MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENTS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFIAB) WEDNESDAY, 9 MARCH 1988 - 0830 HOURS ROOM 340 OEOB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01321R000700330003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 8, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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8 March 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
Meeting with the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
Wednesday, 9 March 1988 - 0830 hours
Room 340 0E0B
The attached package provides you background
information and talking points on a variety of issues
that you will be discussing at your PFIAB appearance.
Most of the subjects in the package have been, suggested
by the PFIAB staff as issues in which the members are
interested.
TAB A Agenda. At TAB A is a memo providing the agenda for
your appearance. Also attached is a listing of CIA
support to PFIAB for the period 7 January - 6 March
1988.
TAB B Current Developments in the Soviet Leadership. At TAB B
are talking points on the current developments in the
Soviet leadership.
TAB C Political/Military Situation in Panama. At TAB C are
talking points on the current political and military
situation in Panama.
TAB D Political/Military Situation in Afghanistan. At TAB D
are talking points on the current political and
military situation in Afahanistan
TAB E
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TAB F PFIAB's Concerns about START. At TAB F are talking
points prepared by ACIS regarding PFIAB's concerns
about START as expressed in its recent letter to the
President. Also at TAB F is the correspondence on this
subject.
TAB G MOU between the CIA and the FBI. At TAB G is a copy of
the most recent draft of the MOU between the CIA and
the FBI regarding situations of counterintelligence
concern. According to this draft has been
cleared through OGC and is currently at FBI
headquarters. The FBI working level has approved the
draft, and it is awaiting final review by Buck Revell
before submission to Sessions for his signature. FBI
officials expect to present the MOU to Sessions for
TAB H
approval soon
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DCl/DDCI Executive Staff
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CIA Support to PFIAB
7 January 1988 - 6 March 1988
OGI met with John Foster, PFIAB member
and Roy Godson PFIAB
consultant, to discuss developments
in
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Larry Gershwin (NIO/SP),
and Doug George (IC Staff) briefed
STATI
the PFIAB on
relating to Soviet
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strategic forces and arms control.
(OSWR) met separately with PFIAB member Dr. Wheelon to
discuss Soviet Space developments, and with PFIAB staffers Gary Schmitt and
Ryan Malarkey to discuss Soviet missile accuracy.
Gary Schmitt made a courtesy call on Dick Stolz, the new DDO.
PFIAB staffer Bob Butterworth met with
Hutchinson (AC/NIC) to discuss CI and related issues.
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(C/CI) and Fred 25)25X1
PFIAB member Leo Cherne and staff member Nina Stewart attended a jointly
sponsored OGI/OTE conference on the global consequences of the 19 October
stock market crash and a jointly sponsored NC/OGI conference on economic
collection issues.
ALA analysts met with PFIAB staffer Gary Schmitt and two PFIAB
consultants (Elliot Cohen and Abram Shulsky) to discuss Cuban military
developments in connection with a PFIAB review of Intelligence Community
reporting on that subject.
rinisnea intelligence uocuments rroviaea:
Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe Under Gorbachev: New Wine or New
Bottles?
A Comparison of Warsaw Pact and NATO Defense Activities, 1976-86
Globalization of Financial Markets: Implications, Vulnerabilities,
and Opportunities
US Dependence on Foreign Defense Manufactures: An Emerging
Vulnerability
High Technology Trade: Changed Settin for US Polic
V
Fiber Optic Sensors: Foreign Excellence in Emerging Technology
Advanced Structural Materials: Foreign Challenges to US Leadership
252'60
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- A Typescript entitled: "The Impact of Technology on Commodity
Markets"
- A Typescript entitled: "Foreign Centers of Technical Excellence:
Prospects for Collaboration"
- The Key Judgments of NIE on "Trends in Western Advanced Technology"
- A Guide to Monetary Measures of Soviet Defense Activities
- Acquisition of Western Technology by the KGB
- A Geographic Guide to SS-25 Soviet Mobile Missile Deployment Areas:
Yur'ya
- Soviet Military Production, 1975-86
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TALKING POINTS FOR THE DDCl/PFIAB
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
General Secretary Gorbachev has made progress in regaining the political momentum he
lost as a result of the Yel'tsin affair last fall, but he now faces one of the biggest
challenges of his tenure in the form of mounting nationalist unrest.
I. The February Plenum: A Modest Victory for Gorbachev
The plenum was held on the heels of a series of events demonstrating Gorbachev's
gathering strength: the INF accord, the decision to pull out of Afghanistan, the legal
rehabilitation of Bukharin, and the removal of Talyzin as head of Gosplan. Gorbachev
successfully overshadowed "Second Secretary" Ligachev at the plenum, but he did not
completely regain the aggressive form that characterized his activities prior to the Yertsin
affair.
o His speech was a defensive reaffirmation of his determination to carry out
"radical reform," and contrasted sharply on certain points -- particularly
history -- with the more comprehensive report delivered by Ligachev on the
plenum's first day.
o Since the plenum, the Soviet media have tended to highlight Gorbachev's
speech while downplaying Ligachev's report.
Gorbachev was able to offset the removal of Yertsin from candidate membership on the
Politburo with other personnel moves.
o The promotions of Gorbachev allies Razumovskiy and Boldin to candidate
membership in the Politburo and full Central Committee membership,
respectively, represented clear gains for the General Secretary.
o The significance of the promotions of Maslyukov to candidate Politburo
membership and Baklanov to membership in the Secretariat is less clear, but
overall, it appears that Gorbachev scored a modest net victory on the
personnel front at the plenum.
II. Nationality Problems: Impact on the Leadership
Ironically, Gorbachev's call at the February plenum for a future plenum to deal with
nationality policy foreshadowed by days the ethnic unrest in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
While there are as yet no clear signs of leadership friction over how to handle the unrest,
the political fallout from the demonstrations and violence may derail the momentum that
Gorbachev seemed to be rebuilding at the plenum.
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o Gorbachev may find himself in a "no win" situation. Outright rejection of
Armenian irredentist demands could precipitate further violence and
necessitate the use of greater force by the regime. Concessions, on the
other hand, could open a floodgate of grievances from other ethnic
minorities.
o The difficulties Gorbachev is almost certain to encounter in resolving the
nationalist unrest in the Caucasus are complicated by the potential debate
within the leadership over the appropriate response. Regardless of the
outcome, more cautious members of the Politburo could attribute the entire
problem to insufficient limits on glasnost.
o On an even more basic political level, attending to the nationality unrest in
the Caucasus could sidetrack Gorbachev from the important task of building
support for possible far-reaching changes at the June All-Union Party
Conference -- now less than four months away.
07 March 1988
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8 March 1988
TALKING POINTS FOR DDCI's PFIAB BRIEFING
Panama
Panama City
and meet
The next two weeks will be the most critical for
as it attempts to restore order in the banking system
its essential expenditures. Noriega remains firmly in control
and is unlikely to step down unless the current liquidity crisis
sparks political turmoil leading
the military to withdraw
its
support for the Defense Chief.
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Opposition Activity
The general strike last week
was the most successful since
June, but participation fell sharply after three days because of
military intimidation and concern about monetary losses.
Despite
Support for the strike
80 percent business participation
remaining closed until
The military exercised
opposition crowds, and
was highest in the capital, with
and most stores
Friday.
restraint in dealing with
no serious violence was reported.
political parties and
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the strike's success,
opposition leaders remain undecided on how to consolidate their
gains.
Indicates that many Civil Crusade
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leacters are reiuctan
to rally behind Delvalle because of
his past association with Noriega and doubts about his
political strength.
Opposition leaders are reluctant to orchestrate large
anti-Noriega rallies for fear of confrontation with
military
They
forces.
continue to rely on US measures
to bring Noriega
down.
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Military Attitudes
The Defense Forces have closed ranks
behind Noriega.
-- Most officers believe both the opposition and the
US are
out to discredit the military as an institution,
as well
as force Noriega's ouster.
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Some colonels reportedly are disturbed by Noriega's
increasing reliance on majors for important tasks, but
there are no signs that their working relationship with
Noriega is strained.
We believe the opposition may be
purges and resignations in hopes
Noriega's support.
Economic Deterioration
spreading rumors of
of raising doubts about
Events of the past week have virtually shut down the banking
sector; most foreign and domestic banks remain closed.
News that the US has frozen some Panamanian funds fueled
massive withdrawals, exacerbating the regime's budget
problems.
We estimate the regime will require about $158 million to
meet essential expenditures in March and April.
If business activity returns to near-normal levels,
government reserves and receipts should be adequate to
cover essential bills.
-- If, on the other hand, most banks remain closed and
business activity remains restricted, regime revenues
could be reduced by half, generating a cash shortfall of
as much as $40 million over the next two months.
The regime is considering several options to deal with the
dollar shortages before they lead to increased domestic
discontent.
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suggested Panama might turn to 25X1
Colombian drug dealers for money, and reported 25X1
that the National Bank of Panama has informed a money
laundering group the bank will accept any amount of
currency without charging the usual fees.
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Noriega's prospects will hinge largely on the ability of the
regime to restore order to the banking system in the next few
weeks.
-- If the banking system stabilizes, the regime's chances of
developing additional sources of revenue would be
significantly enhanced.
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-- A collapse of the banking system would end hopes of
significant alternative sources of financing, creating an
acute financial crisis.
In such an event, Noriega probably would not hesitate to
implement radical economic measures such as nationalizing
the banking system, freezing US assets in Panama, or even
ending the use of US dollars as Panama's national
currency to maintain his hold on power.
Financial pressure alone, however, would be unlikely to
force Noriega's ouster as long as the military remains
firmly behind him.
International Reactions
A growing number of Latin American countries have expressed
their disapproval of Noriega but are reluctant to support harsh
measures against Panama, such as economic sanctions.
Noriega is concerned that only Nicaragua and Cuba have
made strong statements of support for the new President,
Manuel Solis Palma.
At least eight Latin American countries have
their ambassadors, but
most Latin Americans are inciinea
extent of US support for Delvalle
extending official recognition to
recalled
to wait until rne
is clear before
him.
We believe most Latin governments would recognize the
Solis government if Noriega weathers the immediate
crisis.
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Talking Points for the Acting Director of Central Intelligence
for his PFIAB Meeting
7 March 1988
Afghanistan: Pakistan's Strategy
Pakistan continues to take a strong position at Geneva.
--Islamabad wants a Soviet commitment to a simultaneous aid cutoff to
Kabul and the resistance, an immediate cease-fire, and agreement on
an interim government to replace the Kabul regime.
--President Zia has told Under Secretary Armacost Pakistan cannot sign
the accords with the Kabul regime because this would betray the
Afghan resistance and because he is not willing to risk even a "5
percent" chance the Kabul regime might remain in power.
Zia may think that Soviet troops will depart even if Pakistan does not
sign and that he gains little if signing forfeits resistance trust. He
believes the resistance is doing better militarily and Pakistan can wait
for Soviet concessions.
Zia's demand for an interim government could be a ploy to gain further
withdrawal concessions, and may be dropped if Moscow agrees to a
simultaneous aid cutoff. Kabul has already met Pakistan's demands- on a
9-month timetable and withdrawal of half the Soviet troops in Afghanistan
by 15 August.
--The Pakistanis believe the US will not support delaying agreement on
Soviet withdrawal to secure an interim government; Chinese support
may also be weakening.
--Pakistani efforts to persuade the resistance alliance to come up
with a credible proposal for an interim government have met little
success.
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Moscow's View of Negotiation
Moscow continues to press for signature in Geneva of the four
instruments by March 15 and is refusing to discuss with Pakistan the
formation of an interim government to be in place during the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
--The Soviets may be willing to engage in talks on the side about an
interim government if the issue is not a precondition to signature.
1 \ Moscow is stressing that a cut-off of Soviet military aid to the Afghan
I
regime is not up for discussion in Geneva.
--Moscow will probably stand firm in the short-term if Pakistan and
the US press for symmetry in aid cut-offs.
--The Soviets have hinted, however, that this issue
discussed after signature of the instruments.
and others may be
We believe the Soviet leadership is politically committed to the
withdrawal of Soviet troops, but is pushing hard for its settlement terms
in order to save face and enhance the chances for survival in power of the
PDPA.
--Moscow may believe that, given the factionalism between resistance
groups, the PDPA may have a reasonable chance of staying in power.
First Deputy Foreign Minister
Vorontsov stated recently that the Soviets estimate the number of
active insurgents in Afghanistan to be no more than 30,000.
--Nevertheless, we believe that Moscow has accepted the strong
possibility that the Kabul regime may be toppled from power.
Soviet Withdrawal
There are no concrete, unambiguous indicators of Soviet determination
to withdraw, although there is evidence of contingency planning and signs
of preparations to publicize the departure of at least some forces.
--Potential indicators are likely to be equivocal and even
contradictory at this stage. Some of the preparations for departure
might not be evident until the last month or two before any
withdrawal begins.
--The most solid indicator of plans to move troops is improvements at
Soviet facilities near the Soviet Afghan border--Khairabad and
Termez--that would enhance the Soviets' ability to publicize a
withdrawal and facilitate the efficient movement of troops.
--At least one small Soviet unit has left its garrison
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in Kabul report orders to reduce the presence of
Soviet advisors and dependents in Afghanistan.
notes the continued arrival of new dependents.
To fulfill the heavily-frontloaded, nine-month timetable now proposed
by Kabul at Geneva, the Soviets would have to remove virtually all their
forces but those securing Kabul and the road to Termez in the first three
months.
cv
--They likely will opt for a regional pattern of withdrawal,
consolidating isolated units and removing non-essential personnel
before withdrawing combat units and most of their equipment.
Monitoring the departure of Soviet units could be done with a high
Soviet units continue to conduct combat operations, although at a lower
level than in January, and to receive new combat equipment.
--A joint offensive to the northwest of Qandahar has just ended, and
the Soviets may be planning operations along the road north of Kabul
shortly.
Should the Geneva process fail, the Soviets have several military
options to place increased pressure on Pakistan, such as extensive bombing
of insurgent depots in the border region. We doubt that Moscow is prepared
to draw out an effort to pressure Pakistan militarily more than a few
months or to exercise options that would require a significant increase in
Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
Regime Strategy for Survival
The Afghan regime appears to be planning to survive a Soviet withdrawal
by holding on to Kabul and other major cities and expanding the armed
forces.
--The regime has begun mandatory military training for all party
members and is expanding
recruiting for the army, the Ministry of State Security, and police
forces.
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--Soviet and regime forces continue to beef up Kabul's perimeter
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The regime probably expects insurgent factionalism to split the
opposition and hopes to buy off groups controlling the roads to Pakistan
and the Soviet Union in order to ensure its supplies.
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--Regime leaders appear to believe the resistance will become more
fragmented without the Soviets as a common target.
the regime is spreading disinformation that key
commanders have reached agreement with the regime.
--Regime officials have suggested to Iran and Afghan Shia leaders that
they make common cause after a withdrawal against the
"US-influenced" resistance parties.
Insurgent forces in the Kabul area cannot successfully assault the
city's defenses if the regime does not disintegrate from its own
factionalism, in our view.
--The regime would still have a firepower advantage over the
insurgents as well as the ability to rally some 35,000 to 50,000
military and paramilitary personnel from surrounding areas.
We believe, however, that the chances of regime infighting remain high
and this, coupled with steady insurgent pressure, would cause the collapse
of the regime within 6 to 8 months.
--The resistance has the capability to block the roads leading into
Kabul and to gradually chip away at the security perimeters
surrounding the city. Urban guerrilla operations and
resistance-inspired civil unrest would also erode the regime's
control in the city.
--We believe the insurgents would continue to cooperate on the
battlefield until the destruction of the regime. Some insurgent
factionalism may occur among rival insurgent groups but would remain
manageable until after the regime's destruction.
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ACIS 220/88
7 March 1988
Talking Points from Response of General Powell
to PFIAB Chairman, Armstrong
Response was a single letter replying to an Armstrong memorandum of 25
January 1988 to General Powell and an Armstrong letter of 5 February 1988 to
the President.
o many issues raised by PFIAB have long been objects of intense
study by US intelligence e.g., Soviet strategic force structures
under many circumstance and START monitoring judgments in NIE
4/11-88.
o Soviets probably believe that security of USSR for the 1990s and
beyond would be enhanced by a START Treaty because:
the requirement for deep cuts would curtail US strategic
modernizaton program
they appear to want a more stable economic planning
environment in the next decade and a better situation
environment for "perestroika" and industrial modernization
o The risks attending the completion of a START Treaty with the
Soviets are greater than in INF because:
Soviet incentives to cheat are greater than in previous
agreements
there will be more opportunities to cheat than in INF
these opportunities will extend over a longer period of
time.
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o INF incorporates far-reaching and unprecedented arms control
verification provisions and the President will go even further in
START by:
requiring a modified "anytime, anywhere" challenge
inspection provision which would increase our confidence in
Soviet adherence and increase the risk to the Soviets
should they opt to cheat.
much wider use of portal-perimeter monitoring them in INF
physically tagging treaty limited items
proposing limits on the types of missiles to be constrained
in START.
o There are short-comings in our monitoring capabilities and we
share many of your expressed concerns about them.
the specific nature of the shortfalls depends on the final
details of a START agreement.
shortfalls were discussed at length in NIE 4/11-88
o We welcome PFIAB suggestions and help, especially in securing the
necessary funding that will improve our ability to monitor a START
Treaty.
as work continues we will seek better ways to improve our
treatment of the issues and in this regard we would be
happy to meet with the Board to discuss them.
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TO,VSviCRET
TOP CRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
February 11, 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
THE HONORABLE FRANK C. CARLUCCI
The Secretary of Defense
SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS 40066
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
The Director of Central Intelligence
ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: PFIAB Letter to President Regarding
START Treaty (U)
Attached is a copy of a recent PFIAB letter to the President
regarding the proposed START Treaty. The letter raises a number
of intelligence concerns and a couple non-intelligence, national
security, concerns. (C)
In light of our recent NSPG, I request you give this issue your
personal attention and provide me with your comments NLT COB
February 18. (U)
Attachment
Tab A PFIAB Letter dtd 2/5/88
cc: Director, ACDA
TPS ECR ET
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Colin L. Powell
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President's
Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Dear Mr. President:
?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ISC/ICS CORM. HQ.
February 5, 1988
In recent weeks your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has focused
its attention on rhp A
TOP ET
BY: Multiple Sources PFIAB Control No. 003-88
DECL: OADR
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The issues raised above fall within the Board's charter to provide you
our best advice on matters of intelligence. By your careful appointments,
however, the Board comprises a unique repository of experience in national
security affairs. It includes a former Secretary of State, a former
Secretary of Defense, and two former National Security Advisors among other
former Cabinet members. We hesitate to step beyond our formal mandate.
But if the issue warrants, we believe it our obligation to make known to
you other concerns which may fall outside the letter of the Board's
governing executive order.
we oelieve detailed analysis by the
e ary o e ense an t e Joint Chiefs is required to determine what the
net effect on the StratPvir
up against the budget constraints faced by the
the foreseeable future as well as the enormous
facing any attempt to restructure or modernize
ese requirements been put
Department of Defense for
political difficulties
U.S. strategic forces?
Mr. President, we have not raised these concerns to frustrate efforts
to reach an agreement. We do so to ensure that whatever shortcomings exist
with the proposed treaty be fully understood so that they can be addressed,
thereby increasing the soundness of a START accord.
As always, your Board stands ready to assist you in any manner you
deem appropriate to address the issues raised in this letter.
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
TOP SECRET
Sincerely, .
6AAL
Anne L. Armstrong
Chairman
TOP SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 15, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE EDWIN MEESE, III
The Attorney General
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
Director of Central Intelligence
SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS 40
THE HONORABLE JOHN E. OTTO
Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation
THE HONORABLE ANNE L. ARMSTRONG
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
MR. STANLEY E. MORRIS
Director, United States Marshals Service
SUBJECT: ? National Defector Program (U)
As a result of the redefection of Vitaly Yurchenko, serious
questions arose about the adequacy of our National Defector
Program. Consequently, in November 1985, the President signed
NSDD 199 directing a White House review by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) of the intelligence
community's performance regarding several matters arising f
the Yurchenko defection and redefection. The review includgrall
aspects of the Defector Handling Program. (S)
The results of this review have been reviewed by the President.
He has directed the following actions to be incorporated into the
National Defector Program: (S)
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PFIAB should conduct a review six months after the date of this
order and assess the impact and effectiveness of the proposed
changes and reforms as set forth above. (C)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
SECRET
FRANK C. CARLUCCI
oft r.?. r"? r""1"
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