MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY THE SOVIET BLOC TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD

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CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6
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August 29, 2013
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2
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January 1, 1959
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REPORT
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 SECRET ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT N? MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY THE SOVIET BLOC TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD CIA/RR 59-5 January 1959 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S4 50X1 50X1 SECRET pr Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY THE SOVIET BLOC TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD CIA/RR 59-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T CONTENTS Page Summary 1 I. Introduction 2 II. Nature of the Arms Agreements 3 III. Values and Terms of the Arms Agreements 4 A. Egypt' 4 B. Syria 5 C. Indonesia 5 D. Afghanistan 6 E. Yemen 6 F. Iraq 6 IV. Soviet Bloc Military Technicians 6 A. Assembly and Maintenance 7 B. Training of Military Personnel 9 C. Advisory Personnel 10 V. Military Training in the Soviet Bloc 10 VI. Military Installations 14 A. Egypt 14 B. Syria 15 C. Afghanistan 17 D. Yemen 17 VII. Economic Consequences of the Arms Agreements 18 A. Foreign Trade 18 B. Economic Development 21 VIII. Conclusions 22 Appendixes Appendix A. Statistical Tables 25 - - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T Tables Page 1. Soviet Bloc Military Agreements with Under- developed Countries of the Free World, 1955-58 5 2. Military Technicians of the Soviet Bloc Utilized by Recipient Countries, 1955-58 . . . 7 3. Military Personnel Trained in the Soviet Bloc, 1955-58 12 4. Foreign Trade of Egypt and Syria, 1954, 1956, and 1957 19 5. Export of Egyptian and Syrian Cotton to the Sino-Soviet Bloc 19 6. Foreign Exchange Reserves of Egypt and Syria, 1954-58 20 7. Egyptian Trade Balances in Clearing Accounts with the Soviet Bloc, 1957 21 8. Financial Aspects of Arms Sales by the Soviet 'Bloc to the Underdeveloped Countries of the Free World 25 9. Military Trainees in the Soviet Bloc, 1955-58 28 10. Foreign Trade of Egypt, 1954, 1956, and 1957 29 U. Foreign Trade of Syria, 1954, 1956, and 1957 31 12. Estimated Selected Arms Received from the Soviet Bloc, 1955-58 32 - iv - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T Illustrations Figure 1. Egypt: Soviet-Built Jet Fighters at an Air Force Base (PhotograPh) . . . 8 Figure 2. Egypt: Training on Soviet-Built J3-3 Heavy Tanks (Photograph) 9 Figure 3. Syria: Training in the Use of Heavy Artillery (Photograph) 11 Figure 4. Syria: Training in Soviet-Built T-34 Tanks (Photograph) 11 Figure 5. Syria: Example of Modernization at Hama Airfield (Photograph) 16 Figure 6. Syria: Naval Base Under Construction with the Assistance of the Soviet Bloc (Photograph) 16 Figure 7. Egypt: Activity of the Soviet Bloc in the Development of Military Installa- tions (Map) Figure 8. Syria: Activity of the Soviet Bloc in the Development of Military Installa- tions (Map) Figure 9. Afghanistan: Activity of the Soviet Bloc in the Development of Airfields (Map) Figure 10. Yemen: Activity of the Soviet Bloc in the Development of Airfields (Map) . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Following Page 18 18 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY THE SOVIET BLOC TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD* Summary Since mid-1955, six underdeveloped countries of the Free World have signed agreements with the Soviet Bloc for the acquisition of arms through credits valued at a minimum of $910 million.** The credits extended under these agreements are being utilized to equip completely with Bloc arms the armed forces of recipient countries. In conjunction with the purchase of Bloc arms, Bloc advisers are assisting these countries in reorganizing their military establish- ments and are engaged in teaching military science to indigenous military personnel. The USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have been the principal contractors under the agreements concluded with these countries. The United Arab Republic accounts for about 55 percent of the value of such credit agreements concluded with the Bloc. The agreements provide for payment, usually through export of domestic commodities, over periods ranging from 4 to 10 years. Large numbers of Soviet Bloc technicians are exported simultane- ously to assemble equipment and to train indigenous personnel in its use and maintenance. In addition, Bloc technicians are utilized for training personnel in military tactics and operations and as advisory personnel for staff and line units. It is estimated that about 1,200 Bloc military technicians have been utilized by the countries receiv- ing Bloc arms. Since mid-1955, more than 1,600 nationals from countries receiv- ing arms from the Soviet Bloc have undergone military training in the Bloc. Courses of instruction included many phases of ground, air, and naval training and were undertaken primarily in the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In addition to providing arms, training, and the services of military technicians, the Soviet Bloc also has been active in help- ing these countries to modernize established military installations and to construct new facilities. The Syrian airfield network is undergoing an extensive modernization with Bloc assistance. Egypt * The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best judgment of this Office as of 1 January 1959. ** Al]. dollar values in this report are in terms of current US dollars. S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T also has utilized Bloc assistance in modernizing a number of major airfields and in expanding its naval facilities. Yemen and Afghan- istan are receiving substantial Bloc assistance in building domestic airfield networks. The conclusion of military aid agreements has affected directly the trade patterns of recipient countries. Between 1954 and 1957 the trade of Syria with the Soviet Bloc rose from 2 to 13 percent of total Syrian trade. During the same period the trade of Egypt with the Bloc increased from 10 to 36 percent of total trade. Approxi- mately 10 to 15 percent of total Egyptian exports are being utilized to pay for arms purchased from the Bloc. The trade of Yemen, Indo- nesia, and Iraq can be expected to undergo similar changes. The already large percentage of Afghanistan's trade with the Bloc is expected to increase even further. The burden of large defense expenditures has affected adversely the economic development plans of recipient countries. The loss in foreign exchange from the shift of large portions of exports to Soviet Bloc markets has restricted the level of trade with the West and has compelled the underdeveloped countries to seek additional economic assistance from the Bloc. I. Introduction. Exploiting local conflicts and supporting nationalist movements which are basically anti-Western, the USSR has succeeded in achiev- ing a position of influence in regions vital to Western interests. The present turmoil in the Middle East is the culmination of 3 years of Soviet-supported nationalist ferment in order to destroy Western influence in this strategic area. In the Middle East, particularly in Egypt and Syria, the conse- quences of large-scale arms purchases from the Soviet Bloc have been the most dramatic. Latent forces developing since the end of World War II were provided explosive outlet by a series of events that oc- curred in 1955. A destructive raid by Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip early in 1955 and the adherence of Iraq -- Egypt's arch rival in the Arab world -- to the Baghdad Pact undoubtedly impressed upon Nasser that Egypt could never become a leader in the Arab world with- out military strength. The coincident decision of the USSR to provide active economic and political support to nationalist movements in former colonial - 2 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T areas presented a source from which such strength might be developed. This decision became evident in 1955 as the Sino-Soviet Bloc economic offensive gained momentum amidst the illusion of good will created by the Geneva Summit Conference. While the Conference was in session, an Egyptian government representative approached the USSR with a re- quest for the very arms which the West recently had denied Egypt. A credit agreement for Egyptian purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia -- in which Czechoslovakia probably served as the medium through which Soviet arms could be transmitted -- was negotiated quickly. In Syria, where anti-Western nationalism had reached a fierce Intensity, the opportunity to obtain large supplies of arms to de- fend itself against hostile neighbors, particularly Israel, was seized quickly. Within months after the Egyptian agreement, Syria also signed an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia. In Yemen, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, the USSR was able to ex- ploit local, rather than regional, situations. Yemen's.conflict with the UK over Aden, Afghanistan's border conflict with Pakistan, and Indonesia's internal strife and territorial conflict with the Netherlands presented prime opportunities for further Soviet ex- ploitation. In each instance the Soviet Bloc was quick to come forward with offers designed to cultivate local chauvinism and to Increase antipathy toward the West.. II. Nature of the Arms Agreements. The arms agreements discussed in this report are those inter- governmental accords in which a Soviet Bloc country has agreed to provide on credit military goods and services up to a specified aggregate value. Presumably such agreements, which are in effect a line of credit for acquiring military assistance, outline the general categories of goods and services to be purchased, leaving the determination of specific quantities within each category to subsequent contract negotiations by military purchasing commissions. The services of Soviet Bloc military technicians to assemble the arms probably are included in the aggregate value specified in the basic agreement. The recipient country, however, apparently concludes separate contracts for other Bloc technicians and must, in addition, provide the daily costs of the technician during his tour of duty in that country. The costs of training the nationals of recipient countries in the Bloc and of construction of military installations to utilize Bloc equipment also are not included in the basic agreement. - 3 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T III. Values and Terms of the Arms Agreements. Six underdeveloped countries of the Free World -- Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq -- have signed credit agree- ments to purchase arms from the Soviet Bloc valued at a minimum of $910 million.* (See Appendix A.) Except for the Indonesian agree- ment, in which Poland is extensively involved, Czechoslovakia and the USSR have provided the bulk of the arms. (See Table 1.**) A. Egypt. Egypt has accounted for approximately $365 million, or about 40 percent of the value of military assistance agreements concluded with the Soviet Bloc. This estimate includes only those agreements signed with Czechoslovakia in 1955 and the USSR in 1958. Because an additional agreement may have been concluded in 1957, the actual figure may be considerably higher. in Decem- ber 1956 the Egyptian government discussed with Soviet Marshal Zhukov the replacement of arms lost during the previous month's hostilities with the UK, France, and Israel. 2/*** In mid-1957 the Egyptians re- ceived from the USSR, among other things, 20 MIG-17 (Fresco) fighters and 12 I1-14 (Crate) transport planes. 2/ How these aircraft were financed is not known. In the agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1955 the Egyptians were required to make a 20-percent downpayment. The balance was payable in 4 annual installments at 2-percent interest through the Egyptian-Czechoslovak bilateral payment account. Egyptian exports, primarily cotton and rice, were to be the means of payment. Letters of credit presumably were to be opened in favor of Soviet Bloc trad- ing organizations, and these, when utilized, were to be credited against debts due the Bloc for arms purchases. It is possible that the visits of high-level Egyptian officials to Moscow during the past 2 years may have resulted in some revision of the original agreement, probably easing the terms for Egypt. * The total value of the credit specified in a given arms agree- ment reflects solely the selling prices to the underdeveloped coun- try and bears no necessary relation to costs of production or prices of arms in either the US or the Bloc. ** Table 1 foflows on D. -4- S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 50X1 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T Table 1 Soviet Bloc Military Agreements with Underdeveloped Countries of the Free World 1955-58 Million US $ USSR Czechoslovakia Poland Total Egypt 115 250 365 Syria 100 45 145 Indonesia 8 50 120 178 Afghanistan 25 10 35 Yemen 20 20 Iraq 168 168 Total 416 375 120 911 B. Syria. Since early 1956 the Soviet Bloc has provided Syria with credits totaling about $145 million to be utilized for the purchase of arms. As in the case of Egypt, the first agreements were signed with Czechoslovakia and subsequent agreements with the USSR, the latter accounting for about $100 million. The Czechoslovak agreement in 1956 provided for a 20-percent downpayment, the balance to be repaid over a 4-year period. As a result of domestic financial difficulties, Syria was unable to meet its first installment in 1957. Czechoslovakia agreed to postpone the payment The Soviet-Syrian agreement in November 1956 specified a prior payment of one-third the value of the credit extended for arms purchases in cash, with the balance to be repaid in 10 annual in- stallments at 2-percent interest. As in the case of Egypt, the Syrian installments will be met through the bilateral payments ac- count, primarily through exports of Syrian cotton. C. Indonesia. Indonesia purchased approximately $8 million worth of mili- tary vehicles from the USSR in 1957 but did not conclude a major credit agreement for the purchase of arms until early 1958. Credit - 5 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T agreements providing for about $170 million of military assistance have been signed with Poland and Czechoslovakia. An initial pay- ment of at least 5 percent was required in the Polish agreement, Li and, presumably, a similar downpayment was stipulated in the agree- ment with Czechoslovakia. The balance is to be repaid in 10 annual installments at 2-percent interest. There is no indication that Indonesia will be permitted to pay for arms purchases with commodi- ties. The allocation by the Indonesian cabinet in December 1957 of $250 million for arms purchases 2/ seems to indicate that annual payments will be made in convertible currency. D. Afghanistan. The USSR and Czechoslovakia have provided Afghanistan with credits of $25 million and $7 million, respectively, to be utilized for the procurement of arms. The agreement with the USSR, signed in 1956, permits payment to be made in Afghan commodities in 8 annual installments at 2-percent interest, with the first payment due in 1957. The agreements signed with Czechoslovakia consist of a $3- million cash transaction in 1955 and a $7-million agreement in 1956 which specified terms similar to the Soviet agreement. The first payment on the 1956 agreement, however, is not due until 1959. E. Yemen. Before 1958, Czechoslovakia agreed to provide Yemen with arms on credit to a value of about $20 million. Annual payments apparently are to be made over a period of 15 years, presumably in Yemeni com- modities. While there are indications that Yemen may have concluded another sizable agreement with Czechoslovakia late in June 1958, details are lacking. F. Iraq. In November 1958 the USSR agreed to extend a line of credit to Iraq for the procurement of arms. The value of the agreement is reported to be $168 million. IV. Soviet Bloc Military Technicians. Soviet Bloc military technicians in the underdeveloped countries receiving Bloc arms are utilized for three major functions, as follows: - 6 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T 1. Assembling and maintaining military equipment; 2. Training military personnel in tactics and in the operation of equipment; and 3. Advising personnel in staff and line units. It is estimated that about 1,200 Bloc military technicians have been utilized by the countries receiving arms from the Bloc (see Table 2). ?/ It is believed that the cost of the services of tech- nicians required to assemble and maintain equipment is included in the total value of the arms credits but not the cost of technicians performing training and advisory functions. Table 2 Military Technicians of the Soviet Bloc Utilized by Recipient Countries 1955-58 Egypt USSR Czechoslovakia Poland Total 490 150 64o Syria 180 75 10 265 Indonesia 120 30 150 Afghanistan 65 65 Yemen 60 15 75 Total 915 270 10 1,195 A. Assembly and Maintenance. During the period of initial arms deliveries the immediate need is for Soviet Bloc technicians to assemble the equipment and to train indigenous personnel in its use and maintenance. Late in October 1955, more than 40 Soviet and Czechoslovak technicians ar- rived in Egypt to assemble the transport and fighter planes Egypt received from the Bloc. These technicians also were used to train Egyptian personnel in the re- pair and maintenance of the aircraft. - 7 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 80X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T Contrary to the situation in Egypt, there was no immediate influx of large numbers of Soviet Bloc technicians into Syria, partly as a result of the slower rate of deliveries and partly as a result of the necessity of having the aircraft destined for Syria shipped to Egypt because of inadequate facilities in Syria. 11/ The hostili- ties in the Middle East in November 1956 delayed some deliveries of equipment as well as the arrival of Bloc technicians. Indonesia's arms agreements have resulted in the arrival of about 100 Soviet Bloc pilots and technicians to assemble and test the planes obtained by Indonesia. 21/ As new agreements are concluded, technicians usually are required to assemble and maintain subsequent arrivals of equipment. Although most of these technicians do not remain longer than is necessary to fulfill their functions, some are required to remain for extended periods of time to service the more intricate equipment. Soviet Bloc technicians were still assembling aircraft in Egypt and Syria toward the end of 1957, and a mission of Soviet engineers had to return to Egypt to repair damages to submarines resulting from improper operation by Egyptian naval personnel.ill/ Figure 1 (below) and Figure 2 (p. 9, below) are examples of equipment in which the Bloc has conducted training courses in Egypt. Figure 1. Egypt: Soviet-Built Jet Fighters at an Air Force Base - 8 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T Figure 2. Egypt: Training on Soviet-Built JS-3 Heavy Tanks B. Training of Military Personnel. Training of indigenous personnel has become a major function of Soviet Bloc technicians. Late in 1956 a-mission of Soviet officers planned to establish a comprehensive military training program in Egypt. 12/ Soviet military technicians have set up a number of tech- nical schools in Alexandria for training Egyptian naval personnel. A group of Soviet officers also are assisting the Egyptian air force In selecting pilots for preliminary training in Egypt before their advanced training in the USSR. la/ Courses have been established for the utilization of the entire range of armaments from rifles to aircraft with Soviet, Polish, and Czechoslovak technicians employed as instructors. 11/ Late in 1956 a large group of Soviet technicians was requested by the Syrian government to undertake an integrated program to train Syrian military personnel in the use and maintenance of all Bloc mili- tary equipment. 1?/ Polish technicians are training Syrians in the use and maintenance of minr equipment obtained from Poland, 12/ and about 15 Soviet officers are serving at a new military staff college at Qatana, Syria, where military tactics and organization are being taught. 22/ Soviet training manuals have been translated into Arabic and are being used at the staff college. 21/ Figures 3 and 4 (p. 11, below) are examples of the types of equipment utilized in training programs in Syria. - 9 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T In Afghanistan, Soviet officers at the Mazar-1-Sharif' air- field have been training Afghan air force personnel in jet fighter operation, photo interpretation, meteorology, and the use and main- tenance of communication equipment. 22/ One group of Soviet officers is conducting 6-month courses at the Kabul Military School, and another group is instructing at a tank school in Herat. 22/ Since late in 1956, Soviet and Czechoslovak officers have been training Yemeni personnel in the use and maintenance of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. 21.1/ C. Advisory Personnel. Soviet Bloc advisory personnel, particularly Soviet officers, have permeated the military eStablishments of Egypt and Syria. Soviet naval advisers are attached to elements of the Egyptian navy, Soviet and Czechoslovak officers are organized into special advisory groups and attached to divisional and army group headquarters, 22/ Soviet staff advisers have drawn up defensive and offensive battle plans, and Egypt has agreed to adopt Tables of Organization and Equipment drawn up by Soviet advisers. 2?/ In Syria, Soviet officers, at the request of the Syrian government, arrived early in 1957 to undertake a reorganization of the Syrian army. 21/ A large group of Soviet officers arrived in Syria in mid-1957 and were assigned to advisory posts at staff and field headquarters. The extent to which reorganization of the armies of the United Arab Republic (UAR) has been effected is difficult to determine, but it would appear reasonable to expect some reorganization along Soviet lines if efficient utilization of Soviet Bloc arms and equipment is anticipated. V. Military Training in the Soviet Bloc. More than 1,600 nationals of the underdeveloped countries receiv- ing arms from the Soviet Bloc have undergone military training in the Bloc since mid-1955 (see Table 3*). Courses of instruction have in- cluded many phases of ground, air, and naval training and were under- taken primarily in Poland and in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. It is probable that the cost of this training is in addition to the total value of the arms agreements. * Table 3 follows on p. 12. -10 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 50X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T Figure 3. Syria: Training in the Use of Heavy Artillery Figure 4. Syria: Training in Soviet-Built T-34 Tanks S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T Table 3 Military Personnel Trained in the Soviet Bloc 1955-58 USSR Czecho- slovakia Poland East Germany Bulgaria Total Egypt 347 310 46o 20 1,137 Syria 295 25 65 3 25 413 Indonesia 50 50 Afghanistan 50 50 Total 692 1_82 .212 3 45 1,650 Poland has provided training facilities for about one-third of the personnel trained and has been the site for almost all naval training undertaken. Courses have been provided in the operation and mainten- ance of destroyers, submarines, motor torpedo boats, minesweepers, and coastal artillery. 32V In addition, some pilot training has been provided and perhaps some training in armor and artillery. _31./ Czechoslovakia has been a major site for flight training and has provided courses in flight instruction and operations tactics for fighter and bomber pilots. 32./ Czechoslovakia also has been a major training site for antiaircraft and field artillery operation and maintenance. 13/ The USSR is providing a considerable amount of training in land armaments and aircraft but did not become a major location for mili- tary training until 1957. This factor probably is a result of the early reluctance of the USSR to be associated directly with the ex- tension of military aid to countries of the Free World. The Egyptian and Syrian arms credits in 1955 and 1956 were negotiated through Czechoslovakia. Since late in 1956, however, the USSR has undertaken direct negotiations in arranging for arms deliveries. Egypt and Syria have provided the bulk of all military trainees to the Soviet Bloc. It was not until December 1957 that Afghanistan sent 50 trainees to the USSR. Early in 1958, Indonesia sent approxi- mately 50 trainees to Czechoslovakia. There may be as many as 30 Indonesian pilots in Egypt being trained by Soviet instructors. Yemen has not sent any military trainees to the Bloc, but there are a num- ber of Yemeni students attending Egyptian military schools. _LI/ -12.- S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T The training which followed shortly after extension of Soviet Bloc arms credits was generally for short periods, usually less than 6 months, and probably was caused by the urgent need for military personnel to help utilize the large influx of Bloc equipment. In Czechoslovakia, for example, the duration of courses in antiaircraft and field artillery was from 3 to 6 weeks. The number of students varied between 5 and 25. A representative course in operation and maintenance of 85-mm (millimeter) antiaircraft artillery for Egyptian officers consisted of 22 to 25 students and included instruction in the following 15/: 1. 85-mm antiaircraft artillery operation; 2. 85-mm antiaircraft artillery ammunition with time fuses; 3. Theory of ballistics and antiaircraft artil- lery fire; 4. General overhaul of 85-mm antiaircraft artillery guns; 5. Measuring instrument for 85-mm antiaircraft artillery guns -- theory, practice, and repair. During 1957 the USSR began to provide training for periods of a year and longer. Staff and line officers through the rank of general are being trained in the USSR for command assignments. Large numbers of Egyptian officers are being trained to implethent the reorganiza- tion of the Egyptian army in order to utilize Soviet Bloc equipment more effectively. .1?/ The Egyptian government reportedly has decided to send all key officers for varying periods of training in the USSR. Ei High-ranking Syrian officers are being selected to undertake 4-year training programs at the Staff College of Frunze -- the senior Soviet military college located in Moscow. .TY Fifty Afghan officers have gone to the USSR for up to 3 years of training. 35./ Historically, the military groups have been the major source of authority in many underdeveloped countries. In the Middle East the earliest indication of Western influence was evident in the organiza- tion of the military. Training of indigenous military leaders and contact with Western technical superiority strongly affected the course of political development in these areas. The effect of present Soviet Bloc training on future military leaders may be expected to influence profoundly the political orientation of these countries. The proba- bility of ideological indoctrination is obvious, and the "demonstra- tion effect" of the scientific and technological advances of the USSR also is certain to influence the thinking of these trainees. These - 13 - S-E-C-R-E-T ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T developments will be particularly true in Egypt and Syria, where the military is by far the dominant group. VI. Military Installations. In addition to providing arms) training, and the services of military technicians, the Soviet Bloc also has been active in help- ing the underdeveloped countries to modernize existing military in- stallations and to construct new facilities. The cost of this assist- ance usually is in addition to the cost of the arms credits, and, judging from evidence at hand, involves additional credits. Soviet Bloc assistance in modernizing military installations has been confined primarily to air and naval installations and in most instances probably has entailed the use of Bloc technicians in super- visory capacities rather than to the award of contracts to construct an entire project. Available reports often fail to make clear the size of a particu- lar construction project or the extent of modernization involved. In some instances, modernization of an airfield may be a major under- taking. In others, it may be simply the installation of radio facili- ties or the resurfacing of a runway. The construction of an airfield may relate only to the construction of an additional landing strip or the construction of additional facilities. It is unlikely that very many of the airfields are being renovated or modernized to the extent that would permit them to support sustained jet fighter and bomber operations. A. Egypt. Although the Egyptian government has undertaken most of the construction work for its own military installations, it has utilized Soviet Bloc technicians, and probably Bloc guidance, to a considerable extent. In mid-1956 the USSR offered to assist Egypt in modernizing 5 airfields to accommodate jet aircraft. L42/ Soviet Bloc technicians have been engaged in the construction of an airfield in the Qalyub- Benha area north of Cairo L41/ and reportedly supervised construction work at the Dekheila Airfield./12/ Soviet and Czechoslovak tech- nicians were employed extensively in repairing damage at Almaza and other airfields after the hostilities in November 1956. lijj Soviet technicians also have been engaged in the construction of naval facilities in Egypt. In mid-1956 the USSR offered to develop Port Said and Alexandria into modern naval bases. I& A Soviet naval mission reportedly arrived in Cairo in September 1957 to discuss the S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T establishment of submarine bases on the Mediterranean and Red Seas.112/ Sites considered to be possible locations for submarine and naval bases were in the vicinities of Port Said, Mersa Matruh, Hurghada, and Safaga. 14?/ In Alexandria, Soviet naval engineers probably were employed in the construction of a naval arsenal and surveyed the harbor area for further developments. h1/ Soviet engineers assisted in the expansion of facilities at Adabiya L.@./ and probably have been employed in construction of Abu Qir since early 1957. 112/ Figure 7* shows the locations of military installations in Egypt being developed with the assistance of the Soviet Bloc. B. Syria. Since mid-1956, Syria has been engaged in a program designed to modernize and expand its basic facilities to accommodate the arms pur- chased from the Soviet Bloc. Bloc technicians and Bloc guidance have been utilized in accomplishing this program. Shortly after the con- clusion of the first Syrian-Czechoslovak arms accord early in 1956, it was agreed that, pending the modernization and conversion of cer- tain Syrian airfields, MIG fighters supplied by Czechoslovakia would be maintained in Egypt. 22/ In mid-1956, Czechoslovak technicians reportedly were preparing to survey the possibility of converting certain existing airfields into bases for jet aircraft. 21/ There are indications that subsequent to the conclusion of the Syrian-Soviet military aid agreement of NoveMber 1956 the USSR agreed to assist Syria in the construction of 3 new airfields and the modernization of 4 others. 22/ Subsequent reports indicated that the USSR was prepared to modernize the airfields at Damascus, Homs, Qamichliye, Deir-Ez-Zor, and Nayrab (Aleppo) and to construct new air- fields at Risafe, Beggs, and Palmyra. 2.31 In mid-1957 it was reported that about 8o Soviet and Czechoslovak technicians were engaged in construction work on Syrian military airfields. 212/ The Syrians now possess 4 major airfields located at Dumayr, Hama, Mezze (Damascus), and Nayrab. The construction of the major runway for the airfield at Dumayr by a Bulgarian firm, at a cost of about $1.4 million, was supervised by 10 Bulgarian engineers and technicians. At Hama, as many as 60 Soviet, CzechosloVak, and Bulgarian technicians may have been employed in the construction work at the airfield, 21/ which is now the main training base for Syrian pilots. Soviet and Czechoslovak officers are supervising the training of Syrian pilots at Hama. 2W * Following p. 16. - 15 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 S-E-C-R-E-T Soviet Bloc assistance also has been reported in connection with actual or planned construction at other important locations such as Palmyra, Risafe, Qusayr, and Qamichliye. 22/ Figure 5 shows the type of airfield modernization being under- taken in Syria. Figure 5. Syria: Example of Modernization at Hama Airfield Syria has developed a small naval base about 10 miles north of Latakia. A Yugoslav firm constructed the breakwater and dock in- stallations, and the Bulgarians are constructing the military facili- ties and installations surrounding the port area. Figure 6 shows a Syrian naval base being developed with the assistance of the Soviet Bloc. Figure 6. Syria: Naval Base Under Construction with the Assistance of the Soviet Bloc - 16 - S-E-C-R-E-T Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R01141A001300080002-6 50X1 Figure 7 2. 0 34 i .....---..?..?..?___..----(0?Po'I'i?tics!r. 1 1 MEDITERRANEAN SEA t + ISRAEL] .?-??? EL MUSH N4 SUWEIR BILBEIS N.E. ?? i XABRIT 4 ADABIYA HURGHADA t SAFAGA a a LUXOR t ASWAN ?-___.-.1.ou 1 .U A R ? (SYRIA) .- S---? /