AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 20, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate ot 1. arp
Intelligence
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Afghanistan Situation Report
20 November 1984
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
FOOD PRICES IN KABUL
The average price of basic food items in Kabul is 16 percent
higher this year than two years ago.
ARAB DELEGATION ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE INSURGENT DISUNITY
Resistance leader Sayyaf closed his Peshawar office following the
efforts of a delegation from Saudi Arbia, Kuwait, and the UAE to
reconcile dissension among the resistance groups.
IN BRIEF
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PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN:
ATTRITION OR CONSOLIDATION
NEW WRINKLES IN SOVIET STRATEGY
The Soviets are shifting from a stragegy of attrition toward
consolidation in Afghanistan.
SOVIET TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGIC CONTINUITY
Soviet resources in Afghanistan are too limited to implement a broad
consolidation strategy in the near term.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
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FOOD PRICES IN KABUL
Market surveys taken by US Embassy officers during October of
this year indicated that the average price of basic food items in
Kabul is about 16 percent higher than two years earlier. Prices
for bread, flour, sugar, and tea were essentially unchanged, but
vegetable oil and lamb prices increased by 64 percent and 29
percent, respectively.
Comment:
The average annual price increase for food of about 8 percent
is modest given the war situation and generally indicates that
food supplies are adequate, at least in Kabul. The Soviets have
made sizable food deliveries to Kabul to help to ensure that a
degree of normality exists in the Afghan capital. Moreover, food
prices for many in the capital are heavily subsidized by the
government which has its costs underwritten by Soviet financial -
assistance. Surveys taken in provinces outside Kabul, however,
indicate prices for food staples have risen by more than 25
percent annually in most areas over the past two years, although
no faster than non?food items.
ARAB DELEGATION ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE RESISTANCE DISUNITY
In mid?October, a delegation from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
the United Arab Emirates met with at least four leaders of the
fundamentalist alliance in Peshawar in an attempt to reconcile ?
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growing dissension among the groups
Resistance leaders are upset with Abdul Sayyaf, who
formed his own group after being selected to head the alliance
earlier this year. Sayyaf is also accused by other
fundamentalists of misappropriating funds. A week after the
delegation left, Sayyaf announced he was closing his group's
office.
IN BRIEF
Comment
Sayyaf's decision to close his party office probably was made
at the request of the delegation. It may be a sign that he will
devote more energy to the alliance itself. Even so, squabbling
among the Peshawar resistance leaders over distribution of funds
and other issues will probably continue.
-- On 15 November the UN General Assembly passed a resolution
calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan by
a 119 to 20 vote. Last year, 116 nations voted in favor; 114
backed the appeal two years ago.
-- Two Soviet Army deserters from Afghanistan who resettled in
Britain this past summer voluntarily returned to the USSR on 11
November, according to press reports. The US Embassy in
Islamabad reports this incident has infuriated Afghan resistance
leaders and upset Pakistan officials involved in exfiltration
matters.
insurgents in Kabul
assassinated the head of security for the Afghan Ministry of the
Interior and attempted to kill a deputy minister in the same
organization.
small insurgent bands regularly cross into the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan to rest
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PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN: ATTRITION OR CONSOLIDATION?
The two perspectives this week discuss Soviet military strategy in
Afghanistan. The first author views counterinsurgency strategies as a
spectrum with attrition on one end and consolidation on the other. He
contends the Soviets may be shifting from a predominantly attrition
strategy toward consolidation. The authors of the second perspective
argue that Soviet strategy has always been based on both attrition and
consolidation, but that resources have been too limited to consolidate
effectively. The two strategies are not mutually exclusive and neither
perspective argues that the Soviets have, or will, follow a strategy
based solely on attrition or consolidation.
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PERSPECTIVE
NEW WRINKLES IN SOVIET STRATEGY
Soviet counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan have incorporated
features of two basic strategies--attrition and consolidation--with
emphasis on attrition. Recent developments in the Pan jsher Valley,
however, suggest a shift toward consolidation. Such a shift could work
to the insurgents disadvantage without entailing a greater long?term
commitment of Soviet forces or provoking a more strident worldwide
condemnation of the USSR. More Soviet troops, however, would probably
be needed in the short term until Afghan units are properly trained and
more effective.
Strategic and Tactical Experimentation
Despite modifications of their tactics, the Soviets have pursued an -
attrition strategy over the past five years. They have also used some
elements of a consolidation strategy such as attempting to divide and
weaken the resistance through bribes and to win popular support through
propaganda and economic aid. Such efforts increased appreciably under
Andropov but still OCCUPV only a secondary place in overall Soviet
strategy.
The heavy reliance on attrition has brought the Soviets little
success so far. An intensification of this strategy might make it more
successful, but this option probably is unpalatable to Moscow. Massive
reinforcement? ? 300,000 to 400,000 troops?would substantially raise
military, political, and economic costs and diminish Soviet global
military preparedness. In particular, more aggressive attrition tactics
would raise the Soviet casualty rate, something the Soviet leadership
wishes to avoid for domestic reasons.
In theory, Moscow could gain much by changing the emphasis to
consolidation:
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-- Although the Soviets would have to increase their force levels
in the near term so that Afghan units could be withdrawn from
combat and garrison duties for extensive training, these
additional troops could be withdrawn once Afghans were able to
take over the major burden of the struggle.
-- By deemphasizing the more brutal aspects of Soviet activities
in Afghanistan and lowering the Soviet profile in the long run,
the Soviets would dampen international condemnation of their
policy.
-- If the Soviets can deny territory to the insurgents,
particularly areas that have long been considered resistance
strongholds, they would create a perception of their own
capability and of Afghan regime legitimacy that likely would
lessen foreign materiel and diplomatic support for the
insurgents, albeit gradually.
Indications of Change
The Soviet offensive last spring in the Panjsher Valley was patterned
after the three preceding campaigns, all of which were consistent with
an attrition strategy. The Soviets clearly were more determined to
consolidate their hold in this seventh attempt to secure the valley than
in earlier attempts, however:
-- Soviet garrisoning of the valley has been much more extensive
than in previous campaigns.
the Kabul regime is trying--so
far with little success--to resettle areas with civilians loyal
to the regime or hostile to the Panjsher resistance fighters.
The Soviet consolidation effort in the Panjsher may be an exception,.
ref lecting the valley's unique strategic importance. If, however, the
most recent developments point to a shift in Soviet strategy, we would
expect to see some of the following indicators, first in the Panjsher
Valley:
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-- Continued reinforcement of garrisons and improved security for
lines of communication.
-- Less aggressive use of airpower to limit civilian casualties
and collateral damage.
-- Small?scale operations to clear additional areas and establish
new garrisons.
-- Small?unit patrolling to maintain contact with the populace.
-- Redoubled efforts to resettle the valley.
-- Extensive rebuilding of the valleys infrastructure.
-- Increased intelligence targeting against civilians with
relatively less against the insurgents.
Indicators of a shift in? other parts of the country could include:
-- Operations that resemble the gamut of operations in Panjsher
VII.
-- Continued strong defense of strategic urban areas accompanied
by small?scale offensive operations against targets of
opportunity to keep insurgents off balance.
-- A decrease in the overall number of Soviet offensive
operations, accompanied by concerted campaigns against strategic
areas throughout the country.
-- A greater Soviet role, in the short term, in combat and
garrison duties so that Afghan units can be withdrawn for
training purposes.
-- Stepped?up efforts to divide insurgent forces through bribes,
ceasefires, and promises of a greater share of the political
spoils in Afghanistan.
-- An increase in the numbers of students or officials sent to
the USSR for training, especially training that improves KHAD's
capabilities.
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-- A more concerted effort to turn the Afghan ruling party into a
viable political organization and a plausible representative of
Afghan nationalism.
Implications
We believe that a Soviet shift toward a consolidation strategy would
appreciably increase their effectiveness against the resistance. The
insurgents, if denied access to territory vital to their economic and
cultural well?being, would most likely be unable to continue effectively
an insurgency rooted in tribal structures and organization. Efforts by
the insurgents to develop a more modern, politically organized
insurgency--such as that used by the Viet Cong--would be a radical
departure. The insurgents could continue to operate as isolated bands,
harassing Soviet and regime forces from the most inaccessible areas of
Afghanistan, but such harassment would be less of an overall threat to
the Soviets.
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PERSPECTIVE
SOVIET TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGIC CONTINUITY
We reject the contention in the preceding perspective that the
Soviets thus far have considered the consolidation of the Kabul regime's
political position to be of secondary importance. It is, in fact, the
primary reason the Soviets are in Afghanistan.
We judge that resource constraints on Soviet commanders rather than
policy preference have determined the degree to which they could pursue
attrition and consolidation objectives. Low force levels in Afghanistan
have made it difficult to secure and hold territory, making the Soviets
concentrate on temporarily clearing key areas and inflicting casualties
on insurgents. The Soviets nonetheless recognize that they are involved
in a political as well as a military struggle and have complemented
their military efforts whenever possible with economic, educational,
governmental, and propaganda programs designed to consolidate Communist
rule.
Before the Panjsher VII campaign, the Soviets were already pursuing
the policies that have been identified as indicators- of a shift in
strategy.
-- Soviet and Afghan forces have def ended strategic urban areas
and mounted limited attacks against targets of opportunity. The
Soviets evidently hope that improved intelligence will allow more
effective strikes against such targets.
-- The Soviets and the Afghan regime were trying to divide the
insurgents through bribery and offers of ceasefires from the time
of the invasion and have particularly pursued such efforts since
1981.
-- Soviets have long planned to train as many Afghan students and
officials as possible in the USSR in order to develop a loyal
indigenous base. Soviet training was significant before the
Communist coup in 1978 and has increased steadily since.
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-- The Soviets have also emphasized efforts to turn the Afghan
ruling party and armed forces into effective organizations.
We see nothing to indicate that Soviet commanders are contemplating a
basic change in strategy.
The difficulties of shifting more to a consolidation strategy argue
against it.
-- We judge that the Afghan Army will not be able to shoulder a
greater portion of the war effort for the foreseeable future.
The Soviets are increasing their role in combat operations not to
allow more training for Afghan units, but because even the best?
trained Afghans have proven ineffective.
-- The small base of support-for the ruling party in Kabul and
its deep internal rivalries make it a poor vehicle for
consolidating control.
-- The government has little to offer most Afghans. Central
government programs--whether or not Communist?inspired--are
unwelcome in most rural areas. Moreover, government control is
so tenuous in most rural areas that Kabul is not in a position to
offer the local population a share of the economic or political
spoils.
In our view, the Soviets can begin to deal with basically political
problems only when they have some degree of military control in an area.
In order for the Soviets to implement a broad consolidation strategy in
the near term, we estimate that they would have to substantially
increase their forces in Afghanistan to take and hold more territory
long enough to change popular attitudes or to deny the insurgents
support. This would require a dramatic change to the economy?of?force
approach the Soviets have followed thus far, and would be no "cheaper"
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than any large reinforcement undertaken in support of an intensified
attrition strategy. ,
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