PROPOSED PAY AND COMPENSATION SYSTEM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88-01192R000100220007-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
25
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 13, 2013
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 5, 1987
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
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7 tll
ILLEGIB
OFFICIA ? E ONLY
1EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Proposed Pay and Compensation System
1. One measure of the value of the proposed compensation s
salary growth and total compensation analysts can expect over th
career. The calculations presented here compares the new system
current GS system over a 20 year period under a range of assumpt
individual's performance. Because the proposal for the new syst(
specific information needed for detailed comparisons, I made rea:___-.,
assumptions based on the information available in the proposal book.
5 August 1987
2. Assumptions: I examined three career tracks, corresponding to
outstanding, superior, and average performers. For comparison to the GS
system, I equated these to categories I, II, and III, from the present career
panel rankings. The rate of promotion and salary levels under the new systems
are crucial assumptions, however:
The rate of promotion under the GS system is assumed to
depend only on the categorY\ranking and time in grade.
(See table 1.)
The rate of promotion under the new system is not discussed
in the proposal. The correspondence of salary levels under
the new system to GS grades, as implied on page 12 of the
proposal, suggests that approximately the same time
requirements could be applied to the new system. Therefore,
these calculations assume the same rate of promotion under
the two systems from lowest to highest levels (table 2).
The correspondence between the GS system and the proposed
one also suggests a range of salary levels under the new
system (table 2). Other salary levels are possible, based
on market comparability. Such comparability surveys could
result in either an increase or a decrease in the salary
levels from the values used here. At this time it is not
clear what the impact would be on the analysts in the DI.
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In calculating compensation under the new system, both
permanent salary increases and bonuses were derived from
table 3 of the proposal, based on the individual's quartile
position. Other incentive pay grids are possible under the
new system, but this one should illustrate the new system
adequately.
3. Conclusions: The cumulative compensation is higher for outstanding
performers under the new system--amounting to $50,000 or more over 20 years
compared to the GS system. The ?superior and average performers (presumably 80
percent of the analysts) could be worse off, however, with compensations some
$4,000 to $7,000 less. (See table 3, 4, and 5.) This contradicts the notion
implicit in the proposal that no one will "lose out" because of the new
system. It is particularly significant that superior employees would not seem
to be receiving more compensaton under the new system. Two other points are
al so apparent:
Salary growth is driven by promotions, not pay for
performance. This arises because the increase in salary due
to a promotion is far larger than the increase from the
incentive pay, even for outstanding performers. Therefore,
one's long-run salary growth depends more on how quickly one
can move through the levels than on the annual bonuses. In
this sense, the new system differs from the old one mainly
in terms of the number and sizes of promotions allowed.
The actual pay levels and the requirements for promotion
implemented under the new system will determine whether one
fares better. These issues, unfortunately, were not treated
In the proposal for the new system.
4. The calculations presented here are not definitive. The proposal for
the new system has insufficient detail for precise comparisons. Nevertheless,
this analysis raises crucial questions about the possible effects of the
proposed system on compensation for most analysts.
Attachments:
Tables 1-5
-2-
SIG/SE/P Rep
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TABLE 1.
Category
Time
in Grade Assumptions
Promotion To GS Grade:
(ranking)
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
6
6
12
12
18
18
24
30
II
9
9
15
18
24
30
36
48
III
12
12
18
24
30
42
48
.1?10????
NOTE: Table entries are specified in months.
Official Use Only
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TABLE 2. Assumption About Pay Levels And Promotions
Under the New System.
LEVEL Equivalent Salary Range
GS Grades
Months Until Promotion
To Next Level
Cat.
1 Cat. 2
Cat.3
I
7 - 11
18,358-35,326
36
51
66
II
11 - 12
27,172-42,341
36
54
72
III
13 - 14
38,727-59,488
24
36
48
IV
14 - 15
45,763-69,976
:DWI&
.MM..
??????
NOTE: Salary ranges were inferred from the correspondence
between the GS System and the New System, as shown on page 12 of
the Proposed System Summary. Time to promotion corresponds
exactly to the requirements under the GS system.
Official Use Only
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TABLE 3. OUTSTANDING PERFORMERS (Category
Years Comp.Under Proposed System
since GS System Salary Ann. Bonus
EOD
1)
TOTAL
COMPENSATION
0
22458.00
22458.00
+
1122.90
=
23580.90
1
24732.00
23581.00
+
1179.00
=
24760.00
2
27172,.00
27172.00
+
1358.60
=
28530.60
3
28078.00
28531.00
+
1426.55
=
29957.55
4
32567.00
29957.00
+
1497.85
=
31454.85
5
38727.00
38727.00
+
1936.35
=
40663.35
6
40018.00
40663.00
+
2033.15
=
42696.15
7
45763.00
42696.00
+
2134.80
=
44830.80
8
47288.00
45763.00
+
2288.15
=
48051.15
9
48813.00
48051.00
+
2402.55
=
50453.55
10
53836.00
50453.00
+
2522.65
=
52975.65
11
55624.00
52976.00
+
2648.80
=
55624.80
12
57418.00
55095.00
+
3305.70
=
58400.70
13
59212.00
57298.00
+
3437.88
=
60735.88
14
59212.00
59590.00
+
3575.40
=
63165.40
15
61006.00
61974.00
+
3718.44
=
65692.44
16
61006.00
64453.00
+
3867.18
=
68320.18
17
62800.00
66387.00
+
4647.09
=
71034.09
18
68200.00
68378.00
+
4786.46
=
73164.46
19
64594.00
69976.00
+
4898.32
=
74874.32
20
64594.00
69976.00
+
4898.32
=
74874.32
CUMULATIVE COMPENSATION:
GS System New System New System, w/ Bonus
1,017,718 1,024,245 1,083,935
NOTE: All entries in this table are in constant 1987 dollars.
, Salary under the new system includes the permanent increase in
compensation, while the bonus refers only to the one-time
payment. The amount of incentive pay, both permanent and bonus,
are calculated based on the quartile position in the pay levels
defined in table 2. The percentages used to compute incentive
pay are those values appearing on page 23 of the proposal.
Official Use Only
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TABLE 4. SUPERIOR PERFORMERS (Category
Years Comp.Under Proposed System
Since GS System Salary Ann.Bonus
EOD
2)
TOTAL
COMPENSATION
0
22458.00
22458.00
+
673.74
=
23131.74
1
24732.00
23132.00
+
693.95
=
23825.95
2
25556.00
23826.00
+
714.78
=
24540.78
3
27172:00
27172.00
+
815.16
=
27987.16
4
28078.00
27987.00
+
839.61
=
28826.61
5
32567.00
28826.00
+
864.78
=
29690.78
6
33653.00
29692.00
+
890.76
=
30582.76
7
38727.00
38727.00
+
1161.81
=
39888.81
8
40018.00
39889.00
+
1196.67
=
41085.67
9
41309.00
41085.00
1232.55
=
42317.55
10
45763.00
45763.00
+
1372.89
=
47135.89
11
47288.00
47136.00
+
1414.08
=
48550.08
12
48813.00
48550.00
+
1456.50
=
50006.50
13
50338.00
50006.00
+
1500.18
=
51506.18
14
53830.00
51507.00
+
1545.21
=
53052.21
15
55624.00
53051.00
+
1591.53
=
54642.53
16
57418.00
54112.00
+
2164.48
=
56276.48
17
59212.00
55195.00
2207.80
=
57402.80
18
59212.00
56299.00
+
2251.96
=
58550.96
19
61006.00
57425.00
+
2297.00
=
59722.00
20
61006.00
58573.00
+
2342.92
=
60915.92
CUMULATIVE COMPENSATION:
GS System New System New System w/ Bonus
913,780 880,411 909,638
NOTE: All entries in this table are in constant 1987 dollars.
Salary under the new system includes the permanent increase in
compensation, while the bonus refers only to the one-time
payment. The amount of incentive pay, both permanent and bonus,
are calculated based on the quartile position in the pay levels
defined in table 2. The percentages used to compute incentive
pay are those values appearing on page 23 of the proposal.
Official Use Only
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TABLE 5. AVERAGE PERFORMERS (Category 3)
Years
Since
EOD
Comp.Under
GS System
Proposed System
Salary Ann.Bonus
TOTAL
COMPENSATION
0
22458.00
22458.00
+
224.58
=
22682.58
1
23207.00
23132.00
+
231.32
=
23363.32
2
24732.00
23826.00
+
238.26
=
24064.26
3
25556.00
24541.00
+
245.41
=
24789.41
4
27172.00
27172.00
+
271.72
=
27443.72
5
28078.00
27987.00
+
279.87
=
28266.87
6
32567.00
28826.00
+
288.26
=
29114.26
7
33653.00
29691.00
+
296.91
=
29987.91
8
34739.00
30582.00
+
305.82
=
30887.82
9
35825.00
31499.00
+
314.99
=
31813.99
10
38727.00
38727.00
+
387.27
=
39114.27
11
40018.00
39889.00
+
398.89
=
40287.89
12
41309.00
41085.00
+
410.85
=
41495.85
13
42600.00
42318.00
+
423.18
=
42741.18
14
45763.00
45763.00
+
457.63
=
46220.63
15
47288.00
47136.00
+
471.36
=
47607.36
16
48813.00
48550.00
+
485.50
=
49035.50
17
50338.00
50006.00
+
500.06
=
50506.06
18
50338.00
51506.00
+
515.06
=
52021.06
19
51863.00
53051.00
+
530.51
=
53581.51
20
51863.00
54112.00
+
541.12
=
54653.12
CUMULATIVE COMPENSATION:
GS System New System New System w/ Bonus
796,907 781,857 789,674
NOTE: All entries in this table are in constant 1987 dollars.
Salary under the new system includes the permanent increase in
compensation, while the bonus refers only to the one-time
payment. The amount of incentive pay, both permanent and bonus,
are calculated based on the quartile position in the pay levels
defined in table 2. The percentages used to compute incentive
pay are those values appearing on page 23 of the proposal.
Official Use Only
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26 August 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Global Issues
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Deputy Director of Leadership Analysis
Preliminary Report - July 1987;
Proposed Pay, Personnel Management, and
Compensation System
1. The comments from LDA employees on the new compensation
system ranged from apathy to skepticism to aversion. The few
who did have something to say generally did not favor the
proposals. As with the reactions to the Report of the DI
Analyst Occupational Panel, many people apparently believe the
new system will be adopted no matter what they think.
2. Benefits - The one part of the new system that went
over well was the part on improved and flexible benefits.
Several noted that the Agency-should make efforts in this area
even if the rest of the plan is not adopted. Although not
explicitly stated in the comments, I got the impression that
most of our people favored putting any of the extra money into
benefits available to everyone rather than into bonuses
available to a limited number.
3. Performance Appraisal System - The idea of shorter and
simpler PARs got a good reception but the requirement for an
annual performance plan for everyone did not. Annual
performance plans for employees who have been in their jobs for
a number of years and are not having any performance problems
seemed to be an unnecessary burden. There was also concern
that promotions might be made only annually, instead of at six
month intervals.
4. Fear was also expressed that the new PAR numbering
system will be used to force supervisors to rate most people as
"3", or "average," and thus cause unnecessary morale problems.
The current system allows supervisors to rate an employee as an
overall "5", or an "above average" employee, while still having
two more ratings above to use for people who are exceptional.
Those who are concerned about the proposed change recognize
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that employees do not like being rated "average" and any system
that does so to most of the population is creating more
problems than it should.
5. Incentive Pay - The interesting part of the very
negative reactions to this proposal is that those not in favor
include the people who would benefit the most as well as those
who would not benefit. Even those who clearly stand to profit
do not think the extra money is worth the competition and
tension within branches and divisions that they believe an
incentive system would create. In other words, people seem to
prefer harmonious and pleasant working conditions over extra
income. If we were talking about bonuses like those found at
the highest levels of industry of 30 to 50 percent of base
salary, our employees might think differently, but for the
relatively small increases, they prefer to avoid the hassle.
6. When discussing the new PAR numbers above, I mentioned
that people do not want to be told they are just "average."
Nor do they want to be told they are in the bottom half of
their group, which is what the bonus system would do. People
usually know where they stand, but being forced to face that
standing and knowing that all of their friends know where they
rank is another matter. People who are performing valuable,
critical work and form the backbone of the organization would
end up being hurt and partially demoralized for little gain:
the high flyers get their rewards no matter what the system.
7. It appears from the comments I received that much of
the satisfaction our people find in working for the Agency is
being special. Our employees must get through a security
examination that, apparently, few can pass these days. They
are told that the average employee here is more capable than
90% of the US population. They are told that they are trusted
with some of the most important secrets held by this country
and entrusted with vital tasks. And now we are going to do
something that could knock down all of this pride for half of
our people?
8. LDA Recommendations - The D/LDA and I suggest that the
- Agency take the following actions on the task team report:
a. Bonuses - Do not adopt bonus incentives and
especially avoidbonuses accompanied by quotas. In
addition to the reas.ons mentioned above, we believe there
would be a tendency for at least some people to seek less
challenging jobs where the bonus is almost certain, but the
real contribution to the intelligence effort is less.
b. GS Grades - Retain the existing GS grade system, at
least for the time being. The recognition that it provides
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through frequent promotions, particularly in an employee's
early years, is important to our people.
c. Awards - Enlarge the current awards system. Allow
subpanels to award up to $1,500 or $2,000 without further
review. The only paperwork would be in the PAR, which
could come after the award. Set an annual dollar limit on
awards for each career subpanel. Permit awards at any time
but require consideration of all employees twice each year.
d. (Within-Grade Steps - Increase the number of steps
to 15 or 20 (cutting down the amount of each grade step, if T
necessary) and make all step increases annual. This will
provide nearly everyone some recognition of satisfactory
performance each year. Make QSIs easy; consider, for
example, automatic (Nis for PARs at or above a certain
level and two-step QSIs for outstanding performers.
e. Banding - Do not adopt the type of banding proposed
in the study but do adopt grade bands for each type of
work. For example, analysts would be in a band that ran
from GS-07 through GS-15, while the IA band might be from
GS-06 to GS-10. Allow the head of the appropriate career
subpanel to determine where in the band each person
fits--subject to the same Directorate review that now
exists. Exceptions above the band would have to be
approved by the career service head but not PMCD. There
would be no role for PMCD._
f. Salary Scale - Have a single salaiY scale that is
common to most occupations. Provide that an assignment
change from one career track to another would be at the
same salary to avoid encouraging career change decisions
based on immediate small salary benefits. Have as many
levels as there now are in the GS schedule. Continue the
special pay scales for doctors and others who have special
qualifications. Consider eliminating the special
secretarial scale, which seems to be a source of resentment
rather than the special incentive that was planned.
g. Position Management - Managers should receive a
dollar budget for salaries and be allowed to manage that
budget any way they see fit within the bands and within the
dollar limit. Thus a manager could abolish what is now a
GS-13 position and hire two GS-07s for roughly the same
money, or visa versa. Obtain congressional approval to
ignore ceiling and to control staffing by dollar restraints.
h. Benefits - Use the 2% increase and any other funds
available partly to raise benefits and partly to pay for a
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more liberal awards system. Allow employees to have some
choice in their benefits. For example, being able to be
paid for unused annual leave might be the most important
item for some people but for others it might be student
loans. Allow for an annual open-season so employees can
adjust their packages as their circumstances change. Make
the same benefits available to all employees and abolish
the current differences between SIS and non-SIS.
i.fRetirement - Do not make early retirement one of
the new benefits; it is too hard to retain the best people
as it -is.
j. PARs and AWPs - Leave the basic system alone. Cut
the length of PARS by insisting that no PAR, except when
the overall rating is a "2", can be more than one-half page
beyond the form.
k. Promotions - Restore to subpanels the ability to
promote at anytime during the year rather than just at
fixed semiannual dates. Retain the requirement that all
employees must be reviewed for promotion twice each year,
but do not make these the only times promotions can occur
without a lot of hassle.
1. Philosophy - Make all decisions with on eye to (1)
retention of fully satisfactory employees for a full, career
and (2) equal treatment at all grades and .in all career
tracks whenever possible. These criteria would point to a
benefit program that added benefits as years of service
accrue, as we now do with annual leave. They would also
mandate that leave retention or cash-out options be the
same for clerks as for SISers. Abolish the special program
for secretaries. The SIS bonus program probably can be
justified on the basis of the pay cap, but we should not
compound the inequity problem by doing different things for
"managers and specialists" than for others.
m. Salary Verification - Provide for an outside,
independent firm to establish salary rates, etc. if and
when we break away from the GS-scale.
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no ?
???
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Preliminary Report - July 1987;
Proposed Pay, Personnel Management, and
Compensation System
DD/LDA
(26 Aug 87) STAT
Distribution:
Orig + 1 - Addressee
1,- C/MPSS
1 - Each LDA Division & Staff Chief
1 - File O/D/LDA
?
???
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't
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
? 2 c,r7
NOTE TO: DDI
VIA: ADDI
DD/OGI
SUBJECT: Comments from MPSS
Re: HRM&C Task Force
The attached has been pulled
together by on behalf of MPSS.
Because of our total immersion on the
Task Force, neither Pete nor I contributed
directly to this memo.
Attachmen:
As stated
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?
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
26 August 1987
NOTE TO: Chief, MPSS
SUBJECT: Human Resource Modernization and
Compensation
Here are consolidated comments from MPSS
folks.
Attachment:
as stated
r*4441.,Pseverer*:.?
.10????
l?
C/PES
?
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MEMORANDUM
(:) SUBJECT: Reaction and Comments of MPSS People to the Human
Resource Modernization and Compensation Task Force
Preliminary Report
I. MPSS employees, who come from several career services,
expressed a variety of views on the task force report. Most are
concerned that the report is vague at crucial points on the exact
impact on employees and the prospects for obtaining funding for
implementatjon, anxious that administrative resources be
augmented well before any changes, and unconvinced that
revolutionary changes are needed for a system that appears
basically healthy.
General Comments
2. The following are some general comments.from groups of
MPSS people. Some are presented in greater detail in the next
section which discusses each of the specific proposals.
Some of the proposals, such as the Employee Performance
Plan appear too rigid; while others--for example, the one
on Dual Tracks--are vague and opened-ended in stating
what might result.
The feature on Career Development is not as clear as it
should be on how employees would go about charting their
professional careers. (Is this done through one of the
proposed databases, or through the proposed occupational
handbooks, or both?) The feature as described seems to
assume that a position will be available for anyone at
whatever level he/she is aiming for.
The supervisor's role and that of the office in career
development needs to be clarified.
Many doubt Congress would provide necessary personal
services funding for the more generous financial rewards
promised in the report.
-- The report is written in such a way that it appears to
favor senior graded people. While this may not have been
its intent, that is how it comes across.
It is a concern that PARs in the new system would have an
immediate and tangible impact on take-home pay. How do
you ensure equity? Incentive pay will put an additional
premium on inter-rater reliability and consistency. Few
are sanguine that this key problem can be addressed in
new or imaginative ways--"automated performance plans"
and "less complicated" PARs. Grievances will multiply;
and morale may not go up to the degree predicted.
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The proposed new system holds additional disincentives to
rotational assignments. It will tend to accentuate
differences among directorates and emphasize
separateness. If the "one-Agency concept" is still
regarded as a desirable end and rotations are deemed a
healthy thing, it would be prudent to take a hard look at
what it would mean to the individual, under the new
system, to go off for a year or two on rotation.
The Features--Comments and Recommendations
Feature 1: ,Occupationally Defined Bands
A more efficient system for managing Agency occupations
could result under this feature if senior managers receive
classification authority. Much of the discussion of the banding
proposal in the System Design section of the Task Force report
assumes a greater pay spread and increased salary potential for
employees, but availability of funding from Congress is a
systemwide constraint.
This entire feature is focused mainly on management
efficiencies such as job evaluations and market -linkage to
separate us from the inequities of the GS system. We do not see
how CIA unique occupations would be better served by going to the
private sector for market compatibility of jobs that do not exist
there.
This feature has substantial but intangible hidden costs.
In the proposed market linkage features, some career
tracks would change rapidly while others would not. The
result would be morale problems in those areas not
receiving much Agency attention, and a high risk of
creating two classes of citizens among employees. This
situation would be exacerbated if most Congressionally
approved personal services funds go to reward and retain
selected skill areas.
Present cross fertilization among directorates and
flexibility of assignments within directorates would be
reduced. The present GS system offers a measure of
flexibility, but the new plan's emphasis on
specialization would create more occupation-specific
employees who may not be capable of changing assignments
readily.
Visible recognition that now comes with promotions in the
GS system would be curtailed under banding. This could
have an adverse effect on morale, particularly for those
with more experience in the Agency.
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It is unclear how the banding of smaller occupations that
cut across directorates will be managed.
The concept of banding contradicts the CIA tradition of
an "intelligence officer" which some believe should not
be lightly abandoned.
We need comparisons of career progression under the GS
system with comparable tracks in the new proposal to see how
employees with different potential would fare. A modification of
the current GS system along the line of State Department may be
more acceptable by the masses.
Feature 2: Incentive Pay
We would like to see a systematic projection of base
salaries before we go farther. Some individuals may be better
off financially under the proposed system because longtime
employees do not have to wait three-year intervals to get a 3
percent salary increase once they reach the higher steps. Under
this proposal, everyone achieving at least an acceptable level of
performance gets some monetary recognition each year at a rate
roughly equivalent to the GS system.
?
In addition, the following should be considered:
-- Congressional funding may vary from year to year, and
additional incentive pay funding might not be
appropriated.
-- It appears that bonuses and-incentives may not differ
that much when compared with the amount received under
the present GS Step System. An example comparing the two
approaches should be provided.
-- In our view, it is not realistic to assume that
individuals who benefit financially from updated market
surveys of their occupations would also receive from
general pay compatability increases. This might be made
explicit to employees.
-- What would be the impact on morale when at least half of
the Agency employees are identified as "average" and
advised so?
Ranking of employees by each Career Service is necessary
to determine incentive pay awards, but this process
appears to fly in the face of banding similar
occupations. Would each Career Service rank only its own
analysts, computer programmers, etc., or are like
occupations ultimately ranked Directorate and/or Agency
wide? In either case, we wonder how equity will be
ensured among employees.
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Feature 3: Performance Plan
We like the idea of a Performance Plan for each level in a
band, if it is linked to performance requirements. It may help
employees to have written down in outline form (or in a more
detailed format if the situation warrants) a statement of job
requirements. The performance plan could, however, be used in
conjunction with the current GS system or a modified GS system.
The proposed method sounds very much like the
unsatisfactory system of Advanced Work Plans (AWP). Why
would the Task Force's proposal for an employee
performance plan be used any more or any less than the
current AWP?
Care must be exercised in drafting the document so that
it does not become boilerplate, would not inhibit
employees from exercising their own initiative, and does
not preclude original thought, even when it might
conflict with a perceived philosophy or substantive
approach to problems from higher levels. Flexibility
should be incorporated into the Performance Plan
concept. Managers should have the option to provide or
not provide an employee with a Performance Plan depending
on the manager's determination of need.
Feature 4: Performance Evaluation
It is our understanding from the wording of this proposal
that employees in bands which cross directorate lines would be
ranked for Incentive Pay by their min directorate and not an
inter-directorate panel.
Recommendation:
- -
We need a provision that the Incentive Panel Chairman
must ensure equity among employees in the process of
deciding who gets what in terms of incentive pay.
Feature 5: Occupational Career Handbooks
Some offices already have such guides. Given the size of
the Agency, the proposed handbooks would be "good information
points for employees.
Feature 6: Individual Career Development Plan with Modification
The supervisor has an explicit responsibility to help and to
support employees in their career development efforts. We think
It is unrealistic, however, to assume that each supervisor can be
the ultimate Career Development Officer (CDO).
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Recommendation
An office level COO is necessary to ensure a realistic check
between an employee's aspirations and his/her abilities, to help
arrange assignments outside the office, and to ensure a balance
between overall career plans and the benefits that accrue to the
office. The current practice of the Deputy Office Director being
the CDO is not sufficent. Additional professional staff is
needed in some larger offices to ensure this function is carried
out.
Feature 7: Occupation-Specific Training
Support is widespread for this concept.
Feature 8: Improved Availability of Training
If the Agency adopts a program such as the one discussed in
this report, would resources be available to provide training?
Feature 9: Dual Track
The concept appears a good one if we can find ways to ensure
that the "expert" positions would not be used to?harbor
individuals who have achieved high grade, but show declining
performance. This feature could also be used in the current GS
system or a modified GS system.
Would individuals be able to move back and forth between
tracks if they are so inclined and have the talent and
skills required?
How would the proposed expert track differ from the
present Senior Intelligence Analyst Program?
Most strongly support the concept that managers should
retain strong substantive expertise.
The report identifies 90 percent of forfeited annual
leave coming from the GS-13 through 15 employees. The
proposal to allow employees in the manager and expert
tracks who are not SISers to carry over 20 additional
hours, (2 1/2 days) annual leave per year, is stingy.
Recommendation:
Five days should be the minimum carryover per year.
Feature 10: Promotion
This makes sense if you adopt the proposed banding of
occupations.
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Recommendation:
-- Clarify the limit on the number of individuals who can be
promoted to any level by making clear the constraints
under which managers would be working (i.e., authorized
personal services funding and the number of individuals
that management itself decides should exist at each
level.)
Feature 11: Flexible Benefits
Most MPSS people strongly support this feature, using pretax..
dollars, as,long as an employee does not have to pay more for
benefits currently being received.
Recommendations
Even if no other part of the proposed HRMCTF Report is
accepted, the Agency should press ahead with this
feature.
Employees should not be forced to give up health
insurance benefits presently available because the Agency
wants to reduce the number of companies with which it is
associated.
In any plan where annual leave is turned in for another
benefit, the cash value of annual leave should be
determined at its current value, not an average value for
the Agency.
The report is unclear concerning dependent coverage.
Does this refer only to an employee's children, or would
an employee's elderly parents qualify as dependents?
Feature 12: Leave Conversions
The proposals for annual leave buy back, optional conversion
to sick leave, a sick leave bank, and home leave use for all
employees are attractive.
Recommendations
The annual leave hours sold back to the Agency under the
annual buy back provision should be based on cash value
equal to the employee's current salary, not a cash value
based on that salary.
It is unclear that all these potential provisions apply
to all employees. From the proposal as drafted, one
could get the impression that the proposals would apply
only to senior people.
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Feature 13: Educational Assistance for Dependents
The proposed options are attractive, but we wonder about
feasiblity. For example, it would be difficult to change rules
for the Credit Union, which is governed by national standards.
Feature 14: Staffing Management Tools
Support, in principle, is widespread for the options
proposed under this feature, such as early retirement for SIS
managers and experts, involuntary retirement, and retention
bonuses.
Some employees feel the unreduced benefits proposal for
SISers and experts favors too much a group of employees
already highly paid.
Feature 15: System Controls
We believe that substantial care is necessary to ensure that
appropriate administrative and data processing support is in
place before implementation of any changes. MPSS people from the
DA are commenting on the specifics through their home offices.
Feature 16: Projection Tools
Recommendation:
ml?
Employees need to know that automation tools are not the
be all and end all to .the success of any new system.
This should be stated under this feature because the use
of the demographic information tools proposed would only
be as effective as the use a manager makes of them.
We would like details on what the Task Force has in mind
in the way of tools for managers' use.
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8 September 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Chief, Collection Requirements and
Evaluation Staff
SUBJECT: , Proposed Pay, Personnel Management, and
Compensation System
Conclusions
The overwhelming majority of CRES is not in favor of a
comprehensive change to the pay and compensation system at this
time. They are concerned that the pay for performance feature
raises the risk of creating a serious morale problem among the
average" employees, who by definition represent the majority of
the work force. They are also disturbed by calculations that
question the claim that everyone will be at least as well off
financially under the new system as they were under the old one.
At the same time, CRES endorses the new approach taken in
the benefits package. In particular, we would point to a serious
erosion in medical benefits in recent years, and believe that
redressing this problem should be high on our priority list.
Comments By Feature
Feature 1 - Occupationally Defined Bands
--Concern was raised that there is an important sense of
self-esteem associated with GS rank. Most are not ready to
shed that linkage, which is meaningful throughout the civil
service, for more anonymous or neutral titles; many did not
like the idea of two people having the same title at
different rates of pay.
--Questions were raised as to the formula for determining
comparability with the outside with jobs that are not
comparable.
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--An impression that this plan is designed to benefit the
specialty fields (scientists, engineers, computer
scientists, etc.) possibly at the' expense of less
specialized fields (requirements officers were not part of
the banding proposal).
--Concerns were raised over who would have control over
ceiling and funding allocations and what checks and balanced
wouldeexist, if any.
--Most managers like the idea of having added flexibility in
determining the grade and type of persons they can hire and
would support legislation to give us that capability.
Feature 2 - Incentive Pay
This proved to be the most controversial element of the new
compensation system. While a handful of the staff--mostly
younger officers--welcomed this proposal, most had serious
reservations. Their concerns were:
--the implications of this system on retirement annuities
and taxes.
--A belief that this system is biased toward rewarding the
superstars at the expense of the average employee.
--How to keep PARs from becoming inflated and, more
Important, how do we keep some uniformity among offices to
ensure fairness?
--A belief that this approach would
problem for the 'averages employee.
--Sufficiently bad experiences with
question how equitable it would be.
create a serious morale
previous supervisors to
--A belief that it will discourage people from taking
rotational assignments or assignments with higher risks
fear of jeopardizing their chances for a bonus.
--The lack of evidence of strong support for this
at the management level.
for
Proposal
--Encourages superstars to jump from job to job due to
Promises of high bonuses, etc.
--May encourage cronyism.
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--To be successful, the plan must provide only general
guidance and permit managers and employees significant
latitude in creating their own performance plan--especially
one that recognizes and rewards initiatives, even if they
are not entirely successful.
--Employees must have a role in creating the plan.
Feature 4 - Performance Evaluation
This feature did not prompt any significant discussion
within CRES; the staff believed the new rating form seemed
reasonable.
Feature 5 - Occupational Career Handbooks
The younger generation officers wholeheartedly endorsed
this feature; managers generally were skeptical of its value
and worried that if not carefully written would leave people
with unrealistic expectations.
Feature 6 - Individual Career Development Plans
There was mixed reaction to this feature; with some
endorsing it while others were apprehensive or skeptical
that it would be useful; some wondered where the incentive
was for supervisors to take this seriously.
Feature 7 - Occupation-specific Training
People wondered about the availability of these courses
and whether they would be linked to promotions.
Feature 8 - Improved Availability of Training
This was perceived as moving in the right direction.
Feature 9 - Dual Track
This concept was strongly endorsed by all.
Feature 10 - Promotion
This is an important part of any compensation system
and was not deemed to be controversial.
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Feature 11 - Flexible Benefits Programs
Many regarded this as the most important element of the
entire proposal. Employees want more information that would
explain the tax implications, as well as simulations of how
this would work. There is widespread concern that medical
benefits in particular have eroded in recent years. In
contrast to pay for performance, this is a real problem that.
needs to be addressed. It is not clear from the pamphlet
that this feature will do that.
Feature 12 - Leave Conversion
This feature was highly endorsed, but many believed
that employees should be encouraged to take leave. Perhaps
a minimum amount should be set aside to use or lose. There
was also dissatisfaction expressed by several employees over
current leave policies regarding funerals and pregnancy--
i.e., the point being that an employee must use all of her
sick and annual leave for ?maternity leave. An employee
must use annual leave to attend or arrange for the funeral
of an immediate family member unless that family member died
as a result of an injury received on active military duty.
Feature 13 - Educational Assistance for Dependents
This is an enticing_ benefit. People would like more
information on this proposal.
Feature 14 - Staffing Management Tools
These are laudatory objectives but there is
considerable skepticism that they will ever be implemented
as described.
Feature 15 - System Controls
Given the Agency's less than successful record at
bringing up large ADP applications, this proposal looks
worrisome. At first glance, this proposal looks overly
ambitious and costly and will probably need to be scaled
back. It also appears as if some of these functions, which
are now being done in the Office of Personnel, are being
moved to line managers to implement. This proposal needs a
feasibility study.
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