VIEWS OF MAX MILLIKAN ON NIE 100-3-56: SINO-SOVIET POLICY AND ITS PROBABLE EFFECTS IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A008400030013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2014
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 26, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 April 1956
INTERNAL 0/NE ONLY
STAFF MVJORANDUM NO. 3346
SUBJECT: Views of Max Milliken on NIE 100-346: Sino-'Soviet Policy
and Its Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas
10 On 20 April we sent a copy of the Board-approved draft of
NIE 100.3-56 to MAK Milliken, noting that final IAC action would
occur before his views Imre received but expressing the desire to
obtain his views nonetheless. We have now received his comments
(attached) ehich T feel are of sufficient general and continuing
interest to circulate to the Board, and possibly to pasa on to the
DOI.
2, I believe that in his comments, Max has overplayed the
limitations of writing an estimate on this subject which makes
sense without including in it a detailed appraiaal of US policy.
It seems to me that many of the points Max wishes to make explicit
are implicit in the paper and that no one could fail to get the
point that the content of the current Bloc tactics is conditioned,
to some degree, by "our emphaaia on pacts and alliances, our
insistence that those not with us are against us, etc." Nor could
they fail to understand that future effects of Bloc tactics will
depend, in large measure, on US courses of action.
3. Max does raise a point concerning the dilemna confronting
the Soviet leadership in making any contribution to the economic
and political stability of the bourgeois regimea in the underdeveloped
areas which has bothered me for some time. Some such view
as that expressed in the imagined Molotov address to the Presidiun
(attached) maY still exist in Moscow. If this is so, it may serve
to limit the extent of "dis.interested" Soviet aid and to hasten
a return to more familiar tactics*
Attachments
a) Letter from Max Milliken
b) Imaginary statement by Molotov
written by W. Roatow
ata/le,"4,0,/
J. C. GRAHAM
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MASSACHUSSTTS IBREEME OF =NOLO=
?enter for International Studies
50 tlemorial Drive
ee erid ge 39i Beassachusetts
April 25D 2,6
Mr. 4.822083 (trek=
Dear clisa:
? I have reAd with great Merest theedraft of WIS 100..346.
I Save scribbled - number of detailed- reections it the Marains9
.but I Save eeveral major ttees of emphasis / would like to .
suggest*
1. First; this seems to ma almost Classic case of the
difficulty evening an estimate uhleh atkes egy sense without
including in it a detailed appraisal ef 41. S. policy. To talk
about the eharacter, the probable conseqeences, ael the dances
or oweese or a eemi;setitive race between to a;jor pavers in a
.tkird area uithout saying anything about the nature of the
pellet.= of one of the competitors seems to ma to be juit hope-
less. It is little short of ridiculous to try to say vluat tbe
effects of the Soviet campaign of economic and political, peas-
tration be eithout exPlicitly considering the range of
Ur. S. policies in the light of uhich theft Soviet policies are
designel. X feel this so strongly that if there were any
possibility of doing so I Would. urge you most solemnly to try
in thin case to have recognized the impostance of an explicit
exception to the usual estlmates erotedure. *
ea ?ea reason for this Sas to 40 with omees estiatte of
the factors loadiag the Soviets to mdertake this campaign.
This is sukely a strictly intelligence preblem. I em convinced;
however, Unit it Lathe particular character of U. S. policy
over the Last few years more than any ether single factor vhich
has.lead the Soviets to believe in spite of the very real
dangers and =certainties for tfitem of the tactic they eve nee
pursueng, that this was somethiag worth trying. In this cone
nectioa 1 feel you do net eabe agythieg like clear enoUgh the
nature of the dilemma which must have confronted the Soviet
leadarahip when they adopted this policy. In any Lang-run '
sense tec development of genuinely independent neutral states
is very much mere to our advantage than to theirs. To strengthen
bye:commie assistance and political recognition the bourgeois
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regimes in many of the presently underdeveloped countries, several
of them fiercely dedicated to the extermination of their local
Communist parties, involves real dangers for the Soviets. Unless
the United States and the other. Western powers pursue. quite stupid
policies, the chances of the Soviets being able to bring about
additions to the membership of' the bloc, new Communist regimes,
or military or political allies milling to take instructions are
quite small.
What then has persuaded the Soviets that this was a sensible
course to follow? One factor has no doubt been the relative
failure to date of their traditional reliance on support of
revolutionary, explicitly Communist parties. A major factor must
have been, however, their estimate that our emphasis on pacts
and alliances, our insistence that those not with us are against
us, and the growing image of the United States as aggressive
and militaristic provided a golden opportunity for them to make
short-run political and psychological capital out of the sort
of line they are now following. The objectives they hope to
gain by this I would guess are short-run rather than long-run
objectives. They are an increase of anti-American feelings and
? a consequent increase in the resistance of third countries to
participate in our military arrangements. Perhaps the most
important single aspect of this not mentioned, I think, in the
estimate is the Soviet hop that they can secure the denial of
mow foreign areas to us for use as bases. They probably hope
tO embarrass us in the U. N. and to make collective Western
action in areas like Viet Nam, Korea, and Germany most difficult.
They also may have real hopes perhaps inadequately treated
in your estimate, of developing take-over potential by the popular
front route. This looks very unpromising in countries like India
? and Burma but not all hopeless in Indonesia, Ceylon, etc.
Their capacity to exploit this situation and set of atti-
tudes will depend very largely on what sort of policies we
pursue. Should we reverse our, field, come out strongly in
support of neutralism and independence, support development
programs on a much more imaginative scale without political
strings, and invite the Soviets to participate in a joint program
for economic aid, it seems quite possible that the Soviets
would re-examine their Whole tactic. Because I do not regard
such a change of U.S. policy as wholly out of the question, I
have some doubts about your statement on page 2 that "The condi-
tions on which Communist policies are now based will not change
in the foreseeable future." I enclose, in further elaboration
of our conception of the Soviet dilemma, an imaginary memorandum
from Mr. Mblotov to his Presidium Colleagues which should make
this dilemma clearer.
-2
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As you know, I am as fully aware as anyone of the limits on
discussions of U.S. policy in intelligence estimates._ This does
seem to me to be a case, however in which a strictly intelligence
appraisal maybe grossly misleading if it does not indicate those
elements in Western policy which may well have been responsible
for the whole choice of tactic and design of campaign by the other
side. I repeat, in my view the present Soviet campaign in the
underdeveloped areas is much more largely a reaction to and an
exploitation of our own policies there than this estimate suggests.
3. One other quite different point. / think the Soviets
are not unaware of the extent to Which, in spite of their campaign
of sweetness and light, there are still many in the underdeveloped
areas whose attitudes and actions will be influenced much more
by who they think will win any conflict if it occurs, that is
by who represents the wave of the future than by talk of peace
and disarmament. I believe the explosion of the hydrogen both
in Russia may wellhave been purposely timed to coincide with
the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to India. I do not think
W. Ihrushchev's comments in Ragland about Soviet missiles
development were either an unguarded expression of pique at his
cool reception there or an attempt to destroy the British case
for strategic trade controls. They along with many other quiet
but persistent Soviet comments are designed to exploit the
ambivalence in many Asian end African minds between wanting
peace and wanting to be on the winning side. I have spelled
out my view of this double-edged Soviet tactic at slightly
greater length in a statement I prepared for the Special Senate
Subcommittee on Disarmament which held some hearings here
recently. I enclose a copy.
I hope we can perhaps get together at the next Princeton
session to explore these matters at greater length.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
Max F. Milliken
Director
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TO: My Presidium Colleagues
FRCMI V. Molotov (Walt Roster.)
Nov that the TeentictAl Party Congress is over / wish to 'warn my
colleagues of the danger that confronts us, as a result of our actions.
speak frimey because, as is well known, / accepted the collective
decision, denounced my own previously stated views, and joined in an
effort which, I cannot conceal from you, I still regard as right-wing
adventurism.
Let me recall the arguments we have had over the past fro years and
which came to a head before the Congress.
Certain of our Comrades took the following view:
1. In prolonged reaction to the Korean War the United States
was devoting its efforts overwhelmingly to developing a ring of
military pacts.
2. These pacts were unpopular as well as ineffective. The
peoples of the conetries concerned wanted peace, economic develop-
ment, and increased national development and stature.
3. Therefore, it was time to make serious movements to
associate ourselves with these emotional sentiments and outflank
the Americans.'
I led those?Immix:3MA; I may say the more experienced among us in
these matters--vho took a contrary view. We held the following position:
1. The tactics proposed would strengthen existing bourgeois
governments, give these nations time to organize themselves, and
promote a protracted stage of bourgeois development.
2. The influence we would in by such tactics would be
superficial and could not be translated into a serious acquisition
of Conmunist paver.
3. The necessary Popular Front tactic within these countries
would make impossible the development of infiltration and guerrilla
tactics which alone promise success in these regions.
SEC=
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4. We could be drawn into economicatly costly competition,
at a time when our resources are badly needed for military and economic
purposes within the Soviet Union.
The only hope that coal be offered was that without American assistance,
these countries, with their silly bourgeois methods, would fail in their
economic plans and turn to us.
I repeat that we regarded the proposed tactics as a denial of every
lesson of our collegial experience, from Lades October victory to our
diplomatic trium0h at Geneva in 1954 in the natter of Indo-China. Our
movement has never before confused the superficial symptoms of power and
influence with its substance. In the end, power is a matter of physical
control; and the proposed policy in no way promises physical control. On
the contrsalf,. it nukes more difficult the problem of acquiring physical
control.
? As 1m0r,'well know, no one of those advocating the proposed policy was
able to explain to us how we move from economic pacts and flowers around
the necks of our colleagues to the serious acquisition of power. But
our clever and flexible colleague Mikoyan settled the matter with his
two famous propositions:
1. What Is bed for the United States is good for the Soviet Union;
2. Mikoyan can make a profit out of Soviet economic aid.
These two superficial, I might say almost cosmopolitan concepts
settled the matter; and we all vent in together to enunciate the doctrines
of the Twentieth Congress: prolonged coexistence, popular front, and all
the rest.
Why do 1 now return to these painful netters, having accepted
manfully the collective decision? I do so because now I believe we shall
see the Americans spring the trap upon us. We are now deeply committed to
these high4lown position! and policies. Every day we pursue them, we
strengthen In some measure non-Commmist governments over Shot we have
no real control. As long as the Americans continue their present policies
we can no doubt influence these governments to act in our interest. But
are the, Americans committed to their silly concentration on military
pacts? Are their ruling circles (who can blame changes on such absurd
excuses as elections and &mercurial public opinion) .4 ask you-- are
their ruling circles Incapable of changing their economic foreign policy?
.2 -
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And if they do, what reliable controls do we have over these Asian
and Middle Eastern governments to insure that, once strengthened, they
will not again switch their alleginace to the American Bloc?
We have known all along that the margin of success or failure in
the Indian Second Five Year Plan was a matter of a few billion dollars
in foreign exchange. This news excited even some of our ccaleagues.
You recall it was only with the greatest effort that I managed to
persuade some Of our colleagues from making that Plan a great success
for Nehru by lending him this money. But do you think the Americans,
having feigned stupidity in this matter, are incapable of making the
offer now, after we are conadtted to this right-wing adventurism? The
money means little to them; and if they prolong the automobile boom
in the United States by borrowing on the 1957 model, as that great
expert on, American capitalism, Mikoyan, was telling us, they will need
to make foreign loans next year to keep full employment.
And so also in Indonesia, Burns, Pakistan, and--mark my words--in
the Middle East as well.
We are playing with bourgeois tricks, Comrades; and we will get
burned. We have been lead into a trap. The Americans will soon be comirg
with money and technicians and missionary interest in these wretched
areas; and the people there will be glad to see them back. India will
be getting Goa with American support and with all the more credit
because of Dulles' cleverness. We shall soon have to return to the true
principles of Lenin and Stalin--yes / say Stalin--and we had better
begin tlythink about what is then to be done.
February 29, 1956
50X1
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