NEAR EAST/AFRICA TURKEY/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 5 MAY 1948 - TURKEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004700010002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 5, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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P4Stio to rocovny: It is entirely poscible that tha. Lost ondarine
benafit to bo grtra--d by tho Turks out of the: t175 tilliona allonted
thtn from the US Creoces?Turkoy aid billa till ea= frai the very
call amount (lcao than 3 por cent of tin total) titicli is being
applied to hir.my courtruction.
It is trtn that tin tork is prfrarily dir:cted to..Ard eauting
poesibly urgalt military neod. Thc TurIcich road natr ark is anpallinalcy
bad? and it hoc aluoyo boss zr_glected in inter of ths cortutruation of
railroads, uhich thczclvus invs bean built pri: irily to r ot /111-?
tory strateetc requireesontc0 rou? howevur, it is r-tliacd th7t, caile
tin construction of railroad:, continuer!, th-e npid buildini:, of
durablo allcthar roado ins bocoen of tb: first Illitarj iL2ortancer,
Hatr tin technical ,,uidinco of US Public faord-: .td-larietrntion e.:-Tertn?
the program is earcsdy till undor ray,
But whother or not military math over h:co--: urzsnt? tin flan
roads will bo than:, available for co:norcial They undoubtodly
will bo of cnorrout tconoic value, rimral me:our:mop in cc:z in
ctancoo itTIOTM to catict for thousands of years, rand no loncr rear_iin
undovelopod for inch of econoriml trenrportation. Poriehoblo foe do
ray be swiftly csrriod to nrket, instead of tx.tinc loft to rot for
lack of mane of tr.aseport or cafe utor:ct) space. Turkey t e. forest
tralth ray be exploitsd no nover Lvfore, whiles ma induetrles can ha
brought into existence) in that hat hitherto n.11.-..;1; boon skeuorted,
rocky rildormco? An this cannot happen in a yr r, of courcz, and
its occurronca will only be possible without tar nnd, to a consida.r-
able =tent, without ovon the threat of c?ar.
Glad:item:is sick nn of &trope doesn't loo': Quito to ;sickly
taWr.3 days,. Ho ny, indood, prove to be an tacrictincly fortur.to
E:TELL1537.:C-e..?
For 1-?se's !siding
5 Kly 1948
TIIRZLY
VOL. XIII sIaolS
7124r -Xc,
reeige
ARAB STATES
Tho oituation in Nicotine) The prospects for s F.aestira true,
appalr its rceato no over in spite of tin veriovi Ilforti re: bal.-AL;
tzsdo in ?nicotine, r:,; tar!c, end the) Arnb c pitJ0 1r- di:patch
of Britirh roinforc....nta !nu had tkto Sfoot or
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TernitkET
attacks on Jaffa and in the Jerusalem area and ponaibly of delaying
the invasion of the country by the armies of the Arab states. Both
Jews and Arabs appear unwilling to provoke the British, who are
increasingly determined to maintain order during the last ten days
of the Mandate. After the end of the mandate 15 Itay, contingents
of the Arab states' armies will be free to move in, and full-scale
operations can be resumed without interference fret the British,.
Neither side can muster decisive etriking forces, although both
Arabs and Jess have large numbers armed and trained for part-tine
defense of their own communities. Hagana0 the Jewish army, has
approximately 350000 full-tixe members, with perhaps 200e00 more
troops available for field duty out of scar 50,000 civilians now on
part-time home guard status. &gam is well trained and has armored
care and light support weapons. However, ',a Hagans field forcee
are scattered, and the Jews have not committed more than 3,000 men in
any attack to dates,
The principal segment of the Arab forces is expected to come
from the regular armies of the Arab states0 operating under Arab
League control, Althouet the armed forces of the Arab states total
well over 1(4,000 most of them will be needed at home for internal
security duty. Initiellye, the Arab states are expected to contribute
no more than 18,000 (out of some 350000 avnilable for Palestine duty)0
including the 8,000-an Tranajordan Arab Legion and contingents from
Iraq, Syria, and perhaps Egypt. These forcce possess armored cars
and light artillery, and the Arab Legeon's efficency is relatively
good., Also available are the 15,000 troops of the only partially
trained Arab Liberation Army, ehich is still emerting from recent
defeats. Approximately 30,030 Palestinian Arabs are webers of para-
military argent:stip= and another 70,000 are available for home
guard duty.
The Arabs can count on some assistance from Beduin tribesmen in
the nearby countries,. while the Jews have eame reinforcements available
among immigrants waiting at Mediterranean and Black Sea ports for the
British naval blockade to be lifted,
The beginning of the unrestricted campaign 7111 find the Jews in
substantial possession of the areas allotted to them under the,parti-
tion scheme, except in southern Palestine, where no more than 3,000
Jews are scattered in isolated settlements. They strongly hold the
coastal area from newly captured Haifa to meth of Tel Aviv, include
in a small area in the Arab port of Jaffa, They have consolidated
their poeitions in the take Tiberias area of the northeast and appear
to be in a position to seise all of Jerusalem. They it not ter/even,
hold a firm route of supply-from the mast to either TiteriL or
Jerusalem?
T.012-Sfereaket,
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30
The primary aim of the Jews, therefore, will be to hold their
present areas, making partition a fact. They will probably attempt
to complete the seizure of Jaffa and to extend their coastal holdings
north of Haifa to the Lebanon border. They will probably undertake
limited attacks to strengthen their momamdcations with the Lake
Tiberias region (particularly around Arab-held Nazareth, which
controls the nein Haifa-Tiberias road). They may seek to seize
Jerusalem (either for themselves or for the UN), and may make some
attacks on Arab troops concentrations. In can of military reverses,
the Jews are probebay prepared to abanden their Lake Hula salient in
the extreme north and then the Tiberias area, holding the coastal
areas (which contain well over half the Jewish Paleetinian population)
at all costs. Ie the event of striking initial sualesso.they might
launch a major attack on the Arab Liberation Armarin the Nablus area
and might eventually attempt to extend their mu over all of Palestine*
Although the ultimate Arab aim is to destroy all vestiges of a
Jewish state, their ismodiate aims appear less ambitious than those
of the Jews. Initially, the Arab regulars can be expected to occupy
the Arab sectors of Palestine and possibly alto the Jewish areas of
southern Palestine. Thercafter, they will probably make limited
scale attacks on key points along Jewish conturdcations, on utilities
(such as the Jeruselfleater supply at Hassel-Ain and Solomon?.
Pools) and on isolated Jewish settlements. They would resist Jewish
seizure of Jerusalem. Despdte public pressure for a dramatic victory
and possible limitations on the ability of tha Arab states to maintain
their armies in the field for an extended period, strong direct ,
attacks by the Arabs are unlikely.
Thus the immediate prospect is for a seri:no lisd.ted-scale
battles, in which neither side will obtain a decisive victory. The
Jens will probably hold substantially what they da at present but.
the communications will remain aubject to haraasment. The campaign
trill settle down to a long-run affair in which the Arabs will damage
the Jewish economy by guerrilla attacks on connuniostions and exposed
farms and by economic sanctions (including oontinued shutdown of the
oil pipeline to Haifa and the latharaylm hydro-electric station which
supplies Haifa and Tel Aviv).
The changing role of the political party in Iraq: Hitherto, political
parties have played a minor role in determining the course of Iraqi
politics. Ministers in successive cabinets have bean members of a
tightly-bit ruling clique and without exception hsve been connected ?
with the two conservative parties, the National Eimecratic and the
Liberal.
There have been recent indications? however, that this funds-
rental pattern is now undergoing basic changes. In April 191a61
aiLibeRET?
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4.
the
-
the Independence Parteiwes formed under the. leadership of Uchameed
Lubba. This party contains a hard core of the pro-ftwhid Ali elements
remaining in Iraq; its philosophy to intensely nationalistic, anti-
Hashemite,Anglophobitvend of the extreme right. Its influence, though
steadily on the increase, did not become A force to be reckoned with
until the sining of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in January 194B. As the
leading spirit in organizing the demonntrations which led to the con-
vequent fall of the cabinet of Balch Jahr, the party gained additional
adherents anong the people, the nee goverment was obliged to acknow-
ledge the partyte increased stature by giving eat* a cabinet poet.
At the other ead cf the scale, another group is also preparing
to challenge the existing regime. The Peopleet ?Arty headed by Aziz
Sharif? and the National Unity Party led by Abdiel-Fattah Ibrahim,
both leftist in inclination, were banned by the gsvoinent in 1947
as nenbversive.n Despite this, they have continued their operations
underground. becoming more and more Cosmuniatic in character, In
January an attempt was ands to turn the demonstrations against the
treaty into a Communist rally, but the groups had evidently over.
estimated their strength; they received a severe setback at the hands
of the government and of the Independence Party asberents and several
of their henchmer were jailed. There have been recent reports that
the leftist leaders have reconciled their differences and hnve agroed
to cooperate in mapping strategy for the coming elections.
Of the tvo opposing formai, the Independence Party loess as the
etron4er. Should it become sufficiently influential to obtain con-
trol of the goverment* the position of the Regent and the Hashewite
dynasty would be extremely precarious. The Independence group would
certainly demand the return of Rashid Ali; in view of his bitter feud
with the Haehemites it is difficult to see how the country would be
big enough for both.
It is also possible that the deteriorating economic situation
nay increase the strength of the leftist groups to a pant where
they will feel themselves in a position to make another bid for
power4 Thuir next appeal to the people amyrattract enough dissident
elements to bring euecesso
At all events, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the day
of the small group which has hitherto controlled the destinies of the
muntheris passing. The wane of British influence, on which they have
relied, and the ineffective fumblings of the present weak government
are hastening their eclipse. A populatimewbich has at last realised
the power it wields demands a change, and whether that change be to
the left or to the right, that it will ONO, is inevitable.
err
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TOP-Seerr
IRAN
5?
The return of QR711 The enthusiastic reception given Qavam upon his
return to Iran on 3 Nay may presage a reneual of the struggle for '
power between him and the Shah. Qavaa not only retains a group of
loyal supporters in the Najlis but also appears to be gaining the
support of subh varied elements as the anti-Soviet Seyyid Zia (former
prima minister) and members of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, The Shah,
to is increasingly insistent on obtaining greeter prerogatives, has
declared that "dictatorial measures" night shortly become necessary,
especially if Came engages in political intrigue. If Qavam becomes
politically active, the ensuing conflict between him and the Shah
will seriously reduce Iran's ability to stand up againct Soviet demands.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
Pakistan and the USSR: Pakistan's decision to exchange ambassadors
with the USSR can be attributed to dissatisfaction with the US and UK
rather than to a reversal of its firm anti-Soviet stand: Heretofore,
Pakistan has clearly indicated its intention of remaining aloof from .
the USSR. Nary however, it is convinced that the UN has unduly favored
India (as a more valuable ally), and it also holds the US and UK
largely responsible for the concessions made to India by the Security
Council in the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan further resents the decision
of the US not to allow it to purchase in the US greatly needed mili-
tary supplies so long as the Kashmir dispute remains unsettled.
Pakistan's establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR (while
it does not represent the adeption of a pro-Soviet attitude) is
apparently intended as a clear indication that the Western powers
cannot ignore the wishes and needs of Pakistan if the close collabore -
tion of the latter is to be assured.
The Kashmir situations Efforts by tSe Security Council to effect a
settlement of the Kashmir dispute have resulted in the passage of a
resolution acceptable neither to India and the pro-India legal Govern-
rent of Kashmir headed by 5wrikAbdullt nor to Pakistan and the
revolutionary pro-Pakistan And (Free) Kashmir Government.
Under the terms of the resolution, Sheik Abdulla is Government
would, pending the outcome of a plebiscite, be broadened to include
equal representation of pro-Pakistan elements; Indian troops would
be progressively withdrawn to the extent permitted by the requirements
of internal security; and Pakistani forces would be allowed by
mutual agreement between the dominions to occupy certain areas of
the State be assist in the maintenance of law and order. The Govern-
ment of India and Sheik Abdullate Government of Kashmir claim that
these provisione, it implemented, would nullify the legal rights
of radii,. and Abdulla? and would also constitute a breach of faith
with the people of Kashmir.
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Pakistan and the Azad Kashmir Government, on the other hand,
maintain that a fair plebiscite cannot be held so long as Sheik
Abdulla heads the Kashmir Government and so long as Indian tryops
remain in occupation of the State. The Government of Pakistan
maintains further that it would be unable to persuade the tribesmen
of the ?Orth West Frontier Province to return home, and that the
use of force against them would permanently alienate this important
segment of Pakistanee population, Pakistan, supported by the Azad
Government, demands therefore the complete withdrawal of all troops
and the replacement of Abdulla by an interim neutral administration
to be appointed by the Security Council,
Despite the bitterness of the dispute and Pakistan's conviction
that a fair plebiscite would result in a pro-Pakistan vote, it is
unlikely that the Government of Pakistan will sponsor an attempt to
end Indiage occupation of the State by force. The Government realizes
that the Armyis serious shortage of arms and ammunition makas victory
improbable. Indian Army leaders? on the other hand, notwithstanding
Indians superior military strength, recognize the possibility of
over-extending their forces in Kashmir and have indicated a desire
to effect a settlement by agreement with Pakistan.
Current statements by Indian political leaders are contradictory.
They suggest that in view of the failure of the Security Council to
provide a satisfactory colutiona the termination of the dispute will
be sought both by "other peaceful means" (implying direct arbitration
with the Government of Pakistan) and by intensified action of the
Indian Army, If arbitration isedopted? a satisfactory and lasting
solution could probably be obtained by conceding to Pakistan those
areas of west and north Kashmir (including ?Noonan and Gilgit) which
have clearly indicated an overwhelming sentiment in favor of Pakistan,
Jammu and the important vale of Kashmir would be retained by India.
If, on the other hand? India attempts by force to establish Sheik
AbdUlla's rule over all of Kashmir, initial successes will probably
be obtained, but retaliation by the tribesmen, with the connivance
and possible involvement of the Pakistan Government, and further
rebellion in the State can be expected in the near future,
laesirSECRST
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