LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 20, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
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Latin America
Review 25X1
Article Cuba: Military Commitment in Angola
personnel-even further.
Cuba's willingness to defend its Angolan ally remains strong despite
the unpopularity of the cause at home, and Havana could decide to
increase its military presence in Angola-now some 36,000
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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ALA LAR 85-027J
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
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Cuba: Military Commitment
in Angola
Both Havana and Luanda appear convinced of the
need to maintain a large Cuban military presence in
Angola, where the Cuban military contingent has
grown to some 36,000 personnel. While mounting
Cuban casualties probably remain politically and
militarily acceptable to the Castro regime, any
measurable increase in Cuba's participation could
heighten the war's unpopularity at home, where
economic and political incentives must be used
increasingly to entice recruits into serving in Angola.
Even so, Cuban willingness to defend its Angolan ally
remains strong, as reflected by recent public
reiterations of Havana's commitment. Moreover,
some growth in Cuba's military presence seems
possible as Cuban units obtain their full complement
of personnel and new Soviet equipment deliveries
require additional Cuban advisers.
Havana's intent to maintain its sizable military
presence in Angola was underscored in early
November by Cuban Communist Party Politburo
member Sergio del Valle, who stated that Cuban
forces would remain in Angola until the Luanda
regime decides that "the aggressions against its
sovereignty and territorial integrity have ceased."
Moreover, Cuban President Fidel Castro asserted in
late May, during UN Secretary General Perez de
Cuellar's visit to Havana, that "200,000 Cubans have
already gone to Angola, and, if another 200,000 must
go, they will."
some Cuban officials continue to believe that
it is Havana's "internationalist duty" to help the
Angolans, who are considered "political adolescents" Angolan insurgents, and an apparent improvement in
by the Cuban
Castro's resolve probably has been strengthened
Angolan President dos Santos meeting with Cuba tnternacronat
Fidel Castro in Havana in May 1984.
Angola's military performance.' Following Angolan
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recently by developments in southern Africa, visits to
Havana by leaders of the Frontline States, the repeal
of the Clark Amendment prohibiting US aid to the
Top Secret
ALA LAR 85-027J
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
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President dos Santos's visit to Cuba last October,
Castro publicly proclaimed that the "new strength" of
Angolan and Cuban forces coincided with the
"irreversible crisis of apartheid in South Africa."
Cuba's Current Military Posture
The breadth and depth of Havana's involvement in
Angola remain high, as indicated by an estimated
total presence of some 42,000 civilian and military
personnel. Approximately 28,000 Cuban combat
troops currently are stationed there
In addition, there are 8,000 Cuban military
advisers believed to be attached to various Angolan
armed forces (FAPLA) units, bringing Havana's total
military presence to some 36,000 personnel.
There are indications that Cuban forces probably
played a more visible role in the recently concluded
FAPLA offensive against the forces of Jonas
Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence
of Angola (UNITA).
Government operations near Cazombo in eastern
Angola also reportedly included the use of Cuban-
manned tanks. A senior UNITA official told the US
Embassy in London that perhaps as many as 5,000
Cuban troops took part in the FAPLA operations, but
added that no major Cuban combat units were
involved in the actual fighting.
Convincing evidence of Cuban participation in the
offensive remains sketchy. Nevertheless, we believe
Cuba's involvement probably mirrors its participation
in past Angolan operations, in which Havana has
provided officers, specialists, and other skilled
technicians to supplement-but not replace-
Angolan troops.
Cuban personnel also play a key role in Angola's
growing air defense network, operating and providing
technical expertise to Luanda's mobile and fixed
surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries and air
warning radar sites, most of which are located in
southern Angola along the Namibe-Menongue rail
line. Havana also is involved in an effort to upgrade
the air defense of its forces in Angola.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
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at one air
defense site in southern Angola, a probable SA- 13
battery had replaced SA-9 equipment, which
subsequently was deployed to another location in
Luanda's southern air defense perimeter.
Cuban pilots fly virtually every type of aircraft in
Luanda's inventory, including MIG-21 and MIG-23
jet fighters and MI-8 and MI-25 helicopter gunships.
Cuban
pilots-who appear to be heavily involved in combat
support operations-probably carried out the lion's
share of airstrikes against UNITA positions during
1978, when the majority of combat responsibilities. 25X1
were turned over to Angolan Government forces, the
spread and intensification of UNITA guerrilla
activity since 1982 appears to have again accelerated
Cuban losses. According to a 25X1.1
defector, Cuban troops are ill prepared for their
involvement in Africa, where malaria, primitive living 25X1
conditions, heat, and isolation have been serious
problems. Heavy casualties also reportedly are
exacted on the Cubans by insurgent mines, and
Cuban troops routinely use underground shelters to
the recent FAPLA offensive.
Drawbacks to Further Involvement
Reassurances from Havana of its continued support to
Luanda, however, are likely to be tempered by the
reported distrust and periodic hostility between
Cuban and Angolan forces, the mounting Cuban
casualties, and the need by Havana to provide its
personnel with incentives for overseas service.
it is not
uncommon for Cubans to be verbally and physically
abused by the Angolan populace, and considerable
anti-Cuban graffiti has appeared in the Angolan
Recent Intelligence Community estimates place the
total number of Cubans killed and wounded at some
4,000 to 5,000 since 1975, but data on Cuban
casualties remain imprecise and Havana's losses could
be higher. Community analysts, for example,
calculate that several thousand Cubans probably have
died as a result of accidents e.
Cuban deaths in
Angola by early 1985 totaled 8,000 to 10,000.
capital.
many Angolans view the Cubans-who are given
preferential treatment in many areas-as responsible
for many of their food and commodity shortages. One
unconfirmed UNITA press report claims, for
example, that seven Cubans were killed last October
when Angolan Government forces mutinied against
them. In addition, a Cuban defector
comments that Cuban troops frequently complain
that their Angolan counterparts are undisciplined,
given too little training, and are ineffective in combat.
Correspondingly,
the Cubans suffer from low morale, in part because of
growing frustration over their consignment to largely
defensive functions in rear areas.
The growing number of casualties and other
depredations suffered by Cuban military personnel is
also likely to influence Havana's thinking with regard
to any further combat commitment by its Ground
Forces. Although Cuban casualties declined after
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200970001-1
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Incentives are used increasingly by Havana to entice
new recruits or additional service from its officer
corps for overseas duty. For example,
"internationalist duty" is used to accrue benefits at
home, such as permission to buy major appliances or
obtain an apartment. Following the expulsion of
Cuban forces from Grenada in October 1983,
astro offered
veterans who survived the US intervention an
opportunity to recoup their prestige and rank-
stripped by Castro after the hostilities ended-by
serving a tour in Angola.
Outlook
Some modest growth in Cuba's military presence is
possible over the next six months to a year as newly
formed units are brought up to full manning levels,
and as the arrival of new military equipment from the
Soviet Union-such as air defense systems-
necessitates the deployment of additional Cuban
probably would commit additional resources if it
appeared the Luanda government was in danger of
falling to UNITA forces.
In our judgment, however, Havana is most likely to
continue its policy of defensive rear-guard operations,
and-at a minimum-its present level of involvement
in air and air defense operations in support of its
Angolan ally. We anticipate that Havana will
consider its support to Luanda on a case-by-case
basis, to provide Cuban decisionmakers the widest
flexibility, but we conclude that there is little prospect
for a withdrawal of Cuban troops in the near future.
Indeed, we believe it unlikely that Havana would
signficantly reduce its military presence even if
Angolan forces were to make noticeable gains against
UNITA in the coming months.
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Latin America
Briefs
Cuba-Iraq Upturn in Relations? (u)
Havana's diplomatic overtures may be yet another effort at gaining a mediator
role in the Iran-Iraq war. Although Cuba probably has no illusions that it can
successfully mediate the war, the Castro regime probably views its involvement as
helping to bolster Havana's international prestige. Cuba's efforts probably also are
designed to avoid alienating either side, thus opening opportunities for earning
hard currency in the postwar rebuilding efforts by both countries. In the
meantime, Cuba probably will try to maintain balance in its relations between the
belligerents-ha in no real affinity for either side-and hoping to gain economic
benefits from bot
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