WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100020043-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 7, 2010
Sequence Number: 
43
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 21, 1983
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP91B00776R000100020043-2.pdf121.58 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2 j *. ~ SE E ? National Intelligence Council NIC #5283-83/1 21 July 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa SUBJECT Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa Community representatives and specialists met on 19 July 1983 with the Acting NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. Attachment NIC #,5283-83 25X1 25X11 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2 ? SECRET ? NIC #5283-83 21 July 1983 WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA CIA analysts began the discussion by observing that Habre apparently was taking time to consolidate his control in eastern Chad after recently capturing Biltine and Arada. Once having done so he probably will move against Faya L argeau on two fronts, from the south and the east. The NSC representative expressed the hope that Habre would not move prematurely and risk suffering a major defeat against the fixed and better armed the Libyan-backed Gouk ouni forces at Fava. CIA also noted that the outcome of the situation in Chad now hin es on the external support that is bein ~rovi r-, 1- L 11~ si riec ~iH analysts were encouraged that, despite earlier fears, southern an cen ra Chad are quiet and thus not distracting Habre from his northern and eastern campaigns. WARNING NOTE The fighting in Chad is likely to drag on with the chances increasing of more Libyan involvement as Habre moves north. To a large extent, the outcome of the fighting will depend on the relative staying power of Habre's and Goukouni's external suppliers. ETHIOPIA-USSR Discussion focused on indications of what may be a new phase in Ethiopian-Soviet relations, with Mengistu moving closer to the Soviet model in his efforts to restructure Ethiopian society and the Soviets, for their part, probing Mengistu to see how much they can Qain from him in the wav of arracc and facilities. 25X1 25X1 '~ FX'I 25X1 Z~X1 25X1 25X1 ore an more vie exper s are eing a ace to the Ethiopian administrative structure. The NSC representative speculated that Soviet actions toward Ethiopia may be part of a larger Soviet counteroffensive to head off the weakening Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2 ? SECRET ? positions of its major African client states -- Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. Turning to recent Somali claims of a major Ethiopian invasion, analysts agreed that the Somali government has ,exaggerated what may have been little more than low-level insurgent forays. These forays can be expected to occur at any time but do not presage, in the view of the intelligence community representatives, an upsurge in Ethiopian-Somali hostilities. ANGOLA Community analysts agree that UNITA activity in Angola is increasing but the situation is obscured by conflicting claims and counterclaims. Cuban forces do not appear to be meeting UNITA head-on but they do seem to be taking a somewhat more active role in supporting Angolan operations against the insurgents. Cuban casualties appear to have increased somewhat in recent months but may reflect increased UNITA targeting of Cubans rather than a new-found Cuban aggressiveness. Although UNITA is expanding its operations out of its traditional tribal areas, analysts do not believe that UNITA is prepared to hit fortified Angolan military positions in areas where it does not have local support. 25X1~5X1 SNIPPETS NIGERIA: The community agrees that the level of pre-election violence in Nigeria is less than might have been expected in view of the violence that preceded and accompanied the elections four years ago. Nevertheless, during the 5-week election period beginning on 6 August, the danger of escalating violence will be strong although the process itself probably will not be derailed. GHANA: The DIO for Africa noted that Ghana will be facing a crisis by mil-August when it will run out of diesel fuel unless it finds new supplies. ETHIOPIA: The DIO for Africa felt that the intelligence community needs better information on the Ethiopian military campaign against insurgents in Eritrea Province. 2 SECRET~~ 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/02 :CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100020043-2