AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00792R000300040006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 22, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence ~ ~ ~ ~
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Africa Review
o ~ ALA AR 88-003
22 Janua~ 198
Copy J[ 99
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Africa Review
Articles South Africa: Joint Management Centers-Concession
Pretoria is using its Joint Management Centers-government
organizations that oversee local social, political, economic, and
security matters-to try to restore order and improve living
conditions in the black townships. Many blacks, however, view the
Centers as tools the government uses to suppress opposition and
divide the black community.
President Siad's regime remains concerned over Ethiopian
involvement with Somali insurgents and further Ethiopian attacks in
Brief Nigeria: 1988 Budget
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices
within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may
be directed to the Chief; Production Std; Office oJ'African and
Latin American Analysis,
Secret
ALA AR 88-003
22 January 1988
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Africa Review
Articles_
South Africa:. Joint
Management Centers-
Concession or
Coercion?.
A strong commitment to the restoration of order in
the black townships has prompted South Africa to
increase its use of Joint. Management Centers (JMCs),
government organizations that are responsible for .
social, political,?and economic as well as security
matters in the townships: Pretoria developed the
JMCs, which are manned by both military and
civilian personnel, because it believes that the problem
of black. unrest cannot. be. solved through solely
military means. The effectiveness of the JMC system
will be important in determining the nature and
intensity of future conflict in the townships.~~
Background ;
The JMCs are,part of the government's National
Security Management System, which was established
in 1.979 by P.W.. Botha to address the lack of
coordination among government departments on
security issues and to institutionalize Pretoria's
control over regional;.local, and civic activity in the
townships. The-State Security Council heads the
NSM3 at ahe_ Cabinet ;level. On the regional level, 11
JMCs-organized along the defense force command
structure-coordinate strategies to deal with actual or
potential security problems. Under the JMCs, 60 sub-
J1VICs and 44.8 mini-JM.Cs operate at the sub-regional
and local levels.and.include as members local military
and police chiefs;:postmasters, and other municipal
officials.
Every JMC, sub-JMC, and-mini-JMC consists of
three committees ?that are not equal in influence. The
intelligence committee, with its security and oversight
responsibilities, is considered _the most.imporiant. It
allows the .police, military, civilian National
Intelligence Service, and military intelligence to pool
information and is comprised primarily of security
force personnel. The political, economic, and social
committee-whose members are mostly civilian-
deals with problems of. rent, services, and the
provision of facilities in-the townships; these issues
often become security matters. This committee works
closely with the communications committee, which
informs the public about JMC decisions and actions
through the press, radio, or distribution of pamphlets.
Each JMC level concentrates on affairs within its own
region and functions largely as a clearinghouse ?for
information-including everything from rock- 25X1
throwing incidents-to local sanitary conditions: The
JMC's primary objective is to anticipate, identify, and
deal with flashpoints before, they became. security
problems. According to press reports, each JMC
monitors and. evaluates the: performance of
administrators and politicians and checks. on local
implementation of decisions taken at higher levels.
The centers draw up lists of grievances provided by
residents, compile ideas on introducing or improving
community facilities, and keep tabs.on important local
figures, particularly black activists.
The prominent role played by security force members
in the JMCs has created. friction among its members.
The US Embassy reports that although ,civilians
outnumber security force representatives,. all JMC
chairmen and many sub- and mini-JMC leaders are 25X1
senior military or -police officers; Pretoria's .statement
that increased security force involvement in the
townships was necessitated. by local government ,
inadequacy and ineffectiveness has only served to
aggravate civilian unhappiness with the prominence of
security personnel.
Secret
ALA AR 88=003
12 January 1988
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JMC Case Study: The Oil Spot Strategy
The JMC is the vehicle through which Pretoria has
sought to implement its "oil spot" strategy for dealing
with black unrest. The term refers to the government
policy of injecting -large amounts of money into
certain townships to improve living conditions; the
goal is to win the hearts and minds of black township
residents. Alexandra township, near Johannesburg, is
the initial target fora $47 million reconstruction
project. Alexandra was chosen, in our view, because of
the township's history of political activism and
location on Johannesburg's doorstep. Government
officials hope that the township will serve as an
example to urban blacks, showing what can be
accomplished by working with the authorities and the
The oil spot strategy has led to a new focus for the
Alexandra JMC. JMC activity in Alexandra initially
involved massive searches by the security forces and
the detention of hundreds of-black activists, but now
the JMC is'improving housing, roads, and community
services. Under JMC auspices, Alexandra has
acquired its first post office and telephone service,
four new schools, and a new health clinic. The JMC,
according to Embassy reports, has-also attempted to
gain cooperation from organizations such as parent-
teacher associations in an effort to gain legitimacy in
the black community
Opposition to JMCs
'Although some blacks support the economic-and to
a lesser extent political-reforms implemented by
JMCs, we believe that most politically active blacks
view the JMCs as a tool of co-optation designed to
suppress black opposition and divide the black
community. Those blacks who see positive aspects
argue that JMC efforts to involve black grievance
committees in township management-and the JMC
commitment to economic progress suggest that
Pretoria is reevaluating its strategy toward blacks.
Opponents, however, charge that the JMCs use the
media and other means to spread disinformation
about organizations such as the United Democratic
Front as part of an effort to counter black
organizational activity at the grassroots level. Black
opponents also point to the security forces' extensive
network of informers in the townships as evidence that
the JMCs use questionable methods to achieve
"negative" goals. Finally, the absence of blacks from
JMC administrative machinery has convinced many
blacks that Pretoria's objective is not political
development, but rather more effective government
control over the townships; according to the Embassy.
While resistance to the JMCs is apparent among
blacks, the most active political opposition to the
system itself emanates from liberal whites.' Liberal
politicians argue that the JMCs are undemocratic by
definition because they are composed of civil servants
and not elected representatives, and are accountable
to the State Security Council-an appointed body
which reports only to the President. Liberal politicians
also argue that the JMC's ability to go around normal
government channels and to make important decisions
in secret reflects the growing authoritarianism of the
government.
Outlook
Senior government officials do not believe that the
days of violent confrontation have ended in the
townships, but they apparently are convinced they
have established a systematic process that will contain
violence at an acceptable level. If unrest continues at
current low levels the JMCs will. increasingly
emphasize local economic and-to a-much lesser
extent-political reforms. We believe that Pretoria
still calculates that it will be able to accommodate
black political aspirations without endangering white
control if blacks can be co-opted into-having a stake in
the status quo.
Despite government rhetoric; however, we judge that
the JMC system will have only limited success
because of its inability to address black political
demands and because Pretoria has insufficient
financial resources to improve black living conditions
nationwide. In addition, Pretoria's theory that
improved economic conditions will ease black political
demands is problematic;
Deven better-off blacks remain politically active.
The "oil spot" campaign, combined with tight
security measures, may partially succeed in dividing
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black moderates from activists, but we believe the
JMC system will not satisfy black political aspirations
at the national level. Instead, the JMC system
probably will lead to the institutionalization of the
security force role in South Africa and the continued
decline in importance of even white elective
government bodies.
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Somalia: Security Concerns
in the North
Somali insurgent activity in the country's strategically
vital north, though limited, continues to strain
Mogadishu's limited resources and tie down
government troops. Unless Ethiopia substantially
increases its backing for the insurgents, however, they
will lack the capability to prevail, and we believe the
current stalemate is likely to persist. We doubt Addis
Ababa will become significantly more involved so long
as the Ethiopian regime remains preoccupied with
supporting southern Sudanese insurgents and
countering a recent surge of insurgent activity in
Eritrea.
Nonetheless, President Siad is concerned about
Ethiopia's involvement with Somali insurgents and
further Ethiopian attacks in the north. He will
continue to seek more US and other foreign military
assistance to appease his military's demands for more
sophisticated equipment. Mogadishu has been
dissatisfied with the level of US military assistance
and has sought aid from non-Western sources, such as
Romania and Hungary. Efforts to obtain such
assistance from the Soviet Bloc have met with little
success to date.
Somali Insurgents
Background. Somalia's insurgent groups date from
the coup in 1969 that brought Siad Barre to power. A
civilian government-whose leadership was drawn
heavily from the Majertain clan'-was ousted in
favor of the small Marehan clan from which Siad
filled key. positions in the government and military.
The coup was sparked by discontent in the military
over concessions by the civilian regime to demands by
neighboring countries that Somalia forsake its.
Irredentist claims to disputed territories. The result
has been a sharply diminished role for the Majertain,
the Issak, and their allies in policymaking
' In Somalia, clan is a group bound by its presumed descent through
the male line from a common ancestor. There are six major groups
of clans-or clan-families: the Darod, Hawiye, Issak, Dir, Digil,
and Rahanweyn. The Majertain and Marehan clans belong to the
Darod group.~~
Disaffected Majertain in 1976 formed the Somali
Salvation -Front (SSF) and, in 1981; joined forces with
two other groups to form the Somali Democratic
Salvation Front (SDSF~--ostensibly for the purpose of
restoring Somalia to democracy, but, we believe;
primarily to overthrow the Siad regime. The SSF had
little impact before the Ogaden war between Ethiopia
and Somalia in 1976-77, despite some support Addis
Ababa provided to the movement in retaliation for 25X1
Mogadishu's backing to the anti-Ethiopian Western
Somali Liberation Front, Z according to academic
Growth of Ethiopian Involvement. Ethiopian
involvement with Somalia's northern insurgents
increased substantially following Mogadishu's
crushing defeat in the Ogaden war: Although Addis
Ababa stopped short of invading Somalja, Ethiopia
increased pressure by augmenting support to the
Factional feuding in the SDSF, coupled with the
movement's inability to broaden its base bf support
beyond the Majertain tribe, led Ethiopia in 1.986 to
switch the bulk of its assistance to another clan-based
anti-Siad movement in the north, the Somali National
Movement (SNM),
the SNM-rooted in .the disaffection of the large
Issak clan-family-primarily seeks the overthrow of
the Siad regime. The emergent SNM-rapidly eclipsed
the SDSF, whose capabilities we believe continue to
decline
Z The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF); established in
1963, is aoomali-backed insurgency devoted to regaining the
Somali-inhabited Ogaden for Mogadishu. Seriously weakened by
declining Somali assistance and by Ethiopian military sweeps; this
group has an estimated military strength of approximately 1,000.
Secret
ALA AR 88-003
22 January 1988
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Current Threat. Although Ethiopia continues to
provide sanctuary, weapons, finance, and logistic
support to the Somali National Movement, the SNM
has fared poorly in military encounters with Somali
Government forces and is still regrouping from recent
defeats. for example,
the SNM took heavy casualties in a combined
assault with Ethiopian forces on the Somali arrison
at Balli Digh in February 1987.
in spite of the latter's Ethiopian
air and armor support. In our view, the low level of
SNM activity since Balli Digh-limited to small
attacks and banditry, according
and US Embassy reporting-suggests t at t e oma i
armed forces' claims to have inflicted major losses on
the SNM probably are justified.
We believe SNM recruitment suffered significantly
after the demoralizing defeat at Balli Digh. Factional
squabbling also has probably discouraged potential
recruits. In some cases, the internecine fighting has
led to assassination attempts by rival leaders,
according to US Embassy reporting
In our judgment, SNM setbacks have further reduced
its ,ability to launch a major military attack without
massive Ethiopian assistance. Although the SNM's
clandestine Radio Halgan continues to claim that the
group is inflicting significant casualties on
government forces, eyewitness accounts by US
Embassy sources of one encounter suggest the rebel
claims are groundless. SNM units remain capable of
acts of banditry, primarily against commercial
vehicles, and activity
of this type is common in SNM-frequented areas of
the north.
Government Response
The Somali Government's counterinsurgency effort in
the north,-led by General Morgan-is constrained
by manpower and equipment shortages. Army units
are able to do little more than defend garrisons and
Northern Somalia is vital to Somali security and
important to US strategic interests. The Somali
northern, or 26th, military sector is key to ensuring
Mogadishu's control of its coastline along the Gu(f'of
Aden. The strategic value of'this coast derives from
its proximity to Saudi oil pipeline terminals and the
major shipping lanes to the Persian Gul.1'and Red
Sea. The US maintains basing rights at several key
installations in Somalia under the 1980 Somali-US
Access Agreement, which expires in 1990. Under the
terms oj'the agreement, Berbera, Somalia's major
port in this region, is currently being upgraded and .
expanded with US.financing.
Morgan's command suffers from
limited communications and reconnaissance
capabilities, the latter because of a dearth of trained
personnel. Efforts by Morgan and other military
leaders to secure more manpower and equipment,
including armor, have made little headway, largely
because the shortages they face reflect nationwide
conditions. Diplomatic reporting indicates that the
northern command already receives men and materiel
at the expense of other sectors.
Despite the shortage of resources, General Morgan
has implemented several measures aimed at
undercutting local support for the rebels. His forces
deal harshly with captured insurgents, but generally
disarm and "reeducate" defectors, according to
Embassy reporting. Radio Hargeisa employs these
defectors to urge other insurgents to surrender. Local
party officials hold neighborhood orientation meetings
to explain government policy and encourage
cooperation. A strict curfew is enforced, and the
results in Hargeisa and most large villages are
peaceful and secure conditions, according to US
diplomats.
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Morgan is implementing an economic strategy
designed to dry up Issak financial support for the
SNM Besides
imposing internal travel restrictions, he has denied
Issak businessmen access to bank credit and import
permits, while extending these benefits to more
cooperative clans in his military sector.
Although Morgan's policies probably have eroded the
SNM's economic strength, we believe they also have
reinforced anti-Siad sentiment among the Issaks. C
ssak leaders claim the
severe disruption of economic activity caused by
Morgan's policies have spurred some newly
unemployed Issak to join the SNM's ranks. We
doubt, however, that such enlistments have
substantially replenished the SNM's depleted ranks.
will fuel growing Issak discontent
Outlook
We believe the Somali military and anti-Siad
insurgents in the north will remain stalemated over
the near term. Somali forces probably will maintain
counterinsurgency efforts at current levels, enough to
keep the rebels off balance but not to prevail.
Maintaining the counterinsurgency program,
however, will continue to drain scarce Somali
Government resources and to corrode the Army's
morale over time, while restrictive security measures
do so.
In our view, there is little chance that the SNM will
be able to mount a major challenge to Morgan's
forces without a substantial increase in support from
Ethiopia-a development we consider highly unlikely
over the next year. Nor do we expect Ethiopia to
mount another punitive raid similar to that on Balli
Digh. Addis Ababa currently is preoccupied with
providing support to southern Sudanese rebels as well
as countering a recent surge of insurgent activity in
Eritrea-developments that, in our view, have
reduced the availability of military assets for
deployment elsewhere and probably will continue to
The Insurgents
Somali Democratic Salvation Front ...favors a
vague form of democratic government ...driven
primarily by opposition to Siad ...radicals within
call for the revitalization of Islamic principles ... 25X1
advocates a nonaligned foreign policy, rapprochement 25X1
between Ethiopia and Somalia, and end to US
military presence in Somalia ...military strength
approximately 1,500.
Somali National Movement ...now the primary
recipient of Ethiopian assistance to Somali
insurgents ...formed in 1981 as a focus for Issak
disaffection ...lacks any guiding ideology or
political philosophy ...propaganda statements often
reflect divided ranks .:.seeks to overthrow Siad and
establish an autonomous, Issak controlled region in
the north ...military strength approximately 3,000.
The Siad regime's concern over Ethiopian
involvement with the SNM and its fears of another
Ethiopian attack in the north nevertheless will
continue to add to Mogadishu's preoccupation with
obtaining more US and other foreign military
assistance. These security concerns and the military's
demands for more sophisticated equipment with
which to counter the perceived Ethiopian threat
probably have heightened Mogadishu's dissatisfaction
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with the level of US military assistance and 25X1
encouraged the Somalis to seek military aid from non-
Western sources, such as Romania and Hungary.
Efforts to obtain assistance from the Soviet Bloc have
met with little success to date. 25X1
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Africa
Brief
Nigeria 1988 Budget
Nigerian President Babangida announced a 1988 deficit budget last month that is
intended to stimulate the economy through special spending allocations, lifting of
the four-year wage freeze, and expanding bank credit. The new spending proposals
will be aimed at improving mass transportation; rehabilitating the deteriorating
infrastructure, and generating employment. Moreover, the regime appears to have
backed down for now on reducing government subsidies on domestic petroleum
products-a move demanded by the IMF and international creditors. Although
Babangida reaffirmed his commitment to economic reform, the reflationary
measures are an attempt to placate the disgruntled population, unhappy that
despite major restructuring and the imposition of painful austerity measures, the
economy has not improved significantly.
Lagos plans to finance the projected $2'.1 billion deficit partially with domestic
borrowing and probably will turn to the World Bank and official creditors for
additional loans. The government-which expects to receive over 77 percent of its
revenues- from oil exports--calculated the budget on a world price of oil at $16 per
barrel. Weakening world oil prices, however, which could result in lower revenues,
coupled with continuing domestic petroleum subsidies and a general slowing of
economic reform plans may make it difficult for Nigeria to conclude new loan
agreements.
Secret
ALA AR 88-003
22 January 1988
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