LETTER TO RUSSELL J. BRUEMMER FROM SVEN ERIK HOLMES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01264R000100050016-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 25, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90MO1264R000100050016-6
WILLIAM S. COHEN. MAINE, VICE CHAIRMAN N=V
LLOYD BENTSEN, TEXAS WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR.. DELAWARE
SAM NUNN. GEORGIA ORRIN HATCH, UTAH
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS. SOUTH CAROLINA FRANK MURKOWSKI. ALASKA
BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY ARLEN SPECTER. PENNSYLVANIA
q.} ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA CHIC HECHT. NEVADA
DENNIS DFCONCINI, ARIZONA JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM. OHIO
ROBERT C. BYRD. WEST VIRGINIA. EX OFFICIO
ROBERT DOLE. KANSAS. EX OFFICIO
SVEN E HOLMES, STAFF DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL
JAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
KATHLEEN P. McGHEE. CHIEF CLERK
Mr. Russell J. Bruemmer
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
1"A nited *tates senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20610-6476
February 25, 1988
SKI
#88-812
We appreciate receiving a copy of the letter of February 1
that you sent to Mike O'Neil concerning which types of
activities require Presidential findings under the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment, and which do not. Please be advised, however, that
the interpretations of law contained in your letter and the
accompanying documents have not been fully accepted by this
Committee. For example, your letter cites the Committee's
report as being consistent with the Agency's interpretation of
the Hughes-Ryan Amendment "as not requiring Presidential
Findings for counterintelligence activities, logistical support
to other United States departments or agencies, and other minor
support or routine activities...." (page 5). This contrasts,
however, with the actual language of the Committee's report
which recognizes an exception to the finding requirement for
"certain counterintelligence, routine assistance to the
Department of State in performing certain diplomatic or overt
initiatives, and certain routine assistance to the Department
of Defense or other agencies under the Economy Act" (emphasis
added).
More specifically, we are concerned about the attempt in
your letter to use a subsequent Executive order to interpret a
statute (e.g., footnotes 1 and 3 on page 3). For example, at
the bottom of page 2 and top of page 3, you point to the
provision in Executive Order 12333 which defines "special
activities" as activities which support "national foreign
policy objectives", and you conclude that since most day-to-day
logistical and other support CIA provides other U.S.
departments and agencies overseas is not substantial enough to
rise to the level of support for "a national foreign policy
objective", that it does not constitute a "special activity",
and, therefore does not require a Presidential Finding under
Hughes-Ryan. While we might agree with your ultimate
conclusion, we have difficulty reaching this point through the
language of the Executive Order itself. The fact that the
Executive Order defines the term "special activity" as
something that supports a "national foreign policy objective"
cannot necessarily be engrafted as a qualification to
Hughes-Ryan. Certainly there may be CIA activities overseas
which do not support "national foreign policy objectives", but
which should be reported under Hughes-Ryan.
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#88-812
Mr. Russell J. Bruemmer
February 24, 1988
Page two
A similar concern is raised by the second sentence in the
first full paragraph on page 3, as it relates to whether
"counterintelligence activities" can be "special activities".
You make the point that the Executive Order contains a separate
definition for "counterintelligence" than it has for "special
activities", and therefore counterintelligence activities are
"outside the ambit of special activities." Again, the fact that
the Executive Order has separate definitions of these terms
does not necessarily translate into a diminishment of the
Hughes-Ryan requirement. Indeed, the term "counterintelligence"
was defined as it was largely to set jurisdictional boundaries
within the Intelligence Community and not for purposes of
excluding "counterintelligence activities" per se from the
requirements for Presidential Findings. The Committee has
consistently regarded CIA "counterintelligence activities" in
foreign countries as primarily collection operations, and, so
long as this was the case, there was no requirement for a
Presidential Finding under Hughes-Ryan. However, if the
purpose of such operations became to influence or affect other
countries in support of other U.S. policy objectives, then they
may require such Findings.
Moreover, we also found ourselves at some disagreement
with the examples cited in the attachments to your letter.
For example, it appears to us that the CIA counterintelligence
program discussed in the memorandum from the Attorney General's
Counsel for Intelligence Policy may require a finding because
the relationships with foreign business firms and governments
could have significant foreign policy implications. With
respect to the last example at Tab C, the type of CIA
assistance to a joint State/Defense Department evacuation of
U.S. citizens also may require a finding because of the
nonroutine nature of the CIA's covert role in the operation.
Indeed, in the hearings on S.1721 the Executive branch,
including Judge Webster, went to great lengths to emphasize
that the reporting requirements associated with Findings
authorizing such undertakings would potentially jeopardize
them, citing specifically the exfiltration of American citizens
from the Canadian embassy in Iran. In several other cases
cited at Tab C, findings may not be needed, but in our view on.
the basis of a different rationale than is offered by the
Agency.
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tl (,,} #88-812
Mr. Russell J. Bruemmer
February 24, 1988
Page three
In order to avoid any future misunderstandings and to be
sure the CIA is in compliance with the statute, we would
appreciate your advising us of any other similar analyses of
Hughes-Ryan and its relationship to Executive Order 12333 that
have been made. It is imperative that the determinations
regarding Hughes-Ryan made in the context of 5.1721 be clear to
all parties concerned.
Sven Erik Holmes
Staff Director and
General Counsel
lflftw;
L. Brit~SdiSer
Minority Counsel
cc: Mike O'Neil
SE
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90M01264R000100050016-6