AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96R01136R001302260003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 5, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate ot
/i Intelligence
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Afghanistan Situation Report
5 May 1987
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C/Tlif A/ AS I A/S OV A
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
KARMAL TO MOSCOW
Former PDPA chief Babrak Karmal has gone to the USSR
for medical treatment, although his removal from
Afghanistan almost certainly will do little to quell
discontent within the party.
USSR BOLSTERING LINKS WITH NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN
A delegation from the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic
recently signed a protocol of cooperation with Balkh
Province officials. This is the latest Soviet effort
to strengthen linkages between Soviet Central Asian
republics and northern Afghan provinces.
CONSCRIPTION OF CRIMINALS
The Afghan regime recently announced that some
prisoners will be conscripted, but the measure will do
little to overcome the military's manpower problems.
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IN BRIEF 4
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PERSPECTIVE
GULBUDDIN'S HIZBI ISLAMI: LOSING SUPPORT IN THE 8
RESISTANCE
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar heads a faction of the Hizbi Islami
that is one of the most effective Afghan resistance
groups. But his force frequently attacks other
insurgent groups, and Gulbuddin's intransigence and
divisive policies are alienating other resistance
fiahters as well s some of his own followers.
This document was prepared by the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of
Soviet Analysis.
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KARMAL TO MOSCOW
According to TASS, former PDPA leader Babrak Karmal
arrived in Moscow for medical treatment on 4 May.
Earlier media stories claimed that he was being held in
Pol-e Charki prison. Karmal had been under house
arrest since late 1986.
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COMMENT: Karmal had long been the rallying point for
PDPA members--both Khalqis and Parchamis--who oppose
Najib and his Soviet masters. Pro-Karmal
demonstrations during the Revolution Day parade on
27 April probably convinced the Soviets that he was too
much of a threat to the current regime to keep in
Kabul.
The removal of Karmal is unlikely to quell discontent
that has been intensifying in the PDPA since January.
Should dissidents see the deportation as an indication
of a pending purge, they may increase demands on Najib
for greater powersharing while stepping up anti-regime
sabotage and random physical attacks on Najib's
supporters.
USSR BOLSTERING LINKS WITH NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN
A Soviet delegation from the Uzbek Soviet Socialist
Republic (SSR) visited Afghanistan in late April to
discuss establishment of economic, technical, and
cultural ties with Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan, and
Baghlan Provinces, according to Afghan press reports.
It signed a protocol of cooperation with Balkh
Province.
COMMENT: Soviet plans to
annex the northern Afghan provinces have surfaced
periodically throughout the war. The most economically
valuable area of Afghanistan, the region has fertile
agricultural land and extensive mineral wealth,
including natural gas and petroleum reserves. This
protocol and other recent direct agreements between
northern Afghan provinces and Soviet Central Asian
republics may be Soviet attempts to strengthen linkages
between the two areas. Moreover, public demonstrations
now of the commonality of interests between governing
authorities in these regions serve to counter Afghan
insurgent claims of support from the Soviet Central
Asian populace.
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CONSCRIPTION OF CRIMINALS
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Kabul recently announced
that beginning
in mid-June,
prisoners who have served at least one-fourth of their
sentences will be inducted into the military. Only
recidivists or "insurgent supporters" will be excluded.
Prisoners pardoned in February under the national
reconciliation campaign were also conscripted,
according to the US Embassy in Kabul.
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COMMENT: The military's serious manpower
caused by a continuing high number of
shortages,
desertions and
casualties, have driven the prisoner release. This
intake of poorly disciplined personnel, however, will
not improve the Army's combat effectiveness
or manning
levels.
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IN BRIEF
An Austrian official recently told the US
Charge in Kabul that his government probably
will consent to a Saudi request to host an
Afghan interests section in Saudi Arabia.
He also noted that Kabul has previously asked
Vienna to allow the opening of an Afghan
Embassy in Austria. He speculated that the
Afghan regime would push the embassy
question, and that Austria--because it has an
embassy in Kabul--would be hard pressed to
refuse.
Visits initiated in early March by the
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to regime-held prisoners in Kabul have
been "interrupted" by the regime's refusal to
let the ICRC prepare registration lists,
according to the US Consulate in Peshawar.
ICRC officials said, however, that Hizbi
Islami insurgents recently released Afghan
soldiers held prisoner since last spring.
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On 29 April the Red Cross Society of China
donated medical supplies, food, clothing, and
transportation vehicles worth approximately
$100,000 to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
This modest public donation is intended in
part to underscore China's continuing support
for Islamabad's Afghan policies.
Based on conversations with refugees and
humanitarian relief agencies in Pakistan, the
US Embassy in Islamabad believes that only a
few thousand refugees have accepted Kabul's
national reconciliation offer and returned to
Afghanistan. In contrast, the Afghan regime
claims that 30,000 to 50,000 refugees have
gone back. Regime officials may be including
in their count refugees who periodically
return home for personal or business reasons.
According to UK officials, the European
Community (EC) will soon deliver a demarche
to Harare asking the Zimbabweans to prolong
discussions with Kabul about the timing of an
exchange of ambassadors. The EC apparently
will argue that a quick envoy exchange on the
heels of Harare's recognition of Kabul will
make it more difficult to negotiate a Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Prime Minister
Mugabe is unlikely to be swayed by the
argument.
A Soviet sociologist recently told the .US
Embassy in Moscow that the Institute of
Sociological Research is conducting a poll
among Muscovites on their attitudes toward
the Afghan war. He claimed that such a poll
would have been "unthinkable" a year ago
because of opposition from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, which reportedly is now
pushing to see the results of the poll.
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Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs Wakil met
with Fidel Castro on 25 April. Wakil, who
led an Afghan delegation to the sixth session
of the Group-77 in Havana, reportedly briefed
Castro on the Kabul regime's "national
reconciliation program," and discussed Afghan
and Cuban positions on regional and
international matters. Wakil also met with
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Vice President of
the Council of State and Council of
Ministers.
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PERSPECTIVE
GULBUDDIN'S HIZBI
ISLAMI:
LOSING SUPPORT IN THE RESISTANCE
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Gulbuddin Hekmatyar leads a faction of the Hizbi Islami
that is one of the most effective Afghan resistance
groups. His force, however, has often been accused of
attacking other insurgent groups and collaborating with
the Soviets and the Kabul regime, and Gulbuddin's
intransigence
other resistance
and divisive policies are
fighters as well as
alienating
some of his own
followers.
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Supporters
of the Hizbi-Islami
The Hizbi Islami
is one of the
largest of the seven
maior resistance
groups.
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Gulbuddin controls 15 to 20
the armed insurgents--an estimated 22,000
guerrillas; Gulbuddin himself claims to have more than
percent of
to 30,000
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100,000 armed followers.
all areas of Afghanistan
we believe it is strongest
Laghman, and Parvan
The organization operates
except for the Hazarehjat,
in Nangarhar, Konarha,
Provinces. The group is dominated
in
but
by Sunni Pashtuns.
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Gulbuddin reportedly
has close ties with the Islamic
fundamentalist organizations outside Afghanistan. He
receives money and materiel from the Moslem Brotherhood
and the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami political party.
Although Gulbuddin denies that he has privileged
relations with the Jamaat-i-Islami, the group has
supported him since the 1970s and clearly
favors the
Hizbi Islami over other resistance arouns.
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Gulbuddin
Pakistani
also enjoys good relations with senior
military and civilian officials,
He allegedly
receives the largest share of military aid to the
resistance from the Pakistani Government because of his
Pushtun connections and close relationship with the
Jamaat-i-Islami. This perceived favoritism by Pakistan
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and other outside supporters has prompted substantial
criticism from other resistance leaders.
Gulbuddin also received some arms and supplies from
Iran until late 1984, when the Hizbi Islami joined the
fundamentalist alliance headed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.
the Iranians opposed
the alliance because they believed it to be anti-Shia.
Citing Iran's "failure" to cooperate in supply matters,
Gulbuddin closed the Hizbi office in Tehran in July
1985. he may shortly
visit ''ehran, possibly to discuss renewed Iranian
support.
Gulbuddin's Organization
The Hizbi Islami has the most highly organized
administration and command-and-control structure in the
resistance. the group's tight cell
structure is modeled on that of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood.
The Hizbi Islami organization inside Afghanistan is
organized by provinces, which consist of fronts of
to 500 insurgents. Fronts are represented at the
headquarters in Peshawar by a provincial military
office. Its representatives lobby the committees for
support and distribute the armaments and supplies
obtained. Hizbi Islami commanders must align
themselves with a front to get assistance,
Front commanders are required to
coordinate all military activities through their
provincial military office.
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Gulbuddin keeps
a tight reign on his field commanders, who take no
initiatives without his prior approval. He reportedly
has personally planned several operations and
frequently travels into Afghanistan to take part in the
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fighting. he requires
daily status reports from commanders inside Afghanistan
on activity, manpower, and supplies.
Fighting in the Field
The Hizbi Islami has been effective in combat against
the Soviets and the Afghan regime. Gulbuddin's field
commanders are generally well trained, ideologically
dedicated, and highly motivated. Most fronts--
particularly those in Nangarhar, Lowgar, Parvan,
Laghman, Konarha, and Kabul Provinces--are relatively
well armed with light weapons, heavy machineguns,
mortars, and rocket launchers,
The Hizbi Islami reportedly was the first
insurgent group to receive the Stinger antiaircraft
missile.
The organization's Tobuk Front in Nangarhar Province,
commanded by Engineer Abdul Ghaffar, is probably
Gulbuddin's most effective force. The front has ample
light and heavy weapons, including Stinger missiles and
BM-12 multiple rocket launchers,
Since receiving the Stinger system
late last summer, Ghaffar's men have shot down several
aircraft around Jalalabad;
Soviet
and Afghan regime forces have reacted to this Stinger
threat by sharply increasing attacks on Ghaffar's area
of operations and by establishing numerous outposts in
the lower Konar Valley,
Ghaffar cooperates closely with the
Hiz Islami (Khalis) commander, Hazrat Ali,
provides backup when needed.
local
and
Other prominent Hizbi Islami commanders include:
--Ustad Karim--leader of a small and strictly
disciplined urban operations unit in Kabul.
He is one of the few insurgent unit
commanders who plans extensively for
operations,
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--Sanagul--commander of the Saur Kamar Front in
Laghman Province. His force has been highly
effective in striking convoys along the
Kabul-Jalalabad road.
--Mamur Ghoyur--principal inburgent commander
fighting near Baghlan city.
his men frequently harass
local Soviet and regime posts and ambush
convoys en route to and from Kabul.
--Haji Abdul Karim--commands 120 insurgents and
operates out in Talukan in Qandahar Province.
He has conducted several joint operations
with guerrilla forces from Khans' Hizbi
Islami faction and the Jamiat-i-Islami near
Qandahar city.
Instigator of Infighting
The Hizbi Islami is responsible for much of the
internecine fighting that takes place between
resistance groups inside Afghanistan.
Gulbuddin--in pursuit of a
position of dominance in the resistance--instructs his
field commanders to attack other insurgent groups whose
power and influence threaten expansion of the Hizbi
Islami. Most of these attacks are directed at the
Jamiat-i-Islami. We believe Gulbuddin is particularly
iealous of Jamiat insurgent leader Ahmad Shah Masood.
Gulbuddin has ordered
interdiction of Masood s supply lines, attacks on his
forces, and interference with his operations against
the Soviet and Afghan regime forces.
Gulbuddin, accused of collaborating with the Soviets
and the Kabul regime, has also been labeled by some
opponents as an agent of the Afghan Government.
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Gulbuddin's Growing Isolation
dissension is on the
rise in the Hizbi Islami.
in the last two months, there has been an
unprecedented increase in the number of Hizbi
commanders defecting to the Jamiat-i-Islami. Many
prominent commanders from Konduz, Baghlan, Nangarhar,
Kabul, and Lowgar Provinces have indicated to Rabbani
that they are tired of Gulbuddin's extreme and divisive
policies and inadequate support. The Jamiat has
apparently received so many inquiries for membership
from former Hizbi members that they are becoming more
selective in accepting defectors.
anti-Masood efforts have resulted '
inside Afghanistan.
Shir Gul, a pro-Masood Hizbi commander in
Gulbuddin's
Valley, had a running feud with his front
Engineer Tariq, who is close to Gulbuddin
particularly hostile to Masood.
the Zalang
commander;
and
Anti-Gulbuddin sentiments also a..ear to be inc
throughout Afghanistan.
Gulbuddin has not been able to recruit
sufficient replacements for the losses his forces
suffering in combat and through defections.
Gulbuddin has been
forced to replace those groups with followers not
native to the areas to which they have been assigned;
these "outsiders" are typically resented by the local
populations. Such a situation exists for Gulbuddin in
the Ghowr Band Valley, where most of the insurgents are
former villagers from the Shomali Plain, and in Ghazni,
where the insurgents are natives of Zabol and Vardak
Provinces.
It
are
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Gulbuddin's belligerent and confrontational attitude
has alienated some members of the resistance alliance.
fundamentalist leaders
Rabbani, Yunus Khalis, and Sayyaf recently created an
informal alliance based on their common concerns for a
negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. Although
Gulbuddin's views on the issue are similar to those of
the three leaders, they refused his inclusion because
they consider him too unpredictable and ambitious to
trust.
Prospects
We believe that Gulbuddin and the Hizbi Islami will
continue to be a divisive element in the Afghan
resistance. Insurgent infighting involving Gulbuddin's
and Masood's forces is unlikely to decline, given
Gulbuddin's determination to thwart Masood's expanding
influence in northern Afghanistan. Gulbuddin's quest
to dominate the resistance will intensify as political
maneuvering over a possible settlement continues.
the party has been
stockpiling arms, ammunition, and other supplies inside
Afghanistan in anticipation of a possible cutoff of
Pakistani and Western aid.
Gulbuddin intends to use these weapons to
secure power once the Soviets leave the country.
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Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: The Man They Love to Hate
Ambitious, outspoken, and doggedly independent,
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has long been both a central figure
in the resistance and the source of many of its
problems. His fellow Peshawar-based resistance leaders
dislike and distrust him as a dangerous and autocratic
radical. He, in turn, sees them as undercutting his
position in the jihad.
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Gulbuddin would like to create a militant revolutionary
Islamic society in Afghanistan. He is as hostile to
Western ideas and influence as he is to Communism and
vehemently opposes a role for former King Zahir Shah
and other members of the old, Westernized elite in a
post-Soviet regime. His long association with the
Muslim Brotherhood, the model of the Iranian
Revolution, and the example of Libya's Muammar Qadhafi
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stubborn individualism, we doubt that either Tehran or
Tripoli could exert strona influence over him should he
come to power. 25X1
Gulbuddin's organizational skills, as well as his
radical tendencies, first became apparent during his
days as an engineering student at Kabul University. He
was converted there from leftist views to conservative
Islam, possibly by Sayyaf, and in 1968 helped found the
Javanan Musulman (Muslim Youth League), the predecessor
of the Hizbi Islami. With Sayyaf and Rabbani, both
then Kabul University professors, Gulbuddin became a
central figure in the Islamic movement that battled the
Communists for control of the campus in the last years
of Zahir Shah's reign. He was "almost brilliant" in
the speed with which he could make a Molotov cocktail,
according to one fellow student. The young radical was
imprisoned for over a year after killing a Communist
student but was released following the coup in 1973
during which Mohammad Daud overthrew the King.
In 1974 Gulbuddin was implicated in a coup plot and
fled to Pakistan, where then-President Zulfikar All
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Bhutto supported his anti-Daud activities in
retaliation for Kabul's agitation among Pushtun and
Baluchi border tribes. A failed uprising in the
Panjsher in 1975 led to bad feelings between him and
Rabbani, but Gulbuddin's continued opposition to the
Kabul regime provided him with an organizational base
to build on following the Communist takeover in 1978.
In early 1979 the Hizbi Islami split, with a minority
faction forming a separate organization under Yunis
Khalis.
Like Sayyaf, Gulbuddin is a Ghilzai Pashtun of the
Kharoti tribe. About 40, he was born in Konduz
Province and attended high school in Baghlan before
entering Kabul University.
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