AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 6, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005X1
0a4t,,, Directorate of 1 Orgjeent?
If Intelligence
25X1
Cd
Afghanistan Situation Report
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
6 Novem1;er 1984
Copy n
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 5X1
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
SAUDIS VIEW INSURGENT DISUNITY
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud asserted that the Afghan insurgents'
lack of unity has little impact on their effectiveness.
IN BRIEF
PERSPECTIVES
THE WAR IN OCTOBER
The Soviets continued efforts to block insurgent infiltration
from Pakistan and began another offensive in the Panjsher Valley.
AFGHANISTAN: PRELIMINARY 1984 CROP ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED AREAS
Adverse weather has reduced this year's grain crop in
Afghanistan's principal farming region, but military operations
have had no significant effect on grain production except in the
Pan jsher Valley.
1
2
3
9
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 )5x1
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
ii
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 15X1
60 -\\11r5ench
Bukhar
Chardz
Karshi
Jeyr .an
yvadz ,K0
ari-e
IShehergha
JOWZJAN1BALKH hZ
? iv,.
? j ?emangti
iMaymayli 5AMANGAN/'
I ? 1?.g.1,1 FraB - ????,1:
owragho
shabadiL4
1.?
hrd...riter72? 4
i IS Ot.
ARHA
?
/Pik' Pealiawar 9
atich'inhikhrb P999 IslA hbi I
V
alpindi
Jammu
,???a
andahar
QANDA AR;
Afghanistan
741', 1.1 we'n, MilrZ1*
Nok'Kundi
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
0 Province capital
Railroad
Road
0 DO 100 150 200 Kilometers
800084 1-84
Boundery repreeentotion
not necoshirji uthoritalive ?Orti
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84- 10196CX
25X1
III
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 15X1
SAUDIS VIEW INSURGENT DISUNITY
Saudi told US officials that the Afghan
insurgents' lack of military coordination and political unity
have no significant effect on their ability to operate
effectively. Saud said that the issue of unity should be
addressed by international supporters sending aid through a
single channel. Another Saudi Foreign Ministry official told US
officials that the greatest amount of Saudi assistance goes to
Afghan fundamentalist leader Sayyaf "because he has the most
support among Afghans."
the Saudis continue to aid other resistance groups,
including the moderates.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
25X1
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 15)(1
IN BRIEF
Comment
assertion that lack of unity has no noteworthy effect
may be designed to forestall any charges that aid to ' Sayyaf has
increased rivalries in Peshawar. The Saudis have told resistance
leaders that greater unity is a prerequisite to increased aid.
Saudi assistance has been channeled through Sayyaf ? ?perhaps the
least popular of the Peshawar leaders--because of his support for
Wahhabi missionary work among Afghans. Some Saudi aid, in any
case, is likely to continue to flow to any militarily effective
group.
-- According to US Embassy reports, the Kabul regime has gone out
of its way to express sympathy over the death of Indira Gandhi,
but privately many nonofficial Afghans are pleased by her death
and hope Indian policy on Afghanistan will become less supportive
of Moscow.
2
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
?
25X1
25X1 ,
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 25X1
PERSPECTIVE
THE WAR IN OCTOBER
The level of combat in Afghanistan dropped during the first half of
October but increased again after mid?month,
This surge reflects the continued high
priority they are giving to blocking guerrilla infiltration. Soviet and
regime forces began another offensive in the Pan jsher late in October.
Sizable
successful so far
Soviet and Afghan air and ground efforts have not been
in either locating or engaging the insurgents.
1
Soviet Reinforcements and Rotations
Diplomatic sources in Kabul allege that the Soviets have recently
undertaken a major augmentation ? of their forces in Afghanistan.
there was only a modest increase of Soviet
troop strength in Afghanistan in October:
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
6 November 1984
NESA M 84 ?10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 -!5X1
Military Operations
Nangarhar, Paktia, and Lowgar
Soviet and regime forces conducted several operations against the
guerrillas in the border provinces east of Kabul? ?Nangarhar, Paktia, and
Lowgar? ?in another attempt to stem infiltration:
-- Major joint?service operations in the Jalalabad area of Nangarhar
be an on 13 October.
Because of the particularly rugged terrain, the
Soviets expected that the effectiveness of their air and artillery
strikes would be limited.
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
6 November 1984
NESA M 84 ?10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 5x1
-- According to the US Embassy, the Soviets terminated the sweep
activity in Lowgar that began in late August or September without
achieving their objectives. The road from Kabul to Gardez in Paktia
remains as hazardous as ever for supply convoys, and the insurgents
used the opportunity provided by Soviet forces staging out of Kabul
to increase their own operations south of the city. The US Embassy
estimates that perhaps as many as 400 people, mostly women and
children, were injured during the fighting.
The Pan jsher Valley
Operations in the Pan jsher Valley reemerged as a focus of the
counterinsurgency campaign in October.
This buildup of troops in the Pan jsher was anticipated by Afghan
insurgents, who believe the Soviets are planning a major winter
offensive in the valley. Heretofore, the Soviets have not conducted a
major counterinsurgency operation in the Pan jsher after mid?November
because the harsh winter weather makes movement in the valley extremely
difficult
Early in the month, sources of the US Embassy claimed that the
Soviets had renewed an offer of a truce in the Panjsher to guerrilla
leader Masood. Terms of the proposal reportedly called f or the Soviets
to withdraw from the valley in exchange for a standdown of attacks on
convoys traveling on the road from Kabul to the Soviet border. Soviet
and East European sources intimated to US Embassy personnel that the
USSR had no intention of voluntarily abandoning an area which it has
expended so much effort to try to control. As for the guerrillas, they
saw few benefits from respecting a truce in that strategically important
area of Afghanistan.
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
6 November 1984
NESA M 84 ? 10297CX
SOVA M 84 ? 10196CX
25X1
25X1
')cY1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 15X1
Kabul
Insurgent operations in the Kabul metropolitan area slowed early in
October as the result of increased Soviet defensive measures that
entailed stationing armored forces between Bini Hisar and Kabul airport,
strafing nearby villages, and conducting aggressive searches in central
and outlying districts. House?to?house searches by the Soviets in the
Shewaki area of Kabul uncovered a large cache of rockets, which regime
authorities later determined had been pilfered from an army arsenal.
The insurgents' activities in Kabul in October underscored the
Soviets' persistent inability to secure the capital and its environs.
Even during the quietest periods last month, the guerrillas continued to
flaunt their ability to penetrate the Soviet defenses in the Kabul area
by assassinating a group of KHAD personnel, attacking Bala Hissar, and
striking the Bagrami textile mill.
Some of the sharpest reminders of the enduring guerrilla presence
were provided by rocket attacks on the city. In the second week of
October, the guerrillas struck the Wazi Akhbar Khan neighborhood?the
site of Radio Afghanistan, the major ORA military hospital, the Ariana
Hotel, and the homes of several high?ranking officials. That district
again came under fire in late October, when other sections of eastern
Kabul also were targeted.
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
25X1
es
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 ?5X1
The guerrillas demonstrated that the skies over Kabul are unsafe by
striking Soviet aircraft, probably with SA-7s. According to the US
Embassy, an MI-8 and an MI-6 were hit during daylight hours on 25
October. The MI-6, which has a troop capacity of 65, crashed shortly
after being hit, whereas the MI-8 continued flying for a while before
exploding in mid?air.
So far, the. -
insurgents have claimed relatively few Soviet and regime aircraft with
SA-7s, but the guerrillas' increased training and experience with the
missle system may now be yielding results.
Kabul's electric power problems eased temporarily last month.
According to the US Embassy, sections of Kabul that were without
electricity in September began receiving power for as much as 18 hours a
day by the second week of October. The insurgents' destruction of more
pylons between Sorubi and Kabul interrupted power supplies in mid?month,
but most of Kabul had electricity during the evening by the end of
October.
Outlook
The guerrillas almost certainly will be able to thwart the Soviets'
recent campaign to curtail sharply their activities in the border area.
They are more knowledgeable of trails and passageways in the mountainous
border area and probably will continue to be able to evade successfully
enemy search parties. Soviet and regime forces lack sufficient manpower
to keep constant watch on the numerous routes to- and from Pakistan.
The Soviets' renewed offensive in the Panjsher also seems doomed to ?
have disappointing results for Moscow. Once again, the guerrillas were
prepared for the assault and had taken appropriate defensive measures.
Even if Soviet and regime forces prolong their occupation in the
southern part of the valley, they will not have succeeded in eradicating
guerrilla activity in the Panjsher. So far, the Soviets have not made
preparations suggesting they intend to press the campaign against the
insurgents in the valley throughout the difficult winter.
7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA NI 84-10196CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4_5x1
PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN: PRELIMINARY 1984 CROP ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED AREAS
A preliminary assessment of three crop areas in Afghanistan (the
northern plains, the Panjsher Valley, and Herat Province) indicates that
this year's grain crop has suffered damage from adverse weather and that
military operations have not had a significant effect on production
except in the Panjsher Valley. Based on
meteorological data, we estimate that drought conditions in the
northern plains--Afghanistan's principal dry land farming region--caused
a 30 percent downturn in grain production there. Fighting in the
Panjsher Valley--which has already experienced a major population
exodus--has either destroyed or led to the abandonment of about 75
percent of the grainfields in that region. Grain output in Herat .was
virtually unaffected by the heavy military activity and is estimated to
be about the same as in 1983. Together, these three areas accou7 for
roughly a quarter of the annual grain harvest
Available meteorological data for the current crop season--although
generally sparse and incomplete--indicates that snowfall was sufficient.
last winter to ensure adequate irrigation supplies. In the northern
plains region, however--where virtually all of the nonirrigated crops
are grown--rainfall during the critical February?to?April period was
less than 50 percent of normal. Rain occurred only on 17 days compared
to the average of 35 days.
Most serious food shortages in the past have resulted from drought?
induced crop shortfalls in the dry land agricultural regions. Drought
not only reduces grain production drastically, but also desiccates the
grazing pastures used by the nomadic herdsmen who make up approximately
10 percent of the total population. When this occurs, the farmers and
herdsmen face possible starvation because they typically reside in
remote regions with poor transportation and food distribution systems.
Previous food aid has usually gone to the cities first even though the
major need was in the remote countryside areas.
9
neclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 15X1
Crop Assesssment of Selected Areas
Northern Plains.
major drought damage to most of the dry land crops here.
Compared with 1983, we estimate that grain yields in the western portion
of the region in the vicinity of Meymaneh? ?f ell by nearly two?thirds,
while those in the east--near Gonduz and Talogan? ?were reduced by about
one?third. In the central portion of the region--south of Mazer ?e
Sharif ? ?yields are likely' to be similar to last year. As a result, we
estimate overall dry land grain yields this year to be nearly 30 percent
smaller than the slightly above?average yields estimated for 1983. A
drop of this magnitude would pose a threat of serious food shortages in
the hardest hit areas.
Pan jsher Valley..
Soviet and Afghan military operations caused the destruction or
abandonment of about -75 percent of the grainf ields in the valley. Such
losses will have little impact on total Afghan grain output this year
because the valley is only a minor grain producing region. Even so,
they almost certainly will be devastating to the remaining people.
Since 1979, more than half of the population has fled the area because
of repeated Soviet attacks,
We estimate that two?thirds of the damage is a direct result of the
fighting.
If the
Soviets are deliberately destroying crops in the Pan jsher Valley, they
probably intend stripping Masood's insurgents of their agricultural base
in this strategic region.
Considerable damage was also caused by armored vehicle trackage,
construction of military bivouac areas, bomb blasts, and artillery
shelling. The heavy military activity also led to sizable abandonment
as many villagers appeared to have fled the valley.
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4 15X1
Herat Province.
little, if any, change in grain
production between 1983 and 1984. A reduction in the amount of
irrigation water available from the Harirud River probably was offset by
a slight expansion in the area sown to grain this year. Despite heavy
military activity in the province, there was no evidence of deliberate
crop burning or destruction of irrigation systems. Damage caused by
armored vehicle tracks, bomb craters, and artillery shells is estimated
at less than one percent of the crop areas
6 November 1984
NESA M 84-10297CX
SOVA M 84-10196CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4
Top Secret
25X1
0
Top Secret
a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03: CIA-RDP96R01136R001302320005-4