ITALY AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A014700050015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 26, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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BUREAU OF INTELUGENCE
AND RESEARCH
No. 8095 August 26, 1959
ITALY AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE
4300133
"Mile Italy's full participation in NATO will continue
in the foreseeable future, its specific role will be conditioned
by the nature and composition of the Italian government in power.
Italian adherence to the Western Alliance is dictated by the
immediate requirements of national defense and the need for
economic development rather than by any overriding democratic
ideal. Italy's specific role in the alliance, on the other hand,
is subject to change since it is dictated by internal as well
as external political considerations.
A center-right government similar to the present one of
Premier Segni, which depends for its support on the parties of
the extreme right, can be expected to align itself in favor of
a tough Western policy vis-a-vis the USSR both within NATO and
in the orientation of the European Community of Six. Such a
government can also be expected to align itself more readily
with a continental policy such as advocated by President de Gaulle
and Chancellor Adenauer.
\)\ A center-left government similar to the one of former
Premier Fanfani, which would depend for its support on the political
_N parties to his left, including eventually the Nenni Socialists,
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. would, on the other hand, very likely support a more flexible policy
. em :Nvis-a-vis the USSR both within NATO and the Six. It would be more
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in an eventual lbontinental bloc,' unless French initiatives were
>? a ; `',?cgv. idirected toward the full implementation of the European Community
' Zof Six treaties and toward the relaxation of international tensions.
reconstituted center-coalition government, difficult as that may
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SECRETI STAT
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_ In the present confused situation both within the Western
Alliance and in internal Italian politics, however, Italy is
likely to steer a very cautious course, so as not to antagonize
either its continental friends of the Community of Six or its
other NATO allies outside Europe, especially the United States*
In the long run, Italian policy can be expected to be increasingly
directed toward the fulfillment of the economic, military, and
political integration of Europe, regardless of the composition
and political orientation of the government in power*
I. ITALIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WESTERN ALLIANCE
Italy's concern with national defense and the requirements of its
economic development were the determining factors which led it to participate
in NATO. Italy desired to achieve an international status which would remove
it from isolation and the ignominy of its defeat during World War II and
restore it to a position of equality as an accepted member of the community
of free nations. The Italian governments supported NATO as the best means
of 1) defense against Soviet aggression and 2) the revival of Italian in-
fluence in the Mediterranean. From the beginning of NATO Italy viewed the
pact not merely as a defensive alliance but as a potential springboard for
the political and economic integration of Europe which it is now attempting
to achieve through the European Community of Six. Domestic factors also
played and continue to play an important part in determining Italian govern-
ments' attitudes toward NATO.
Italian governments from 1949 to the present day have considered
NATO as a basic weapon of the anti-Communist forces in Italy in their in-
ternal struggle against the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its former
any, Nenni's Italian Socialist Party (PSI). To anti-Communist leaders,
NATO provided psychological as well as physical defense of Italy against
a Communist threat by reminding Italians that a Communist accession to
power in Italy would mean turning Italy over to the Soviets,. The cold war
made it relatively easy for former Italian governments to keep the left --
as represented by the PCI and the PSI -- relatively isolated. The obvious
threat of Soviet imperialism enabled the Christian Democratic-led coalition
governments to reject the advances of the left for an alliance which would
have carried out a radical domestic social and economic reform policy and
a neutralist foreign policy.
Controversy over the Italian Role in NATO
Beginning in 1955, there has arisen a controversy over the role that
Italy should play in the Western Alliance. This controversy has been caused
by a variety of factors, including: 1) the relaxation of world tensions
following the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955; 2) the diminution of the
internal threat posed by the Italian Communist Party to the Italian state;
SECRET,
STAT
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SECRET SI-AT
? 3 .
3) the general belief among a large sector of the Italian people that the
danger of a world conflict has been reduced because of nuclear parity
between East and Nest; 4) the disunity in the Western coalition over policy
during the Suez, and more recently, the Berlin crisis; and 5) the gradual
emergence of Nenni's PSI as an independent force in Italian politics
following its abrogation of the "unity of action pact" with the PCI in 1957.
Italian foreign policy since 1955, therefore, has been torn by two
tendencies: 1) a desire for a more active and independent role for Italy
in the initiation and conduct of Western policies; and 2) the need for
the continuance of the status quo within NATO. This controversy involving
specific NATO policies and the Italian role in that organization took the
form of a debate between the so-called "neo-Atlanticists" and the
"Atlanticists."
The term "neo-Atlanticism" describes a foreign policy which seeks
a more active role for Italy in the international political and economic
field, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Middle East where Italy
believes it possesses a special interest and competence, while still main-
taining the military commitments to NATO. The leading exponents of neo -
Atlanticism have been President Gronchi, oil magnate Enrico Mattel, and
former Premier Fanfani. They have had the support of the center-left and
elements within and outside the Christian Democratic party, including
Saragat's Democratic Socialists and to a certain extent the Nenni Socialists.
The Atlanticists have been led by former Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino
and have been generally supported by Christian Democratic conservative
elements, the Liberals, the Republicans, and the Vatican hierarchy.
The Atlanticists have accused their opponents of wanting to carry out an
aggressive Middle East policy that would antagonize Italy's allies, particu-
larly Great Britain and France, and undermine NATO unity.
The controversy between Atlanticists and neo-Atlanticists took a
definite form at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956. The first government
of Premier Antonio Segni, based on a coalition of the Christian Democrats
and three minor center parties (Democratic Socialists, Republicans, and
Liberals), took an Atlanticist position when it supported US action to end
hostilities but at the same time refrained from criticizing the UK and France.
These Atlanticists held that Italy could not afford to weaken its associa-
tion with European members of NATO. They maintained that if the US were to
modify its European policy, Italy would have to close ranks behind its
European Allies even at the risk of weakening its alignment with the US.
The opponents of this view, the neo-Atlanticists, held that in the event
of a break between the major European powers and the US, Italy's alignment
with the US would permit it to increase its political and economic interests
in the Near and Middle East.
This controversy has been resumed from time to time along different
lines, more recently during the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference and in
SECRET
STAT
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IWO
the aftermath of the announcement of the exchange of visits between the
US and the USSR. It was used by conservative forces both within and with-
out the Christian Democratic Party to embarrass and eventually bring down
the Fanfani government early in 1959. Fanfanifs pan-Arab policy and his
trip to Cairo came under constant attack by Fanfani 'sopponents as a
neutralist policy disruptive of Atlantic solidarity and antagonistic to
French and British allies. It is being used today by Fanfanifs supporters
in accusing the Segni government of close identification with the da.
Gaulle-
Adenauer inflexible stand at a time when the major Western Allies, the US
and the UK,are engaged in an effort to ameliorate international tensions
and bring about a detente between East and West. The controversy can be
expected to rage with increasing force as the national convention of the
Christian Democratic Party scheduled for October approaches. At stake at
the convention is the control of the party leadership and its political
direction. Fanfani is determined to wrest control of the party from his
opponents and his main line of attack will unquestionably continue to be
directed against the rightward direction of the present government and party
leadership both in domestic and foreign policy. There is strong evidence
that Fanfanifs strategy is hitting the mark, is gaining increasing support
both within and without his party, and may very well succeed at the party
.convention The reemergence of Fanfani to the formal or implied leadership
of the dominant political force in Italylwaaldalmost certainly bring about
the demise of the Segni government and its replacement with a govern
,-
'Tent which would, be left-oriented both in domestic and foreign policy.
Aware of these dangers, the Segni government is likely to steer an in-
creasingly cautious course in foreign policy. In domestic policy he will
attempt to free himself of Fanfanifs accusation that he has led his party
in a rightward direction, by disavowing support of the neo-fascists and by
presenting a convention platform pledged to a return to the old Christian
Democratic-led center-coalition government.
II. ITALIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EUROPEAN COMUNITY CY SIX
Most Italian political leaders have come increasingly to believe that
NATO, while a fundamental and a necessary instrument for the preservation
of peace, is too unwieldy to satisfy the particular interests of Italy.
In the words of President Gronchi, Italy and the other continental European
powers "should have something to say vis-a-vis certain aspects of Americanism
(US policies in NATO) It is here (in Europe) that we must find a policy,
certainly not contrary to the US, not conceived as a realization of a third
force, but capable nevertheless of bringing about a safer equilibrium between
East and West." Italy's long range foreign policy, therefore, will be
directed increasingly toward European economic, politicalsand military inte-
gration. Most Italian political leaders believe that European integration
is the primary means by which Italy can make its voice heard in international
affairs and that the degree of initiative that Italy is able to bring to
bear on NATO policies will be directly commensurate with the support that
Italy is able to muster from among members of the European Community of Six.
SECRETJ STAT
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SECRETI STAT
Italian obsession with the necessity of consultation within the
Western Alliance, and its timid independent initiatives in foreign
policy, are not only dictated by reasons of national interest and prestige
common to all Italian governments regardless of their political composition,
but are intimately tied in with the internal political situation. Internal
political pressures for Italian participation in the inner councils of the
Western Alliance are so strong that Italian governments are often forced to
go to almost desperate lengths to satisfy them. Illustrative of this
situation were the Italian initiatives during the Geneva Foreign Ministers
Conference and more recently in the aftermath of the announcement of the
Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange of visits and the President's forthcoming
trip to Europe. The Italian Government's almost hysterical pleas for
participation in the Geneva conference, a NATO Heads-of-Government meeting,
and a Segni-Eisenhower meeting represent not only Segni's concern over the
adverse effect that a relaxation of international tensions would have on
his government, but they reflect also the necessity of satisfying the
demands and nationalist aspirations of the extreme rightuing forces on
whose support the Segni government depends. In addition, they represent
an answer to his opponents' accusations that the Segni government by support-
ing the Ai Gaulle-Adenauer line has backed the wrong horse, thus becoming
completely isolated.
Controversy over the Italian Role in the Community of Six
The controversy over the role of Italy in NATO also affects the role
of Italy in the European Community of Six. While with the exception of the
Communists, there is general support for European economic, political and
military integration, there is disagreement among Italian political leaders
as to the role and the policies that Italy should advocate in an integrated
Europe. The controversy has been sharpened and brought into focus by recent
developments in East-West relations, including the Berlin crisis, the
Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, and most important the announcement
of the forthcoming Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange of visits in Washington
and Moscow.
Broadly speaking the controversy has been polarized between those
who, like the present government and its rightwing supporters, conceive an
integrated Europe as a third force under the aegis of a Paris-Bonn-Rome
Axis designed to maintain the status quo in Europe and in East-West relations,
and those on the other hand who$ like Fanfani, Gronchiland their supporters
of the center-left and left, believe that the role of an integrated Europe
should be a corollary of NATO and should promote or help to promote a detente
in East-West relations. Illustrative of the two positions was the reaction
to the recent announcement of the forthcoming US-USSR talks. Reaction to
the US initiative ran from outright suspicion, skepticism, and disapproval
in the extreme right parties, through lukewarm support and approvalin govern-
/lent circles, to unqualified -support on the part Of the.Nenni Socialists,
the Italian Communists, and Fanfani and his supporters in the center-left.
SECRET
STAT
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SECRET
-6-.
The controversyoaside from the different political concepts of
the advocates of either position, has tremendous overtones in the internal
political situation. The adoption of a flexible role in East-West relations
either in NATO or the integrated Six as advocated by the Italian center-.
left, implies the eventual realignment of Italian political forces to the
left, which means essentially a Catholic-Socialist rapprochement and their
eventual collaboration in a government coalition. The adoption of the
inflexible line, as advocated by the Italian center-right, implies, on
the other hand, the continuing isolation of all center-left forces and the
participation in the governing majority of the extreme right forces, in-
cluding the monarchists and the neo -fascists.
III. ITALIAN AIT1TUDES TOWARD AN EVENTUAL CONTINENTAL BLOC
While there undoubtedly are potential factors which favor an Italian
alignment in an eventual continental bloc or European third force) there
are others which militate against such an alignment in the immediate future.
The factors which could favor an Italian alignment in such a bloc
are essentially four: 1) fears of a possible US withdrawal from Europe;
2) fears of a possible isolation from the Community of Six if Italy did
not join in the "bloc"; 3) fears that major changes in the world balance
of power may become detrimental to Italian and European interests; and 4)
the prospect (if a left-oriented government is in power in Italy at the
time) of a continental policy aimed at a detente in internabional relations.
Another important but by itself a less determinant factor, is the prospect
of satisfying Italian desires and ambitions (common to all Italian govern-
ments irrespective of their composition and political orientation) for a
larger voice in the formulation of Western policy which would be satisfied
if they participated fully-in a continental bloc.
The factors which militate against an Italian alignment are intimately
connected both with the uncertainty and suspicion about the policies of such
a bloc, and with the precarious position of the Segni government. They
are: 1) fears that an even closer Italian alignment with the az Gaulle-
Adenauer rigid line, at a time when the US and the UK are engaged in an
effort to bring about a detente in East-West relations, will almost certainly
bring down Segni and bring back Fanfani to a position of preeminence in the
Italian political scene; 2) general Italian suspicion of de Gaulle's and
Adenauer's motives, and the fear, especially among the leaders of the
Italian center-left and left, that Italy might get involved in adventures
in Algeria and perhaps Europe which would be contrary to Italian interests
and aspirations in those areas; and 3) fears, again generally shared in
Italy, that Italian adherence to a continental bloc, might find Italy back-
ing the wrong horse if the present divisions within the Western Alliance
were to be polarized between a continental bloc and a US-UK alliance work-
ing at cross purposes.
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STAT
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SECRET STAT
-7.'
V. CONCLUSIONS
1. In the foreseeable future, Italy will remain firmly aligned
to NATO, whatever the political orientation and composition of the Italian
government.
2. Italy's specific role in NATO, however, will be conditioned
by the nature and composition of the Italian government then in power. A
left-oriented government will advocate a more flexible policy-vis-a-vis
the USSR than a right-oriented government and both will seek a greater
Italian voice in the formulation of that policy.
3. In the short run, however) Italy is likely to steer a very
cautious course, so as not to antagonize either its continental friends
of the Community of Six or its traditional NATO allies outside continental
Europe) especially the United States. This will be particularly true
in the present confused situation within the Western Alliance in the after-
math of the announcement of the forthcoming bilateral talks between the
US and the USSR. '
L. In the long run, Italian policy can be expected to be increasingly
directed toward the fulfillment of the economic, military:and political
integration of Europe, regardless of the composition and political orienta-
tion of the government in power.
S. Italian efforts and demands for a larger voice in Western councils'
decisions will continue unabated. If these demands are not met in NATO,
satisfaction will undoubtedly be sought in closer political consultation
within the Community of Six. Nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful that
under present international and national conditions the satisfaction of
this Italian need for consultation would be the determining factor which
mould induce Italy to choose between the Six and NATO, should current
divisions in the Western Alliance be polarized.
6. It is not likely that an Italian government will align itself
with an eventual European third force or continental bloc in the immediate
future unless there are major changes in the world balance of power which
the Italians would consider detrimental to their own and European interests.
SECRET
State - -FD- -Wash., DC
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