ACTIVITIES OF ZEISS, JENA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01030R000100320006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 4, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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.fritITELLOFAX A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
COUNTRY East Germany
SUBJECT ActiVities of Zeiss, Jena
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT
REFERENCES
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4 December 1953
16 50X1-HUM
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THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
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STATE #
ARMY #
NAVY if
X
AIR #
FBI
AEC
ORR EV
(Note: Washington Distribution Indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)
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SECURITY INFORMATION
REPORT
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".1...01.1?111?????=111=1111111.0.11?1111=1?111?1
;;?_,
COUNTRY GermanSr (SovZone)
SUBlECT : Activities of' Zeiss, Jena
PLACE
iACQUIRED ,
DATE
ACQUIRED
DATE. OF INFORMATION :
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
DATE DISTR. 30 OCT-5-3
NO. OF PAGES 15
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTEDPELOW)
SUPPLEMENTITO 50X1-HUM
REPORT NO.
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INDEX
Subject
1.1_VA
.Prodaction of Zeiss
3
Exports to the West
3
Exports_to the East
5
Distribution Difficulties
5
Functions of the Sales Distribution Branch., West
Production of the Special Products, Rales Section for 1952
7
Production of "A-1" Devices
9
Production of Aerial Cameras
9
Imports by Zeiss
,9 ,
Relationship ;between Zeiss & DIA
Representation in the United States_
12
_
Rumanian 'Trade Fair
13
Zeiss Training School
13
Production Planning at Zeiss
13
The Collective AgreeMEni'it Zeiss
14
The "New Course" and 'Zeiss
15
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. PRODUCTION OF ZEISS
1.
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rough production-estimates for the entire plant, 50X1-HUM
and these only in terms of monetary value. According to official
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figures circulated within the plant and consider accurate, ,
production in 1948, the first year of production after the plant wasom -HUM
reconstru .., -. :.. 0 0 ? ? I I
pro-
Auction increased annuallyland that in 1952,tota1 production was valued
at from 75 to. 80, mil/ion.DM's (East). Production valued at 100 million
DM's (EaSt) has been planned for 1953 50X1-HUM
the production plan calls for the following geographic distribution:
East ()lemony
50..0 million DNS
(East)
Soviet Bloc..
40.0 million DNS
(East)
5.5 million DNA
(East
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4.5 million DNA
(East)
million DEE
(East)
'Total
100.0
2. During thelfirst hilf-of 1953, equipment valued at 35 million INs
(East) was produced. Although it mould appear from this that the
plant had fallen behind schedule, that is, in producing only 35 per
cent of the year's plan, this is not the case. An interesting
feature of the industrial plan is that a gradual increase in pro-
duction throughout the year is called for, with production building.
steadily toward a climax in Decemberond dropping sharply at the be-
ginning .of the following year. There is, therefor% no continuous
production curve as usually found .in free-enterprise firms. This
is typical of all planned industries, because by the end of the
calendar, year all sales must have been completed. Another reason
for this pattern is the foot that ninety per cent of Zeisets orders
in 1953i for example, are assigned to countries with controlled
economieelthNiebudgets are geared to the same calendar year.
the 1954 plan calls for production valued at 135 50X1-HUM
million DMe (East), of which exports are to absorb sixty per oent
of the total, compared to fifty per cent in 1953. The increased
quantity of exported products is scheduled for China. China is
particularly interested in obtaining geodetic and,hospital equipment
such as mioroscomes. 50X1-HUM
efforts
are being .made by China to raise the general health level of the
population, and that these purchases of hosbital equipment represent
a phase of this effort. . 50X1-HUM
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IffaCHTS TOTED EAST
7.
UbbH, bast Germain or the satellites.
HISTRIBUTIONAllitCULTIES
, 8. As early as 19481the Sales Division of Zeiss feared difficulties
in distributing Zeiss's output because of the production.policy
which the plant administration had decided to follow. This policy
was that large quantities of old, standard pre-war types of equipment
were'to be 'produced in order to satisfy the repressed consumer.de-
mand which was believed to exist at that time. The Sales Division
felt that this policy was unrealistic because it did not take into
account the technical'advancps made by Zeiss's coMpetitors in the
optical field. Distribution kept pace with production through 1950,
but the anticipated difficulties began to appear' in 1951. In
that.year many products remained incomplete even though production.
in monetary terms for the entire plant was meeting the planned
?
schedules. That is, in some production sections plans were ful-
filled- and overfulfilled, but in others production fell short of
plan. Consequently, many articles were carried over into 1952 '
still unfinished,
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gElports from Zeiss to the 50X1-HUM
/See paragraph 12
These difficulties increased during :1952 and 1953, as the Sales
Division fell farther and farther behind production. The problem
was accentuated by the fact that although the Sales Division pressed
the management for new. products to meet competition, the plant
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management had to continue producing standard types of equipment
because the Research and Development Departments did not have the
calibergrersonnel necessary to keep abreast of progress and develop-
ments abrcae1/
1/ Another reason
why production was continued at full speed, with no consideration
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given to proposals for a temporary halt in production to retool for
produotion of more modern products, was the need to keep the 17,00050X1-HUM
workers employed. Contrary to all expectations the Sales Department
was able to dispose of all production in 1952 within the limits of
the turn-over period decreed by the government, JJ
?u s was on y possible by supplying orders amounting
to about eight million DMs. (East) which were due in the calendar
year of 1953 ( to the Eastern Bloc). This'distribution backlog
increased during 1953, and by 1 July, equipment valued at only 25
million of the 35 million DM& (East) by the plant, had been dis-
posed of. Elimination of this back)... of: :$ 0- it: ? prow
Hem facing the Sales Division 50X1-HUM
10. The distribution difficulties discussed above had increased steadily
despite their theoretical elimination by an order issued by the
goVernment in late 1952 calling for prior consignment of all ipro-
duction from 1953 on. According to this order, the forty per cent
of the total production which was scheduled for export to the Eastern
Bloc during 1953 was to be covered by contracts between Zeiss and
the German Internal and Foreign Trade Office (Deutsche Innen-
und Aussenhandel Abteilung, DIA), which handles the disposal of
Zeiss products to all countries within the Soviet Bloc except East
Germany. However, orders from the Bloc had fallen far behind the
quantity that DIA was obliged to purchase from Zeiss, and DIA has
not been able to distribute its share of Zeises production. DIA
has tried to salvage its position by claiming that the forty per
cent of Zeiss production originally contracted for inc1u?et all
exports 50X1-HUM
L If DIA
is successful in this attempt, exports will constitute only forty
per cent of Zeiss's production,and the plant will be forced to in-
crease distribution within East Germany from fifty to sixty Der
cent of total production, e 50X1-HUM
equipment which had been consigned to
IA and which was stored in Zeiss warehouses was valued at between
eight and ten million DMa (East).
11. An additional factor which has contributed to the distribution
difficulties plaguing both Zeiss and DIA has been the striving
of some of the other countries in the Bloc for economic independence.
Development of individual optical industries has been part of this
program. This is true of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania,
where plants have been established to produce optical and geodetic
equipment. Such production would reduce the market in those countries
for Zeiss products.
12. It is hoped that China will increase its purchases of Zeiss equip-
ment during 1953, reducing both the DIA and the Zeiss surplus stook.
Between September 1952 and May 1953jan East German trade delegation
representing DIA was in Peking with the objective of increasing
trade between the two countries. ROLL represented the interests of
Zeiss in the delegation. Reports from ROLL indicated that increased
orders might be expected from China during the fall of 1953. Addit-
ional impetus to German-Chinese trade may have been given by a
German industrial fair which was held in Peking between April and
August 1953, Gerhard ROMMEL and MUELLER represented Zeiss at this
fair.
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?'?Proslubtion of the Special Products Seiles-:?Sedtion?lor .1952 '
Product
Approximate
Value ?
(DMa (East))
P:'.Principai-Consumers
Special lenses (linear, prismsi.mirror,.:,..: ? 28o;000
"Kuevetten" (cuvettes), polarization filters)
Lenses of second quality-(lenees and prisms)
Leans t unmounted2pr photographic equipment
Agate products-.(bearing stones)
Sappiire products (phonograph needles)
Quartz products (supersonic quartz plates,
frequency control crystals)
Diamond products (dies, cutting tools,
strength testing apparatus)
Total value
Institutes and universities (Hall.9 Jenap.
Leipzig, Greif's-weld)
60,000. -Astronomical initallations such as the
Sonneberg Observatory and schools
24000,000:
?600,000.
50,000
120,000.
900,000
4,010,000
-Zeiss Ikon, Dresden and camera plants: ins.
Niederseidlitz
RFT Leipzig
RFT, Leipzig and RFT, Erfurt
?
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Dies and tnols (nearly all machine construction)
DDR plants such ass
EMW, Eisenach -
If
Walzwerk, Hettstedt
Zeiss, Jena
Schott, .Jena
-:.,Hescho Hermsdorf in Kahla (SAG Koepenick)
Strength testers:
Louie Schopper, Leipzig
Zeiss, Jena
Keilparth, Suhl
Zeiss Ikon, Dresden
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PRODUCTION OF "A-1" DEVICES
15. Zeiss bagan_produotion of t!ia .. aeria.1.7sight type "A-i"?during.1950. _
Each year since then it has produced this item, which is not included
in the annual production figures. The order for the rA-1"s was
given ?to Zeiss by DIA, but it is generally understood that they are
for shipment to the USSR. they are eonsidered50X1-HUM
exports or reparation- goods, the production of
"A-1"ts was during 1950, 1951, or 1952, but the production program
for 1953 calls for the-manufacture of between 130 and 155 of these
items0 the maximum production for the year 1953 (1)(1-HIIKA
or 1954 has been set at 200 units. 50X1-HUM
the "A-1" total value of 1953 production will be 150X1-HUM
10 million Die (Best). This is in addition to the official total
of 100 million Dlie (East). 50X1-HUM
of
Division.
PRODUCTION OF AERIAL CAMERAS
16.
the Telescope Production
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in August 1953 no production of aerial cameras had been started.
Conferences cf officials of the Commercial Department had been held
at which the subject was mentioned, but all discussion of it was
indefinitely postponed because no concrete plans for aerial camera
production had been made by the plant management, no experimental
models had been constructed, no drawings had been made, etc. All
of these things would have to be completed before the Commercial
Department would become involved. Although the plant could easily
construct aerial cameras with the personnel and equipment available,
it would take about two years for all plans, test models, 50X1-HUM
tests, and necessary changes to be completed before series pro-
duction could be commenced.
IMPORTS BY ZEISS
17. the availability of raw 50X1-HUM
materials used by Zeiss or from where they were procured. Imports
. lwerethandled by the Materiel Division of the Commercial Department,
and this office worked through the Central German Trade Office
(the D.H.Z.) (Deutsche Haadelszentrale). The D.H.Z..in turn obtained
the necessary imports through DIA. The Zeiss official responsible. 50X1-HUM
for contact tith the D.H.Z. was Kurt MUELLER.
18.
once, when Zeiss encountered delays and difficulties
in regard to a raw material, MUELLER contacted DIA directly to
expedite the matter.
a number of raw materials used by Zeiss, 50X1-HUM
and comments, to the best of my knowledge, as to their availability:
Abrasive paper:
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Agates: Approximately 200 kilograms are reauired
annually
is in Bitterfeld
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the source of surly
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Aluminum sheet
metal:
Ball bearings:
Diamonds (chips,
stones, dust):
Ferric oxide
-(Paris Red):
Fluorspar:
Heavy chromium
glass:
LaCqueri
Methyl chloride:
Nickel anodes:
Platinum crucibles:
Quart:
Radio tubes:
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Zeissgs requirements are 50X1-HUM
fully satisfied by the Buntmetalwerke in,
Hettstedt.' 50X1-HUM
ball bearings are obtained
through the I.K.A. in Scharfenstein. 50X1-HUM
it has been necessary to rework
these ball bearings at Zeiss for greatez50X1-HUM
precision.
per year.
no shortages of
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Zeiss required 100,000 carats
there were
?
diamonds during 1952 and
1953.
tamed on the
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11 diamonds were ob-
black market.
the firm HaarPudg50X1-HUM
in Berlin is
involved in the diamond trade.
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Shortages of ferric oxide exist at ZeisE,
attempts were made to ob-
tain fluorspar, but none was procured.
theecl A tempts were 50X1-HUM
unsuccessful.
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Adequate quantities of this item were pro.-
cured from the Schott, Jena, glass factory.
There was no ehortage of lacquer at Zeiss.
I it is obtained from firms 50X1-HUM
in the Soviet Zone of Germany (in or near
Halle) that have been_construqted since
the beginning of the blockade. 50X1-HUM
Rubber insulated- This material dame from the cable plant
wire: in Koepenick, there
were no shortages.
Tungsten contacts:
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ZEISS AND DIA
Exports to the East
19.
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on the basis of existing laws,
DIA is responsible for distributing all Zeiss products that are
? destined for export to the Bloc. During 1948 and 1949, Zeiss
iattempted to maintain a direct contact with trade organizations
in countries of the Bloc, but this contact was abruptly broken '
when DIA learned of it. Thus, an contact, even dealing with re-
quests for literature, must be made via DIA. 50X1-HUM
?
22.
_ .
23.
DIA plays no role with regard to the determination of the prices
charged for Zeissts exports. Most foreign exports of Zeiss 50X1-HUM
are in the form of barter agreements between the DDR and another
'country. ...The only foreign currencies which the DDR will accept
for Zeiss's exports to countries with whom no barter agreement
exists
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Therefore DIA merely kept records of all transactions of Zeiss's
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export program. This was far from a satisfactory relation-
ship for DIA because as early as 1948 DIA had desired to establish
its own sales representative organization. Therefore, DIA took
advantage of the arrests of many of Zeissis leading personnel in
March 1953 to claim verification of their long-standing charges . 50X1-HUM
of economic espionage in the plant, and took over the entire export
program.
A representative of DIA was stationed at
Zeiss who was to exercise a control function
exports from the plant. The DIA representatives (first BASTIAN,
succeeded by BERGER) were quickly convinced, however, that in order
to assure the continued functioning of the export program,
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RUMANIAN TRADE FAIR
27. a trade fair in Bucharest,
' Rumania, at which DIA was exhibiting industrial products from the
DDR. The fair lasted three weeks
equipment on display from Zeiss. This equipment included: micro-
scopes, precision instruments, medical instruments, spectacles,
measuring equipment, etc. Most of the people who showed interest
in our equipment were Rumanians who represented various educational
institutions and hospitals, but there were also Soviet civilians
and ipilitary personnel present. The Soviets did not show special
interest in any particular type of equipment. Orders for equip-
ment could not be taken on the spot. If a Customer desired to
purchase equipment it was necessary to apply through the appropriate
import organization. This was evidently realized by the visitors
at the fair,
The main purpose of the fair was simply propraganda
to play up the industrial progress of East Germany. Judging by
the visitors to the fair and by press reports, it was quite success-
ful in this .
ZEISS TRAINING SCHOOL
28. The Zeiss training school is located on the plant grounds. It is
located in a four-.or five-story building. Workshops are on the
first floor and schoolrooms are on the others. There are about
2,000 students in training here for work in the Zeiss plant, and
the entire school is subordinate to the Plant Training Division
(Lehrbetriebsleitung). ROMBACH is the chief of the training division.
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29. Regarding the school's expansion, a new wing was under construction
mmer of 1952, and was completed during the fall.
it was only about one quarter as large as the re- 50X1-HUM
maind.er or tbe school ,J I 50X1-HUM
it was built because there
was not enough room in the former school alone to '; accomo-
date all the students. The construction of the new wing had nothing
to do with any change in the length of the training course. It is
merely coincidence that the training course, which was four years
in length during the war, and was shortened to two and one-half
years some time before 1948, has been lengthened this year (1953)
to three years. This change was brought about because it was felt
that two and one-half years was not sufficient time for the training.
PRODUCTION PLANNING AT ZEISS
30.
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The individual firm in the DDR usually has very little influence
in determining the production quota for a coming year. Generally,
the quota is assigned by the government on the basis of the previous
year's production and sales, and the productive capacity of the firm.
details of the planning procedures
levels, or within the higher echelons of Zeiss.
Zeiss presently maintainsammewhat unique 50X1-HUN
position in the DDR in that the total production quotas for a given
year are still very much left for the management of Zeiss to
de-
termine; this is done with a minimum of interference from governmental
on the government
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quarters. Zeiss determines the total production figure, and the
government merely rubber-stamps the management's decision.
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31. ,Each department is consulted in arriving at the production quota
for the year. The Sales Division of the Commercial Department has
the following role to play. Having been notified of the total
production quota for a given year, the chief of the Sales Division
will assign a tentative quota to each sales section. Each section
is then required to assess its ability to distribute the provisionally
assigned quota, and must either accept it or argue its inability to
meet it. (It is, of course, not impossible that a section may
request that the sales quota for a certain article be increased over
the given one.) If, when collected, the reports from the various
sales sections do not reach the total quota required, the chief
of the Sales Division will distribute the deficit among the various
sections. The norms having been assigned, the Production Department
Is advised of the break-down of the total production and is in a
position to distribute the various factors of production in accordance
with the plan. Simultaneously, the geographic sales distribution
branches have been making the necessary plans'for the regional
? distribution of the planned production.
32. It should be noted that in addition to the economic phase of the
production planning picture, that is, the most efficient use of
the available factors of production, a\-political factor influences
the planning as well. This factor is of great importance to the
Zeiss plants in the Soviet Zone. Irrespective of demand and sales
prospects, political considerations require the steady employment
of the greatest number of w orkers so as to prevent unemployment
and its resulting dissatisfaction. It is this over-all political
? consideration which determines the continuous annual rise in pro-
? duction, even though the possibilities of distribution have not
increased proportionately, if at all, or have actually decreased.
A major disadvantage to this type of planning program is its in-
flexibility. Once production has been planned, it is virtually im-
possible to change the schedule, at Least not until the following
year. And, as discussed previously See paragraphs 8-117, Zeiss
? is encountering serious distribution difficulties as a result of
its arbitrary production increases each year.
THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AT ZEISS
33. Just as Zeiss has held a somewhat unique position in the Soviet
Zone of Germany regarding the implementation of economic planning,
its position until 1951 with regard to one of the principal methods
of work increase, i.e., the collective agreement, was also unique.
This was because Zeiss in that year was the last VEB without a
collective agreement. The plant maintained that the relationships
of the worker to the management and the rights and privileges of the
workers were outlined in the very liberal Zeiss Statute of the early
twentieth century. However, in 1951 Zeiss was forced to capitulate
and introduce the collective agreement into the plant.
34. The collective agreement ordinarily does not deal with questions of
wages, hours of work, or employment conditions. In theory it con-
stitutes a contract between the plant management and the workers
with the aim of assuring the successful execution of the production
plan. The essence of the contract is a series of mutual obligations
which individuals or groups assume. For example, the plant director
may bind himself to introduce or en1;arge certain social benefits.
Others may obligate themselves to train newcomers or other colleagues,
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aRientiets may agree to. (level:op certain new processes, etc. A
p,pegalmfaatarepf:the .sailective agreement is the possibility
ofb8n9An4iyidu4 Orgguupoof4Tposing obligations upon others.
For example, a researchAaboratory malimpowe upon thel'plant director
the duty ,Of proCuring certain fixtures, equipment, Or Materials
Such externally impoied.obligations may not be rejected -Without
first, offering reasonable explanations.
35. The actual mechanics of the writing of the agreement call for
eyeryjpdividual-to submit on a prepared form separate resolutions.
These indiviidual resolutions are later compiled and published as
ithe "Collective Agreement" by a special plant office organized
ad hoc for this purpose.
THE "NEW COURSE" AND ZEISS
36.
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phe "New Course" (Der Neue Kure) refers to government policies -
in the Soviet Zone which were changed as a result of the June (1953)
riotag the June riots and any changes
in East German policies resulting therefrom had any direct effect
ht-Zai8S.. Roweter,:inlarch or April of this year (1953) Zeiai
ieceiVed oanoellations of-large-Scale orders for equipment whfch 50X1-HUM
was for the use of the Peoples' Police. 50X1-HUM
Whi e it is
that th se cancellations came in advance of the June riots
they are nevertheless part of the "New Course".
this new-policy was introduced as early as the beginning o
1953 when the Communist East German government perceived that 50X1-HUM
the Peoples' Police was becoming an unreliable tool, and that
continued scivietization. of the Soviet Zone was resulting in ever-
increasing resistance. In other words, the "New 50X1-HUM
Course" wan not necessarily the immediate result of the June riots,
but rather that a Ohange in policy, gradually being introduced,
was accelerated, intensified, and publicized as a result of the
riots.
50X1-HUM
SECRET
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/23: CIA-RDP81-01030R000100320006-9