RAIL TRANSPORT IN COMMUNIST CHINA 1958-59

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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET N? 98
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
RAIL TRANSPORT IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1958-59
CIA/RR 59-45
November 1959
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
SECRET
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans..
missionor revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
RAIL TRANSPORT IN COMMUNIST CHINA
1958-59
CIA/RR 59-45
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
The expanding economy of Communist China requires a continuing in-
crease in railroad facilities. In 1958-59 a heavy demand for service
was placed on the railroad system, and announced performance was con-
siderably higher than anticipated. The main purpose of this report is
to explain how the Chinese railroad system achieved the performance
levels that were announced for 1958 and how the system is expected to
achieve planned performance goals for 1959.
This report has been coordinated within ORR but not with other USIB
agencies.
_
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary 1
I. Introduction
II. Performance
2
2
A. 1958 2
B. 1959 Plan 5
C.. Comparison Between the Rate of Growth of
Railroad Tons Originated and Production of
Selected Commodities 6
D. Commodity Composition of Railroad Freight
Traffic 6
III. Operating Efficiency
A. Freight Cars
9
9
1. Average Load per Loaded Car 9
2. Daily Carloadings 10
3. Turnaround Time and Freight Car Require-
ments 11
a. Turnaround Time
b. Freight Car Requirements
B. Locomotives
11
12
IA
1. Performance 14
2. Requirements 15
IV. Investment 15
A. Railroad Network
B. Rolling Stock
19
20
V. Administration 21
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Appendix A. Methodology
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Appendixes
Page
23
Tables
1. Communist China: Estimated Rail Transport Per-
formance, 1952 and 1956-59
14.
2. Communist China: Estimated Tonnage of Basic
Commodities Originating on Railroads, 1958-59 . 7
3. Communist China: Capital Investment in Railroads
Compared with Total Capital Investment, 1953-58
and,1959 Plan
Illustrations
Figure 1. Communist China: Annual Investment in
and Performance of Railroads, 1952-59
(Chart)
Figure 2. Communist China: Railroads and Selected
Roads, May 1959 (Map)
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16
Following Page
6
Tnside
Back Cover
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RAIL TRANSKET IN COMMUNIST CHINA*
1958-59
Summary
Approximately 380 million tons** of freight were originated on the
railroads of Communist China in 1958. Performance of this magnitude,
which was adequate only to handle the demands made on the railroad
system by the modern industrial sector of the economy, resulted from
an increase in the average load per loaded car to 37.6 tons, a reduction
in actual turnaround time to about 3.3 days, an increase of about
11,000 units in the freight car park, and an increase of 350 units in
the locomotive park. The planned performance of 520 million tons origi-
nated in 1959 is expected to be attained by a further increase in the
average load per loaded car to 40 tons and a further decrease in turn-
around time to about 3 days. An increase of 20,000 to 28,000 units in
the freight car park and an increase of about 1,000 units in the loco-
motive park also will be important factors in the attainment of the
performance goal for 1959. Under these circumstances it is estimated
that the railroad system will continue to support economic growth in
the modern industrial sector of the Chinese Communist economy during
1959.
During 1958 the great increases in production in Communist China
created a heavy demand for rail service. The railroad system, however,
had little or no excess capacity, because the relatively small incre-
ments of investment made during 1950-57 had not been adequate to pro-
vide sufficient facilities and equipment to handle completely the in-
creased demand. Had a greater portion of railroad investment during
1950-57 been made in improvements to the existing system instead of in
new construction, the system would have been in a much better position
in 1958. Railroad investment during 1957 and 1958 remained at about
the level of 1956. Planned investment in 1959 will be about double in-
vestment in 1958, reflecting a realization on the part of the Chinese
Communist leaders that a higher level of state investment is necessary
to cope with a congested transportation situation of the type that
developed in 1958. Investment expenditures for construction of new
rail lines in 1958 were directed primarily toward extending the rail-
road network. Investment in 1959, however, has been directed largely
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 15 September 1959.
** Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
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toward the improvement of the existing network through reconstruction
and double tracking and the addition of branch and special lines. The
large increase planned for production of rolling stock will help to meet
the shortage of transportation equipment in the face of the demand for
rapidly increasing tonnage.
A simplified organization of the Ministry of Railroads in Peking and
a decentralized administration in the provinces also contributed to the
performance of 380 million tons originated on the railroads of Com-
munist China in 1958. The reorganization of railroad administration
abolished the more than 50 subbureaus which were responsible to about
15 regional administrative bureaus and changed the regional bureaus to
about 30 provincial (or city) bureaus, which were in turn made respon-
sible both to the Ministry and to the "provincial authorities." The
authorities in Peking expect the new organization to effect a closer
liaison at the local level between transportation and the expansion of
all branches of industry and agriculture and to provide better results
in railroad operations and construction.
I. Introduction
During 1958 the "leap forward" program placed a heavy burden on the
transportation system of Communist China. The Chinese claimed that
record-breaking performances were achieved by all forms of transporta-
tion, both primitive and modern. Railroads and other modern types of
transportation allegedly produced 229 billion ton-kilometers (tkm), an
increase of 39 percent above the level of 1957, and originated 633 mil-
lion tons of freight, an increase of 48 percent above the level of 1957.
In addition, primitive forms of land transport and junks were said to
have originated about 663 million tons. In total, nearly 1.3 billion
'tons of freight were originated by all forms of transportation, both
primitive and modern. Against this background of tremendous achievement
by the transportation system as a whole, it seems appropriate to examine
and evaluate the performance of the railroads in 1958-59, because rail-
roads remain the most important type of transportation in Communist
China, particularly with respect to the support of heavy industry.
II. Performance
A. 1958
Late in January 1959, Yu Knang-sheng, a Vice Minister of Rail-
roads, stated that more than 380 million tons of goods were shipped on
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the railroads of Communist China in 1958. 1/* This performance repre-
sented an increase of 38.7 percent above performance in 1957, or 22.6
percent above the original state plan for 1958 of 310 million tons
originated. 2./ The 38.7-percent increase was a remarkable achievement
when compared with the average annual increase of 15.7 percent which
took place during the First Five Year Plan (1953-57).
During 1958 the ton-kilometer performance of the railroads in-
creased by 38 percent above the level of 1957, or at almost the same
rate as tons originated. ,V Thus it is estimated that the railroad
system of Communist China produced about 186 billion tkm in 1958 com-
pared with 134.6 billion tkm in 1957. The system produced 5.96 million
tkm per route-kilometer in 1958 compared with 4.51 million tkm in 1957,
4.14 million tkm in 1956, and 2.46 million tkm in 1952. The railroad
system of the USSR produced about 10.6 million tkm per route-kilometer
in 1958.
Because the ton-kilometer performance of the railroads of Com-
munist China is reported to have increased at a slightly slower rate
than tons originated in 1958, it can be inferred that the average
length of haul decreased from 491 kilometers (km) in 1957 to 489 km
in 1958. Most of the available evidence before the end of the year
had pointed to a greater decrease in the average length of haul than
actually took place. A number of references were made to a shortening
of the average length of haul for coal, but apparently the expected
results did not materialize sufficiently to have a significant effect
on the over-all figure. Table 1** contains estimated performance
figures for the railroads of Communist China in 1952 and 1956-59.
Performance of the magnitude announced for 1958 was adequate
only to handle the demands made on the railroad system by the modern
industrial sector of the economy. Because of the over-all shortage of
transportation in 1958 and the high priorities given to heavy industry
in the use of transportation of all kinds, there was increasing conges-
tion of rail transport, primarily in the movement of goods of lower
priority. Thus a lack of additional transport capacity may have con-
tributed to serious shortages of food in some urban areas and to the
decline in exports that took place at the end of 1958 and the beginning
of 1959.
The tremendous increase in production that occurred in 1958
created an unusual demand for service by a railroad system that had
little or no excess capacity. During 1950-57 the Chinese Communists
had not invested heavily in transportation, possibly because it appeared
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** Table 1 follows on p. 4.
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Table 1
Communist China: Estimated Rail Transport Performance
1952 and 1956-59
Year
Tons Originated
(Million)
1952 13212/
1956
1957
1958
1959
24612/
274 el
380 I/
520 1/
Ton-Kilometers
(Billion)
60.2 E/
120.4 2/
134.6 h
186 '
253 m/
Average Length
of Haul
(Kilometers)
Railroad
Network
(Kilometers)
Ton-Kilometer Performance
per Route-Kilometer
2/
455 d/
24,477 2/
.,Thousand)
2,459
489 2/
29,071 E./
4,142
491 2/
29,862 2/
4,507
489 1/
31,193 h/
5,963
487 E/
N.A.
N ?A ?
a. Ton-kilometers divided by length of railroad network -- that is, the number of route-kilometers in
use at the end of the year.
b.
C.
d. Ton-kilometers divided by tons originated (using unrounded data).
e. The total length of operating rail lines was 29,862 km by the end of 1957, 22 percent above the
level of 1952. ?,./
f.
h. 2/,
"
j. During 1958, ton-kilometer performance increased by 38 percent. 11/
k. By the end of 1958, 31,193 km of railroad line were open to traffic. 12/
1. 1959 plan. 1.1/
m. Tons originated multiplied by the estimated average length of haul of 487 km.
n. Estimated.
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that a satisfactory rate of growth was being maintained with relatively
small increments of investment. Railroads fared better than other
carriers, but a large part of the amounts invested had gone into new
construction. If larger amounts had been devoted to improvements in
the existing system, railroad facilities and equipment might have been
adequate to handle the increased traffic demands of 1958. Figure 1*
shows the relationship between annual investment and the performance
of the railroads in terms of freight ton-kilometers during 1952-59.
B. 1959 Plan
At the end of 1958, about 30 million to ko million tons of goods
were waiting to be moved on the railroads of Communist China. IA/ The
evidence indicates that these goods were primarily products other than
those of heavy industry. Thus the railroad system started 1959 with a
backlog of unshipped commodities that was approximately equal to 10 per-
cent of 1958 performance. The 1959 plan for railroad tons originated,
announced in April, was set at 520 million tons, Li an increase of
37 percent above the level of 1958.** If the plan is fulfilled, tons
originated will increase by 140,million tons, the largest absolute
annual increase ever attained. Although the demand for rail transport
in 1959 was expected to increase by about 100 percent above the level
of 1957, 11/ the 37-percent increase in tons originated planned for
1959 should be practically sufficient to take care of increases in pro-
duction in industry and agriculture, which are not expected to expand
as rapidly as in 1958. Many problems remain in the field of rail
transport in 1959, but, in contrast to the situation in 1958, the regime
is acutely aware of them and will pay more attention to transport capa-
bilities when production plans are made.
* Following p. 6. For the location of railroads and selected roads
in Communist China as of May 1959, see the map, Figure 2, inside back
cover.
** The volume of freight originated on the railroads of Communist China
during the first 6 months of 1959 reportedly was 247 million tons,
49 percent more than that in the first 6 months of 1958 (166 million
tons). 1J,J In the first 6 months of 1958 only 43.7 percent of total
annual performance was accomplished. In 1959, however, 47.5 percent
of the annual plan was fulfilled during the first 6 months of the year.
Because performance during the second half of the year usuR]ly exceeds
that in the first half, it appears that the plan goal of 520 million
tons will be achieved, if past experience is a guide. During the first
6 months of 1959 the railroads originated a volume of freight about
equal to total performance in 1956. If the 1959 goal is achieved, the
volume of freight originated during July-December will be about equal
to performance in 1957.
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C. Comparison Between the Rate of Growth of Railroad Tons Origi-
nated and Production of Selected Commodities
In order to compare the rates of growth of rail transport per-
formance and industrial production, a multiple correlation between tons
originated on the railroads and the production of coal, cement, and
ferrous materials in Communist China can be computed for 1950-57.*
With the three key commodities as the independent variables and tons
originated as the dependent variable, the coefficient of correlation
is found to be 0.99. To determine whether or not announced rail trans-
port performance was adequate in 1958, production estimates for the
three commodities can be substituted in the regression equation for
the multiple correlation and the equation solved for tons originated.
The results show that the tonnage originated by the railroads should
have been 385 million tons. This is only 1.3 percent higher than the
announced performance of 380 million tons originated and indicates that
for all practical purposes rail transport performance was generally
adequate to support estimated production in the modern industrial sec-
tor of the economy in 1958.
In order to check the rail transport performance planned for
1959, a new regression equation can be computed using data for 1950-58,
and production goals planned for 1959 can be substituted in the equation.
The results indicate that the railroads should originate 504 million
tons in 1959; or 97 percent of planned performance, in order to support
modern production in other sectors. Thus it is estimated that rail
transport performance in 1959 will be adequate to support production
in the modern industrial sector of the economy.
D. Commodity Composition of Railroad Freight Traffic
The estimated tonnage of certain basic commodities originated
on the railroads of Communist China in 1958-59 is shown in Table 2.**
The identified commodities listed in this table account for about
78 percent of the total tons originated by the railroads.
* These commodities were chosen because they are key commodities from
the point of view of both transportation and the growth of industry in
the present stage of economic development in Communist China. The three
commodities also constituted about 40 percent of the tonnage originated
by the railroads during 1950-57. The production estimates for 1958 and
1959; used in computing or substituting in the equation, exclude the
large quantities of handicraft or native production not included in the
data for 1950-57.
** Table 2 follows on p. 7.
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COMMUNIST CHINA
ANNUAL INVESTMENT IN
AND PERFORMANCE OF RAILROADS, 1952-59
Figure 50X1
OUTPUT
(Billion Ton kilometers)
600
500
400
300
200
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
INVESTMENT
(Billion Yuan)
6.0
50
INVESTMENT
OUTPUT
1952
28157 9-59
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
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1958
40
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
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1959
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Table 2
Communist China: Estimated Tonnage
of Basic Commodities Originating on Railroads
1958-59
Commodity
Volume
(Million Metric Tons)
Percent
of Total 2/ 1958 1959
Coal
39
148
203
Construction materials
12
46
62
Ferrous materials
11
42
57
Agricultural goods
10
38
53
Timber
5
20
26
Petroleum
1
3
5
Other
22
83
114
Total 100
a. These percentages are for the most part based on Chinese announce-
ments of the percentage of rail tons originated which were accounted
for by different commodities. In arriving at these estimates, however,
consideration was given to the volume and location of production, flow
patterns, methods of distribution, and consumption areas. The percent-
ages are assumed to be about the same for both years.
Because the irrational transportation of coal wasted transpor-
tation facilities during 1958/ transportation of coal is considered
by the Chinese Communists to be the key to fulfillment of the 1959
goal for tons originated. Careful planning for transportation of coal
in the first part of 1959 resulted in "more coal and other goods being
delivered." 1g/ Production of coal in 1958 was announced to be about
double production in 1957/ or 270 million tons, of which about 208
million tons were produced by modern mines. Traditionally, the rail-
roads have hauled about three-fourths of modern production of coal 12/
and probably hauled about this share in 1958, even though coal accounted
for about 39 percent of tons originated compared with 33 percent in
1957. E2/ In recent years, about 60 percent of the coal has been pro-
duced in north and northeast China, and the surplus in these areas has
been shipped by rail and water to central and south China. Some of
this surplus production is transported 2,000 km, more than five times
the average distance over which coal is transported by rail. 21/
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Construction materials -- including cement, glass, brick, sand,
gravel, earth, and stone -- are estimated to constitute only about
12 percent of total railroad tons originated in 1958-59 compared with
about 18 percent in 1954. 2g/ In 1958 these materials were not given
the priority in the transportation system accorded to materials for
the steel industry, nor in 1959 when coal, steel, grain; and cotton
are priority items. During 1959, however, the increase of 35 percent
in the amount of these materials transported by railroad* is more than
the planned increase of 26 percent in construction investment. 2?3./
Cement produced by modern plants amounted to 6.9 million tons in 1957,
9.3 million in 1958, and 12.5 million planned for 1959. Li/ About
70 percent of production in the past has been hauled by railroad. 22/
In 1958 the movement of ferrous materials was given top priority
to achieve the "leap forward" goal of 11 million tons of crude steel.
About one-fourth of .the 42 million tons of these materials estimated to
have moved by railroad consisted of iron ore transported from the mines
near An-shan to the steel complex. About 3 million tons of pig iron
and semifinished steel moved as interplant shipments. Of the 4.6 mil-
lion tons of finished steel produced in 1958, more than 2 million tons
are estimated to have moved by railroad. Not only did materials from
modern plants enter the railroad system, but also native production of
crude steel was reported to have added to the congestion in the last
half of 1958. EW
Agricultural goods; which in rail transport comprise mainly
government-procured grain and cotton, move from inland producing areas
to the large cities. During 1958, apparently both grain and perishable
agricultural products were delayed at loading points. Not until Decem-
ber were agricultural goods moved on a priority basis. The timber in-
dustry, which is mainly in northeast, central, and south China, is being
modernized and is using narrow-gauge steel or wooden railroads to take
logs to waterways or directly to the mills. Lumber is shipped either
by rail or by water to large cities and construction projects. In 1958
the estimated production of timber was 35 million cubic feet. This
production is estimated to have accounted for 20 million tons on the
railroad system, either as logs or as lumber. In the petroleum indus-
try the major movements of crude oil were the movement to refineries
on the coast of about 600,000 tons of Yu-men production and about
360,000 tons imported from the USSR through the transloading stations
of Otpor,and Chi-ning. Of about 4 million tons of domestic and imported
refined products available in 1958; it is estimated that roughly 2 mil-
lion tons were distributed by rail.
* Based on information in Table 2, p. 7, above.
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Other categories not listed include such important groups as
railroad stores, which in past years have accounted for as much as
11 percent of the railroad tons originated, 2// and military supplies.
In addition, there are the products of industries such as chemicals,
nonferrous minerals and metals, and consumer goods other than products
of agriculture.
III. Operating Efficiency
A. Freight Cars
1. Average Load per Loaded Car
In order to originate 380 million tons of freight in 1958
with their relatively limited freight car park, the Chinese Communists
apparently increased substantially their average load per loaded car.
In January 1959 the publication Hung Chti (Red Flag) carried an article
by Lu Cheng-tstao, a Vice Minister of Railroads, which stated that
during 1958 the average net load per freight car was increased to 37.6
tons. E1V This figure represents an increase of about 8 percent above
the 1957 figure of 34.7 tons per freight car. g2/ In October 1958 it
was reported in the Soviet newspaper Gudok (The Whistle) that freight
cars in Communist China were being loaded 20 percent above their load
capacity in order to cope with rapidly growing traffic. ?E/ The Chinese
announced at the same time that the loading capacity of freight cars
had been increased by 15 to 30 percent as a result of a series of
technical innovations. 11/
A large percentage of commodities carried on the railroads
of Communist China are materials that load to 100 percent or more of
capacity, often in freight cars with a carrying capacity of 50 or 60
tons. It is estimated that more than two-thirds of the freight carried
by the Chinese railroads consists of such heavy-loading goods as coal,
grain, railroad supplies, ores, heavy steel products, chemicals, salt,
and cement and other construction materials. 3E/ With many 50-ton and
60-ton freight cars regularly loaded to 100 percent or more of rated
capacity, many 30-ton cars loaded to 120 percent of capacity, and the
remainder packed as fully and heavily as is humanly possible, the
announced figure of 37.6 tons per car does not appear implausible. In
addition, it is less than 1 percent above the average capacity of the
entire freight car park of 37.28 tons as of mid-1957. .1V
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The most serious consequence of overloading of freight cars 50X1
is the possible damage to springs and bearings. Operating speeds must
also be reduced to prevent damage to rail ends and trestles.
The Chinese Communists have said very little concerning 50X1
their 1959 plan for average load per loaded freight car. In April 1959,
however, it was announced that the plan for railroad freight transport
for the first quarter of the year had been fulfilled. The same announce-
ment contained a statement to the effect that during the second quarter
the plan called for an average load per loaded freight car of 4o
tons. 16../ If such a figure was attained during the second qparter, it
is estimated that the annual achievement in 1959 will approach the same
figure.*
2. Daily Carloadings
In order to originate 380 million tons of freight in cars 50X1
loaded to an average of 37.6 tons, the Chinese Communists averaged
* During 11-20 August 1959, average load per loaded car reportedly was
increased to 40.1 tons. dU/ Another announcement indicated that during
the first 20 days of August average load per loaded car was 4o tons,
1 ton more than during the first half of the year. .5..g/
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27,689 carloadings per day in 1958, a 26.5-percent increase above the
level of 1957.* From a daily average of 25,741 during the first quarter
of 1958, carloadings increased to a peak of 32,800 during Novem-
ber. 1-12/ In January 1959, daily carloadings dropped to 30,146.
During the next few months, however, daily carloadings again increased,
reaching a new peak of 36,870 in May.)12/ During the first half of
1959 an average of slightly less than 35,000 freight cars was loaded
each day.** In order to reach their plan goal of 520 million tons
originated in 1959, the Chinese will have to average slightly more than
35,600 freight cars loaded per day with 40 tons per car during the
entire year. Thus continued improvement in daily carloadings is a
necessity if the plan is to be fulfilled.
3. Turnaround Time and Freight Car Requirements
a. Turnaround Time
According to Chinese Communist announcements, turn-
around time was again reduced significantly in 1958, from the 1957
figure of 2.9 days to an average of 2.75 days. La/ This Office pre-
viously estimated that the Chinese are referring to turnaround time
for loaded cars in their announcements rather than to conventional
turnaround time as the term is used in other countries. Therefore,
if approximately one-fifth to one-third is added to the announced
turnaround time figure to take care of the empty haul, actual turn-
around time may have ranged from 3.3 to 3.7 days.
Although a range of 3.3 to 3.7 days for turnaround
time in Communist China seems to be low when compared with turnaround
time of 5.7 days in the USSR in 1958 and nearly 15 days in the US, it
is conceivable that the Chinese have been able to attain such figures.xxx
During the last three quarters of 1958 the Chinese made frantic efforts
* The figure of 380 million tons originated divided by 365 days
gives 1,041,096 tons originated per day, and 1,041,096 tons divided
by 37.6 tons per car gives 27,689 cars loaded per day.
** The figure of 247 million tons originated divided by 181 days gives
1,364,641 tons originated per day, and 1,364,641 tons divided by 39 tons
per car gives 34,991 cars loaded per day.
XXX In 1958 the average length of haul on the railroad system of the
USSR was 806 km. Thus the average length of haul of 489 km on the
Chinese Communist railroads was only 61 percent of the average length
of haul on the Soviet system. At the same time, turnaround time on
the Chinese system was 58 percent of the Soviet turnaround time, if
the 3.3-day figure mentioned above is compared with the Soviet figure
of 5.7 days. Thus average length of haul and turnaround time in China
were both about 60 percent of the similar Soviet figures in 1958.
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to reduce unloading and loading time so that the existing car park could
be used to transport more freight. Under the leadership of local Com-
munist Party committees, numerous rail transport commands were estab-
lished. These commands organized great masses of people into loading
and unloading teams to assist in rail operations. On one occasion,
more than a million people were organized to deal with congestion of
railroad freight at a number of stations.122/ Thus the Chinese attempted
to organize the available labor force in such a way that "men wait for
the cars instead of making the cars wait for the men." Liji
Turnaround time on the railroads of Communist China
allegedly was reduced to 2.42 days in April 1959 and to 2.38 days in
May./ If these figures represent loaded car turnaround time, actual
turnaround time may have been reduced almost to 3 days by May 1959.
The reductions in turnaround time in 1959 were to be accomplished by
continued use of special loading and unloading teams, by effecting
technical innovations in freight loading and unloading evipment, and
by strengthening cooperation between transport units and factory and
mining enterprises.LE/ The greatest stress was to be placed on in-
creasing labor productivity rather than on mass use of labor. New
devices were to be emphasized rather than an increase in the number of
workers or working hours.1?2/
b. Freight Car Requirements
During 1958 the Chinese Communists averaged 27,689
freight cars loaded per day with 37.6 tons per car. Estimates of
freight car requirements thus depend on estimates of turnaround time
plus an estimated allowance for cars in reserve and under repair. The
following tabulation indicates the number of freight cars which would
have been required during 1958 under varying assumptions for actual
turnaround time. Because the number of freight cars required would
have to be available on the average during the entire year, the figure
for car requirements must be equated to the midyear figure for the
freight car park.
Actual Total Freight Car
Turnaround Time Requirements*
(Days) (Units)
4.0
112,400
3.7
104,000
3.5
98,400
3.3
92,700
3.0
84,300
A factor equal to 1.5 percent of the operating freight car park has
been included to take care of cars being repaired and cars in reserve.
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At the end of 1957 the freight car park of Communist
China reportedly consisted of about 86/000 cars.112/ During 19581
production of freight cars increased greatly, although production re-
portedly was hampered by a shortage of wheels and axles. 22/ According
to the State Statistical Bureau, Communist China produced 11,000 freight
cars in 1958/ a 51-percent increase above production in 1957. 21/ Thus
the freight car park at the end of 1958 probably consisted of no more
than 97,000 cars and the midyear park of no more than 92,000 to 93,000
cars. The park at the end of the year may have been considerably less
than 97,000 freight cars if a large number of cars were retired during
1958. Because there is no evidence to indicate large retirements and
because the demand for freight cars was extremely heavy, it is believed
that retirements in 1958 were negligible.
If the midyear park in 1958 is compared with freight
car requirements, it appears that actual turnaround time was reduced
to about 3.3 days in 1958. Even a turnaround time of 3.5 days would
have left the Chinese Communists with a deficit of about 6,000 freight
cars. An estimate for actual turnaround time of 3.3 days is 20 percent
above the announced figure of 2.75 days for loaded car turnaround time.
Thus only about one-sixth of the time between loadings was taken up
with the empty haul rather than one-fourth, as previously estimated.
In view of the efforts which the Chinese made during 1958 to utilize
all their available freight cars and to reduce loading and unloading
time, it is estimated that turnaround time was reduced to 3.3 days and
that production of new freight cars in 1958 was sufficient to meet
total car requirements for the year.
In order to originate 520 million tons of freight in
1959 in freight cars loaded on the average to 40 tons, the Chinese will
have to average 35,616 carloadings per day. The following tabulation
indicates the number of freight cars which would be required in 1959
under varying assumptions for actual turnaround time:
Actual Total Freight Car
Turnaround Time Requirements
(Days) (Units)
4.0
144,600
3.7
133,800
3.5
126,500
3.3
119,300
3.0
108,500
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During 1959 the production of freight cars is planned
to increase from the 1958 level of 11,000 to between 27,000 and
28,500, 22/ although it is currently estimated that no more than
20,000 units actually will be produced.* Thus the park at the end of
1959 may range from 117,000 to 125,000 freight cars and the midyear
park from 107,000 to 111,000 cars. If the estimated midyear park is
compared with freight car requirements, it appears that actual turn-
around time will have to be reduced almost to 3 days if the 1959 plan
for tons originated is to be fulfilled. The evidence indicates that
reduction of turnaround time to this figure may have been attained in
May. Further improvement may be possible during the rest of the year.
During 1960-70, continued increases in performance
probably can be achieved only by sizable annual increases in the freight
car and locomotive parks rather than by much further improvement in
operating efficiency, where the limits appear already to have been
reached or exceeded. Thus it will be necessary for the Chinese Commu-
nists to continue investment in rolling stock and in improvements of
existing facilities at the 1959 rate for a number of years in order to
keep up with increasing demand.
B. Locomotives
1. Performance
The Chinese Communists have published very few recent figures
concerning locomotive performance. During 1958 the average daily kilo-
metrage per locomotive was reported to be 391 km, 2.21/ 7.7 percent above
the 1956 figure of 363.2 km. So far, no daily kilanetrage figures for
1959 have been announced, which may indicate little or no improvement
in this particular indicator.
Minister of Railroads T'eng Tai-yuan in February 1958
again called on all railroad workers to carry out the program for
achieving 1 million thin per locomotive per day. 22/ During the course
of the 1 million-tkm campaign, the average for the country increased
from 525,000 thin per locomotive per day in 1956 2W to 530,000 thin in
January 1958 a/ and to 698,000 thin in June 1958. 22/ The average
slipped back to 632,000 thin per locomotive per day in January 1959 22/
but increased again to a new high of 755,000 thin in May 1959. 62/
* According to the Chinese Communists, less than 40 percent of the goal
for the production of locomotives and freight cars was accomplished
during the first half of 1959. The Chinese have also indicated that
limited supplies of raw materials and other components will make it
impossible for freight car production to show a very big increase in
the second half of the year. 22/
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2. Requirements
At the end of 1957 the Chinese Communists are estimated to
have possessed a park of approximately 3,850 locomotives. This park
amounted to 4.48 locomotives per 100 freight cars, or 22.34 freight
cars per locomotive. During 1958 the Chinese produced 350 steam loco-
motives L/ and imported 50 steam locomotives from the USSR, thus in-
creasing the park to about 4,250 locomotives at the end of 1958, if
retirements, estimated to be negligible, are ignored. The ratio of
locomotives to freight cars declined to about 4.38 per 100 at the end
of 1958, a continuation of the 1952-57 trend. Thus the Chinese appar-
ently acquired enough locomotives during 1958 to meet both freight and
passenger traffic requirements, inasmuch as passenger traffic has been
increasing at almost the same rate as freight traffic.
During 1959 the locomotive inventory of Communist China
probably will increase to about 5,200 units as a result of both pro-
duction and imports. The ratio of locomotives to freight cars probably
will remain about the same. Thus it is estimated that the Chinese will
acquire enough locomotives during 1959 to meet traffic requirements.
IV. Investment
Since 1949, nearly all new capital invested in the railroads of
Communist China has been allocated through the state budget of the
national government. The railroads received about 12 percent of the
49.3 billion current yuan* invested by the state for all purposes in
1953-57. They are estimated to have received 9 percent in 1958 and
14 percent in the 1959 plan. Besides the capital investment by the
state in 1958 and 1959, however, there may also have been considerable
extrabudgetary investment by local and provincial governments.
Capital investment in the railroads of Communist China through the
state budget for construction of new rail lines, improvement of existing
lines, purchase of rolling stock, and planning and design is shown in
Table 3.** Information released by the Chinese for 1953-57 reveals that
railroads received between 60 and 70 percent of the investment made in
transportation and post and telecommunications. LV The proportion of
the investment in this sector going to railroads during 1958-59 hasxxx
* Because of the difficulty of determining a valid exchange rate,
yuan have not been converted into dollars. The rate of 2.46 yuan to
US $1 usually quoted is based on the yuan-sterling rate for telegraphic
transfers, which is arbitrarily established and bears no relation to
domestic price levels.
** Table 3 follows on p. 16.
XXX Text continued on p. 18.
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Table 3
Communist China: Capital Investment in Railroads
Compared with Total Capital Investment
1953-58 and 1959 Plan
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Transportation and Post
and Telecommunications Railroads
Year
Total for the Economy
(Million Current Yuan)
Amount
(Million
Current Yuan)
Percent
of Total
Amount
(Million
Current Yuan)
Percent
of Transportation and Post
and Telecommunications
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959 plan
6,506 2/
7,498 2/
8,632 a/
13,986 21
12,700 1/
21,400 g/
24,800 1/
1,063 2/
1,440 2/
1,724 2/
2,581 2/
2,411 2/
2,780 LI/
5,550 h/
16 12/
19 12/
2012/
18 12/
19 12/
13 Di
22 121
642 2/
917 2/
1,202 2/
1,738 2/
1,661 1/
1,900 1./
3,800 1/
60 2/
64 2/
70 2/
67 2/
69 2/
69 1/
69 l/
a. f,..1/
b. Computed from figures in columns 1 and 2.
c. Computed from figures in columns 2 and 4.
d. During 1953-57, total capital investment was 49.3 billion yuan. ?22/ The sum of the figures for
1953-56 subtracted from the total leaves about 12,700 million for 1957.
e. Investment in transportation and post and telecommunications in 1953-57 was 18.7 percent of
total capital investment.
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Table 3
Communist China: Capital Investment in Railroads
Compared with Total Capital Investment
1953-58 and 1959 Plan
(Continued)
f. During 1953-57, total investment for railroads was 6;160 million yuan. _g The sum of the
1953-56 data subtracted from the total leaves 1;661 million for 1957.
g. 162/. Investment through the state budget was 21.4 billion yuan. (Total investment; including
that by local governments, was 26.7 billion.)
h. Z./. Thirteen percent of the tOt6.1 was invested in transportation and post and telecommunica-
tions.
i. Assumed to be about the same percent of the total as in 1955-57.
j. The original plan for total investment was 27 billion yuan. When the revised plan total
was announced; the proportion of the total going to each sector was not discussed.
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not been announced, but, assuming that the proportion remains approxi-
mately the same as in 1955-57, railroad investment through the state
budget for 1958 can be estimated to be about 1,900 million yuan and
investment in 1959 to be nearly double that amount (about 3,800 million
yuan). Investment in transportation and communications, as originally
planned for 1959, represented the highest percentage of total invest-
ment ever given to that sector, probably reflecting the realization
that a higher level of state investment is necessary to cope with a
congested transportion situation of the type encountered in 1958.
Total investment in the original plan was revised downward in August
1959 from 27 billion yuan to 24.8 billion yuan? with no indication as
to which sectors have reduced goals.
Although the amount of rolling stock produced and track laid during
any one year is to a certain extent the result of accumulated invest-
ment in previous years, the excellent achievement during 1958 in both
of these categories makes it appear that actual railroad investment in
1958 was not limited to that included in the state budget. According
to a report of the State Statistical Bureau from Peking in April 1959,
total investment in capital construction amounted to 26.7 billion yuan?
of which 21.4 billion was made through the state budget. In addition,
the peoples communes built "a certain number of capital construction
projects." The report goes on to say that 13 percent of investment for
capital construction went to transportation and communications. 12/
Traditionally, the announced percentages of investment going to each
sector of the economy apply only to the investment made through the
state budget. Furthermore, railroad investment in past years has been
the responsibility of the central government. If it is assumed, how-
ever, that the 13 percent allocated to transportation and communications
applies to total budgetary and extrabudgetary investment combined, the
amount of railroad investment can then be estimated to be 2.4 billion
yuan in 1958. In view of the change in railroad administration which
placed railroad construction under the supervision of the provincial
railroad bureaus, 22/ extrabudgetary investment by the local governments
may have contributed substantially to the 1958 achievements. In 1959
the provincial governments are being urged to contribute to the construc-
tion of "provincial" railroads.
In addition to budgetary and possibly extrabudgetary investment,
there was considerable labor investment by the communes, which helped
to build the roadbeds for main and branch lines running through their
areas. This innovation is described by Lu Cheng-tsiao, a Vice Minister
of Railroads, as follows
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Concerning railroad capital construction, a new situation
arose after the implementation of the policy of the whole
Party and the whole people engaged in railroad work. Mil-
lions of the population were mobilized in various areas to
work on and repair several thousand kilometers of roadbed.
A. Railroad Network
Under the First Five Year Plan, during which state investment
in railroads was 6,160 million current yuan? /2/ a total of 10,000 km
of track was laid in Communist China. j1/ This addition resulted in
a 22-percent increase, from 24,477 km to 29,862 km, in the length of
main line in operation by the end of 1957. /V In 1958 a total of
3,564 km of line was laid, 900 km of which were conversions from single
track to double track, ig/ and 1,300 km were new lines. /2/ The re-
mainder, 1,364 km, apparently consisted of new branch and special
lines. The amount of new and double-track lines laid in 1958 was more
than double the amount completed in 1957, Eigl/ making 1958 the year of
greatest achievement in track laying. The length of total rail line
in operation at the end of 1958 was 31,193 km. L./ Even more track
probably would have been laid in 1958 had rails been readily avail-
able..E12,21 In addition to the amount of line laid in 1958, the roadbed
was completed for the double tracking of the Peking-Canton, Tientsin -
Plu-ktou, and Nanking-Shanghai lines. Only 500 km of double track were
laid on these lines during 1958. 112
Investment expenditures for construction of new lines in 1958
were directed toward extending the railroad network -- the construction
of east-west lines to balance the predominantly north-south lines;
lines to the transport-poor southwest; cutoff lines to avoid heavily
used junctions such as those at Tientsin and Milkden; and branch and
spur lines for industrial mining, forestry, and agriculture.
The 1959 plan calls for 7,000 km of track to be laid, about
double the 1958 total. ?2/ Investment will be directed primarily toward
the improvement of the existing network by reconstruction and double
tracking and by the addition of branch and special lines. ??./ Po I-po,
Vice Premier of the State Council, said that the transportation of
coal, steel, and iron should be insured primarily through the construc-
tion of railroad branch and special lines for shipping coal, steel, and
iron; through the improvement of existing railroads; and, particularly,
through the double tracking of some railroads. ..3,1/ Highest priority in
double tracking is to be given to the Peking-Canton, Tientsin - P'u-k'ou,
and Nanking-Shanghai lines, on which the roadbed was completed during
1958. It is planned that the remaining 2,342 km of these lines will be
double tracked by the end of 1959. Also planned is double tracking of
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800 km of the Lung-Hai line, which runs from Lan-chou to the east coast,
making the double tracking goal for 1959 at least 3,142 km. LW About
2,300 km of new branch lines also are to be built. 4/ The plan for
track to be laid on new lines may be as high as 1,55 km, the difference
between the total of 7,000 km and the sum of the double-track and branch
lines.
About 400 km of "native" railroads were built in 1958, according
to Lu Cheng-ts'ao? who urged the people to "walk on two legs in railroad
construction." He explained that they should build "large and foreign-
style" railroads as well as "small and native-style" railroads. 22/
The latter he divided into two types, as follows: one type feeds into
the nationwide railroad network, and for these, standard-gauge rails
are supposed to be used in order to facilitate their future conversion
into "large and foreign-style" railroads; the other type does not connect
with the railroad network, and its standards vary with local conditions.
The "native" railroads are made mostly of locally produced cast iron
and wood and are operated by diesel, gas, or steam engines; railroad
motor cars; and even converted automobile engines. 21/ The labor to
build these railroads is mostly "voluntary." They are said to be built
with local investment, which almost certainly is extrabudgetary.
B. Rolling Stock
The allocation of total railroad investment in Communist China
between construction of rail line and purchase of rolling stock during
1958 and 1959 has not been announced. The large increase planned for
production of rolling stock, however, as shown in the following tabu-
lation, may put into action the words of Po I-po, who stated that in
capital construction equal attention should be paid to construction of
railroads and to production of locomotives and freight cars.
Year
Production Production
of Locomotives of Freight Cars
(Units) (Units)
1956 22/
1957
1958 2.1
1959 plan 22/
184
167
350
555
6,380
7,500
11,000
27,000 to 28,500
Po I-po explained that the main problem in meeting the trans-
portation needs of the people is the shortage of transportation equip-
ment in the face of the demand for rapidly increasing tonnage. For
this reason the central government placed a high priority on production
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of locomotives and freight cars in an effort to insure fulfillment of
the plan. 2.6./ The increase of about 145 to 160 percent in the 1959
target compared with the 1958 achievement in production of freight cars
is considerably higher than the less than 50-percent increase in 1958
compared with that in 1957. Most of the railroad cars to be produced
in 1959 are open freight cars, suited for hauling coal and iron. 22/
V. Administration
A simplified organization of the Ministry of Railroads in Peking
and a decentralized administration in the provinces also contributed
in part at least to the performance of 380 million tons originated in
1958. The increase of 39 percent in tons originated coincided with an
extensive but gradual reorganization of railroad administration which
began on 1 January 1958. This reorganization abolished the more than
50 subbureaus which were responsible to about 15 regional administra-
tive bureaus and changed the regional bureaus to about 30 provincial
(or city) bureaus which in turn were made responsible to both the
Ministry and the "provincial authorities." The "provincial authorities"
are described as the "provincial Party committee" and
as the "provincial or city people's councils." 2?1/ At the same
time the Ministry in Peking consolidated its organization and reduced
administrative personnel by as much as 40 percent in some units. 99/
In the provinces the present railroad administrative organ is
usually called simply a "railroad bureau" or "railroad control bureau,"
prefixed by the name of the city in which it is located, instead of a
railroad administration or railroad administrative bureau. In addition
to one railroad bureau in almost every provincial capital, there are
bureaus known to be located in Shanghai 122/ and Pao-tiou, 121/ possi-
bly because of the large amount of traffic or construction these cities
have, and in Ch'i-ch'i-ha-erh, Mn-tan-chiang, 122/ and Chin-chou, 111/
possibly because of the large area and extensive railroad system in the
former Manchurian provinces. Except for the Manchurian provinces, the
territorial jurisdiction of the provincial bureaus follows closely the
provincial boundaries and is in contrast to the arrangement of the
former 15 railroad administrative bureaus, the boundaries of which
were fixed to control whole sections of main rail lines. 104/ With
one bureau in almost every provincial capital, and others in special
cities, there are probably about 30 railroad bureaus at present.
The first announcement of the change in administration came in
November 1957, when the Ministry of Railroads made public the decision
to place the administrative organs of rail transport under two
authorities -- the Ministry and the provincial authorities. General
planning, traffic rules, distribution of rolling stock, the establish-
ment of technical standards, and the like -- that is, everything
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requiring standardization over the entire country and centralized
guidance -- remained the prerogative of the Ministry. Questions of
"concrete control" of railroad operations and construction were given
to the provincial authorities. 122/ "Concrete control" apparently
means that the railroad bureau actually operates the railroads in its
territory without the former subbureaus as the final administrative
arm.
Pre-
sumably traffic provided for in the state plan is controlled by the
Ministry, and less important traffic and local traffic are controlled
at the provincial level. It is safe to assume that the new provincial
organization provided the mass labor to speed up loading and unloading
time, to repair and maintain rail lines, to prepare roadbed for double
tracking, to stockpile goods at the railheads, and the like. The
authorities in Peking expect the new organization to effect a closer
liaison at the local level between transportation and the expansion
of all branches of industry and agriculture and to provide better
results in rail operations and construction. 12?./
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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
The information used in the preparation of this report was based
largely on announcements in the Chinese Communist press concerning rail
transport performance in 1958-59.
Wherever possible, the statistics were checked
for internal consistency and for consistency with other available in-
formation. Multiple correlation analysis was used to assess the rela-
tionship between industrial production and rail transport performance,
but even here reliance was of necessity placed on published figures.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/20:
CIA-RDP79R01141A001500160002-5
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/20:
CIA-RDP79R01141A001500160002-5
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP79R01141A001500160002-5
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1 I 5i?30'
1 6?30
PEIPING AND ADJACENT AREA
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BROAD-GAUGE RAILROADS (5'6" in India,
5'0" in U.S.S.R., China, and Mongolia)
ttc in Double-track
Single-track
Under construction
Projected
STANDARD-GAUGE RAILROADS (4'85")
NARROW-GAUGE
SELECTED ROADS (western and southern border regions only)
Major road
Minor road, or trail
Road under construction
Huai-jou
I
9 PEI-C
Niu-Ian?shan
K'ai.yrian
Pi-se-chai
GENERAL BASIC INFORMATION
International boundary, demarcated
International boundary, undemarcated
International boundary, indefinite
Internal administrative boundary
National capital
Operable, double-track
Operable, single-track
Inoperable
Under construction
Projected
RAILROADS (various widths)
Operable, single-track
Inoperable
Under construction
Projected
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ang-hsin-tien Feng-
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PEIPING
PEKING)
Nan-yuan
NOTE: Minor industria( mining, and logging
railroads are not shown.
Alignments of all projected railroads
are approximate.
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'Ban Nam
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ien
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oundoiies and names ore not necessarily
6Se re ognized'by the U.S. Uovernment,
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27780.1 5-59
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP79R01141A001500160002-5
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP79R01141A001500160002-5