(SANITIZED)WALL ST. JOURNAL ARTICLE (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020066-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2014
• Sequence Number: 66
• Publication Date: March 29, 1961
• Content Type: LETTER

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr
2014/01/15: CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020066-9
Next 15 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr
2014/01/15: CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020066-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15: '
CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020066-9
,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Tuesday, November 15, 1960
,?-
?
Indonesia's Sukarnb
Adds More Trappings
0 f. Red Dictittrship
He Tightens Curbs ? on. Press,
Political ,Parties .but , Much.
Of Army Is Anti-Communist
? .
,
? i:,
By IGOR OGANESOFF .
i Staff Reporter of,Ths WALL STREET JOURNAL .
I i JAKARTA ? Sick joke, Indonesianstyle:
all activities, 'everything, with spirit, with
enthusiasm." '
' The developments in Indonesia are Impor-
tant to US. businessmen, who had an esti-
mated $163 million invested in Indonesia at the
beginning of this year. The American taxpayer
has a stake, too. In the period from December,
1sta, when inderiesta gained its independence
from the Netherlands, to last June 30, net U.S.
grants, credits and other aid to the new nation
'totaled about $250 million, including $40 million,
? in the year ended June ?30. These net figures
? take into account payments made by Indonesia
, on some U.S.' loans. ? ? . ?
An Instrument of Policy
. The Indonesian president ,is now busy or-
ganizing tbe National Front Party to 'fulfill a
Communisfaike role as an instrument of gov-
ernment policy. Specifically exempt from the
"One thing about Moechtar Lubis, you an current restraints on political activities, the
- ,always find him at home." - . ? I' , National Front is being assembled from mem-
' The unfortunate *Mr. Lubis, ,you see, ,has,'bers of the ruling N'ationalist Party (Mr.
-
been under house arrest for nearly' four years,' Sukarno's closest supporter), the politically
a victim of President Sukarno's "guided fuzzy Nahdatul Ulama Party, and a sympa-
? democracy." The handsome sik-footer, who has: thetic cross-section of occupational groups.
taken up oil painting and- woodworking in'his The Indonesian leader also likens what he
enforced seclusion, used to run the prominent calls the continuing Indonesian revolution to
Indonesia Raya, a newspaper which reflected: the Communist concept of constant revolution
(,Mr. Lubis' Views once too often in scathing' in building a Red society. The process here,
? ', states an Indonesian government communique
attacks on the Indonesian president.
Never died, the former ,editor now appears, issued a few weeks ago, involves "eradicating
to face' diminishing prospects for freedom.. all foreign concepts such as liberalism and
President Sukarno's rule of this richly-en.; opposition, so as to arrive at a just and pros-
dowed, tropical island republic of 98 million' perous society which is founded on the Political
inhabitants has:now taken on the trappings of Manifesto) and USDEK." c
a: totalitarian Communist state, though with' The former, often simply Called Manipol, a
the fangs filed down a bit. , . government spokesman informs one, is the
i The 58-year-old chief executive governs with: president's ' speech last year announcing the
a combination of semi-mystic ideology, his own reinstatement of the dictatorial 1945 constitu-
enormous personal magnetism, and his -con-
viction that any deviation from his personal
tion and the abolition of the elected parliament..
..
socialist concept . of running 'the nation ? iel:USDEK is an abbreviation standing for the.
i':un-Indone.sianq , a.nd,: dangerously . subversive.11945 constitution, Indonesian socialism', guided
Two Legislative Bodies . . , ? ? ? , democracy, guided economy and the Indonesian,
Witness these developments of the past 'ear: "identity." It's' all wrapped around the sym- ?
President Sukarno dissolved ` the elected bolic five principles of Pantja Sila as formu-'
parliament and created two new legislative lated by President Stiltarrio: Belief in the one
bodies whose" members are all appointed by Moslem god and in humanity, natiOnalism,,
.1
the president. One is the 283-delegate "Mutual* sovereignty of the people and social justice.
? Help" parliament, installed in June; the other:A vigorous program of popular indoctrination:
is the Peoples' Consultative Congress of 610 in Manipol and USDEK has been launched
seats which convened this month. Both contain through schools and goyernment Organs.
not only carefully selected members of friendly , Even at President Sukarno's big receptions
political parties, including the Communists, but in his white palace, where sparrows soar be-
also representatives of "functional groups": tween crystal chandeliers and the air is heavy
' The 'Indonesian army, labor, farmers, the with the aroma of spicy Indonesian cigarets,
Moslem clergy, artists and women's brganiza? this vaporous doctrine is the subject of an,
tions. They're expected to rubber-stamp pol- occasional, behind-the-hand snicker. Outside,
icies laid down by the cabinet.- ? criticism is more pointed. "When you look at,
, In mid-August, the president ordered the the way Sukarno is running tie country you
' dissolution' of the prominent opposition Masjumi know it's all nothing but words," snaps a youth-
(Moslem) Party and the small Indonesian So- ful Indonesian, insurance man.
, cialist Party on the grounds ,4that both had .A Mid-Day Break
? helped fan the 'unsuccessful 1958 military Sukarno's influence ranges far and wide.'
revolt in Sumatra against the Jakarta govern. Because downtown Jakarta appeared too de-
ment. The rebellion still, sputters on in central serted in the evening, he ordered stores to'
Sumatra and the Celebes in the form of weak remain open until eight o'clock, taking a four-
guerrilla activity, keeping'a large. segment of hour mid-day break. Couples out dancing at
, the loyalist Indonesian army tied clOwn, the fashionable, open-air Wisma Nusantara
? On September 13, Mr. Sukarno announced feel ?
a gentle tap on the shoulder from the
a ban on all political activities "by individuals manager if they swing into a jitterbug break:,
or groups" effective until. November 30. After the president finds such frivolous dancing dis-
'that date, political meetings or rallies will re-'tasteful.
;quire specific government approval. Formation ,
Despite the chief executive's open admira-
of new political 'parties has been prohibited ition for
the kructure of the Communist state,
since July 5, 1959. .
his relations with the Communist bloc are any-
And on November 1, the government issued g
n but warm. Mr. Sukarno Summarily
new regulations to put Indonesia's press under
'ordered the deportation of tens of thousands of
firm state control. Henceforth, articles critical
Chinese residents who 'controlled retailing in
.of Sukarno and his policies are forbidden. A.
rural areas. Red China's outraged official
'cabinet-level' committee has the right to sus- protests and propaganda blasts were ignored
pend publication of any paper that shuns gov- by Indonesian officials who carried out their
ernment "guidance." plan to the letter. Relations between the two
Not surprisingly, President Sukarno de- countries sank to a low early this year when
scribes his "guided democracy" as "somewhat the Red Chinese consul in east Borneo was
the same" as the government structure of
put briefly under house arrest for obstructing
Communist China? and the Soviet Union. Thethe ? . recen . wee s as
toured neutralist Indonesia,' exhibiting open
scorn for Indonesian handicrafts and culture
alike. The proud Indonesians made not the
slightest effort to ingratiate themselves with
the Soviet premier?but still won a $250 million
Russian economic credit.
But President Sukarno's relations with the
Indonesian Communist Party have been con-
spicuously close. The party has been careful
to support unwaveringly all Sukarno policies, ,
which has often placed the Reds in the positioni
of presidential allies. Though officials of the I
banned Masjumi and Socialist parties speak
bravely of continuing their struggle against the
present government underground, it's apparent ;
that the Communist Party, headed by English-
speaking D. N. Aidit, is the best organized te
exploit the iriolitical bans over the long haul.
And after November 30 it will be allowed once
More to function as a legal party, with roughly
a 25% representation in legislative,- bodies.
Economic Stagnation
On the Communists' side is the faet
that President Sukarno's ? preoccupation with
strengthening central political power and im-
planting socialism has led the eeonomy, rich
in rubber, oil, copra and mineral resources, to
stagnation and a standard of living lower than'
,before ',World War II., It's true, though, that
'economics in a backward ,land like Indonesia
often Is a minor factor in politics.
More important, much of Lt. General Abdul
Hans Nasution's 200,000-man Indonesian army
is strongly ,anti-Communist and views with
considerable misgivings President Sukarno's
constant flirtation with the Reds. Says a high-
ranking member of the defunct Socialist Party:
"The president considered us ,far more dan-
gerous than the Communists, something. the
army could never understand."
This politician, like some others, sees a
showdown ' ahead between Sukarno and the
'army over Communist influence. Though it's
'said that Gen. Nasution himself, a career-
officer, is loyal, to the president and finds the
idea of active opposition distasteful, other army
officers are impatient for a change. One pos-
sibility: A coup by junior commanders. ?
Sukarno's suspicion that his grip on Indo-
nesia may be slipping could easily account for
the trend toward totalitarian control. He found
'tangible evidence of top-level army dissent at,
a significant mid-September conference with
regional. commanders and the 38-man cabinet.
'Commanders Crack Down.
Alarmed at the presidential order dis-
solving the Masjumi and Socialist Parties,
army commanders in south Borneo, south
Sumatra a.nd the southern Celebes Islands took
it upon themselves to crack -down on Commun-
ist Party activities in their' regions in August
and September. At the September conference,
they demanded that the president uphold their
actions. Sukarno responded with the ban on
all political activities. But under army -pres-
sure, Red boss Aidit was called in for intensive
interrogation and the party's official organ,
Harian Rakjat, has been alternately suspended
and reinstated over the past few weeks.
For years now, Mr. Sukarno has been able
to hold a delicate balance of power between
the Communists and the Indonesian army. And
he remains the only real unifying force in the
nation. During his frequent overseas trips,
Jakarta politicians take to acrid squabbling
among themselves; only Sukarno can tame
,them, which he does on his return, to every-
one's obvious relief. "Sukarno's strength lies
in the weakness of his opponents," observes
a prominent anti-Sukarno politician. ?
"Sukarno has always believed God intended
him for power," dommerits S. Western diplomat
here. ."So he's convinced that anyone opposing
him is opposing Indonesia. And the many
Indonesians who regard him as their one and
only leader aren't at all sure he's wrong."
Yet it remains to be seen whether the gentle
Indonesian people will tolerate their spiritual
leader's depening plunge into undisguised
attractive feature of these countries, he says, Peiping softened its radio attacks on Indonesia. ,totalitarian' rule. ?
Is the single party, whose function is "to imbue
I.;ast spring, ? Soviet_ Premier Khrushchev
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15:
CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020066-9 _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15:
CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020066-9
Background of Elections
Japan's .Voting Rate
Turnout Big?Political Consciousness Low '
Japan Times
'Oct 26 1960
-MickYrOund of: Elections
. . . , .
, - _
not a- low rate. it was . also
coming' House of Representatives
, Back-stage. campaigning fsr the '
, election scheduled for Nov: 20 disclosed that those who are
have already entered the final Well conscisus of their role. aS,-
. 'stretch. Prospective candidates voters also show a high rate. ?
for the 'election ? have been con- t. The survey 'also indicated that,
ducting such drives for the past -higher voting rates were regi
five Months because the election
was anticipated just when ? the stered n urban centers than
,i
former I{ishi regime collapsed last be
communities. This can ;
July. For this. the coming elec- be interpreted to ' mean ? that
ton has been called a "marathon people with high political con-:
' election." The following is the ` -sciousness generally ' live in.,
first of a series subject of the . If : highly political-conscious
of articles to ap- . Urban.distriets.
pear 'on the -
' "Background of Japanese ,Elec.'t.
i
tions."?Editor persons really,
live in urban'
_i______ ' ? ?? ' ' ' centers and those .who are not
, ,
general election 'held on May
'last . 'conclusion can be drawn, 'that1
?
The voting rate 'for ,the .
22, 1938, hit a, postwar. ?recard 'in Japan the voters are. not
high of 76.99 per cent.. The. ;very politically. minded but
rate for women has also been their voting rate is high.
.II in the country
a strange
ye
This is because people in ru-
improving. ? . , ' / ral areas are More easily round-
The rate of invalid. ballots ; ed up for voting than those in
for the election,, meanwhile, was . urban centers.
0.73 per cent, the lowest 'since ',', .The people ? in rural corn:
the end of the War. ? ? -. ? Imunities generally%remain "feu-.
? The 'first ? five prefectures: 'dalistia" and "obedient" to au--
Which scored 'high voting rates' ' thority - as well as being co- -
in the election were. Gumma,, ,operative in "no-abstentihn
.Nagano, Yamagata,? Yamanashit. , drives" of local .bosses. They
and. Fukushima, while .those .are, moreover, liable to take
Whose 'rates- were low were joint action .as suggested by
Osaka; Kyoto, Tokyo, , Toku; ;the fact that "their ballots cen-
,shima ,and Hokkaido.
? l andi-
-
4.er mainly .
It is interesting that the, mi,h.. , ,
date and their voting rate is
, .
voting 'rates for elections oti , ?'"
various kinds in Japan are The Japanese system of vot-
v 'Ing, .needless to say, is based
;generally high as compared.
'on the''secret balloting' method.
with those of the ?United States. ,
. People in th'e country,' however,
? ;Japan's first postwar general' -if solicited by a. specific' can-
election held in 1947 registered didate to vote 'fOr him after
a comparative high voting" rate having been given a monetary
,of 7,2 per' cent. The rate has gift or ? entertained,, generally
. been improving since then. ..
. "become inclined to ? vote for
' In the United States, mean- him.
time,: the rate.has also been on, : . -Such a trend, - hoWever, is
the increase. Specifically, the, gradually lOsing ground. An
,rate came to 154' per cent in' old sayin still proves true,
,,1948, 63, per cent in 1952 and, however, that the Tories gain
"61 per cent in 1956. " These. :when the weather is, fine
,figures, however; 'are. notably and the. renovationistS gain
lower as compared. with those when it rains. -This ?means
'of Japan. . -that people in rural
West Germany,: Germany, on t other. ties tend to abstain from voting
* hand, maintains a high average: when 'it rains or blows arid
'-of 88 per cent. ? the Tories who generally have
i' ' These ' figures, however, do, 'their constituencies ? in such,
not directly indicate that the , areas suffer more or less from
,Japanese are moi-e election-con- -it, ,-
. .
' scious than the Americans be-- '. .
? % ihe't
cause there' are various diffe-
,Election ' strategists for
ences between the election and ? Torieso?therefbre, must bes'good
Japan Times
tries.
other systems of the two.coun- 1
. ? . weather forecastes. They must'
at the same lime be farm ex- Oct 23 1960
. .perts.
For the Tory election strate- Japanese, Sovieis
?? which chalked. up high -voting 'gists,' an election during the Condemn Treaty
rates and the rest low figures busy farming 'season must be l.../
. in the 1958 election, shows that
the rates Were high in prefep-'
tures where, there were no big
. cities. ? ?
. Such a trend,has been clear- t,
. ly indicated in all elections
' since ,the end of the war. ,
; A constituency-wise ? checkup 1
, Of voting rates for six postwar
'-general elections also' shows t
.. that the abstention ? rate was
- low in constituencies in rural '
. areas and high in urban cen-?
? ters.
.
i A survey Conducted in, the,
. United . States revealed , that
1 voters taking interest in pond.,
: cal affairs usually show' a high-
' voting rate, while those. who do l
Party Preferences
Choice Depends' on Education, 'Age
This is the second of a series
on the background of Japanese
elections.?Editor
. Figures of the Statistical
Research Institute show that
voters' preferences of political
'parties depend largely on their
age and education. This sug-
gests that the choice of parties
changes according to increasing
of 'age. The following are the
results of the checkup made by
the same institute in November
'1958 and November 1959.
by the 20-24 group.. Voters who
show the deepest interest are
between 35 and 40.
Occupation-wise, factory work-
ers and clerks show the
lowest interest, whereas those
engaged in specialized work and
sales show higher interest.
. From the above figures and
facts, we may derive the con-
clusion that conservative in-
clined voters turn out in larger'
numbers than progressive party'
supporters. It was believed
, Rate of party preference by age and education
Education Age Liberal-Democratic Party Socialist Party
Elementary & 0'
junior' 29 42
High school graduates 30-39 39%
\ 40 up 72%
High school graduates 20-29 38%
30-39 44%
. 62%.,
33%
69%
75%
40 up
College graduates 20-29
30-39
40 up
According to the above table,
those who have received college
education are largely' sympa-
thetic to the progressive parties
during their 20s but as they
grow older. they begin to sup-
port the conservative party.
;. Voters with less education,
too, support the progressive
parties in their youth but they
?'differ from college graduates in
that their switch to the con-
servatives takes place at an
older age. If any generaliza-
tion may be made, it is that.
' there is a swing of votes to the
conservative party with the
advancing age of the voters. '
The institute estimates that
an average, well-educated man
undergoes this "conversion" at
the age of 35 years. In the case
? of women of similar educational
' background, the age is between
25-30.
.? According to the institute's
'statistics on voters' turnout,' the
lowest is recorded by those in
the 25-29 age bracket followed.
For . example,' a glance at the
aforesaid 10 prefectures, .half of
?
?,
.)11%
61%
28%
62%
56%
38%
67%
31%
25%
that the younger generation and
factory workers were more
enthusiastic about politics than
the, older generation .and store
workers: But as the fact
stands, it poses a great problem
for the progressive parties in
collecting more votes.
Another point that should be
noted is that urban dwellers.
whose turnout is lower than
that of the rural population,
constitute a large number of
"floating votes."
By dividing these \votes
equally among the candidates
the actual number of votes to
be garnered by each candidate
can be estimated, the, institute
says. There seems to be a -law
that floating votes are shared
equally, among the different
candidates. - This, in turn,
means that the relatively well-
educated population of urban'
areas are surprisingly "flexible"
in their political inclinations.
In the preceding installment
of this series, we noted that the
high turnout of the rural
.population is accounted for by
the fact that farmers and fisher-
men are "mobilized" to the.
polls.
But now we must admit that
the middle class city residents,
too, are quite indifferent to
elections. It seems that we
have a long way to go to get
the Japanese public interested
in politics?an important re-
quirement for maintaining a
parliamentary system of govern-
ravoided at' all costs if ,they MOSCOW (UPI)?Delegations ment.
, want a good turn, out of of Afro-Asian solidarity corn-
voters and 'more ? voters. for mittees of 'Japan and the Soviet
,the conservatists. 'Union have issued a. joint state-
The coming.. tower House merit condemning the Japanese-
'election was* originally sched-
uled. for Sunday, Nov. 27, but
4 was later advanced ,to Sun-
'day, Nov. 20.' The Govern-
ment's ? action incurred stiff ola- _
jection ?? of the ?? conservative,
forces in western Japan be-
- cause the election date falls on,
the rice-harvesting ',period in
-that district. ?
?
Thtis;I:in japan 'The &green
of the, 4reople'4' colf=1.1
sciouSness and the yoting rate
do not stay. on , properly re.
,lated levels. ? ?
?
American military treaty, Tass
reported Friday.
Tass said the Japanese delega-
tion was headed by Taketo
Makinouchi. '
44
- ? The greater the effort to in-
Crease the voting rate, t e
lower becomes the rate, oftgb
,untary Voting. ?, Drives1.-,agaili. ,
'abstentions Ordhe 'mere "nround-
ing urp'.!? of?voters seem to ham-
per' the normal turn out, of
voters. .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15:
CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020066-9
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15:
CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020066-9
R
Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15:
CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020066-9