THE GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE: EFFECTS ON NATO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00837R000400060005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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A straightforward exposition of the differences between
the two sides; an unemotional appraisal of the effects
on NATO; overall, a balanced piece which reminds the
reader of the depth of feeling dividing the parties,
and hamstringing NATO planners in the process. The
only point not made, and one of importance to the US,
is that should tempers fl air and tensions eventually
mount to the point of actual conflict, both sides
would expect two things at a minimum from us: Support
(or at the very least assurances that we would not help
the other side); and the expectation that we would in
some way intervene to keep things from going too far.
Otherwise, it's an excellent piece.
STAT
DateiA at
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NOFORN
The Greek-Turkish
Dispute: Effects
on NATO (U)
A Defense Research Report
Defense Intelligence Agency
DDB-2200-413-86
November 1986
Secret
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REL... Authorized for Release to...
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NOFORN
The Greek-Turkish Dispute:
Effects on NATO (U)
A Defense Research Report
This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
Prepared by the West Europe' Latin America Division,
Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency
Author: Dana, Bauer
West Europe' NATO Branch,
Military' Political Affairs Section
Information Cutoff Date: 1 October 1986
Classified By: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: OADR
Secret ?
DDB-2200-413-86
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The Greek-Turkish Dispute:
Effects on NATO (U)
SUMMARY
(S/NF) Several longstanding problems between Greece and Turkey continue to interfere with
NATO military activities in the southern region and to obstruct overall Alliance business. Athens
and Ankara are fundamentally tied to their positions and neither government is likely to make
concessions on the main issues.
(S/NF) The Greek Government of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou has exacerbated Greek-
Turkish tensions by claiming that Turkey, not the Warsaw Pact, is the primary threat to Greece.
Papandreou is more obsessed with the Turkish threat than previous Greek governments have been,
and he exploits Greek-Turkish problems for domestic political reasons.
(S/NF) The dispute between Greece and Turkey over Athens' militarization of Limnos Island
complicates NATO operations on the southern flank. The Greeks want NATO to recognize their
forces on Limnos and are boycotting major NATO exercises in an attempt to push the Allies to
support this stance. Turkey insists that Greek forces on Limnos must not be recognized by NATO
in any way and will not concede this issue. Both Athens and Ankara believe their positions in the
Aegean are at stake over the Limnos dilemma.
(S/NF) Greece's attempts to extend its sovereign rights over the Aegean Sea and airspace are
interfering with NATO exercises in the southern region. The Greeks are increasing their claims of
territorial airspace and Flight Information Region (FIR) violations in an effort to pressure the Allies
into supporting Greek positions. Athens and Ankara both use Alliance forums in their efforts to
force NATO into taking sides. Unresolved Greek-Turkish problems are blocking important Alliance
planning documents and Alliance defense projects on NATO's southern flank. Problems between
Greece and Turkey also undercut NATO defenses and solidarity in the southern region. In particular,
Athens' unwillingness to participate fully in NATO's integrated military structure degrades the Greek
Armed Forces' ability to operate with the Allies.
(S/NF) Other NATO members avoid openly taking sides on Greek-Turkish issues in order not
to alienate either Ally. Key NATO members are seeking ways to limit damage to the Alliance as
a result of Greek-Turkish disputes, but they generally agree there is little NATO can do to solve
the problems. Current disputes, coupled with traditional animosities, will keep bilateral tensions
high, and an armed confrontation between the two cannot be ruled out. In the event of hostilities,
neither side would be likely to back down.
(Reverse Blank)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
The Backdrop for Greek-Turkish Animosity
1
Contentious Issues
1
Effects on NATO
4
Allied Attitudes Toward Greek-Turkish Problems
5
Conclusions
6
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UNCLASSIFIED
(C/NF) Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal (I) and Greek Prime
Minister Andreas Papandreou (r) exchanged few words at a
meeting of government and business leaders earlier this year in
Switzerland. Papandreou repeatedly has rejected Ozal's invitations
to discuss bilateral problems, and Ozal, therefore, is taking a
harder line toward Athens.
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The Greek-Turkish Dispute:
Effects on NATO (U)
The Backdrop for Greek-Turkish Animosity
(S/NF) Deep-seated mutual distrust is at the
core of Greek-Turkish disputes. Virtually all
Greeks, including the professional military, view
Turkey as the main threat. Most Greeks believe
Turkey seeks, at some point, to annex the east-
ern Aegean islands and Cyprus. The Papandreou
government, however, is more obsessed with the
Turkish threat than previous Greek governments,
and in its efforts to fuel anti-Turkish sentiment,
has sharply exacerbated Greek-Turkish problems.
For example, Papandreou has announced a formal
defense doctrine that identifies Turkey, not the
Soviet Union, as the primary threat to Greece.
He has also directed his military leadership to
enhance Greek defense strategy for conflict with
Turkey, including strengthening Greek military
forces in the Aegean Islands and Cyprus.
(S/NF) There is no evidence that Turkey cov-
ets Greek territory, and Greece is not central
to Turkish security concerns. The Turks do be-
lieve, however, that Greece is trying to undermine
Turkey's relations with its Western allies, partic-
ularly the US. Ankara is concerned that Greece,
through large Greek-American political constit-
uencies, can influence the US Congress to reduce
security assistance to Turkey. The Turks also are
suspicious of growing Greek ties to Syria, which
Turkey long has viewed as a Soviet surrogate
and sponsor of anti-Turkish terrorism. Ankara, in
addition, believes the Papandreou government is
seeking to undercut Turkish relations with the
European Community and several Balkan coun-
tries.
Contentious Issues
(C/NF) There is a wide range of quarrelsome
issues between Athens and Ankara, many of which
are longstanding. Each side is adamant and neither
is likely to make major concessions.
Greek Militarization of the Aegean
(S/NF) The Turks object strongly to Greece's
militarization of its eastern Aegean islands ? a
process that began after Turkey's 1974 invasion
of Cyprus ? and claim that Athens is violat-
ing international law. Turkey holds that Greece
has militarized its islands at the entry to the
Turkish Straits in violation of the 1923 Straits of
Dardanelles Convention. Athens, on the other
hand, argues that the Dardanelles Convention was
superseded by the 1936 Montreux Convention,
which does not mention the islands in the Turkish
Straits, and therefore no longer ,prohibits their
militarization. Turkey also believes that Greece is
violating,the 1947 Italian Peace Treaty that calls
for demilitarization of the Dodecanese Islands.
Greece rejects Ankara's assertions by noting that
Turkey is not a signatory to that treaty and by
claiming that it must defend its eastern islands
in light of Turkey's moves on Cyprus. The Turks
view Greek militarization of the Aegean islands as
provocative, but have opted, thus far, to take a
low key approach except for the Limnos island
issue.
The Limnos Issue
(S/NF) The militarization of Limnos is only
part of the broader dispute over Greece's right
to place military forces on its eastern Aegean
islands. Limnos, however, has gained visibility
because the Greeks 'want NATO to recognize
their forces on the island and to include Lim-
nos in NATO exercises. Since 1984, the Greeks
have included their Army brigade on Limnos in
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the annual NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire
(DPQ) as NATO-committed forces in an attempt
to obtain NATO's recognition. Alliance support
for the Greek position would be viewed as a
major victory for Athens, and justification for mil-
itarization of the other Aegean islands. For the
Turks, Limnos has become a symbol for their
stance against Greek militarization and Greece's
attempts to exert sovereignty over the Aegean.
Turkey would view any type of recognition of
Greek forces on Limnos as undermining its over-
all position in the Aegean, and consider NATO
approval of the Greek position a major strategic
defeat.
Aegean Sea and Continental Shelf
(S/NF) Athens and Ankara disagree over the
delimitation of the Aegean territorial water bound-
aries and the continental shelf. Greece claims
a 6-mile territorial sea boundary, but reserves
the right to extend its limits to 12 miles under
UNCLASSIFIED
YUGO 24
BULGARIA
GREECE
SEA OF
ARMARA
Greek territorial
water (6 NM)
DPossible Greek
claim (12 NM)
AT ENS
0 50 km
0 50 NM
grir r
titgfia rrluwrkish
tg
6 NM)
TURKEY
SEA OF CRETE
Crete
28
(U) Greek Territorial Water Limits in the
Aegean Sea.
bodes
provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty,
which Greece, but not Turkey, has signed. The
Turks strongly oppose any extension of Greek sea
limits since this would give Athens claim to about
70 percent of the Aegean, dramatically reducing
the area of international waters. Ankara warns
that such a move would be cause for war. Greek-
Turkish differences on the continental shelf cen-
ter on how it is to be delimited around the islands
in the Aegean. Greece believes each of the islands
has a shelf, and, therefore, claims most of the
Aegean's mineral resources.
Aegean Airspace
(S/NF) Greece disagrees with Turkey, as well
as with other NATO Allies, on the division of
Aegean airspace. Greece claims 10-mile air bound-
aries surrounding its mainland and islands for se-
curity reasons, while Turkey and the rest of NATO
recognize only 6-mile airspace limits. In addi-
tion, Greece requires all foreign aircraft, including
Allied military aircraft, to file flight plans upon
entering Greece's FIR. NATO military aircraft, are
exempt from filing flight plans with Athens ac-
cording to the 1944 International Civil Aviation
Convention, but Greece claims the agreement
permits enforcement of national rules.
Aegean Command and Control
(S/NF) Greece and Turkey also differ over
NATO command and control responsibilities in
the Aegean. Athens opposes the current arrange-
ments that have been in effect since Greece
withdrew from the NATO military structure
following Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus. Al-
though Greece reintegrated into the military com-
mand under the 1980 Rogers Agreement, Turkey
continues to share operational responsibility with
the Greeks for part of the Aegean. Greece wants
to regain its pre-1974 authority for Aegean com-
mand and control that would extend to its FIR
? the median line between the eastern Greek
islands and the Turkish coast. In an attempt to
push NATO toward its position, Athens refuses to
establish NATO land (LANDSOUTHCENT) and air
(SEVENATAF) headquarters at Larissa that were
called for in the 1980 Rogers Agreement. Turkey,
meanwhile, wants to maintain its share of opera-
tional responsibility for half of the Aegean, mainly
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CONFIDENTIAL
Greek position on NATO
command & controIL__
Turkish position__
Islands Greece has
militarized
KHIOS
SAMOS
8 \
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t,o\KOS ---.-. we.
RHODES
SEA OF CRETE
arpoin
? (C/NF) Aegean Disputes ? Command and
Control and Militarization of Islands.
UNCLASSIFIED
because Ankara does not believe the Greeks have
the capability or willingness to provide adequate
coverage for Turkey's Aegean coast.
Aegean Army Controversy
(S/NF) The status and mission of Turkeys
Aegean Army is a controversial. point between
Athens and Ankara. The Aegean Army, organized
in the mid-1970s following, Turkey's invasion of
Cyprus, is headquartered in Izmir and deployed
along Turkey's Aegean coast, opposite the eastern
Greek .islands. The Greeks believe the Aegean
Army is deployed to seize, at some point, Greece's
eastern Aegean islands and to provide rapid Turk-
ish reinforcement to north Cyprus. Greek Primp
Minister Papandreou claims the Aegean Army con-
sists of 120,000 Turkish troops and has a large am-
phibious landing fleet. The Turks say the Aegean
Army comprises only training forces, with the ex-
ception of one brigade. Turkish officials, however,
? (U) The Greek Armed Forces, like virtually all Greeks, believe Turkey poses the imminent
military threat. In particular, the Greek military is wary of. Turkish troops in Western
Thrace and therefore keeps its attention focused on the Greek-Turkish border.
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justify maintaining the Army on Turkey's western
coast in the event they need to provide rapid
reinforcement to north Cyprus. DIA believes the
Aegean Army is essentially a training establish-
ment of some 28,000 men and 3 infantry brigades.
It likely is the headquarters for Turkish forces on
Cyprus, providing fresh troops and equipment for
rotation to north Cyprus.
The Cyprus Stalemate
(S/NF) On the Cyprus issue, Greece and Tur-
key remain at odds. Athens and its Greek Cypriot
compatriots believe the entire island should be
under control of the Greek side, and seek to
regain dominance over the Turk Cypriots in any
negotiated settlement. The Greek side believes
Turkish forces in north Cyprus may, at some
point, seize more territory than the 36 percent of
Cyprus that Turkey now controls. Athens, there-
fore, maintains about 2,450 Greek regulars on
Cyprus that constitute several special forces-type
units and provide much of the leadership cadre
for the 13,500-man Greek Cypriot National Guard.
Greece and the Greek Cypriots, in addition, do
not think that the Turk Cypriots should be po-
litical equals of the Greek Cypriots. The Greek
side rejects the idea of the Turk Cypriots having
a veto in any combined government. Athens and
the Greek Cypriots insist upon the removal of
Turkish troops in the north ? which they view as
an occupation force ? before they will negotiate
with the Turkish side.
(S/NF) Turkey, at the same time, is firmly com-
mitted to protect the political rights and physi-
cal security of the Turk Cypriot community and,
therefore, insists upon maintaining 22,000 to
24,000 mainland troops in north Cyprus. Turkey
refuses to give up any of the territory it seized
in 1974 unless the Greek side provides the spe-
cific guarantees the Turks seek, which is unlikely.
Turkey will not permit the Greek Cypriots to
gain a military advantage on the island and will
ensure the TOM Cypriots are not dominated by
the Greek side. In fact, there are indications that
the Turks have increased their troop strength
in north Cyprus and may be upgrading tanks.
Ankara, as well as Athens, is fundamentally tied
to these views, making prospects dim for any
negotiated settlement.
SECRET
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TURKEY
NATO Installations ?
US Facilities ?
SEA OF CRETE
? Souda Bay
OS
Rhodes
Karpathos
24 28
(S/NF) Souda Bay houses NATO fuel supplies.
NATO Airborne Warning and Control
System aircraft deployed at Preveza Airbase
provides coverage of the central and eastern
Mediterranean. The NATO Allied Missile
Firing Range near Khania provides live firing
ranges. The Fleet Operational Readiness
Accuracy facility is under construction on
Crete.
Effects on NATO
(S/NF) Greek-Turkish disputes affect NATO
military matters in many important ways. Among
them is the disruption of NATO military exercises
because of Greek or Turkish objections to certain
war game scenarios. Greece currently boycotts
NATO exercises because Limnos is not included
in exercise scenarios. Limnos is not included
because the Alliance does not want to interfere
in the Greek-Turkish dispute over Greek milita-
rization of the island. Greece did not participate
in NATO military exercises from 1974 to 1977
and only played in selective maneuvers from 1977
to 1984. While Greek military forces have not
participated since then, Greek merchant vessels
took part in the April 1986 Alliance exercise
MED SUPPLY, a naval control of shipping (NCS)
exercise designed to test wartime control of mer-
chant shipping. For Turkey's part, Ankara has
repeatedly blocked the biannual NATO exercise
TRADE DAGGER because this NCS exercise deals
with fundamental Aegean NATO command and
control issues.
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UNCLASSIFIED
(C/NF) The Greek Air Force generally
goes on alert during NATO exercises in
the Aegean to track movements of US and
Turkish aircraft. Greece frequently claims
its air boundaries have been violated and
sends fighters to escort intruders out of
Greek-claimed airspace.
(S/NF) NATO exercises also are disrupted be-
cause Greece claims the right to prohibit Al-
lied exercise participants from using facilities on
Greek soil during NATO maneuvers in which
Greece does not take part. During a May 1985 ex-
ercise, for example, Greece refused to refuel the
British naval support ship Green Rover when it
called at the NATO depot in Souda Bay, Crete. In
September, the Papandreou government officially
announced that Greece would not allow NATO
units to use any facilities on its national territory
during future exercises. Nevertheless, the Greeks
have continued to permit NATO members to use
these facilities on several occasions, usually when
Allied units have not declared theft participation
in an exercise.
(S/NF) Greece's efforts to advance its positions
on Aegean airspace and the Greek FIR create
safety problems during NATO maneuvers and ag-
gravate tensions between exercise participants
and Athens. The Greek Government repeatedly
charges the US and Turkey with airspace viola-
tions, and Greek fighter aircraft escort the alleged
intruders out of Greek-claimed airspace. The
Greeks also claim FIR violations during exercises
because US and Turkish aircraft do not comply
with Greek demands that they file flight plans.
The British, however, abide by the Greek re-
quirement, primarily to avoid provoking Athens.
During the May 1986 DISTANT HAMMER exer-
cise, Athens claimed the US and Turkey violated
Greek airspace 44 times and the Greek FIR in 94
instances.
UNCLASSIFIED
(C/NF) Greek forces do not participate in
major NATO exercises but conduct their
own national training, including amphibious
maneuvers designed to defend the many
Greek islands against a Turkish assault.
(S/NF) Greek-Turkish differences over the mil-
itarization of Limnos Island have interfered with
several NATO planning documents. Because of
Greece's inclusion of its forces on Limnos in
its annual NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire
(DPQ) country chapter, and Turkey's strong ob-
jection to this move, these two chapters have
been excluded from the NATO planning docu-
ment for the past 2 years. The Limnos impasse
also has prevented the Alliance from producing an
updated NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons
Paper since Turkey refuses to accept the Greek
DPQ data including Limnos forces.
(S/NF) Finally, Greek-Turkish problems have
blocked the construction of NATO-funded pro-
jects for some Alliance countries. Greece, for
example, opposes the construction of a low-
frequency transmitter in Canakkale, Turkey,
because it claims the station would provide
coverage of the northern Aegean, including Greek
islands. The Greek veto, moreover, is holding
up release of NATO's Slice XXXI' infrastructure
funds that are necessary to implement several
large projects in other Alliance countries.
Allied Attitudes Toward Greek-Turkish
Problems
(S/NF) The other NATO members, for the most
part, have sought to avoid taking sides on Greek-
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Turkish issues. Most Allied governments believe
NATO can tolerate Greek-Turkish problems for
the time being, and believe there is little the
Alliance can do to solve the problems. They
generally agree that the Alliance should not take
concerted action on particular Greek-Turkish dis-
putes for fear of further damaging the Alliance's
solidarity.
(S/NF) The Allies largely agree that Greek
Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou is exacer-
bating Greek-Turkish problems and obstructing
NATO business. But they also believe Turkey is
equally intransigent on some Aegean issues. Most
NATO partners doubt that applying pressure or
sanctions on the two countries would cause them
to make concessions on the disputes affecting the
Alliance. Last year, however, West Germany tried
to alter Papandreou's anti-NATO policies by delay-
ing the release of military aid to Greece. German
military aid to Greece, roughly $25 million per 18
months, is the second largest ? after the US ?
that Greece receives. Bonn later approved the aid
package.
(S/NF) NATO Allies also are reluctant to con-
demn Papandreou publicly because of Greece's
longstanding political and economic ties to West
Europe. At the same time, many European Allies
have been critical of Turkey on human rights'
policies and restrictions on certain democratic
freedoms. Within NATO defense circles, however,
Alliance representatives privately condemn Greek
behavior and praise Turkey for its solidarity with
NATO.
(S/NF) Within the NATO framework, some ef-
forts have been made to lessen the impact of the
dispute ? although none of the Allies expect
major breakthroughs. NATO Secretary General
Lord Carrington, for example, convenes from time
to time an informal contact group on Greece-
Turkey-NATO issues. NATO Permanent Represen-
tative from the US, UK, FRG, Italy, and France,
meet to discuss Greek-Turkish problems that af-
fect NATO and examine proposals that seek to
limit the damage to the Alliance. In addition,
the Deputy Permanent Representatives have es-
tablished a working group on Aegean affairs. At
their first meeting in April 1986, for example, the
major Allies agreed to focus on Greek/NATO ex-
ercise problems and broader Greek-Turkish issues
relating to NATO.
Conclusions
(S/NF) Aegean controversies will remain divi-
sive and obstructive factors in NATO as each side
tries to push the Allies to support its stance. In
this regard, Athens more frequently will take the
lead and apply strong pressure. Moreover, the
Papandreou government will continue to scru-
tinize NATO policies and will reject those that
are not perceived as being useful. Ankara, for
its part, will not be hesitant to respond to Greek
actions, particularly if the Turks believe their core
interests are at stake. Turkey will be increasingly
sensitive to NATO positions it perceives as tilting
toward Greece, especially regarding recognition
of Greek forces on Limnos.
(S/NF) The Greeks and Turks will continue to
use Alliance forums to advance their positions
on bilateral issues. Greek-Turkish disputes will
intrude into NATO affairs and will hamper Allied
business and projects, particularly infrastructure-
funded projects in the two countries, the NATO-
Warsaw Pact Force Comparison process, and
Allied exercises in the Aegean.
(S/NF) While arms modernization programs in
Greece and Turkey will help to strengthen each
country's military capabilities and to contribute to
Alliance defense posture in the southern region,
the continuing Aegean disputes will persist in
undercutting NATO solidarity on the southern
flank. Lack of cooperation between Athens and
Ankara, and Greece's unwillingness to integrate
fully into NATO's military structure will compli-
cate NATO military planning for the southern
flank. Continued Greek absence from NATO ex-
ercises will degrade the armed forces' ability to
operate effectively with the Allies.
(S/NF) Current disputes, coupled with tradi-
tional animosities, will keep bilateral tensions high,
and an armed confrontation between the two
countries cannot be ruled out. Neither side wants
a fight, but one could develop over such key
issues as control of Cyprus or the Aegean. Ankara,
thus far, has sought to avoid provoking Athens
without compromising core beliefs but might be
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persuaded to take a harder line as its patience
wears thinner. Athens also wants to avoid a clash.
However, the Papandreou government's obses-
sion with the Turkish threat and use of a hard
line toward Turkey for domestic political payoffs
increase the likelihood that a military confronta-
tion could take place. Frequent military exercises
in the Aegean area by both countries creates the
setting in which the possibility for an incident
? and unintentional military confrontation ? is
high. In the event of hostilities, neither side
would be likely to back down.
(Reverse Blank)
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(U) Each classified title and heading has been properly marked; all those unmarked are
unclassified.
(U) This document has been fully coordinated with the Directorates fOr Current Intelligence
and Estimates.
(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the
Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-3B), Washington, D.C. 20340-0001. Requests for additional
copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (ATTN:
RTS-2A), using DD Form 1142, Interagency Document Request, in accordance with DIA Manual
59-3, DIA Reference Library.
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DOD & JOINT AGENCIES
A024 1 DEF NUCLEAR AGCY
A085 1 NAT DEF UNIVERSITY
A103 1 OSD ASDSD NATO AFF
A109 1 OSD/ODUSD(P)/IP&S
0110 1 110AM
A115 1 DASD ISA
A117 1 SAID PANE
8124 1 OSS NET ASSESSMENT
A129 1 JTC3A
A134 1 DASD ISP/IET&SP
8135 1 OSD/USDP/ISA/NEASA
0138 5 DASD ISP/EAR-NATO
0151 1 OUSDRE (IP&T)
A152 1 OUSDRE (SAA)
0205 1 DMAHTC, CODE SDTSD
A210 1 DMAAC
A302 1 JCS/CHAIRMAN
A305 1 JSOC
0306 1 SFOD-D
0310 1 JOINTSPECOPSAGCY
8315 1 JCS/JAD
A325 1 JCS/J-3
0332 1 JCS/J-3 STRAT OPS
A335 1 JCS/J-4
A340 1 JCS/J-5 MIL SEC
6341 1 'JCS/J-5 M/UN NEG
0345 1 JCS/CCC SYSTEMS
A350 1 USDOCO USNMR SHAPE
A362 1 USDOCOLANDSOEAST
0363 1 USNMR SHAPE
A365 1 US DEL (UN MSC)
A368 1 USRMC/NATO
0706 1 JLD NAPLES
6716 1 DASD/ISP/S&TNFP
0723 1 OUSD(P) SAS
DIA
8002 1 DIA/DD
8003 1 DIA/DR (PROD REV)
B004 5 DIA/DI-1
8029 1 DIA/GC
8030 1 DIA/ED
8032 1 DIA/JSJ
8040 3 DIA/D10
8045 1 5I0/61-2
8060 1 DIA/RTS-2A5 PENT
8091 1 DIA/DIA REP NMCC
8096 1 DIA/DI
8097 1 DIA/DI (NFI8)
8100 1 DIA/DB
8131 1 DIA/DE
8134 1 DIA/DE-1 '
8137 1 DIA/DE4 TRANS NAIL
8142 1 DIA/DE-1 (POL/MIL)
8150 1 DIA/DT
8345 1 DIA/RTS-2C(VJ)
8351 1 1I8/RTS-3A4
8352 50 DIA/RTS-2F
8367 1 DIA/DB-4G -
8369 1 DIA/08-8C
8504 1 DIA/05-1C
8549 1 DIA/DB-PDO
8551 1 DIA/DE-P
8555 1 DIA/JS
8564 1 DIA/JSI
8573 3 1I0/18-4E
8575 1 DIA/D8-1
8581 1 DIA/08-1B
8582 1 DIA/DB-1C
8583 1 DIA/D8-10
8588 1 DIA/JSI-2C
8591 2 DIA/01-5
8593 1 DIA/08-1E
8598 1 DIA/D8-2
8602 / DIA/VP-I
8603 1 DIA/DB-6
DOD & JOINT AGENCIES
0363 USNMR SHAPE
DIA
8331 1 . 0I0/RTS-2A2
8352 5 0I0/RTS-2F
ARMY
C242 FORSCOM
C307. 1 24TH INF DIV
DISTRIBUTION LIST
8612 1 0I8/08-502
8617 1 5I0/08-3
13620 1 DIA/DB-8
8621 1 DIA/D8-38
8624 2 DIA/D8-383
8634 1 DIA/D8-5E1
8636 1 DIA/JSI-4
8637 1 DIA/JSI-4A
8644 1 DIA/D8-5D
86451 5 DIA/D8-5D3
8646 DIA/D8-381
8663 1 5I0/08-382
B6641 1 DIA/DB-3134
8680 DIA/D8-4
86863 1 DIA/08-6D
8718 0IA/DX-5A
87201 1 DIA/DX
8724 DIA/DA-P
137281 2 DIA/D0-5
8737 DIA/RTS-28 (LIB)
8782 1 DIA/DB-1[2
87851 1 DIA/JSI-2
8822 0I9/010 REP PACOM
8824 1 DIA/DIA REP SAC
8825 1 DIA/DIA REP EUCOM
8826 2 DIAREP RED/CENTCOM
8870 1 USDA? NICOSIA
8882 3 USDAO ATHENS
8893 1 USDAO ROME
8933 3 USDAO ANKARA
ARMY
CO20 2 DCS-OPS&PLANS
C201 1 HQ I CORPS
C202 1 III CORPS
C2991 2 194TH ARMS BDE
C303 4TH PSYOP GROUP
C305 1 18TH ABN CORPS
C316 4 20TH SEA (ABN)
C347 1 469TH MID (STRAT)
C454 1 ELI ARTY SCH
C459 1 COPS-GEN STE COL
C400 1 ENGINEER SCH
C470 1 ARMY WAR COL
C513 1 ARRADCTR
C605 1 1ST SOCOM
C617 1 CONCEPT ANLYS AGCY
C646CACDA
;
C684 USAISD
C763 1 HODA DAMS-FIT
C766 S HODA SARI-FIC
C768 3 ITAC (LIBRARY)
C786 1 HQDA DAMI-FIW
C819 1 5TH SFA(ABN)1ST SF
U.S. NAVY
5007
0150
5184
0202
0246
0247
0248
0249
0351
? 5505
0562
0971
5972
U.S. AIR FORCE
NIS HQ (NISC-22P)
CRC (DOTE)
NAVSTRKWARCEN
NAVWARCOL/LIB
NAVSWC CODE 022
NAVSURFWPNCEN WOAK
NAVSEASYSCOM
NAVPGSCOL
OP-009
COMNAVSECGRU
NISCSPAWET 0108
OP-009Y2
OP-009Y1
E001 3 HQ USAF/IN
E017 1 HQ USAF/INA (W)
E018 1 HQ USAF/INA (C)
E051 1 HQ USAF/INEK
E053 1 HQ USAF/INET
DISTRIBUTION LIST (MICROFICHE)
C454
C768
U.S. NAVY
0184
0700
U.S. AIR FORCE
E100
E706
PLO ARTY SCH
ITAC (LIBRARY)
1 NAVSTRKWARCEN
CGMCDEC
30 TAC 480 RTG/INPPD
HO ESC/ INYQ
E054 1 HQ USAF/INER
E100 2 TAC 480 RTG/INPPD
E102 1 TAC/INYC
E1041 1 4513 TTG/INOI
E303 HQ USAF/INEGD
E310 1 HQ USAF/X000
E401 1 HQ AFLC/IN
E411 1 ASD/FTD/TGIA
E413 1 ESD/IND
E438 1 3480 TCHTW/SSO RL
E450 2 AIR UNIV
E4511 1 AUL/LSE
E706 HQ ESC/INYQ
E7261 1 USAFTAWC/IN
E730 HQ USAF/000IR
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
F005 1 CINCMAC
F010 1 23 AF/IN
F018 1 21 AF/IN
F019 1 22 AF/IN
F047 1 DET 3, 625MASG/IN
F055 1 625 MASS/IN
F058 1 1 SOW/IN
F060 1 7 SOS/IN
F072 1 23 AF/0001 (DET 1)
F082 1 20 AIR DIV
H005 1 USCINCEUR
1007 1 SILK PURSE
H0101 SOTFE (J-2)
H100 1
HQ USAFE/INS
H101' 1 '
USAFE 497RTG (IRC)
H300 ODCS IN(USAREUR)
4310 1' USASETAF
H330 1 320 AADCOM
H337 1 4430 MID (STRAT)
H500 1 CINCUSNAVEUR
H511 1 COMSIXTHFLT
H527 1 HQ 8TH ONE DIV
H701 1 FOSIF ROTA
H706 1 USAFE COIC
1005 1 USCINCCENT
J005 1 USCINCLANT
J009 1 COMSOCLANT
J500 1 CINCLANTFLT
J502 1 COMSECONDFLT
J515 1 FICEURLANT
J575 1 FMFLANT
0300 1 IPAC (LIBRARY)
4005 1 HO SAC (/NO)
L006 1 SAC/IN
4040 1 SAC 544 SIW/DAA
L0441 1 HQ SAC/INA
8005 USREDCOM
OTHERS
P002
P055
P079
P080
P081
P080
P090
P091
P092
P100
P109
P111
P112
P127
P702
8619
8069
R135
S030
NPIC/REG
CIA/OCR/DSD/DB
STATE INR/PMA
STATE INR/RWE
STATE INR/EC
STATE
NSA
NSA REP DEFENSE
NSA T52/FS
NAT SEC COUNCIL
PP 568
WH SIT ROOM
OH MILITARY OFF
US SECRET SERVICE
CIA/NIO/GPF
ASIC REDSTONE
USCG ICC
USIA
FRO LIB OF CONS
216 CUST'S 332 COPIES
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
F010 1 23 AF/IN
F082 1 20 AIR DIV
H101 1 USAFE 497810 (IRC)
1005 1 USCINCCENT
K427 1 MACG-38
K516 1 FIRST MAF
K7001 SEVENTH MOB
4040 SAC 544 SOW/DAA
4141 1 7 AD/IN
20 COST'S 54 COPIES
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/12 : CIA-RDP93T00837R000400060005-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/12 : CIA-RDP93T00837R000400060005-9
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/12 : CIA-RDP93T00837R000400060005-9