DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01363R000200260010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 2, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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t~~rectorace of
Intelligence
Developments in Afghanistan
T~r~ C~i...~4
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Developments in Afghanistan
2 April 1986
1 Perspective-Cross-Border Assistance: Pakistan Delays Decision
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package continue.
Pakistan's apprehensions about the possible Soviet response to and domestic
political repercussions of an overt program of cross-border humanitarian assistance
have delayed approval for over a year. Islamabad probably will maintain await-
and-see attitude so long as there are reasonable prospects for progress in the UN-
sponsored peace talks on Afghanistan and the negotiations on the new US aid
9 Iran and the Afghan Resistance: Fostering Revolution in the Hazarehjat.
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and could affect Moscow's willingness to negotiate a pullout of its forces.
Iran is increasing its influence in the Hazarehjat region of central Afghanistan,
where Tehran-backed Shia insurgents are in ascendance. The spread of Khomeini-
style fundamentalism in Afghanistan is an unwelcome development for the Soviets
NESA, and OCR
factionalized forces.
Under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Jamiat-i-Islami has become
the preeminent insurgent group in northern and western Afghanistan, but the
insurgent chief still faces a difficult challenge controlling his widespread and
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25 Soviet Policy on Afghanistan: Public Signs of Change and Controversy
FBIS
Soviet leader Gorbachev's statement on Afghanistan at the recent Congress of the
Soviet Communist Party suggests the Soviet Union is looking for new ways to
resolve the conflict. Whether the statement signals a significant change in Soviet
policy toward Afghanistan is unclear, however~~
29 Afghanistan: Selected Political Chronology, January-March 1986
This document is published monthly by the Directorate oJ'Intelligence. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editor,
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Developments in Afghanistan
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peace talks on Afghanistan.
Pakistan's apprehensions about increased domestic political opposition and
heightened Soviet pressure have delayed for over a year Islamabad's agreement to
an overt program of cross-border humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan. These
considerations will continue to slow Pakistan's approval for the program, with the
new civilian government in Islamabad clearly taking a more cautious approach to
Afghanistan-related issues than the Martial Law Administration. Moreover, the
Pakistanis probably will be unwilling to move ahead with an overt aid program so
long as they feel there are reasonable prospects for progress in the UN-sponsored
going to the Afghans.
Cross-Border Aid as Originally Envisioned
When US-Pakistani discussions concerning formation of an organization in
Pakistan to coordinate humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan began over a year
ago, Pakistani officials told US Embassy officials that such a program could be
rapidly implemented. Pakistan wanted to retain firm control over any assistance
(PVOs) operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan
Last fall, Islamabad began organizing Pakistan Welfare International (PWI) as a
nongovernmental agency with three primary functions:
? Working through the insurgent's seven-party alliance, PWI was to serve as a
conduit for humanitarian assistance from foreign governments and private
donors to Afghanistan.
? It would establish new aid programs, including health and education programs
for civilians inside Afghanistan.
? PWI would coordinate the efforts of the many private voluntary organizations
The program's function as a conduit for humanitarian assistance created serious
concern among PVOs that relief efforts would be politicized. Those apprehensions
were heightened with the appointment of Abdullah Khan as chairman of PWI. He
is widely viewed by the PVOs as favoring the alliance, especially Gulbuddin's
Hizbi Islami group, and as antagonistic toward PVOs. Some PVOs have indicated
that they would cease work in Afghanistan if forced to operate through PWI.
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President Zia ...has
consistently supported an overt
humanitarian aid program but,
with the ending ojmartial law,
has indicated that the decision
on thejorm oJcross-border
assistance is in Junejo's hands.
Yaqub Khan ...Minister 4f
Foreign A(Iairs ...has
consistently supported
establishing an overt cross-
border aid program, such as
PW/, and continues to express
optimism that such a program
will be implemented shortly.
Prime Minister Junejo ...will
decide under what conditions
cross-border assistance will be
permitted ... to date, has
blocked the implementation of
the overt cross-border aid
program. ~~
Current Status
Although President Zia and Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan continue to voice
support for an overt program of assistance, implementation of PWI has been
hampered by domestic political pressures on the new civilian government. When
martial law ended last year, Pakistani political groups that oppose Islamabad's
support for Afghan insurgents became more vocal. Frime Minister Junejo fears
that awell-publicized aid program would provide additional ammunition to the
opposition and would erode his own developing power base.
Islamabad also believes that an overt program would eliminate plausible denial of
Soviet charges that it is abetting the insurgency in Afghanistan and could cause
Moscow to break off UN-sponsored peace talks. Islamabad is sensitive to any
undertaking that infers that Pakistan is following the wishes of Washington rather
than its own independent foreign policy.
Although Islamabad has continued to delay the overt program, it recently allowed
a shipment of surplus nonlethal US military items to enter Pakistan under the
provisions of the McCollum amendment. The Pakistanis insisted, however, that
the entire shipment be consigned to the alliance, secrecy be maintained, and that
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) oversee transportation of the goods to
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the alliance once they arrived in Pakistan. Recent discussions between US and
Pakistani officials suggest that any shipments in the near future will occur under
similar restrictions.
So long as there are reasonable prospects for progress in the UN-sponsored peace
talks on Afghanistan, the Pakistanis probably will be unwilling to risk being
charged by Moscow with scuttling the talks by moving ahead on the overt aid
program.
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Wintertime Combat Up 25X1
Last month, combat in Afghanistan continued at a relatively brisk pace for the
winter. Heavy combat was reported near Qandahar, with Soviet forces conducting
heliborne assaults during the operations
The US Embassy in Kabul
in~c'icates that a Soviet motorized force conducted sweeps in the Lowear Vallev for
several days in an attempt to uncover food and arms caches
Combined Soviet and Afghan operations in Nangarhar Province continued, with
the heaviest fighting reported in the Nazian Valley and Towr Kham on the
Pakistani border
Independent Afg an Army sweep operations were also noted in river valleys
around the garrison at Hesarak-e Pain and northeast of Khowst as well as in
Herat,
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The US Embassy in Kabul reports insurgents mounted several operations against
garrisons in the Panjsher Valley. Heavy fighting persisted in the cities of
Qandahar and Herat, according to the Embassy. Guerrilla forces in Paghman
continued harassing actions. Kabul was generally quiet
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Afghanistan
Iran,
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Hints of Progress in Talk
UN negotiator Cordovez is hopeful that peace talks can resume in May, but
progress hinges on the willingness of the Soviet-sponsored regime in Afghanistan
to yield on the issue of direct talks. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad,
Cordovez "had the impression" that Kabul could be persuaded to resume
proximity talks on Soviet troop withdrawal if Islamabad agreed to undertake
direct talks after the comprehensive settlement had been finalized. Pakistan has
accepted a diplomatic note to this effect, but Cordovez reportedly said the Afghans
need "a few more days" before deciding. The Embassy also reports that Pakistani
Foreign Minister Yaqub has examined a draft withdrawal timetable that the
Afghans passed to Cordovez-which has not been shown to US diplomats-but
called it "no basis for negotiations."
Cordovez has typically been more optimistic than developments warrant. Pakistan
has always maintained that direct talks were possible only upon completion of the
settlement. The submission of a timetable will not advance the talks until the
Afghans agree to resume them on an indirect basis-a process that could drag on
for weeks, especially if rumors of a Soviet pullout are encouraging the regime to
look more to its own interests. Nevertheless, on matters of major policy, Kabul is
not an independent actor, and the Pakistanis probably believe their steadfast
opposition to direct talks is beginning to pay
New Spetsnaz Battalion
The eighth Soviet Special Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz) battalion in Afghanistan was
identified at a garrison 60 kilometers northeast of Farah
This is the fourth Spetsnaz battalion deployed to A ghamstan since
early 1985. The Soviets now have special forces troops at key locations along the
southern and western frontiers, in addition to the eastern border area.
Spetsnaz units apparently are becoming somewhat more successful in
counterinsurgency operations. Spetsnaz troops, operating at night in 10- to 15-man
teams, ambushed several supply trains from Pakistan and destroyed some
insurgent base camps in Ghazni and Zabol Provinces in January and February,
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Iran and the Afghan Resistance:
Fostering Revolution
in the Hazarehjat
Iran is increasing its influence in the Hazarehjat
region of central Afghanistan, where Tehran-backed
Shia resistance groups are in ascendance. Although
Iran's attempts to establish aKhomeini-style
government in the Hazarehjat have increased fighting
among local Shia resistance groups, as well as
between Shia insurgents and Sunni groups that transit
the region, Shia groups would be able to concentrate
on fighting Soviet and regime forces if the gains of
pro-Iranian groups in the Hazarehjat could be
sustained. Fear of the spread of Khomeini-style
fundamentalism in Afghanistan remains an important
factor in Soviet policy calculations. It helps account
for Moscow's reluctance to make concessions during
ongoing UN-sponsored peace talks.
Iran has been
consolidating its influence in the Hazarehjat region-
where Afghanistan's Shia community lives.
Iran organized all Tehran-base resistance
groups under the Sazman-i-Nasr group (Nasr), which
it controls, and proposed a joint Pakistani-Iranian
Committee on Afghanistan to coordinate and
exchange information.
Iranian aid goes almost exclusively to favored Shia
groups in the Hazarehjat, and that Nasr's policy
statements on the indirect peace talks in Geneva are
written by the Iranian Government.
Iran has also been more active in
proselytizing in central Afghanistan, and pro-
Khomeini cassettes and posters are widespread.
As evidence of Moscow's concern over Iranian
subversive efforts in the Hazarehjat, Kabul protested
Iranian behavior twice since the disappointing visit in
February of Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
Korniyenko to Tehran. A week after Korniyenko's
departure, Kabul issued a formal protest to Iran for
sending a delegation of Iranian clerics into
The Hazarehjat is one oj'the most backward and
isolated regions of Afghanistan. Because of their
Mongoloid j-eatures, separate dialect, and minority
(Shia) religion, the Hazaras have traditionally been
regarded by other Afghans as the lowest social class.
the social
structure of this poor rural area is based on a tenant-
farmingpeasantry cultivating land for large
landowners.
Members of all classes oj'Hazara society who have
lived in Kabul tend to become Marxists or Islamic
revolutionaries, Many,
especially the Islamists, have returned to the region
and provided the leadershiplor the most radical of
the.1'undamentalist insurgent organizations: Sazman-
i-Nasr and Sepah-e Pasdaran. With little affection
,for the traditional social institutions of the
Hazarehjat, the Islamists are attempting to joster
Iranian-style revolution-in our view, with some
success.
Afghanistan to promote Islamic revolution-a
demarche we believe Moscow probably inspired in
light of gloating Iranian press reports of the clerics'
"secret mission" during Korniyenko's visit. The
Afghan Foreign Ministry, in an unusually strongly
worded protest note last month, complained again
about Iran's subversive behavior, including
interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, border
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Excerptslrom Kabul's
Foreign Ministry Statement
The Iranian Charge d'ATlaires in Kabul was
summoned to the Foreign Ministry on 3 March and
handed an unusually strong protest note. Kabul
complained that:
? During the current year (21 March 1985-20 March
1986), Afghan territory "has been violated 63 times
by the ground and air.Jorces of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, as a result of which 20 people have been
killed, 245 people wounded, and 19 people abducted
to Iran.... "
? "Despite repeated requests, the propaganda,
publicity, and organizational operations against the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have not been
reduced, but the hours of hostile broadcasting of the
Iranian radio and television against (usJ have been
increased and ... is (sic lull of hostile articles and
concocted subjects against (usJ.... "
? "The authorities and leaders of (Iran) have
expanded their interference in organizing,
provoking, and instigating the resident Afghans and
counterrevolutionary elements in Iran to such an
extent that religious leaders, instructed by the high
authorities, enter the territory of (Afghanistan) in
order to carry out unfriendly secret actions which
the Iranian media extensively publicize. Such
actions are taken at the instruction oj'such
personalities as Ayatollah Montazeri.... "
counterrevolutionaries and exposes those persons
at the Presidency, the Prime Minister's Office, the
Ministry of internal Affairs and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps who are in charge of
and oversee these actions. It is due to the
involvement of these authorities that the Afghan
counterrevolutionary bands have been organized in
Tehran, Qom, Mashhad, Yazd, Esfahan, and other
parts of Iran, and are sent to Afghanistan,for
murder, plunder, and subversion...."
? "It has become necessary once again, in the light of
evidence and documents at hand, to state
(AJghanistan'sJstrongest protests at the Iranian
state (and ask it toJ reconsider its position and
method o.1'approach ...and not allow, by supporting
reactionary and CIS-linked bands, to take up
positions within the ranks of CIS imperialism and its
collaborators.... "
? "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan states
that if the authorities in the Islamic Republic of
Iran do not cease, resolutely and effectively, the
course of their interference and aggressions in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan, conditions will be
imposed on us such that we shall defend our
national sovereignty and security at any cost. In that
case undoubtedly the responsibility for their
inevitable and dangerous consequences will rest with
the Islamic Republic of Iran. "
? 'Some Iranian media ...admit that the Islamic
Republic of Iran gives broad material, financial,
political, and military assistance to the Afghan
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the Iranians
train and finance Shia guerrillas in four camps near
Islamic centers in Qom, Isfahan, Shiraz, and
Mashhad and outside of Tehran. The fighters are
infiltrated into Afghanistan after six months of
training and are supplied with light weapons.0
Afghan mullahs
trained in Iran enjoy support at the highest levels of
the Iranian Government, including Ayatollah
Khomeini and his designated successor Ayatollah
Montazeri, who favors an activist policy on
Afghanistan. Moscow, for its part, recently publicly
charged Iran with operating 20 training camps for
How Important Is the Hazarehjat?
The region has strategic value to the resistance. Some
insurgent groups active in western and northern
Afghanistan-such as Jamiat-i-Islami groups in
Herat, Balkh, and Kapisa Provinces-use supply
routes that pass through the area (see map). The
Hazarehjat's terrain, moreover, provides the
insurgents with a natural redoubt from which to strike
Soviet and Afghan convoys and installations on the
highway encircling the region. The Soviets would be
at a disadvantage during such assaults because the
region's mountainous terrain makes vehicle land
transit difficult and hampers effective helicopter
support operations
To date, the resistance in central Afghanistan has not
played a significant role in the war effort. Attacks
against Soviets and Afghan Government forces have
been minimal. Much of the resistance's potential in
the Hazarehjat has remained unfulfilled because of
fighting among the numerous Iranian-backed groups.
There also has been fighting between Shia groups and
the mainstream Sunni insurgents based in Pakistan
that seek to transit the region.
Major Resistance Groups
Four major Shia groups compete for power in the
Hazarehjat:
? Shura-Ingilab-i-Itl1aq-i-Islami (ShuraJ is a
traditionalist, Hazara coalition of some 30 groups
that united during local uprisings in 1979 against
the Communist government. Once dominant in
central Afghanistan, its influence has declined 25X1
because of internal weaknesses that caused the
departure of many of its original member groups, and
the growth of more revolutionary Iranian-supported
groups in the Hazarehjat.
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? Harakat-i-Islami (Harakat) operates on the 25X1
periphery of the Hazarehjat region. It is the most
active in fighting the Soviets in the Qandahar
region. Sheikh Asef Mohseini, the head of Harakat,
is based in Qom but reportedly gets no arms from
Iran. He is highly suspicious of revolutionary
Islamic doctrine, and Harakat's relations with Iran
have often been strained because it has rebuffed 25X1
Tehran's "guidance," 25X1
Its members are mainly of Tajik, Pushtun,
and Turkmen ethnic stock, with some Hazaras.
? Sazman-i-Nasr (Nasr), an Iranian-backed group,
seeks the establishment of a Khomeini-style society
in the Hazarehjat. Formed in 1972 by Shia students
in Kabul, it moved to Iran in 1979 and became
active in the Hazarehjat in 1980. We believe most
Hazaras who are attracted to Nasr view it as more
nationalist than pro-Iranian.
? Sepah-e Pasdaran (PasdaranJ, the most
revolutionary of the Hazara resistance groups, is a
direct instrument of the Iranian Revolutionary 25X1
Guards, Its recruits 25X1
are young Hazaras, uprooted from their villages,
often without family ties and dissatisfied with the
traditional social structure in the Hazarehjat.
Relations With Other Resistance Groups
The Pakistani-based resistance alliance has a history
of troublesome relations with Shia groups in the
Hazarehjat, partly because of Iranian meddling.
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Iran instructed
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Nasr to confiscate weapons and supplies from the
Hizbi Islami-Khalis faction and Sayyaf's Islamic
Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan in 1983 and
1984.
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Selected Insurgent Groups and Insurgent Transport Routes in Afghanistan
eegn?~~
Herat
Sliba
Qila
Soviet Union
Faryab J ~,J~~,i`
-~I(~vzj~n~ 1.1 U~1hgi~"
8isheh?~
Mogoi~
\Qaadah r
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
North- West
Frontier ,
Harakat-i-Islami
Sazman-i-Nasr
Shura-Ingilab-i-Itifaq-i-Islami
%i: Area formerly controlled by Shura
now contested by Nasr and Pasdaran
~~Selected insurgent transport route
- Province boundary
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Even Hizbi Islami faction leader Gulbuddin-whose
staunchly fundamentalist and anti-Western values
most closely mirror Iran's-is reportedly unhappy
with Iran. He objects to the low level of support to
Peshawar-based resistance groups. Moreover, his
faction reportedly closed its offices in Iran last
summer over alleged Iranian mistreatment of Afghan
refugees in Mashhad.
Individual Nasr commanders, however, make ad hoc
transit arrangements with local Sunni commanders,
because the Shias are not adequately supplied by
Iran. The arrangements often include the collection of
"tolls" from comparatively better supplied Sunni
groups. Nasr, for example, began cooperating with
Jamiat groups in Balkh Province under a 1984
agreement with their now deceased commander
Zabiullah Khan,
The agreement provided for safe passage for
Jamiat convoys to Balkh and Jowzjan Provinces, in
exchange for a percentage of ammunition, medicine,
and money for Shia commanders along the convoy
route. The system appeared to be working well in late
1985, according to press reports.
the revolutionary groups
backed by Iran, Nasr and Pasdaran, have displaced
those in the Hazarehjat that are more traditionalist-
s development we believe will give Iran an important
foothold in the country.
The contest among the resistance groups for the
Hazarehjat is not over, however.
the Harakat still holds positions
on the outskirts of the region, such as southern Balkh
Implications
...For the Mainstream Resistance. We do not
expect the movement of resistance forces and supplies 25X1
through the Hazarehjat-which has always depended
on local and somewhat fragile arrangements-to
become significantly more difficult. Because Iranian
materiel support is minimal, we believe Shia
insurgents have come to rely on Sunni groups that
transit the area for needed supplies and weapons.
Only a major breakthrough in the Iran-Iraq war,
which would allow for a significant increase in Iranian 25X1
materiel support for Shia groups in Afghanistan,
would alter this assessment
...For the War. The growing capabilities of Iranian-
trained forces operating in the Hazarehjat are likely
to increase military pressure on the Soviets somewhat,
but Shia groups probably will not make a substantial
difference to the course of the war until Nasr and 25X1
Pasdaran can sustain and further consolidate their
position. Shia groups would then be able to
concentrate on fighting Soviet and Afghan regime
forces-a development we believe would be a major
step toward opening a front west of Kabul. Soviet-
Afghan forces now have only two outposts in the
region-at Chaghcharan and Bamian-but a 25X1
significant increase of antiregime activity would force 25X1
them to garrison more units.~~ 25X1
... For a Peace Settlement. Growing Iranian control
and intervention in Afghanistan would further
complicate progress toward a settlement, in our view.
Fear of rising pro-Iranian fundamentalism in
Afghanistan was one of the reasons for the Soviet
invasion and remains an im ortant art of the Soviet
softened their demand that an Iranian-Afghan
policymaking calculus UN 25X1
negotiator Cordovez's March shuttle round indicates
that, although Kabul and Moscow appear to have 25X1
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bilateral agreement on noninterference be part of a
settlement, Kabul still insists that Iran "sign off ' on
any peace agreement.
Iran, which has consistently called for a unilateral
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to be followed by
the creation of an Islamic state in Kabul, has not
backed down from these demands. Although we do
not believe Tehran currently could torpedo a peace
agreement-the level of military activity in the
Hazarehjat remains only a nuisance to the Soviets-a
substantial increase in Iranian-sponsored attacks
would make Moscow more reluctant to make
concessions.
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of the estimated total of 7,000 to 11,000 insurgents in
northwestern Afghanistan. Some Western observers
believe that the predominance of ethnic Tajiks and
widespread influence of a Sufi brotherhood have
provided a social bond among western Afghans not
apparent elsewhere in the northern tier and have
made Ismail's organizational tasks easier. (s rrF)
The insurgents' ability to sustain fighting in the west
continues to be constrained by shortages of supplies.
The region is remote from Pakistan, and caravans
must transit extremely difficult terrain. Few supplies
come from Iran, and Tehran has even occasionally
hampered deliveries from Pakistan. Moreover, there
has been some factional bickering among the
insurgents about the distribution of supplies,
Combat Operations Since Mid-1985
Combat in the west has been nearly continuous since
the summer of 1985.
Early July 1985. Insurgent forces already established
in Herat city launched an offensive that expanded
their control to about two-thirds of the urban area,
according to the US Embassy in Kabul. With Afghan
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Burhanuddin Rabbani:
Academician of the
Resistance
Burhannudin Rabbani heads the Jamiat-i-Islami, the
largest and most militarily capable of the Afghan
resistance groups. Under his aegis, the Jamiat has
become the dominant resistance group in northern
and western Afghanistan. Rabbani's personal appeal
and ability to get along with rival insurgent leaders,
coupled with his skill at selecting and maintaining
good insurgent commanders, have made him one of
the most important and respected resistance leaders.
His organization, however, shows signs of serious
factionalism, which could erode combat effectiveness.
Rabbani will begin athree-month stint as spokesman
for the insurgents' seven-party alliance in April.
Middle-of-the-Road Fundamenalist
The 46-year-old Rabbani, a former dean and
professor at Kabul University and a Tajik from
Badakhshan, is an Islamic fundamentalist who wants
an Islamic political and social order in Afghanistan.
At the same time
Rabbani supports the free election of politicial leaders
and multiparty politics. A Western scholar familiar
with Afghanistan believes that Rabbani occupies the
ideological middle ground between the dogmatic
fundamentalists, such as Gulbuddin Hekmaytar, and
the pragmatic fundamentalists, such as Yunus Khalis.
Rabbani (flatly rejects any role for former Afghan
monarch Zahir Shah in a future Afghan government.
Rabbani ;has long been involved in antiregime politics.
According to Western observers, he became active in
the Muslim Brotherhood while at Kabul University in
the 1960. Along.with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, now
leader of a Hizbi jIslami faction, Rabbani led
Brotherhood protests against the Daoud regime and
fled from Kabul in 1973 to organize resistance
activity against Daoud. Following the failure of the
fundamentalist-led uprising in the Panjsher Valley in
1975, Rabbani moved to Peshawar~~
Prq/essor Burhannudin Rabbani ...head of
Jamiat-i-/slami ...inspires strong loyalty from
Jamiat members ... a moderate fundamentalist
who has promoted greater co, Operation among
Afghan resistance groups.
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Rabbani has a sound reputation 25X1
among resistance leaders stemming from his strong
credentials in three areas: classical Islamic culture,
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Sufism, and political Islam. His doctorate in theology
is from Al Azhar University in Cairo, and he has
written a book on rationalist philosophy in Islam.
Rabbani is well known for his translations of Sufi
poetry and his thesis on the 16th century Sufi poet
Nur-al-Din Jami. Finally, Rabbani translated the
works of Muslim Brotherhood founder Sayyid Qutb
from Arabic to Dari.
Rabbani's popularity among resistance members also
reflects his apparent lack of personal ambition. His
longstanding efforts as diplomat and mediator among
resistance factions have enabled him to attract
support from diverse segments of Afghan society.
According to a number of observers, he has shown the
greatest tendency among resistance leaders to
compromise and put together a united front. ~~
Although he is often ill at ease with Western customs,
Rabbani is generally pro-Western. He has traveled to
France and several Arab countries in search of
support for the resistance. He has developed good
relations with his Pakistani benefactors and with the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
good Jamiat relations with Iran, however.
in mid-1985 that Iran had accused
the Jamiat of being a "tool of US imperialism."
Securing Tehran's cooperation for movement of
supplies over Iranian territory to Jamiat fighters in
western Afghanistan has been a major sticking point
in the relationship.
Rabbani as Leader of the Jamiat
Rabbani has sought to centralize control of the
Jamiat and to make himself the final authority of all
major decisions.
Rabbani personally controls
and allocates all the money and materiel received by
Jamiat. He is considered to be highly adept at
dispensing the organization's limited resources in such
a way that subordinates do not feel slighted if their
requests for support can be only partially satisfied.
But Rabbani is no autocrat, and his reluctance to
crack down on unruly subordinates and his tendency
to procrastinate over tough decisions have sometimes
promoted factionalism.
Rabbani's personal adviser,
Sayyed Nurullah, has worked behind the scenes to
replace Ismail Khan, commander of Jamiat forces in
Herat, with a more conservative fundamentalist.
Nurullah's troublemaking evidently has engendered
some criticism within Jamiat, but Rabbani has not
rebuked him
an extensive organization.
Despite flareups of infighting, cooperation among
Jamiat groups is generally growing. Improved
communications, political awareness, and application
of force have enabled skilled Jamiat commanders to
develop spheres of dominance in northern and western
Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah Masood has made the
most extensive effort to spread cooperation, although
Masood must often deal with strong rival insurgent
groups as well as intense Soviet pressure. In Balkh
Province, Maulawi Alam Khan has been trying to
rebuild the strong organization that Zabiullah Khan
had developed before his death in 1984. In Herat
Province, Jamiat leader Ismail Khan has maintained
the three commanders share personnel
for training, exchange letters, and communicate
indirectly through the Jamiat office in Peshawar; the
Balkh and Panjsher insurgents also communicate
periodically by radio.
Rabbani's Relations With Other Insurgent Leaders
Rabbani-long a proponent of closer cooperation
among the insurgent groups-pushed for formation in
May 1985 of an insurgent alliance of the seven major
moderate and fundamentalist groups. His moderate
views and pragmatism will make him be an effective
international representative as spokesman for the
alliance for three months starting in April.
In our view, Rabbani's political savvy is considered an
asset by fellow alliance leaders. In January 1984, he
was designated by the alliance as spokesman for the
meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization.
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Mojadedi's forces and the corruption of Mojadedi's 25X1
family impede closer ties. Although Rabbani has had
little personal contact with moderate leader 25X1
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, head of the Harakat-
Ingilab-i-Islami, he consulted with Mohammadi on
the choosing of a successor to slain Jamiat
commander Zabiullah Khan, 25X1
Rabbani has had
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sometimes rocky relations with fellow fundamentalist
leaders Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin
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When trying to decide last year the order in which
leaders would serve as alliance spokesman, the others
wanted Rabbani to serve his term in November 1985
to coincide with the UN General Assembly's debates
on the Afghan issue.
Afghanistan.
been marred by clashes between their groups inside
time to time.
Outlook
Rabbani's reputation and interpersonal skills will, in
our view, enable him to contain any serious
factionalism within the Jamiat and help maintain
Jamiat's position as the dominant insurgent group.
But Rabbani's reluctance to crack down on dissenters
and to rein in headstrong field commanders probably
will hinder the group's operational capabilities from
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Rabbani has succeeded in maintaining relatively
correct relations with the three moderate insurgent
groups in the alliance. 25X1
~tabbani respects ibghatullah Mojadedi, leader 25X1
of the Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli, but that the weakness of
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Soviet Policy on Afghanistan:
Signs of Change
and Controversy ~~
General Secretary Gorbachev presented a new
formulation of policy on Afghanistan in his report to
the 27th Soviet Communist Party Congress-
declaring that Moscow wants to withdraw soon and,
as an apparent inducement to progress at UN-
mediated talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
claiming for the first time that he has a plan for a
phased pullout. By including the formulation in the
authoritative policy statement at the Congress,
Gorbachev has increased his stake in resolving the
Afghan conflict. The possibility that he is exploring
more than a change in rhetoric is suggested by signs
of tension between Moscow and Kabul that appear to
reflect Soviet dissatisfaction with the status quo and
fear in Kabul that Moscow is willing to compromise
Afghan interests to resolve the issue. Nevertheless,
Gorbachev has as yet given no sign he will abandon
longstanding Soviet demands that foreign support for
the Afghan resistance cease before Soviet troops are
withdrawn.
Gorbachev's New Formulation
Gorbachev's statement on Afghanistan stood out in a
Congress report that was long on its discussion of
policy toward the United States but offered no
specifics on relations with other individual countries,
except China. Addressing the issue of Afghanistan in
the context of the security of Soviet borders,
Gorbachev sought to underscore Moscow's continued
commitment to eliminating what it depicts as a
security threat to its southern border. At the same
time, he claimed that a concrete step had been taken
toward disengaging Soviet troops. Stating that "we
would like in the nearest future to bring the Soviet
forces" in Afghanistan "back to their homeland," he
added: "The schedule has been worked out with the
Afghan side for astep-by-step withdrawal, as soon as
a political settlement has been achieved which will
provide for a real end to, and reliably guarantee a
nonrenewal of, the outside armed interference in the
internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan." He did not make clear whether such a
"political settlement" had to be implemented fully
before the withdrawal began.)
Statements by Other Soviet Officials
Gorbachev's formulation on an early withdrawal from
Afghanistan has thus far not been pressed by other
top Soviet leaders, even when the occasion was
appropriate, nor has it begun to appear in routine
commentary. It is not clear whether this reflects
Soviet discretion in a diplomatic probe or disarray
resulting from less than a solid consensus for the
initiative. Gorbachev's approach has been presaged,
however, by two officials of the Central Committee's
International Department:
? Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the
Department, observed in an interview on 9 January
in L'Humanite that "we are pleased" about the
Afghan regime's claimed increase in popular support
because "we do not want to stay there indefinitely."
In his speech to the Turkmen Communist Party
Congress, he claimed that Moscow had already done
"a great deal" to achieve a solution through
negotiations, and pledged that "much more will be
done in the nearest future."
? Similarly, Karen l3rutents, deputy chief with
responsibilities for the Middle East and Latin
America, was quoted as saying in an interview in Al-
Khalij on 6 January that the Soviet Union wants to
withdraw from Afghanistan "as soon as possible."
"The sooner we execute this step," he added, "the
better it will be."
The Afghan issue was not raised in any public
account of a Congress speech by a Soviet leader other
than Gorbachev. Senior Soviet officials, in remarks to
journalists following Gorbachev's Congress report,
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were pessimistic about the prospects for Soviet troop
withdrawal and emphasized that Moscow's
preconditions for a pullout still stand:
? In a press conference on 27 February, Politburo
member Geydar Aliyev asserted that Moscow is
"very interested in ensuring a gradual withdrawal"
of Soviet forces but stopped short of repeating
Gorbachev's wish that this take place in the near
future.
? In a televised press conference on 28 February, First
Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko said that the
phased withdrawal had not yet been implemented
because forces both in Pakistan and maybe even
more, outside of Pakistan," were "holding back"
Islamabad from "serious and businesslike talks" on a
political settlement. At the conference, Chief of the
General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev adopted an
uncompromising tone, repeating longstanding Soviet
charges that thousands of insurgents are being sent
into Afghanistan from Pakistan
Evidence of Tensions Between Moscow and Kabul
Gorbachev's seeming doubts about the performance
of the Kabul regime and about Soviet commitments to
it appeared soon after he took power in March 1985.
A shift in stance was apparent in Moscow's annual
greetings message on the seventh anniversary of the
Afghan revolution, published in Pravda on 27 April
1985. The message was less positive and supportive
than those of previous years, omitting phrases that
had previously signaled the inclusion of the ruling
Afghan party among Soviet-approved "progressive"
parties. 0
Another indication of a deterioration of relations is
Moscow's failure to accord normal protocol courtesies
to Afghan leader Karmal during the Congress. No
Soviet leader was reported to have received Karmal,
although such a meeting was clearly required.
Gorbachev met personally with all other foreign heads
of state or government attending the Congress except
for Angola's President dos Santos, who was received
by Premier Ryzhkov.~~
schedule, even though Gorbachev had pointedly
drawn attention to Kabul's prior agreement, and he
seemed concerned to defend the legitimac of his
regime's dependence on Soviet support.
Efforts To Broaden Political Base of Afghan Regime
Gorbachev's new formulation of Soviet policy appears
to be accompanied by new Soviet efforts to redefine
the Afghan domestic political structure. Recent
authoritative statements have tied hopes for early
Soviet disengagement to efforts by Kabul to extend
the political base of the Karmal regime. Gorbachev
clearly implied in an interview in L'Humanite
published in Pravda on 8 February that the Kabul
regime's ability to stand on its own would be a
necessary precondition for Soviet withdrawal and
expressed optimism on this score.
Moscow has strongly endorsed aplan-unveiled
by Karmal at an extraordinary session of the
Afghan Government's Revolutionary Council on
9 November-to broaden the Afghan regime's
domestic support. The program, known as Karmal's
"theses," was reported at length by both Pravda and
Izvetiya when it was released. It includes:
? Bringing a large number of nonparty representatives
into the Council of Ministers and the Revolutionary
Council.
? Renewing an invitation to Afghan "compatriots who
are living outside the country" to return "without
prejudice and distinction."
? Encouraging and supporting "national traders and
industrial capitalists" to help develop a mixed
economy.
? Calling for support from all nationalities, tribes, and
clans on the basis of "equal rights, fraternity, and
friendship."
? Appealing to Islamic religious leaders to support the
government in exchange for promises of official
protection of religious institutions and education.
Karmal's theses are only the latest in a series of
attempts by the Afghan Government to institute
policies to broaden its political base. Such efforts have
been promoted by Moscow since at least 1979, prior
Karmal's Congress speech of 28 February appeared to
reflect a lack of enthusiasm for Gorbachev's initiative.
He failed to utter a word about the withdrawal
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to the Soviet intervention, but have apparently met
with little success. With the regime's limited popular
support and no evident alterations of Moscow's
longheld contention that withdrawal of Soviet forces
must be preceded by termination of foreign support to
the resistance, Gorbachev's new formulation does not
seem likely to resolve the Afghan conflict. ~~
Moreover, Gorbachev's announcement of a phased
withdrawal plan seemed designed in part to induce
Pakistan to move beyond the UN-mediated proximity
talks on Afghanistan and engage in direct
negotiations with Kabul. According to Western media
reports, UN mediator Diego Cordovez announced on
18 March that the Afghan Government had provided
him with a document containing a timetable for
Soviet troop withdrawal. Western news accounts have
said that Kabul has linked presentation of a timetable
to Islamabad's agreement to hold direct talks.
According to Kyodo News Service, Cordovez said
that, although the format of talks was still unresolved,
he now had all the elements required for a
comprehensive settlement of the Afghan pioblem and
cited Gorbachev's Congress statement as one of the
factors that had improved the climate for a solution.
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Afghanistan: Selected Political Chronology 25X1
January-March 1986
Resistance leader Sayed Ahmad Gailani became the new spokesman of the
Afghan resistance alliance on 1 January. His three-month term is part of a
scheduled leadership rotation determined when the alliance was formed last May.
Early January The Afghan resistance attended the Organization of the Islamic Conference's
Foreign Ministers' meeting, where Gailani was allowed to speak as a "guest."
No member government proposed granting the resistance formal status in the
conference, however.
Kabul Radio announced that the Afghan intelligence service (KHAD) had been
upgraded to ministerial status and renamed the Ministry of State Security.
As part of its regime-broadening efforts, Kabul announced the expansion of its
Revolutionary Council-the highest executive and legislative organ in the
regime-by adding many nonparty members, including religious leaders,
tribesmen, and members of private industry.
The Kabul regime hosted a delegation of visiting journalists from Western Europe,
the United States, and Japan. The journalists visited Jalalabad and some rural
villages outside of Kabul, and met with government ministers.
were arrested on suspicion of collaborating with insurgent groups. Scores of Army
officers and government officials have been arrested in recent months on charges
of coup plotting and espionage.
senior Afghan officers in the Ministry of Defense
Mid-February Pakistani officials, concerned that a highly visible program of cross-border
assistance would increase pressure from the Soviets and domestic political
opponents, continued to delay final approval.
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21 February A commission to draft a new constitution was named in Kabul, according to
regime media.
Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, arrived in Moscow to attend the 27th Soviet Communist Party
Congress.
Resistance alliance spokesman Gailani leads a delegation to the UN Human
Rights Commission meeting in Geneva, but Pakistan instructs the insurgents not
to speak or to seek to be seated at the Commission.
A US aircraft carrying humanitarian aid for Afghans landed in Pakistan,
according to the US Embassy in Islamabad. The shipment will be distributed by
the resistance alliance inside Afghanistan.
7 March Babrak Karmal returned to Kabul from Moscow, according to press reports.
Mid-March In a press interview, former Afghan King Zahir Shah said he remains devoted to
the Afghan cause but has no plan to return to Afghanistan.
Afghan resistance leader Abdul Haq met with British Foreign Secretary Sir
Geoffrey Howe and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in London. The meeting
drew sharp criticism from the Soviet news agency TASS.
An Afghan regime representative went to Libya to attend a conference on "the
aggression of imperialism."
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