FOREWORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00181R001701640041-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: August 4, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREWORD
This report represents a response to the 6 November 1986 request by DCI
Casey to the Director of the Intelligence Community Staff to look at and "come
up with some guidelines on commercial imagery issues.' Terms of reference for
an examination of such issues by an ad hoc interagency group were approved by
the Director of the Intelligence Community Staff and forwarded for information
to Acting DCI Gates on 18 December 1986. The latter endorsed these activities
as a "Good plan" on 22 December 1986.
The ad hoc interagency group met for the first time on 9 January 1987.
The initial group included representatives from national security, foreign
affairs, and intelligence organizations. To help ensure both a maximum of
pertinent information exchange and a national outlook, participation from the
key federal departments with civil remote sensing interests and concerns was
subsequently invited.
The chairman of the group also interacted with the DoD National Operations
Security Advisory Committee's Working Group on Security Implications of Civil
Satellite Remote Sensing Programs, and with the project leaders of the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment Project Staff on Commercial
Newsgathering From Space.
The results of the group's analyses, deliberations, and findings have been
summarized in the form of the 8 recommendations that follow on pages xx.
These recommendations are supported by the succeeding text. (Except where
specifically noted) The views, assessments, and recommendations developed in
the report represent a consensus of the group as a whole, and not necessarily
the views of individual organizations.
The issuance of the report at this time should make it a useful
contribution to the Administration's ongoing reassessment of national space
policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Civil remote sensing programs from space satellites are entering an
especially dynamic period. During the past decade many such programs have
transitioned from the planning to the implementation phase. Technology,
previously available to only the US and the USSR for their classified
satellite reconnaissance imagery programs, is now being used by other
countries to produce imagery products which have information and intelligence
collection capabilities that are greatly increased over past civil
photographic products. And further increases in capabilities are to be
expected.
These developments are generating high levels of visibility and attention
worldwide. Domestically, they are raising questions among US senior officials
relative to national security, legal, and intelligence issues, foreign
affairs, and international obligations. The following report, prepared under
the aegis of the Director of the Intelligence Community Staff by an
interagency group of individuals who monitor civil satellite remote sensing
activities, is a systematic attempt to identify the implications of these
developments on relevant aspects of US national space policy. Where feasible,
options for policy changes have been identified, and where appropriate,
recommendations have been developed to facilitate policymaker focus,
discussion, and aecisionmaking.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Tne interagency group has analyzed the defense, intelligence, and foreign
policy issues arising from recent civil satellite remote sensing developments,
including possible development and operation of a "MEDIASAT," and has
developed the following recommendations.
RECOMMENDATION 1:
Within the bounds of prudence and common sense, the US should continue the
long term support of ever more sophisticated programs of civil earth remote
sensing from space, and continue to promote vigorously our traditional
policies and practices of open, equal, and non-discriminatory data
dissemination from all civil earth remote-sensing systems, foreign and
domestic.
RECOMMENDATION 2:
The nominal 10-meter constraint on the resolution of private sector
satellite remote sensing systems should be relaxed or removed. The existing
authorization in the National Security Decision Directive 42 on National Space
l
.
Policy should be applied to effect this relaxation or remova
RECOMMENDATION 3:
Of the three policy options available for implementing Recommendation 2,
the interagency group recommends the complete elimination of any spatial
resolution limit. This recommendation was made after considering two other
options of dropping the resolution limit to a specific level such as 5 meters,
or adopting an ad hoc approach of dropping the limit to the extent necessary
to permit US operated systems to be competitive with foreign civil satellite
imaging
RECOMMENDATION 4:
If some fixed resolution limit should be imposed for panchromatic imagery,
then the same limit should be applied to other types of.imaging
(multi-spectral, radar, or other non-conventional, non-literal imagery)
capabilities. There should be no additional spectral resolution constraint.
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RECOMMENDATION 5:
RECOMMENDATION 6: DISCUSSION APPEARS TO REJECT THIS)
If national policy continues the imposition of some restrictions on
domestic operators of satellite imaging programs, efforts should be initiated
by the State Department to achieve agreements with friendly nation operators
of civil satellite remote sensing systems on parallel restrictions concerning
the collection and/or dissemination of high quality imagery that would
adversely affect the national security of any of the agreeing parties.
RECOMMENDATION 7:
RECOMMENDATION 8:
Until the civil imaging satellite situation stabilizes, the expertise of
the interagency group shoula be preserved. The group should meet at monthly
or bi-monthly intervals to continue to exchange information required by the
federal organizations represented, and be on call for addressing new issues
that require the expertise of the group's representatives.
The analyses of the arguments for and against these recommendations are
indicated in the following text.
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OVERVIEW OF GROUP'S ACTIVITIES
The interagency group carried on its activities during an especially
dynamic period of civil satellite remote sensing developments. The group
began its work by systematically concentrating on several specific issues that
were identified in the Terms of Reference (Attachment A). However, this
systematic approach was barely gathering momentum when it was sidetracked by
the pressure of ongoing events and the concomitant need to provide immediate
support on specific issues. The Terms of Reference had foreseen the need for
and provided flexibility for the preparation and issuance of quick-reaction
studies on specific issues as required. This flexibility was exercised on
several occasions.
One such occasion was in response to the proposal by the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency to include LANDSAT and SPOT imagery in the 1987
edition of the widely disseminated DoD publication Soviet Military Power. The
issue was important because inclusion of the LANDSAT imagery would represent a
break with a historic national policy of keeping the US civil program free
from any taint of intelligence collection. The pro and con arguments,
considered in the context of the contemporary civil satellite situation, were
forwarded to to the DCI action officer, and subsequently transmitted for the
consideration of the Acting DCI. His decision to permit the proposed
inclusions provided the group with one benchmark for applications to other
intelligence uses of civil satellite products.
The precarious situation relative to the continuty of the LANDSAT program
also demanded the early attention of the interagency group. The group
summarized the impact of a demise of the LANDSAT program, specifically on
defense, intelligence, and foreign policy activities, and on the broader
aspects of achieving broader aspects of existing national space policy. The
group's findings on this issue was subsequently incorporated in a memorandum
forwarded by the Acting DCI to the President's National Security Advisor. The
findings were also disseminated informally to the representatives of the
various departments who briefed two Congressional subcommittees on their
interests in, and concerns about, LANDSAT program continuity on 31 March and 2
April, and who subsequently met with 0MB on 29 April. The development of this
national outlook apparently influenced 0MB to reverse its previous position
and authorize some funding to continue the LANDSAT program.
Throughout this dynamic period the interagency group facilitated and
promoted the exchange of information among the various interested federal
organizations so that the LANDSAT continuity issue was addressed as a national
space policy issue rather than a narrow matter of interest to one or several
departments, or an issue to be decided solely on budgetary grounds
specifically restricted to those individual departments without consideration
of broad national space policy objectives and concerns.
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LANDSAT CONTINUITY ISSUE
The terms of reference included the following provisions relative to the
issue of maintaining the continuity of the LANDSAT program:
o Is an operational civil earth remote sensing program from space
sufficiently important to the national interest that we should
maintain an internationally competitive technology or regain our
international leadership?
o Alternatively, what are the implications for the national interest of
a demise of the LANDSAT program?
o To what extent will the US Intelligence Community require use of
LANDSAT data in`future years? At what level of resolution and in how
many spectral bands?
o If LANDSAT operations should cease, what are the pros and cons of
using imagery collected by foreign imaging systems?
As indicated in the Overview section, the interagency group addressed and
developed findings on the various aspects of this issue. Mr. Gates, the
Acting Director of Central Intelligence, incorporated these findings into his
16 March 1987 memorandum to Mr. Carlucci, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. A copy of this memorandum and the response
memorandum that indicates that the decision depends on resolving budgetary
considerations is provided in Attachment B. (ALTERNATIVE: INCORPORATE
DIRECTLY INTO TEXT AS FOUR FOLLOWING PAGES)
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TEN-METER RESOLUTION ISSUE
The terms of reference included the following provisions relative to the
10-meter resolution issue:
o What are the pros ano cons for relaxing the 10-meter criterion for
the LANDSAT program? ..... Is there likely to be a commercial
market need for such data at resolutions better than 10 meters? What
other policy constraints on imaging system technical parameters
(e.g., timeliness, substantive content) need to be defined?
In view of the emergence of the MEDIASAT concept, the interagency group
generalied the phrasing of this issue in the following manner:
o Should the 10-meter resolution constraint be relaxed for private
sector applicants for a license to operate remote-sensing space
systems?
The interagency group concluded that in the past decade since the
imposition of the 10-meter resolution constraint the worldwide scene relative
to civil remote sensing from space had changed so drastically that the
constraint is no longer valid. Therefore the 10-meter constraint should be
relaxed or removed. The existing authorization in the National Security
Decision Directive 42 on Nat Space Policy should be applied to effect
this relaxation or removal.
BACKGROUND
On 17 July 1984 Congress enacted the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization
Act of 1984* to provide a framework for a phased, orderly commercialization of
land remote-sensing technologies using satellites in space. Title IV of the
Act authorizes the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with other
appropriate Federal agencies, to license private-sector parties to operate
private remote-sensing systems in space. As a condition for granting the
license, Section 402.(b)(1) requires the licensee to "operate the system in
such manner as to preserve and promote the national security of the United
States and to observe and implement the international obligations of the
*Originally designated as u is Law 98-365, now integra a into United
States Code as ##4201-4292 (1982 & Supp. 1986)
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United States in accordance with Section 607." The latter Section makes the
Secretary of Defense responsible for determining those conditions necessary to
meet national security concerns of the United States and the Secretary of
State responsible for determining the conditions necessary to meet
international obligations and policies of the United States. The provisions
of existing national space policy would of course be key factors in making
these determinations One such provision establishes a nominal 10-meter limit
on the resolution of civil satellite imaging systems.
Rigid adherence to this 10-meter rule, which was originally established in
a completely different stage of imaging satellite capabilities, would have
considerable adverse impacts under current technological conditions.
Therefore, the validity of the 10-meter rule under present day conditions is
examined in considerable detail.
DISCUSSION:
Current national space policy includes a 10-meter resolution limit as a
baseline for commercial imaging satellites. National Security Decision
Directive 42 on National Space Policy, which was approved by President Reagan
on 4 July, 1982, spells out this constraint in the following words:
Civil Earth-imaging from space, at resolutions at or better than ten
meters, will be permitted under controls and when such needs are justified
and assessed in relation to civil benefits, national security, and foreign
policy.'
In actuality, this 10-meter limit as national space policy has a longer
history since it dates back to May 11, 1978, when Presidential
Directive/NSC-42 was issued. This Directive stated:.
"Federal civil earth imaging from space, at resolutions at or better than
ten meters, will be permitted under controls and when such needs are
justified and assessed in relation to civil benefits, national security,
and foreign policy."
The text of the two versions is virtually the same. The only difference
is that the 1978 version is directed to federally operated systems, whereas
the 1982 version was broadened to include commercially operated systems.
This 10-meter limit was established after considering various contemporary
foreign relations, technological, and other national security concerns ana
factors, which are briefly summarized in the following paragraphs.
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Foreign Relations Considerations
A major consideration was to allay the concerns of foreign countries about
the unrestricted dissemination of high resolution US LANDSAT satellite imagery
that would reveal details of their territory that they considered important to
their economy or national security. In international forums these concerns
were resulting in efforts to impose restrictions on the LANDSAT program.
Among the less developed countries economic concerns were the dominant
factors. It was feared that the US LANDSAT system would permit the United
States and other major developed countries to unilaterally collect
information -- without their Knowledge -- about their minerals and other
resources that would be exploited to their disadvantage.
The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries were concerned about the
threat that unrestricted dissemination of high resolution satellite imagery
would pose to the secrecy surrounding their military forces. They reluctantly
accepted the capabilities of the US classified reconnaissance satellite
program as long as its products were not declassified and openly distributed;
however, they were concerned about other countries getting similar information
from unclassified satellites. Thus, in 1977 the Soviet Union proposed
limiting worldwide dissemination of civil satellite imaging systems to sensing
data coarser than 50 meters of ground resolution. For better resolution
imagery, they favored a regime that would require the consent of the imaged
country before being released to any other country.
For a more detailed discussion of foreign reactions in the late 1970's see:
- the section on Foreign Reactions, pages 19-23, in the Options Paper
on the Declassification of Photoreconnaissance Imagery, prepared in
March 1979 by the DCI Task Force on the Declassification of
Photoreconnaissance Imagery
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Technological Considerations
The 10-meter limit also provided considerable latitude for improving the
resolution of the US unclassified civil satellite program. At that time the
US LANDSAT program, with its 80-meter MSS sensor, had a monopoly in providing
the world with unclassified satellite imagery. However, some foreign
countries, notably France and Japan, were initiating plans to develop their
own satellite imaging systems. To maintain the undisputed US technological
lead in civil imaging systems from space, national space policy provided room
for increasing the resolution. A 10-meter resolution was estimated to be
around the level where significant intelligence about military installations
and deployments would begin to surface. The objective of having an improved
LANDSAT resolution system was subsequently achieved by the 1984 launch and
operation of the 30-meter Thematic Mapper sensor.
National Security Considerations
Another consideration in imposing the 10-meter limit was to provide a
sizeable buffer between the resolutions of the classified and unclassified
satellites so that individuals using the latter imagery would find it
difficult to accurately estimate the actual resolution of the classified
imagery. (The specific scenario of using the commercial system imagery as a
cover for releasing information from the classified system was not a factor,
since one objective was to keep the unclassified system free from intelligence
implications.)
However, the following extract from a 1984 COMIREX study emphasizes the
point that from an intelligence viewpoint the 10-meter limit is not a hard and
fast dividing line. (LOCATE HERE ? OR ELSE1aIERi?)
"There is no magic boundary line between imagery which is useful and that
which is not useful for intelligence purposes. Virtually any imagery, no
matter how old it is or how poor the resolution, has some intelligence
value. The construction of large missile test ranges, to use an extreme
example, can be detected on even poor quality civil satellite imagery, and
since the construction cycle of such a facility is measured in terms of
_ears, even old imagery would be useful if nothing newer was available.
"As perhaps a more relevant example, the position of an aircraft carrier
underway could be detected (at least by its wake, if not by the ship
itself) by a medium quality civil satellite system. And some of the
oetter quality planned civil systems will probably have the capability to
detect the presence/ f large aircraft on runways or large ships in
known docking areas.
The judgments in the last paragraph have been subsequently validated by
the 10-meter quality SPOT imagery.
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To summarize, the 10-meter limit has never been a hard and fast barrier.
It was a limit judged to be reasonable at a particular point in time. In
formulating NSDD-42, it was specifically recognized that changing
circumstances could make it necessary to revise this 10-meter criterion, as
the following text indicates:
"Civil remote sensing system constraints on spatial resolution,
timeliness, spectral resolution, substantive content, or other appropriate
parameters will be periodically reviewed to dp" ine when policy
constraints should be revised or imposed."
Current Situation
The national space policy considerations, objectives, and concerns
relevant to civil satellite imaging outlined in the preceding paragraphs have
to a major degree been overtaken by events. The following update of these
considerations indicates that circumstances have changea to such an extensive
degree that the 10-meter constraint is no longer valid.
o Foreign reactions to satellite imaging at higher resolutions have
been tested by both the 30-meter LANDSAT Thematic Mapper resolution
since 1984 and the 10- and 20-meter resolutions of the French SPOT
system since 1986. Despite the high visibility that the imagery from
these systems have achieved, which included major Soviet
installations that have never been seen in unclasssified media, no
significant negative reactions have surfaced. Therefore the fact of
higher-resolution imaging from space now appears to be accepted
worldwide.
o The ability to build and launch satellite systems that image the
earth from space is no longer the exclusive domain of the United
States and the Soviet Union. Additional space imaging programs are
being planned by Canada, Japan, the European Space Agency, the PRC,
India, and Brazil (?).
o Both the existing LANDSAT and SPOT capabilities are based upon older
technology.
o Technology available to all interested foreign countries permits
development of imaging systems from space with resolutions
considerably better than 10 meters. Further improvements in imaging
capabilities by French, Japanese, Canadian, and European Space Agency
systems are planned for the near future. These improvements will
include better spatial resolution for photo systems and lower
resolution day-night all-weather radar capabilities.
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o The USSR, which in the past has been a strong opponent of
unrestricted dissemination of higher resolution satellite
imagery--without the approval of the imaged country, has just
announced its own program to sell 6-meter resolution satellite
photographs of individual countries. Considering the momentum
achieved by the rapid evolving civil satellite imaging capabilities
in recent years, this Soviet move should be viewed as a realistic and
pragmatic approach to become a major competitor on a worldwide
basis. The Soviet program tie-in with their well-developeo technical
mapping capabilities would facilitate making satellite products in
photomap formats that would be easy to read and use, and thus be of
maximum value to both technical ano non-technical customers. Thus,
the Soviet program may become a primary source for worldwide sales of
good quality satellite photographic coverage. This program could
earn them foreign currency, prestige, and additional influence in
many countries. In addition, the bilateral relationships that such a
program will develop could facilitate Soviet collect on of basic
intelligence data on each country that it maps.
o As satellite imaging systems become more sophisticated, the ability
of nations to protect important military and economic security
information will inevitably aecline, and traditional aspects of
national security will be increasingly compromised. This trend is
less disadvantageous to open societies such as the US where national
security thresholds are inevitably low, while working to the
detriment of closed societies, such as the USSR, why 'Ational
security thresholds are high.
e
nal
to
jbably
d be
o Applying the 10-meter constraint to any US licensee of a private
sector satellite imaging system would make the US system unable to
compete effectively against the aggressive foreign competition. Thus
this constraint would be counter-productive to the US national space
policy objective of maintaining (or more accurately, attempting to
regain some) technological leadership in space remote sensing
matters.
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POLICY OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE 10-METER CONSTRAINT:
The preceding overview of the current situation relative to the civil
satellite remote sensing developments summarizes why the 10-meter constraint
is no longer valid. Therefore it is recommended that the constraint be
relaxed or eliminated. Acceptance of this judgment leans to the question of
exactly how should the constraint be changed. Should it be relaxed somewhat
or completely removed? There are three principal policy options to implement
this recommendation, namely:
Option A. Dropping the 10-meter spatial limit to a specific lower
figure such as 5 or 3 meters.
Option B. Adopting a "sliding rule" approach whereby the permitted
resolution would be relaxed to a level competitive with
foreign civil satellite imaging systems.
Option C. Complete elimination of any spatial resolution limit
The arguments for and against each of these options are outlined below (in
the following text):
option A: Dropping the 10-meter spatial limit to a specific lower figure
such as 5 or 3 meters.
o Promotes national security. Moderate resolution levels help keep
most detailed imagery information from terrorists and other elements
capable of taking hostile actions against US and Allied installations
and facilities.
o Provides a specific figure that facilitates the approval or rejection
of licenses.
o National policymakers maintain maximum control. Decision-making on
potential exceptions remains at the National Security Council level.
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CON:
o Technology is changing so rapidly that any figure is arbitrary,
difficult to obtain consensus on, and will probably become obsolete
quickly.
o A resolution limit that is fixed at too poor a resolution level would
tend to hinoer potential US operators from being competitive with
foreign systems.
o A resolution limit that is fixed as national policy does not
facilitate making the rapid changes required to respond to changing
circumstances and technological developments in a field that is
especially dynamic. (Changes would require obtaining interagency
consensus -- a usually cumbersome procedure.)
o A fixed resolution limit will generate media opposition because of
the potential adverse impact on future media uses of satellite
imagery. The fact of media opposition is not a CON argument, but the
ensuing ligitation, which can be expected, over a limit that would be
difficult to justify from a technical viewpoint is a negative factor
o Strength of national security pro argument cited above is undercut by
the fact that imagery from forin satellite systems and high quality
imagery collected by domestic aircraft is readily available.
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OPTION B: Adopting a."sliding rule" approach whereby the permitted
resolution would be relaxed to a level competitive with foreign
civil satellite imaging systems.
PROS:
o Permits US operators to be competitive with foreign operators because
adjustments on the resolution figure will invariably be in direction
of better resolution.
o More flexible than Option A in that it would not require continuing
evaluation at the National Security Council level.
o Would probably be practical and reasonable for several years.
CONS:
o Would require additional effort on part of licensing authority to
monitor and assess the details of evolving technology, most of which
are not significant from an overall national and international
perspective.
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OPTION C: Complete elimination of any spatial resolution.
PRO:
o Maximizes potential for achieving national space policy objective of
demonstrating US technological excellence. The context of an
unclassified civil satellite remote sensing program is especially
desiraole for maximum impact on world opinion.
o Provides maximum flexibility and opportunity for US potential
operators to compete with foreign operated systems. Superior US
systems will probably result in US retaining greater share of
value-added activities, to the benefit of US economy.
o Completely eliminates any need for establishing
administrative/bureaucratic mechanism to evaluate evolving technology.
o Resolution will be determined by market mechanism. Cost-benefit
ratio considerations will tend to limit actual resolution -- probably
to the 3 to 5 meter range.
o From a national security viewpoint the 10 meter level represents a
particularly pertinent threshold for beginning to detect deployments
of major military combat forces. Whether that level is further
breached at 8, 6, or 4 meters is not as significant except for being
able to differentiate specific categories of military equipment,
e.g., one type of tank, artillery piece, or aircraft from another.
o Given the ongoing increasingly extensive operations of foreign
unclassified systems such as SPOT and classified systems such as the
Soviet satellites, national security concerns about US and Allied
military forces and installations will need to be protected by
concealment measures rather than by unilateral constraints on only US
operated systems
o Ad hoc restraints/constraints on timeliness of imagery collection and
timeliness of aisseminating data are more critical than constraints
on resolution.
CONS
o Surrenders all control with reference to resolution limits.
RECOMMENDATION:
In view of the existing and planned foreign-controlled civil satellite
imaging systems the inters ency group believes that the arguments for Option C
carry the most weight and therefore recommend this Option. 7
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In other woras, the conclusion is that if policymakers were to establish a
5-meter criterion, it would be reasonable to apply it across the board to all
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Such an approach is given
additional validity by the estimate that economic viability may be more useful
determinant and would tend to naturally limit the practical resolutions of
sensors using different parts of the spectrum to approximately the following
levels:
technical feasibility and economic
viability (50-100 meters)
same as above, but even coarser
resolution
Economic viability (many channels
with sharpening band; 3-5 meters in
next ten years
Same as above -- used as sharpening
band
Thermal infrared
Passive microwave
Multispectral
Panchromatic
(OTHER POLICY CONSTRAINTS?)
Although the 10-meter is no longer a realistic mechanism for protecting US
national security interests, there appear to be two principal methods for
imposing ad hoc limitations on privately-operated satellite imaging to provide
some measure of protection to these national security concerns:
o Imposing constraints on the timeliness of data dissemination in
specific situations or specific geographic areas where personally
directed for national security or international relations/foreign
affairs reasons by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of
State, or their respective Undersecretaries. In peacetime such
constraints should be in writing and limited to specific periods of
time.
Imposing constraints on the collection of imagery in such specific
situations or specific geographic areas.
(CONTINUE WITH
AUG 07
25X1
NPUTS)
SEC 2 r 25X1
- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP92B00181 R001701640041-7