VARIOUS REMARKS ON THE NIO FUNCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100030023-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: May 16, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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16 May 1984
SUBJECT: Various Remarks on the NIO Function
A. Miscellaneous
1. From John McMahon to Horton in May 1983. Some NIO's just sit on
behinds and get the DDI to do their work for them, says John. Later,
David Gries told Horton that McMahon had said that ". . . the DDI and the
NIC should face away from each other." McMahon was emphatic at the NIC
retreat about the need for NIO's to get out into the world, away from the
Community, to get different views. (This is much easier said than done
what with the workload some NIO's have.)
does not want to see disagreements between the NIC and the CIA,
particularly via NIC memoranda.
2. Hal Ford commented on the 1982 forecasts (which see) and Horton
copied down these notes from his comments:
-- be sensitive to the United States as an actor especially in
financial and world economic developments, and for the
prospects in places where the US is heavily committed.
-- include more contingencies, clearly labelled as such.
-- identify and explain areas where there are substantial
differences in judgment.
-- where intelligence support will improve, or not.
3. Things Horton felt we should think more about:
-- irrationalities (because of two-dimensional reporting and a
lack of continuity both among analysts and those serving
abroad, we lack information on personality and character of
leaders, their biases, ambitions, weaknesses, and the same
with other persons in the society.)
watch those border disputes.
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-- what are the unresolved policy issues, especially those
that may involve the United States?
-- what causes instability? And how does the economic scene
relate to it?
4. Advice from Charley Waterman.
Spend 40% of the time on policy-related activities, such as
meetings at State or at the Pentagon; Congressional
testimony or briefings; ISA/DoD.
Devote 25% to Community management: that is meeting with
NSA, INR, DIA (both current and estimates)
Estimate, some 25-30% of the time, but don't ever draft it.
Contingency papers: future-leaning, in Waterman's term.
is good at this. Horton wrote several on
Central America, without changing our course there.)
Outside contacts, meaning think tanks, academic people,
business people, and do a memo for DCI when something
interesting comes out of it.
Collection guidance: Often by what comes out of an
estimate or other paper where ignorance is starkly
revealed. A regular feature of warning meetings should be
collection needs.
See Ambassadors, COS's, and so on.
B. From the NIC retreat in March 1984
1. Ambassador Leonhardt discussed the study* the SRP did on
estimates in the past and described them -- some of them, anyway -- as
. . . thin, faltering efforts to stitch together analytical sections:
political, economic, military. There were few estimative projections,
according to him, and they lacked speculative content. There was an
overstress of precedent and historical continuity. Some of these cases
led to unlikely outcomes. History and trends were of marginal value if
not counterproductive, and he noted a lack of attention to the unlikely
outcome. There was a reluctance to quantify probabilities. (But simply,
2 to 1.) Incident-oriented, episodic--there was no analytical framework
or looking at different alternatives and, therefore, alternative outcomes
*Be sure to read this.
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were neglected. The lesson is to focus on the speculative content and
alternative outcomes. There was often an ignorance or neglect of
economic and business activity in the country involved and of market
reactions. Need for integrative analysis, the blending of fields:
countries are often handled as discrete, disembodied cases, with no
relation to the outside. Many estimates were too long. There was
discussion here of the OGI spread sheet with computerized maps, the use
of graphics to tell a story, even a reference to the electronic displays
at the Crisis Management Center, the easy visual presentation with which
our writings must compete.
2. Maurice Ernst said that estimates are not necessarily more useful
to the consumer than are other papers nor are they read more carefully.
They are expensive to produce, and we write too many, writing estimates
when other papers will do. Why should a paper be an estimate?
-- When it is convenient or necessary for specific policy
purposes: An oil paper or on Iran/Iraq War. Action must
be taken by the United States.
-- Bureaucratic differences: The Soviet Energy Estimate, for
example -- and when there are CIA/DIA differences.
-- One way to get the expertise: sometimes only the writing
of a formal estimate will bring the experts out.
-- Address an issue that otherwise would be too narrowly
addressed by one agency or another.
Therefore, we must ask ourselves: What unique functions does the
estimate serve?
An analytical framework should show how you get from here
to there: Indicators -- what to look for -- and collection
guidance.
Saying what we think is going to happen may not be useful
because it is usually traditional wisdom: instead tell the
policymaker what he should worry about -- and is it
actionable?
Don't say there is a 10% chance that it will fall apart:
how do we get there? Therefore, do think pieces and the
building blocks elsewhere than in the estimate.
In many cases, individual papers serve us better, and
estimates should be reserved to focus on specific questions.
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3. Hal Ford mentioned again the question of the impact of an
estimate versus the White House electronics arrangements. He finds
enormous conservatism in the NIE's. Conventional wisdom, the drive to
coordinate, even with dissents; up-the-line leaning on estimates; and the
need to read first drafts because of the difficulty of getting the paper
through the Agency; Hal mentioned all these problems and referred back to
papers on the Chinese in North Korea and the French in Vietnam. NIE is
only one form of estimating: oral presentations, think pieces, and the
use of video, again, versus the long, composed paragraph. Dave Gries
reffered to the question of where to put the alternative outcomes and we
should not try to cover all bets. Discuss a few outcomes, said Dave, and
show them early, to follow the Key Judgments. Larry Gershwin talked
about listing things that matter and those that don't matter in an
estimate: also he talked about mysteries versus secrets. It would be a
good idea, someone said, to do a post mortem after an estimate is
finished or of a number in a given world area to see how well we called
it. said that we are good at saying what we know, but not
so good at saying what we don't know: He pointed out that gaps in
information might make a difference. Hal wants to eliminate the phrase:
"We believe," in estimates, asking "Who is 'we'?"
4. Gates said that the NIC had somewhat less cohesion than a
university department, referring to administration. He went from there
to talk of the NIO role in collection strategy and said to make
collection a part of every estimate, as an Annex or as a part of the
text. Use your Community-wide perspective, he said, to do memoranda for
Casey or for others if collection gaps are seen. In an aside, he said
that the NSC staff wants more political analysis. He considers the
method of writing of estimates an unsatisfactory system. At one time, an
ONE board member or staffer pulled together various contributions in a
draft. Perhaps a TOR should be sent out and each Agency do a draft and
the drafter or NIO would put it together. Weakness is the "reps
meeting." The NIO must see that -- in the TOR -- alternative approaches
are provided. Have close relations with the Office Director, said Gates,
for improving the quality of work as well as for topics for papers.
Follow-up remarks by send the draft out for comments
before coordination. Gershwin added: circulate the draft internally
(DDI) before letting it go to the NIO. Then someone said there are
various bodies to talk to about collection: warning, COMIREX, the COS,
the Ambassador, and NSA.
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C. These discussions contain the remarks of the three visitors plus
comments from others: Hal tells me that each of them is going to
submit a transcript of what they said.
Rich Armitage.
1. This Administration more than any other uses force as an excuse
(substitute?) for policy. (That's what my notes say!) CIA information
is used in summaries or in background papers for OSD. If power is not
enough in itself -- it must be timely and relevant -- intelligence is the
same. Timeliness is more imperative because decisions must be swift.
Relevance concerns the need for judgment, for the forecasting of events
or conditions, and the need to affect policy -- we should be looking for
opportunities, not only threats. He likes predictive studies. (He got a
lot from a Monday group that would get together to talk over things:
Dave Gries and others.) He mentioned the inability of the Community to
provide divergent views. Intelligence everyone can agree on is not what
is needed. He spoke of (the need for?) a compendium of key unresolved
questions and spoke of intelligence papers failing to provide conclusions
or judgments.
Ken deGraffenreid, mostly on the President's needs.
2. The President is sometimes briefed on Key Judgments. (He said
that a paper, to deGraffenreid, is either great or garbage, and garbage
not because of bias but because it does not tell the President
anything.) Is it on an issue on which he needs to focus? Why does he
(or another reader) need to know this? The President needs to know
trends, the essence, not details. He needs education more than
judgments, the bounds of the problems, that the opinion runs from x to y,
the nature of the threat or opportunity. There is no place for
nice-to-know information: it must lead to taking action or the reverse.
He needs macro-economic assessments. He should be told the nature of the
hostile intelligence threat, not about the individual KGB operation.
3. Intelligence is not the only window. He receives an incredible
amount of information--someone is always lobbying him. Intelligence is
competing with this in a neutral way where the other is purposeful. The
latter is coherently packaged, and intelligence thus may lose out.
4. Relations between policymaker and intelligence: The policymaker
needs to think of questions and listen to the answers. We need to say
what we don't know and explain the limits of intelligence, that it is not
omniscient and that there are questions that can't be answered. It is
not important to know when Franco would die, but the parameters of the
meaning of his death. It is important to know what the policymaker is
facing rather than to worry about being right or wrong in a particular
issue.
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5. DeGraffenreid went on to say that we should concentrate on the
few things that the President needs, not a sociological theory of the
world: we may need that but the President does not. On politicization,
which he called also policy-zation, in this Administration, he said it is
all right for the President to ask N-S questions: Mondale might ask E-W
questions. Neither one can ask that we give them what they want to hear
in that way.
Richard Betts (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute)
6. He spoke of the differences between the analytical and the
decision processes. He spoke of a basic tension between accuracy
which is
thorough
with ambiguity and
balance with the danger it may
be mush. Long papers and delays
in production
and the influence which should be
punchy
simple
conclusive and can be tendentious.
There is a problem with the Executive Summary when people know the
subject well. Then the Key Judgments are less significant and you need
to highlight Key Differences--what's new?--and Key Disagreements. What
is disputed? What is not known? Politicization is all but inevitable
and even desirable. Bias comes from basic assumptions about how the
world works. Politicization is more in the management of the conflict of
ideas, and if there is no controversy, the result is a second order of
intelligence. Almost difficult to differentiate between good analysis
and correct analysis. According to Betts, garbage is bad analysis or
something written with a quick deadline (want it bad--get it bad) or
something too long or too short. DeGraffenreid worries that analysts
lack knowledge of Blue policy and intentions. Garbage to Gates is
prevented now by strict DDI review of written work: He cites as a bad
example the Key Judgments not agreeing with the text. Armitage on a
summary: A summary tells him what he wants to read the piece, but
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doesn't tell him what the Key Judgments are. Gates noted the diminishing
ability of policymakers tolook ahead: certainly not three to five
years. He has said more than once that maybe the CIA (the NIC?) is the
place where it is (or should be?) done for neither at State in Policy
Planning nor at the DoD or at the NSC does anyone look far ahead.
Perhaps Hal Ford, or others who might read this, could add to what
are the bare notes I accumulated in this year, especially those taken at
the NIC retreat. I recommend getting aside with Hal for advice and also
to get advice from Dave Gries, Milt Kovner, Graham Fuller, as well as
Randy Pherson.
John Horton
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11 May 1984
NOTE FOR: Constantine C. Menges
NSC
FROM: John Horton, NIO/LA
Attached is the memorandum you requested. I would remind you
that both the DDI and DDO disagreed with much of the data and analysis,
and would challenge its use as an intelligence document.
John Norton
Attachment:
as stated
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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
22 December 1982
NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR
FROM: Constantine C. Menges
National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America
SUBJECT: Worldwide briefing; the connection
between events in Central America
and Mexico
and C/LA/DDO so that they can review and comment
on this during your absence. If there are major
objections or differences of view, I will let
you know by indicating this in a revised text
with comment or dissenting footnotes.
cc: DDCI D/ALA
C/NIC C/LAD/DDO
VC/NIC
I am also sending a copy to
As you requested yesterday, I have written
briefing material on this theme. You may find
the four pages too long, but I felt it would be
better for you to have too much, rather than too
little, information on this important subject.
Also attached is a copy of the opening
Key Judgement from the September 1981 NIE
on Central America which represented the first
time (to my knowledge) that the Intelligence
Community pointed out the potential danger a
communist Central America could pose to Mexico.
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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
February 29, 1984
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Ambassador Gavin
CIA - Mr. Clarridge
f A - Mr. Horton
NSC - Dr. Menges
NSC - Mr. North
DOD/JCS - Adm. Moreau
DOD/ISA - Mr. Sanchez
Treasury - Mr. DeFalco
Agriculture - Mr. Tracy
Commerce - Mr. Dennin
STR - Mr. Rosenbaum
EXIM Bank - Ms. Rodriguez
FROM: ARA/MEX - George High V
SUBJECT: Economic Initiatives in Central America: Mexico
REF: Michel memorandum on this subject, 2/24;
IG meeting, 2/29
Attached is a redraft of the paper prepared by State for
the Interagency Group meeting this morning. This responds to
NSDD 124 and to the McFarlane memorandum on this subject of
February 18.
The redraft takes into account views expressed at this
morning's IG meeting. If you have further comments on the
redraft, please get them to me by opening of business, March 1,
in writing or by phone, as appropriate (632-9894).
Paper, "US Influence on Mexico's Central American
Policy, 2/29 redraft
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16 July 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
: National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT . Overview of Work Performed by the NIO/LA During the
First Nine Months with CIA--September 1981 to June 1982
I am providing this review of my first nine months with CIA both to give you
perspective on what I have done and as a potentially useful case of the multiple roles
carried out by the National Intelligence Officer. In the first section I summarize in
quantitative terms the work performed using my records to provide an overview of the
number of personally-written analytic items and meetings/briefings attended. The second
section of this report provides a brief discussion of some of this work--especially the
large amount done directly for the DCI. Annex 1 provides a list of individuals within the
Executive branch with whom I have a working relationship, while Annex 2 lists a few
examples of my personal analytic production to illustrate the type of writing done.
A. Quantitative Overview
As a result of requests from the DCI, interagency policy meetings, and the other work
of an NIO, my personal analytic production (not counting routine administrative memos) has
totaled about 350 items with 1,200 pages. The chart below summarizes activities by
function:
Written
Function Items Meetings/Briefings
I. Analysis Tasks for DCI 134 with DCI 36+
II. Warning 23 monthly 9
III. Intelligence Community Analysis 49 NFIB/CIA 22
(9 products completed or in process)
IV. NIO/LA Briefings/Meetings
--Executive branch 26 Executive 111
--Congress 7 Congress 21
V. Anal tic Review of CIA Products 27
(review comment on 66 major papers
and about 340 daily items, e.g., NID)
VI. Other Community Products
community
F I s,etc. 8 meetings 7
VII. Other Analytic Production 76
TOTALS
AVERAGE PER MONTH
350 230
39 26
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B. Descriptive Commentary on the Work Performed
While the quantitative overview provides a rough idea of the allocation of time and
energy among the different NIO functions, only a brief descriptive commentary can provide
a sense for the actual work done. This will be organized according to function, and Annex
2 provides some specific examples of the related analytic products.
I. Analysis Tasks for DCI
Four substantive issues have formed the core of analysis done for the DCI: Central
America; Caribbean Basin initiative; the Falklands dispute; and, international
communication needs and opportunities. Of these, Central America has been the continuing
issue and accounted for eight of the ten NSC/NSPG meetings on Latin America held during
the nine months.
Central America
An interagency group involving State, Defense, and CIA responsible for framing a US
strategy toward Cuba and the conflict in Central America moved into an intensive phase
between September and December 1981. During that time, there were two formal NSC meetings
and about ten drafts of a lengthy paper which required a number of comments from CIA and a
number of intelligence assessments concerning the feasibility of different US actions and
the likely responses of the USSR, Cuba, European allies, and Latin America. For the
NIO/LA, this involved about 40 analysis products for the DCI.
A second round of decisions and analysis took place in January 1982, and, a third
from the post-Salvador election time at the end of March to a new NSDD issued by the
President at the end of May 1982. In each of these processes, my contributions included:
-- memos to inform the DCI of progress and issues;
-- memos to present the DCI with alternative views and choices for his
decisions in the process;
-- coordination with DDI/DDO on joint suggestions for a CIA position--this
occurred in all three occasions;
-- briefing points and text for the DCI to use in preparing for the Cabinet-
level meetings;
-- individual analysis papers on key issues raised at the IG or Core Group
meetings, e.g., the paper Central America After the El Salvador Elections,
31 March 1982.
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This work for the DCI in the interagency process certainly was helped by the NIO
accessibility to the entire community viewpoint at the monthly warning meetings and
through chairmanship of three national intelligence estimates on Central America during
this time period.
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Caribbean Basin Presidential Initiative
The interagency process on this occurred during January and February 1982 and
culminated in the speech and legislative proposals of the President on 25 February. The
NIO role included:
-- monitoring both the policy issues and the speech drafts and reporting to the
DCI;
-- specific suggestions to the DCI for changes in the speech (which the
President accepted);
-- briefing and analysis material for the NSC meetings.
Falklands and Impact on US-Latin American Relations
The crisis began with the Argentinian invasion of 2 April; and early that day the
DCI asked the NIO to coordinate an analysis of both sides (which was ready later in the
day). A SNIE was written later in the month, chaired by the NIO/WE with substantial
contribution by the A/NIO/LA. The NI0/LA did the following:
-- carefully monitored the intelligence to assess four main developments:
a) Soviet/Cuban moves to exploit the crisis;
b) possible Latin american military help/participation with Argentina;
c) potential military actions/surprises of both sides;
d) signs of military-political factionalism and reduced support for the
Galtieri and his decisions within Argentina.
NI0/LA advice to the DCI included the view that Argentina would lose and that this
would lead to a new regime with four possible alternatives ranging from a pre-invasion
military regime to pressures for immediately restoring civilian rule (my analogy was
Greece after the 1974 failed Cyprus coup) to an intensely anti-US military obtaining arms
from the USSR (the Nasser example). The NIO/LA raised these alternatives with the
intelligence community by the end of April, and brief interagency analyses were done in
early May. This will now continue with a forthcoming NIE.
One week before major military action began, I wrote a brief paper for the DCI
examining a number of potential military surprises which both sides might employ (a number
of these occurred). Toward the end of May the NIO/LA participated in the first of seven
IG meetings on US policy toward Latin America after the Falklands; this resulted in a
number of intelligence community comments (coordinated) on six drafts of an NSC paper
which will soon come to the Cabinet level.
International Communications--On Latin American Issues
Following the November 1981 decision of the President to make this an integral part
of the Central America program, the NIO/LA produced--with the concurrence or at the
direction of the DCI--a number of analytic proposals for combining public communications,
diplomacy, and special activities in a systematic effort to reduce international support
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for the Central American guerrillas from Mexico and democratic socialist parties while
enhancing the public awareness of the positive support being given to the target
governments by international free labor, the Christian Democrats, and others.
Two drafts were written on this in November 1981, but there was no implementation
until the President made his Caribbean speech in February 1982. From that point, the
NI0/LA represented CIA in the bi-weekly interagency communications meetings--which have
produced some, but too few results.
The NI0/LA also participated directly in writing material for the March 1982 public
intelligence briefings and in the preparation of the new international political action
initiative announced by the President in his speech at Westminster on 8 June 1982.
IT. Warning
The NI0/LA has sought to make the monthly warning meetings a useful intelligence
event because it is the only place and time where all the disciplines meet together
(analysis, HUMINT, SIGINT, PHOTINT). I am informed that the following are innovations
since my chairmanship began:
a wholehearted effort to encourage diversity of view and test prevailing
conventional attitudes--whether these are optimistic or pessimistic;
a known agenda with requests to specific individuals (structured but still
open) throughout the community for one to three minute presentations (this
spreads the interest and participation);
a short chronology prepared by the A/NI0/LA of key warning-type intelligence
items available at the meetings to assure that ambiguous or potentially
dramatic issues are explored;
-- the incorporation of occasional briefings with photos and maps to provide a
greater sense of understanding and immediacy.
On occasion, my own extensive extra-governmental network has provided warning-type
information or indicators, and I have shared these with the DDO or DDI, as appropriate.
III. Intelligence Community Production
To date, four NIEs, etc., have been completed with another four very close to
completion with publication in August (see Annex 2 for a listing). The two fast-track
SNIEs (March: El Salvador Elections; June: Central America) occurred in the midst of
other pressing requirements; and, it seemed to me, produced timely intelligence
perspectives. My goal has been to encourage alternative viewpoints and seek to avoid
ambiguous language that may obscure rather than clarify important differences.
The complex process and lengthy meetings (chaired by the NIO) in producing these
formal products seem to have been useful places where all participants learned from the
others and debated differences in a mature, collegial style.
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In addition, with A/NIO/LA taking the lead, we have sought to have the entire
intelligence community debate and agree on key items of information which come up
frequently such as: for Central America--the size of government and guerrilla military
forces; casualties; and, civilian casualties (though the data is more difficult to
obtain). This data has been attached to the warning reports. In addition, we held
community meetings on the vulnerabilities of the guerrilla forces in Central America and
potential means to divide them from each other and from Cuba and Nicaragua
IV. NIO/LA Briefings/Meetings
In October the DCI asked that I organize an intelligence community briefing on
Central America. This was produced in writing by mid-November based upon agreement and
review by all participants and became the core of many subsequent briefings of Congress.
My briefings have always been based on written, updated talking points, which I
have given to DDI for review. I consider the art of briefing important since it is the
point at which intelligence data is actually being heard and thought about by
policymakers. In more than 70 briefings in Congress and the Executive Branch, I have
experienced only one unfavorable reaction.
V. Analytic Review of CIA Products
I have reviewed about 350 short, daily production items (e.g. NID articles and
about 66 longer analytic papers or assessments prepared by DDI. My approach is to raise
issues only where key substantive (rather than stylistic) matters are concerned, and this
has involved about 27 written analytic comments or suggestions.
The issues I find it necessary to raise most frequently in this process have been:
-- possible Soviet/Cuban/internal communist intentions--it has surprised me
that whether in discussing the Dominican Republic, Haiti, labor in Brazil,
etc., the analysts tend to overlook the intelligence on what the opponent
might be doing or might seek to do in the next months;
-- the internal politics of foreign policy is generally not covered in a
careful way;
-- the need to point to both the positive as well as negative social and
economic trends over time (e.g., how far Colombia has improved) in order to
have a sense of perspective about current problems in the context of global
recession.
At the end of December 1981 I wrote a memorandum to the new DDI, Mr. Robert Gates,
summarizing several analysis issues and methods which my four months with this institution
suggested needed far more attention:
Analysis Issues
-- the connection between the USSR, the Soviet Bloc, and what I called a
"destabilization coalition" operating against pro-western governments in
Central America, the Middle East, and Southern Africa;
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JLI;KL I
-- the "out of area" operation of terrorist groups, e.g., Libya in the
Caribbean; Spanish ETA in Central America--issues too easily missed by the
area divisions;
transnational political action in areas of strategic interest, such as
Central America and the Middle East--we know too little about the Socialist
International, the international labor groups, the international church, and
refugee aid organizations.
Analysis Methods
-- thinking like the enemy in specific contexts--what might USSR/Cuba try to do
next in Argentina as a basis for becoming more sensitive to the intelligence
data and also formulating indicators;
-- alternative or competitive analysis--make different assumptions about key
trends, and then examine consequences in the next two years.
The NIO/LA is chairing two analyses using this last approach--one will be the SNIE
papers speculating on the implications in 1983-84 for Central America of~three ~different
trends in El Salvador during 1982.
Role of the Assistant National Intelligence Officer and Secretary
For three of the nine months the NIO/LA worked alone with his excellent and
dedicated secretary, The obvious high demands on (typing,
filing, appointments, frequent tight time deadlines, and a volume of work) have required
extraordinary competence and substantial amounts of overtime work. Since late January,
Lam....,
w /uTA i. A -
has
the
provided important assistance in this production--in obtaining data, inJsynthesizing
information, in coordinating some of the formal interagency intelligence production.
Constantine C. Menges
Atts: (2) Annexes 1 and 2
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ANNEX 1
EXECUTIVE BRANCH -- OVERVIEW OF PERSONS WITH WHOM THE NIO/LA WORKS
Position
Person
Telephone Number
State
Ambassador to the OAS
Amb.
William Middendorf
632-9376
Ambassador to the UN
Amb.
Jean J. Kirkpatrick
632-8344
UN/Latin America
Ms.
Jackie Tillman
632-8344
INR/Director
Mr.
Hugh Montgomery
632-0342
INR/Latin America
Mr.
William E. Knepper
632-2229
ARA/Asst. Secretary
Amb.
Thomas O.Enders
632-9210
ARA/Dep. Asst. Secretary
Mr.
Stephen W. Bosworth
632-8562
ARA/Dep. Asst. Secretary
Mr.
Everett E. Briggs
632-8386
Policy Planning/Director
Mr.
Paul Wolfowitz
632-2372
S/P/Latin America
Mr.
Jon Glassman
632-8664
Politico-Military (Act.
Dir.)
Mr.
Stefan A. Halper
632-9022
PM/(Latin America)
Mr.
Angel Rabasa
632-1862
AID
Asst. Administrator for LA Mr. Otto Reich
I CA
Director/Amer. Rep. Affairs Mr. Stephen F. Dachi
Defense
DIA/DIO Col.
Brian J. Bosch
695-0198
DIA/Current/Latin America
695-0542
DIA/Estimates
694-8627
DIA/Estimates
694-8627
OSD/Policy (Under Secretary) Dr.
Fred C. Ikle
697-7200
OSD/ISA/DAS Mr.
Nestor Sanchez
697-5884
ISA/CA-Caribbean Col.
Larry L. Tracy
697-9301
ISA/South America Col.
Clarke M. Brintnall
697-9301
JCS Lt.
Gen. Paul F. Gorman
697-9124
Inter-American Affairs Mr.
Staff Member Col.
Roger Fontaine
Richard T. Childress
395-3576
Labor
International Affairs
(Dep. Under Secretary) Mr.
Robert Searby
Inter-American Development Bank
Executive Director Mr. Jose Casanova
634-8044
US Ambassadors
John Negroponte (Honduras); John Gavin (Mexico); Frank Ortiz (Peru);
James Theberge (Chile); William Chapin (Guatemala); Dean Hinton (El Salvador)
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