ARAB POLITICS: FROM DORMANCY TO DYNAMISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700370001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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? DATE
DOC NO /VES4 g7-200
OIR
P & PD I
Central Intelligence Agency
,
VVashington, IA C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 June 1987
Arab Politics: From Dormancy to Dynamism
Summary
Arab political maneuvering has intensified in recent
months, as key regional players share a perception of
movement on an Arab-Israeli peace process and the
Iran-Iraq war. Moderate Arab efforts to narrow rifts
within the Arab world, craft a joint Arab position on
arrangements for an international peace conference, and
strengthen Iraq's position vis-a-vis Iran are gaining
momentum and meeting with some success. Some of the
political shifts that have made this possible
--particularly Syrian policy adjustments--may be onlu
temporary, however, and are subject to reversal.
The moderates are pressing their diplomatic campaign
despite continuing fundamental disagreements, within and
between Arab and Israeli sides, over the modalities of an
international conference and the central issues of land
and peace. Moderate Arab leaders appear to view Israel' s
political deadlock and the PLO's unyielding rhetoric less
as causes for despair than as challenges to try harder to
achieve an Arab consensus on a negotiating formula.
Meanwhile, Soviet activism in the region has created
the perception among Arab leaders that Moscow has been
responsible for many recent political developments. The
enhanced Soviet involvement complgments some short-term
US objectives but raises the prospect that Soviet
influence in the Middle East will continue to grow.
This memorandum was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 17 June 1987 was used in
its preparation. r
NESA M 87-20064
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The strength and durability of these trends are
uncertain. Still, we believe there is a good chance of the
following developments over the next six months:
--Increased cooperation among Arab states on the Gulf war
and on convening an international conference on the
Arab-Israeli conflict, with Syria refraining from
obstructionism.
--Convening of a regular Arab Summit, with endorsement of a
coordinated Arab position on arrangements for a peace
conference.
--Further strengthening of Iraq's political position
vis-a-vis Iran.
--Expansion of moderate Arab relations with Moscow,
allowing the moderates increasingly to play the Soviet
card to gain US cooperation.
Shifting Arab Fortunes
Narrowing Rifts. As a result of a recent easing of Arab tensions, the moderate
Arabs probably sense an opportunity to make progress toward convening an international
conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict and increase pressure on Tehran to end the
Iran-Iraq war. US Embassy reporting, King
Hussein's visits to Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, and Riyadh have been aimed at healing
Arab fractures, broadening Arab support for Iraq, and laying the groundwork for an Arab
League summit meeting, where a unified Arab position on a formula for an international
peace conference could be adopted.
Arab bickering has prevented the convocation of an Arab summit since the Fez
meeting in 1982. The Saudis--as designated host for the next summit and natural
conciliators--have led occasional efforts to reconcile Arab differences sufficiently to
convene a successful meeting. Now joined by King Hussein, these efforts have gained
momentum. The urgency of these efforts derives from the moderates' desire to maintain
movement toward an international peace conference, exploit increased Soviet activity in
the region, and avoid being caught flatfooted in the face of unfolding developments in the
Iran-Iraq war.
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--US Embassay reporting indicates that King Hussein and President Mubarak
are working on lining up Syrian support for a negotiating strategy;
Amman and Cairo plan to seek written Syrian commitments on
conference modalities within the next several weeks.
--Egypt's relations with other Arab states have steadily improved over the
past year. At the Islamic Summit in January--the most recent high-level
regional forum--Egyptian President Mubarak was widely acknowledged as
the star of the show. Assad held discussions with Mubarak--the first
meeting between Syrian and Egyptian leaders since Cairo's estrangement
from the Arab world following the signing of the Camp David Accords in
1978.
--King Fahd brokered a Moroccan-Algerian summit in April.
he two countries probably will exchange
ambassadors and normalize relations by early July, although apparently
no progress was made on the Western Sahara conflict.
--Moroccan and Syrian officials have initiated exploratory talks on the
possibility of restoring full diplomatic relations
Moderate Influence and Radical Weakness. The success of moderate Arab efforts
derives in part from economic woes that have increased the appeal of Gulf aid and other
financial inducements. We believe Syria's less strident positions reflect, in part, an
attempt to play all sides for economic gain. Meanwhile, the Gulf states resumed aid to
Egypt over the past year--an important step in Egypt's gradual reintegration--out of
concern that economic problems in Egypt were leading to political instability and that
Iraqi military setbacks might require closer security ties to Cairo.
Radical states in the region have also been weakened by a variety of other
developments: Syria's problems in Lebanon and with the PLO, Libya's misadventures in
Chad, Iran's inability to effect significant change in the Gulf war, and South Yemen's
preoccupation with internal strife. All these states have been condemned internationally
as supporters of terrorism. Syria, Libya, and Iran have been further weakened by
bickering among themselves, particularly over policies in Lebanon, where there is a
continuing risk of a showdown between Syria and the Iran-backed Hizballah.
The Islamic Summit highlighted the relative strength of the moderates. Iran sent no
delegation because of opposition to its position on the war. Syrian President Assad
showed up in return for Gulf Arab financial aid, but he was overshadowed by Mubarak.
Libya's delegation, minus Qadhafi, faced tough arguments from the Arabs and Africans on
Chad.
Syria's Pivotal Role. Damascus has been the linchpin of Arab relationships in recent
years; its rejectionist positions have been largely responsible for the gridlock in Arab
politics. We believe Syria's current political isolation and economic weakness are pushing
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Damascus to adopt a less strident regional stance, with primary examples being Syria's
/
more flexible posture toward Iraq
/Syria could substantially reduce its isolation and
receive a Saudi payoff by coming back into the Arab fold on the Iran-Iraq war issue; Syria
is not blocking Arab League efforts to garner support for UN sanctions against Iran. Iraq,
for its part, wants to break the Syrian-Iranian alliance and attain more unanimous Arab
support in the war.
The trend in improved Syrian-Iraqi relations, however, is tenuous at best. Assad
probably does not want to break relations with Iran, and he remains a bitter enemy of
Saddam Husayn. Moreover, reduced tension between Hizballah and Syrian forces in
Lebanon would reduce Syria's willingness to break with Iran and improve ties to Iraq. A
Syrian reconciliation with the PLO would significantly increase Assad's overall bargaining
position with the moderates and would encourage him to resort to obstructionism on the
Gulf war as well as Arab-Israeli issues.
Iraqi Question Mark. A wild card in the shifting radical-moderate balance is Iraq.
Formerly a staunch member of the radical camp, Iraq's more moderate stance in recent
years has been driven by its reliance on Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the small Gulf
states for support in the war. While the Baathist regime in Baghdad is not about to
abandon either its leftist ideology or its aspirations to assume the leadership of the Arab
world, we believe the Iraqi position on an Arab-Israeli peace conference would be to
support Jordan over the PLO--if an accommodation could not be reached between the
two--and to stymie Syrian efforts to dominate the Palestinians.
The USSR: Being There
Increased Soviet activism in Middle Eastern affairs has created the notion within the
region that Moscow has been responsible for many recent developments. We believe that
over the past year the Soviets have skillfully dovetailed their Middle East policies with
regional trends ripe for exploitation, and their actions have accelerated movement on
several fronts.
--Expanded Soviet contacts with the moderate Arabs were made possible in
part by growing Arab frustration with US Middle East policies and a
general trend toward more balanced relations with the superpowers.
--The Iranian threat has become an increased concern for the Arabs, who
have appreciated Moscow's increased political and military support for
Iraq over the past several months. Baghdad has recently received Soviet
MIG-29 aircraft, the first export of this advanced fighter outside Warsaw
Pact countries, and Moscow has stepped up its rhetorical support for
Iraq. This support came in the immediate aftermath of strong Gulf Arab
dissatisfaction with secret US arms sales to Iran.
--Soviet success in helping craft a semblance of PLO unity was aided by
the frustration of both moderate and radical PLO factions with their
respective Arab benefactors, the preoccupation of most Arab states with
the Gulf war, and Syria's isolation.
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--Renewed Soviet calls for an international peace conference on the
Arab-Israeli conflict followed the collapse of Jordanian-PLO efforts to
form a joint negotiating team and King Hussein's decision to
internationalize the peace process.
--The small yet unprecedented Soviet security role in transporting Kuwaiti
oil comes on the heels of increasing Iranian intimidation and a resulting
Kuwaiti decision to seek extraregional involvement in the protection of
Gulf oil tanker traffic.
--Soviet pressure on Assad to meet with Iraq's Saddam Husayn coincided
with growing Syrian displeasure over Iranian activities in Lebanon and
intensive Arab lobbying to mend the Syrian-Iraqi split
The Moderate Arab Strategy on a Peace Process
We believe moderate Arab leaders, particularly King Hussein, see Arab divisions--not
Israeli or US policies--as the immediate obstacle to movement toward negotiations.
Bitter rivalries among Arab leaders--frequently on issues far removed from the
Arab-Israeli conflict--have made it impossible for them to agree on a concerted strategy
in the past, but they now are searching for a formula for an international conference that
they believe will force the United States to press for Israeli concessions. The formidable
barrier that the current deadlock in Israeli politics poses to the convening of a conference
will not, in our view, deter the moderate Arabs. Indeed, it may provide an extra incentive
for Arab leaders to come to terms on a conference formula, in order to challenge Israel
and the United States to participate.
The moderate Arab leaders almost certainly realize that there still are major
difficulties to be surmounted before a conference is convened, and that the chances of a
conference leading to a peace agreement are even more remote. The key actors continue
to have sharp differences over the modalities and role of a conference. There is no
indication that key:Arab or Israeli leaders are ready to make the concessions necessary
for a peace settlement, and it is highly unlikely that a conference forum could resolve to
the satisfaction of all its participants the fundamental disagreements over the occupied
territories, let alone the status of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
But even the appearance of progress is important to moderates like Hussein and
Mubarak, who need continually to demonstrate their support of Palestinian nationalism.
Since Jordan has a large Palestinian population on the East Bank and Egypt is the only
Arab state to have made a separate peace with Israel, Hussein and Mubarak probably
believe they are obliged to pursue even slim opportunities for making progress toward
restoring Arab control to part of Palestine.
King Hussein almost certainly believes Assad's hand has been weakened on
Arab-Israeli issues, as evidenced by Assad's inability to prevent the convening of the
Palestine National Council in Algiers in late April and by Arafat's ability to wean some of
the radical Palestinian groups away from Damascus. The Jordanian leader probably will
step up his efforts over the next few months to try to narrow differences between Syria
and the moderates on arrangements for an international conference. He will use a
combination of personal diplomacy and Saudi money to court Damascus.
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Although the difficult question of Palestinian participation in a conference has yet to
be worked out, moderate Arab leaders probably believe that coordination with Syria can
produce a formula sanctioned at an Arab League summit that the PLO would have to
accept or risk being left out of negotiations. Hussein and Mubarak probably believe that
Arafat will soften his hardline positions to avoid being presented with a fait accompli, and
that the PLO chairman would find it extremely difficult to oppose an agreement on
Palestinian representation that was blessed by Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
Prospects
We expect intense maneuvering and more tactical shifts in the coming months,
which may clarify the strategies and objectives of individual Arab leaders. We believe
there is a good chance for several significant trends and developments--some favorable,
others unfavorable to US interests--over the next six months, including:
--Increased cooperation among Arab states, and less obstructionist
Syrian policies on an international conference and the Gulf war.
There are likely to be further high level contacts among Arab leaders
aimed at smoothing over differences. The combination of pressure and
inducements for Syrian pragmatism from all sides will be intense.
Trouble spots such as Libyan radicalism will remain, but will be
peripheral to the Arab-Israeli and Iran-Iraq arenas.
--The convening of an Arab Summit, where a coordinated Arab position
on arrangements for a peace conference, a strongly worded
resolution critical of Iran, and some form of reintegration of Egypt
probably will be endorsed. Any agreement reached on a peace-seeking
strategy probably would reaffirm the PLO as the legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people while leaving open the nature of Palestinian
participation at a conference to give the PLO an opportunity to make
concessions that would allow it to join. The moderate Arabs--and Syria
and Iraq--will expect Washington to match their movement with a more
active political role by pressing Israel to agree to attend a conference.
--A strengthening of Iraq's political position vis-a-vis Iran. This will
develop largely as a result of increased US and Soviet backing, Iraq's
success in courting broader Arab support at Iran's expense, and the
fraying of the Iran-Syria-Libya axis.
--A growing willingness of Arab moderates to expand relations with
Moscow and to use the Soviet card to gain US cooperation on
various regional issues. Jordan, Egypt, and possibly even Saudi
Arabia--in exchange for Soviet moderating influence on Syria and
potential pressure on Iran and the PLO--will sanction a Soviet role in a
peace process and expand bilateral ties. The moderates probably judge
that the United States will be more supportive of Arab interests if
Moscow is more deeply involved in peace-seeking efforts, believing that
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Washington will not want the Soviets to assume the role of championing
the moderate Arab cause. Kuwait's success in gaining the
Administration's agreement to protect its oil exports followed its
flirtations with Moscow about a major Soviet security role in the Gulf.
Other moderate Arab states are likely to repeat similar tactics.
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SUBJECT: Arab Politics: From Dormancy to Dynamism
NESA M 87-20064
External Distribution:
Amb. Richard Murphy/State
Amb. Morton Abramowitz/State
Mr. Christopher Ross/State
Mr. Donald Gregg/OVP
Mr. Peter Rodman/NSC
Amb. Robert B. Oakley/NSC
Mr. Edward P. Djerejian/State
Mr. William Kirby/State
Mr. Peter Burleigh/State
Mr. Roger Pajak/Treasury
Ms. April Glaspie/State
Mr. David Zweifel/State
Mr. Michael Ussery/State
Mr. Marion Creekmore/State
Mr. Roscoe Suddarth/State
Mr. Josiah Rosenblatt/State
Mr. Gary Dietrich/State
Ms. Janean L. Mann/State
Mr. Richard H. Solomon/State
Mr. David Dunford/State
Mr. Phil Wilcox/State
Mr. John Craig/State
Mr. Grant Smith/State
Lt. Col. Robert Kirkpatrick, USMC/DoD
Mr. Stephen Cohen/State
DIA
Mr. Edward Djerejian/State
Mr. George S. Harris/State
USA/DIA
Ms. Sandra L. Charles/DoD
Mr. Dennis Ross/NSC
Mr. Aaron Miller/State
Mr. Wayne Limberg/State
Mr. Edwin Gnehm/DoD
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