBM capability -- a moderate number of
heavy bombers supplemented by large number,
about 1,000, medium type bombers of the B-47 type;
useability (on a 'one-way mission) against the USA.
Big question: Will they try for super-sonic bomber?
SECRET
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7.
(b) Between 1960 and 1963 they will be shifting over
to a greater emphasis on missiles. Indications
are that they have drastically reduced (probably
temporarily ceased) production of heavy bombers
(BEAR and BISON-type).
? (c) In the submarine field with an existing fleet in
the neighborhood of 500 submarines, one-half of
which are modern, they have ceased production
of this type and appear to be starting a new series,
presumably some of which will be nuclear-powered
and probably with built-in missile capability.
(d) Retaining formidable capability in conventional
arms; modernization and streamlining their ground
forces continues. Some force reductions being
carried as they prepare for nuclear warfare.
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8.
(8) General conclusions: -
(1) That Soviet and Communist China does not desire to
initiate general war vs US in near future, say for next
five years, or to be drawn into one if they can avoid it.
(2) My view: - that Soviet would not risk even limited war
involving Soviet forces directly for fear it would not stay
limited. But might through indirect means foster limited
wars, particularly in ME or Asia, begun and run by others,
if it suited their interests.
(3) That Soviet will advance its policies, which remain unchanged,
Lenin-Stalin - by political and economic penetrations,
subversion and the like.
Foregoing: re no war
This is on assumption that we maintain our military deterrent
power; that no spectacular technical break-through in military
field; and finally that there is no serious miscalculation by Soviet
of our intentions to honor our commitments or of our ability to do so.
If this estimate correct, we must look forward to and prepare for
a prolonged and intensive period of cold war. Recent evidence
reversal to hard line attitude to YS - Nagy - Maleter.
Chicoms hard line.
o;fL,
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9.
(9) What weapons will the Soviet use:
A. Communist Party organizations on a world-wide basis
in the hard-core of the Communist apparatus. The popular
front technique; -- refer to Mikoyan at the 20th Party Congress
re Czechoslovakia.
B. Other front organizations; World Federation of Trade
Unions and control of major labor unions, viz., France,
Italy, Indonesia, Japan, women's organizations, student
and youth fronts, and the like.
C. A judicious supply of military equipment to weak governments
in Asia and Africa, particularly where prospects of upsetting
governments are good. Suborning of leaders of weak
countries. Use and abuse of the electoral process of the
democratic machinery of government in those areas where
democracy is young and vulnerable.
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SKR
10,
(10) To combat these techniques we must:
(A) Develop adequate intelligence regarding their techniques
and targets and key personnel of their subversive apparatus.
(B) Develop and indoctrinate real leaders wherever they can
be found and begin building for the future by building up
the younger men who are likely to become leaders in next
decade.
(C) Preparing ourselves to be ready to supply our friends and
allies, those willing to resist Communism with the proper
type of equipment in the. military field; in the field of
communications, as well as helping them to train them to
find and neutralize elements working for the Communists.
How will Joint Staff reorganization handle this?
SECRET
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SECRE'
11.
(11) Under existing authority and high-level decisions, some progress
has been made in these fields; however, much more remains to be done
and it will require a coordinated effort on the part of the Departments
of State, Defense, C.I.A.; USIA, and other agencies to develop
mechanisms adequate to meet the danger we face.
As a result of experience gained, we in C.I.A. are working on a
program for consideration with many of you to see that the great
potential assets available to this government are properly organized;
properly located logistically; and properly manned, -- to meet the
type of subversive warfare with which we are faced.
(0' vry
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