DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 7, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

y
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2 ,
Directorate of
Intelligence
~o
~J:~
Developments in Afghanistan
N ~
~ r'1' lD
I~ ~
25X1 N
NESA DA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003CX
7 March 1986 25X1
ropy 14 5
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Developments in Afghanistan 25X1
1 Perspective-The Afghan War: Is Moscow Changing Course?
imminent.
25X1
25X1
There are growing diplomatic signs that Moscow may float a new initiative on
Afghanistan-most likely as part of a sophisticated diplomatic and propaganda
campaign-but Party General Secretary Gorbachev's opening speech to the 27th
Soviet Communist Party Congress suggests that no diplomatic breakthrough is
25X1
25X1
13 The Afghan Military: Weak But Surviving
morale, manpower, and performance.
The Afghan regime has stepped up attempts to boost its military performance
during the past six months by increasing the use of paramilitary units, improving
training, and closely supervising Afghan-army operations. These efforts will
probably result in only marginal improvements because of ongoing problems with
25X1
25X1
17 Soviet-Afghan Efforts To Destabilize Pakistan's North-West Frontier 25X1
25X1
border regions to discourage Pakistan from assisting the insurgents.
The Afghan regime, with Soviet backing, has tried to stir up tribal unrest in the
This document is published monthly by the Directorate o.1'Intelligence.
i Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
Developments in Afghanistan 25X1
There are some signs that the Soviets may float a new initiative on Afghanistan
soon, but party General Secretary Gorbachev's opening speech to the 27th
Communist Party Congress in late February suggests that no diplomatic
breakthroughs are imminent. A number of events-the March round of UN talks
on Afghanistan, a second set of Soviet-US bilaterals on the same subject, and the
next summit-will provide opportunities for Moscow to offer a different approach.
Although a new initiative would, in our view, probably be limited to a skillful
repackaging of old negotiating proposals accompanied by a sophisticated
diplomatic and propaganda campaign, we cannot rule out the possibility of more
radical moves. As with other Gorbachev proposals, it could feature a "first step"-
possibly including the withdrawal of some troops-designed to win headlines.
Hints From Soviet Officials
Soviet President Gromyko and Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko recently
said that
Moscow will create an independent "nonhostile" government in Kabul and that
recent attempts by the Afghan Government to broaden its base represent the first
steps.
First Deputy Chief of the CPSU International Department V. V. Zagladin gave a
speech to the Turkmen party congress in January emphasizing the Soviet
commitment to a negotiated political settlement. He claimed the Soviets have
already done much and would do more "in the nearest future." Moscow is also
pushing Kabul to expand its political base, possibly even to include some
insurgent leaders in the government.
Top Secret
NESA DA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003CX
7 March 1986
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
A Soviet Afghan expert indicated to US
Embassy officials that a Soviet withdrawal could begin when the insurgents had
agreed to a cease-fire.
Moscow is pushing the Afghan Government to expand its forces. In response,
Kabul recently announced that its security forces will be increased to some
200,000 and will soon take on more of the fighting.
What is Moscow Up To?
A Propaganda O.,6`ensive? Most likely the Soviets are trying to sow confusion in the
resistance, gain the diplomatic high ground, and put the United States on the
defensive. Gorbachev's statement to the Soviet Communist Party Congress was a
reformulation of the standard Soviet position that places Afghanistan firmly in the
Soviet strategic orbit and indicates interest in a political settlement only if it meets
Soviet security objectives. Statements that Moscow and Kabul have reached
agreement on a phased Soviet troop withdrawal are probably intended to increase
pressure on Islamabad to accede to direct talks with Kabul. Additional minor
changes in the Afghan regime and token troop withdrawals are also possible.
"Afghanization?" The Soviets may believe the situation is improving enough to
push the Afghans forward and reap the benefits of a lower Soviet profile. They
may also have decided they can live with a less orthodox brand of socialism in
Afghanistan than is represented by the current regime. In any event, the Soviets
probably calculate that "Afghanization" would aid their propaganda offensive.
This approach could include:
? Strong pressure on the Afghans to broaden the government.
? Attractive offers to key insurgent leaders to get them to stop fighting.
? Attempts to seek a quid pro quo from Pakistan and the United States to reduce
aid to the insurgents.
? Some reduction in the number of troops and level of combat involvement.
? Perhaps even a public statement dropping preconditions for pulling out.
A Major Military Withdrawal? This is the least likely explanation. It would
reflect a decision to wind down involvement in Afghanistan despite the probable
resulting collapse of the current regime. The Soviets might make a public
statement suggesting military success and stressing the present government's
responsibility for Afghanistan's future. They probably would approach the United
States and Pakistan privately to try and negotiate the best possible deal. A
withdrawal of most of their forces could be preceeded by a large influx of
equipment and intense offensive operations to provide breathing space.
The initial signals may be hard to sort out. Even if the main Soviet objective is to
seize the initiative for diplomatic and propaganda purposes, they may well portray
their actions as "Afghanization." In any event, Gorbachev has been supervising
the war for nearly a year now and, unless he can come up with an innovative
approach, he, too, will soon be identified with the Soviet's longstanding Afghan
dilemma.
Top Secret 2
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Afghanistan
Combat Activity Remains Steady 25X1
Combat activity throughout Afghanistan remained light in late January and mid-
February, but by the end of the month, several Soviet-Afghan multibattalion
w
'~ FX'I
25X1
In late February, US Embassy reporting 25X1 ~1
indicated Soviet battalions were conducting operations in Kabul, L~~
Parvan, and Nangarhar Provinces. Major elements of an Afghan division launched
a combat sweep south and east of Jalalabad. Kabul remained relatively quiet,
3 Top Secret
NESA DA 86-003CX
7 March 1986
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2 -
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
according to the US Embassy, although it experienced rocket attacks and small
gunbattles during early February.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Soviets Improve Airfields
Top Secret
The Soviets are completing an expansion and improvement program of their
facilities at major airfields in Afghanistan begun in 1985. These upgrades will
provide facilities for recently deployed Soviet aircraft, allow for the deployment of
additional aircraft and munitions, and improve airfield securit
airfield.
? Bagram: A new revetted dispersal area was constructed and subsequently
occupied by a Soviet squadron of SU-25 ground attack aircraft that relocated
from Qandahar last summer. A new munitions storage area, which will triple the
ammunition capacity of the airfeld, is nearing completion.
? Kabul: An additional helicopter runway, parking apron, and parallel taxiway are
nearing completion. These improvements will not only facilitate operations of the
helicopter regiment deployed here but also will allow Soviet transport and
logistic activities at this airfield to proceed uninterrupted.
? Qandahar: A dispersal area was renovated, and last month a new SU-25
squadron from the Soviet Union was deployed there.
? Shindand: A new revetted squadron-sized dispersal area is nearing completion
and will probably be occupied by the MIG-23 Flogger squadron deployed at the
Resistance efforts near Mazar-e Sharif in Balkh Province were set back last year,
primarily because of a leadership vacuum caused by
in the city.
the death of Jamiat-i-Islami commander Zabiullah Khan. The Soviets captured
the insurgents' permanent base camp in the hills surrounding the city, discovered a
network of underground bunkers, and also arrested many insurgent sympathizers
Pakistani authorities have reacted forcefully to an increase in Soviet-Afghan air
violations along the border. the Pakistani military
claimed to have shot down two Afghan fighters with Stinger surface-to-air missiles
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
who met with Afghan resistance leaders, reports that
although "the insurgents are now better armed, better trained, and more effective"
than at any time in the past, they face new problems. There is a growing feeling
among the resistance that they have increasingly been forced into a defensive,
reactive position by new Soviet techniques. Resistance commanders in
Afghanistan are especially worried about night ambushes and what they called the
"long rifle"-a silencer-equipped Soviet sniper rifle that is causing significant
casualties among insurgent groups. The resistance admitted that it could not do
much in Kabul last year, citing the effectiveness of the newly installed Soviet
restricted zones around the capital.
The insurgents are also feeling the effect of an improved Afghan intelligence
effort. A number of resistance groups have been penetrated-Jamiat-i-Islami and
Hizbi Islami Gulbuddin were believed to be the most vulnerable because of their
willingness to accept new members without close scrutiny.
25X1
25X1
__ Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2 _
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
The Fall of Peshghowr:
Who Dares, Wins
insurgent leader Masood and his forces.
The fall of the Afghan garrison at Peshghowr in the
Panjsher Valley marked the first time that insurgent
forces successfully assaulted and captured a major
government position. The victory exposed the
vulnerability of the Karmal regime's garrisons and
demonstrated the growing professionalism of
base at the time of the attack on 15 June.
ere also presen
There were no Soviet advisers at the
The Players
The garrison at Peshghowr-strategically located in
the central portion of the Panjsher Valley-was
manned in June by several hundred officers and men
of an elite Afghan Army Commando Brigade. An
Afghan intelligence service (KHAD) unit, a
contingent of armed police and a senior Afghan Army
delegation from Kabul, headed by Deputy
Commander of Afghan Army Central Forces General
a few kilometers away.
The garrison was ringed by a series of outposts
connected by trenches to the central base. Primary
fire support was supplied by artillery located at Barak
Masood deployed the elite unit, not only to boost local
military capabilities, but also to ensure that any
victory would foster Panjsheri unity rather than be
viewed as just a Peshghowri accomplishment,
garrison
the core of Masood's assault force aeainst the
A 30-man mobile group from Masood's elite forces
and 22 members of the local Peshghowr unit formed
omman er irza -t a ea er o t e oca
Peshghowr unit and one of Masood's top three or four
I~anjsher Valley 25X1
omman er A ma a Masood believes that the
northern provinces oj'f11ghanistan are crucial to the
war ef.~ort. In his view, Soviet consolidation in the
north would place more pressure on insurgent forces
in the east and the south. He believes that the best
way to prevent Soviet control oj'the north is to seize
the initiative between the Soviet border and Kabul,
Key areas between the
or er an t e capita inc u e the Panjsher Valley,
the Andarab Valley-a joodgrowing area and one
with access routes to Jamiat-i-Islami fronts in the
north-and the Khowst va Fereng area that
dominates the northern approaches oj'the Panjsher.
25X1
25X1
25X1
David Thrashes Goliath
Masood made careful preparations prior to the
assault. Nightly insurgent mortar and machinegun
fire stimulated a steady stream of deserters from the
2f25X1
25X1
va ua a mte igence on the garrison's defenses,
minefields and communications facilities0 25X1
Masood concluded that, LoX1
because of terrain, the defenders of Peshghowr 25X1
expected an attack from the mountainous northern
approaches to the base. In mid-May, Masood
eliminated a government outpost that dominated the
southern approaches to the garrison-the insurgents'
25X1
25X1
The assault force infiltrated a partially destroyed
farmhouse near the garrison's perimeter under cover 25X1
of darkness on 14 June and remained hidden there
Top Secret
NESA DA 86-003CX
V
7 March t 986
- Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Tou Secret
Afghan Army prisoners from
the Peshghowr garrison jollow-
ingits capture by Masood's in-
The Spoils
The insurgents occupied Peshghowr for at least two
days while staging a deceptive communications
operation with the Afghan Army post at Astaneh,
throughout the following da
At dusk on 15 June, the assault force
moved forward under a covering barrage of heavy
weapons fire and neutralized the minefield
surrounding the garrison. The assault force then
divided into teams and moved against predetermined
objectives which included KHAD headquarters-the
primary objective-and the communications facility,
An
insurgent team quickly captured the communications
facility and radioed the regime's fire support base at
Barak that the situation was normal and the base was
not threatened.
By the morning of 16 June, the insurgents had
captured the base, and taken 126 officers and 450
soldiers prisoner. One hundred and twenty Afghan
soldiers defected as soon as they saw the insurgents,
and most of the remainder surrendered in the first 15
minutes The visiting
army delegation, the KHAD unit, and many officers
continued fighting until morning, resulting in the
death of General Ahmaduddin
They 25X1
summarily executed the KHAD personnel, took their
files, and ransacked the base. Prisoners were divided
into three categories: defectors were separated and
sent under escort to Chitral, Pakistan; soldiers who 25X1
surrendered early were released and sent home; those
that continued to fight were taken to a jail at Deh
mikeni in the Moqoni Valley near one of Masood's
northernmost mountain bases.
25X1
25X1
The insurgents suffered only one insurgent
25X1
killed during the fighting and three killed by a mine
25X1
after the fighting had ended. 25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Tou Secret
Afghan Army prisoners carry-
ing captured munitionsJrom
the Peshghowr garrison and
transporting them to insurgent
areas in the mountains.
The insurgents were astounded at the huge quantity
of supplies uncovered, enough to last Masood's forces
for a year
They wore aroun t e c oc using orses an
donkeys to transfer arms and supplies to insurgent
storage areas. The booty included at least four
artillery pieces, which were probably taken to the
insurgent base nearby.
The Astaneh garrison discovered the ruse on 18 June
and realized that the Peshghowr garrison had fallen,
~fhe
insurgents, after trading insults with Astaneh,
evacuated the post. The next day, Soviet and Afghan
jet aircraft and helicopters bombed the garrison and
government forces reoccupied Peshghowr.
A Bloody Finale
The Soviets launched a counteroffensive against
Masood in early July. Fifteen thousand Soviet and
Afghan troops supported by airstrikes and heliborne
assaults moved up the Panjsher from Jabol-os Saraj
and began fanning out into the side valleys. ~
Masood believed that the main objective of the Soviet
offensive was to rescue the prisoners held by the
insurgents,
he main assault of the heliborne troops
was erected at the Moqoni Valley. A heliborne
assault with attack helicopter escort against the Deh
mikeni Prison was driven off by heavy insurgent
machinegun fire, but Soviet troops landed at nearby
landing zones located to the northwest, west, and
southeast of the prison, and began closing in on
Masood's sharpshooters fired on advancing
troops with sniper rifles from the heights overlooking
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
base at Dahane Rewat.
the valley as they undertook an all-day withdrawal by
way of a circuitous overland route to the mountain
Masood reluctantly gave the order to kill the
remaining prisoners-almost all officers-at about
1700 hours as Soviet troops were nearing the prison.
The bodies of the slain prisoners were floated down
the river in the direction of the advancing Soviet
troops.
Soviet forces subsequently destroyed the Deh mikeni
Prison and an abandoned insurgent mountain base
and heavily mined the areas around these facilities,
The
casualties.
Soviets also destroyed some food supplies, but did not
find any arms caches. When, after a week, the Soviets
withdrew from the area, the insurgents rebuilt their
bases, although Soviet mines resulted in 20 insurgent
aggressiveness when conditions required it.
Insurgent Strengths and Regime Weaknesses
The attack at Peshghowr demonstrated Masood's
understanding of reconnaissance, intelligence,
planning, coordination, discipline, training, and
tactical surprise. It also showed his capability for
surrender in the hope of staying alive.
Masood also demonstrated political astuteness by
including in the operation insurgents from outside the
Peshghowr area to foster unity and common cause
among the insurgents. His release of the prisoners
who surrendered quickly guaranteed that news of the
victory would spread and would adversely affect
Afghan morale as well as encourage other soldiers to
to be effective.
The regime's performance at Peshghowr underscores
an appalling lack of morale and aggressiveness that,
in our view, is characteristic of much of the Army,
especially when it operates independent of Soviet
forces. The garrison had hundreds of elite troops in
fortified positions surrounded by minefields and with
fire support nearby. Nonetheless, the majority
surrendered within the first 15 minutes of combat.
The Afghan Army's poor performance also shows that
the Soviets must man garrisons themselves if they are
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
The Afghan Military:
Weak But Surviving
i
The Afghan government has been doing more to
expand and improve the capability of its military
forces over the last six months, probably largely as a
result of Soviet pressure on the Babrak Karmal
regime to assume a larger role in the war. During this
period, the Afghan Army has evidenced marginal
improvements-there have been fewer cases of
disintegration under fire than in the past-but its
capability to fight the insurgents has not grown
substantially. Low morale, defections and desertions,
inadequate conscription, and significant casualties
continue to plague the Army. In our view, it will
remain seriously understrength, and the Karmal
regime's recent emphasis on improving the capability
of border troops, Sarandoy (police), KHAD military
groups, and local militias is unlikely to effectively fill
the gap.
A Renewed Regime Effort
The Karmal regime reportedly is trying to increase
significantly the size of its Armed Forces to take over
more of the fighting from the Soviets.
in December Kabul
decided-probably at Soviet behest-to raise the total
"operational strength" of the Army, police and
government intelligence services (KHAD) to 200,000
men by the end of March. The Army alone is to be
increased to 140,000, almost three times its current
estimated size. regime
authorities are also transferring Afghan and some
Soviet guard and road security duties to the police in
order to free more soldiers for offensive operations.
regime's three main military arms under a single head
was probably encouraged by the Soviets.
Some senior Afghan Army officers, suspected of coup
plotting were purged in late 1985.
Political and military training plays a key role in the
government's attempts to develop a competent and
loyal Afghan military.
Committee is directly involved in the administration
of a new educational and training academy for the
military, In
October a new course was developed for KHAD and
Sarandoy (police) personnel to ensure that they have
the "correct" ideological framework,
Pushing the Army Harder
There are growing signs that the Afghan regime is
uttin the Arm to the test.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
L~~ I
:25X1
1X1
The government has also taken a series of political
steps aimed at improving the reliability of the Afghan
Army. In November, Najibullah, former Chief of
KHAD, was promoted to the post of People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan's (PDPA) Central
Committee Secretary-a new position that will
involve overseeing KHAD, the Ministry of Interior,
and the Ministry of Defense, according to the US
Embassy in Kabul. We believe placing the Afghan
Top Secret
NESA DA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003CX
7 March 1986
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
Former Afghan Government forces stand with
their weapons q/'ter defecting to the resistance.
The Kabul government is also expanding the Afghan
Army presence in key provinces along the Pakistan
border in an effort to interdict insurgent supplies, with
some success. In Nangarhar
the number o A ghan military
posts an sma er firebases had more than quadrupled
by late 1985, but insurgent
base camps in the province ave not een penetrated
and that supplies are adequate.
Developing Local Force Alternatives
The regime is also placing increasing emphasis on
improving the military capability of its local forces,
which include border troops, Sarandoy, KHAD
groups, and local militias:
? Border troops, located in provinces which border
Pakistan and Iran, operate under the Ministry of
Defense through the Border Security Command.
They are lightly armed but they know the local
terrain and people and thus have useful intelligence
capabilities. Two new border brigades-the 11th in
Helmand Province and the 10th in the Konar Valley
region-were formed recently.
Their operational units are
countryside,
? The Sarandoy has been transformed into the 25X1
equivalent of a light infantry force that, in
conjunction with the Army, is responsible for urban 25X1
security and suppression of the resistance in the the
equipped and organized like regular infantry
battalions-giving them a limited combat capability
to engage small, lightly equipped insurgent groups.
One such battalion participated in joint Army-
Sarandoy operations in Khowst in January 1986.
The Sarandoy reportedly suffer from personnel
shortages, however.
Since
early 1985, battalion-sized KHAD units have been
stationed throughout Kabol Province
ne, responsible for Kabul proper,
consis s o approximately 1,100 personnel, divided
into 11 units of 100 personnel each.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2tix~
25X1
25X1
25X1
? Militias have been organized into battalions and
brigades by the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal
Affairs. Originally tasked with providing security
along main highways and at chokepoints0 25X1
any of the units are 25X1
participating in joint operations with regular Army
units, Sarandoy units, and border troops~25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
Most militias have been formed by bribing tribal and
local chiefs to sign "mutual understanding"
agreements with the regime.
The Karmal government is also raising youth
battalions to free the Army for more combat duty.
Afghan youths who recently returned from military
training in the USSR were formed into "party"
battalions last December to guard government offices
and radio stations,
Units already are in p ace in an a ar an era .
Problems Persist
We see little likelihood that present attempts to
increase the Afghan military role in the war will
result in significant gains for the Kabul regime:
? The military forces continue to be plagued with
severe morale and manpower problems, and
defections are widespread.
? Although some new units have been formed, the
Afghan Army continues to operate at almost less
than 50 percent of its authorized strength.
? The Afghan Army is filled with inexperienced,
poorly trained officers and conscripts-who are
usually forcibly recruited.
Nevertheless we have not seen much evidence of mass
disintegration of Afghan Army units under fire-as
has been the case in the past-and Kabul's recent
effort will probably result in improvements at the
margin.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
Soviet-Afghan Efforts
To Destabilize Pakistan's
North-West Frontier
support for the Afghan insurgents.
The campaign by the Afghan regime, probably Soviet
sponsored, to pressure Islamabad into curbing
insurgent movement across the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border has increased in intensity, raising intertribal
tensions and strife in Pakistan's North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP). We believe that fear of Kabul's
meddling in the tribal territories precipitated
Pakistani Government intervention in the Khyber
Agency in December, although Islamabad billed the
operation as an antinarcotics campaign. We do not
believe the Soviet-Afghan campaign will deflect
President Zia or the new civilian leadership from its
The Soviet-Afghan
support for the Afghan insurgents.
Islamabad is anxious to curb Moscow's and
Kabul's influence before it undermines Islamabad's
political standing in the NWFP and weakens public
~er into Afghanistan.
campaign apparently seeks to pit Pushtun clans
against each other, reinforce traditional mistrust
among these highly individualistic groups, and
separate the Afghan insurgents from the people of the
North-West Frontier in the hope of limiting insurgent
movement of men and supplies across the porous
Much of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is
inhabited by highly independent tribes, many of
whom jrequently live on both sides of the Durand
Line-the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The Tribal Territories include the Bajaur Agency
(inhabited by Utman Khel and Tarkhani tribesmen),
Mohmand Agency (Mohmand and Sufi), Khyber
Agency (Afridi and ShinwariJ, Orakzai Agency
(Orakzai and GangashJ, Kurram Agency (Yuri,
Mengals, and BangashJ, North and South Waziristan
(Wazirs and MahsudJ.
The Pakistani Government, like the British
colonialists, have historically exercised only loose
control of the tribesmen of the North-West Frontier.
Late 19th century treaties granted limited autonomy
from the central authorities to the tribes. Islamabad
has allowed the Pushtun tribes to maintain their own
tribal jirgas (councils) and to transit the.frontier
relatively unimpeded. The government has been able
to maintain peace along the North-West Frontier by a
judicious use ojbribes for good behavior and periodic
.forays by paramilitary armed,forces.
The Durand Line.cuts deep into the Pushtun tribal
area that was the traditional home of the dominant
Afghan ethnic group. Pushtun tribesmen since the
beginning oJthis century have sought to create an
independent Pushtunistan in the North-West Frontier
Province ofPakistan where theylorm a majority;
Pushtun-dominated .afghan governments in Kabul
have espoused the cause of their separated brethren.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and
Islamabad s subsequent decision to support the anti-
Kabul insurgents has riveted official attention on the
people oj'the North-West Frontier Province as major
actors in the regional struggle. The influx oj'nearly
three million Afghan rej'ugees into 239 camps spread
across Pakistan and increased narcotic smuggling
have made the situation even more volatile.
Top Secret
NESA DA 86-003CX
SOV DA 86-003 X
7 March 1986
'~ FX'I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Tou Secret
Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the US Embassy that
there were 46 sabotage incidents last year-resulting
in 51 dead and 156 wounded-a nearly 20-percent
increase in incidents over 1984.
sa oteurs are genera y we aimed, trained, and
equipped with fairly sophisticated explosives and
timers. They had been instructed to cross into
Pakistan as refugees, to establish contact with other
KHAD agents in Pakistan, to stockpile arms and
explosives, and to await orders.)
The sabotage campaign escalated at the end of 1985
from back alley attacks on insurgent homes and
businesses to attacks on Pakistani Government
facilities. The 16 October bombing of the control
apprehended KHAD
room of the Peshawar center of Pakistani TV and the
22 January explosion at the Pakistani International
Airlines (PIA) office in Peshawar highlighted the
saboteurs' ability to strike at high profile and well-
protected government facilities. The bombing of the
PIA office in Peshawar generated a series of protest
marches in Peshawar by Pakistani civilians angry at
the Afghan refugees for bringing the war to Pakistan
and prompted calls in the parliament for a review of
government policy toward the Afghan insurgents.
Pakistani and Afghan insurgent political leaders are
also concerned about the impact of the wide open
arms traffic on law and order in the frontier region.
Simple disagreements, authorities believe, have often
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
Agency in early November.
exploded into major gun battles. According to press
accounts, rocket launchers and other advanced
weaponry were used in a clash between Pakistani
tubes in September and a violent clash between
Afghan refugees and Pakistani tribesmen in Bajaur
We believe Afghan and Soviet authorities are also
increasing direct military pressure on Pakistan as part
of the destabilization campaign. Air violations of
Pakistani territory have increased yearly to
approximately 280 in 1985,
Although most of these are byproducts of
bears a direct military cost.
combat operations on the Afghanistan side of the
border, Pakistani authorities believe a series of high
altitude helicopter attacks on civilian targets in and
around Parachinar on 26-30 January were intended to
demonstrate that Pakistani support for the insurgents
Proffering Carrots
Money. The Soviet-Afghan tribal destabilization
program involves buying the loyalty of border tribal
In exchange,
possible.
Afghanistan expects the tribal groups to inhibit
insurgent transit through their t'ctritory when
jirga (council) held in September.
Vietnam-vintage US M-16 rifles to the Pushtun
tribesmen whose leaders participated in the Kabul
Kalakov, and,
Arms. the Kabul
regime has distributed thousands of Kalasknikov,
this policy signaled the beginning of a Soviet-
Afghan plan to take the war into Pakistan. The border
region is to be "flooded" with arms and the Afghan
Government does not particularly care who obtains
Wali Khan Kukikhel: Age
74 ... presides over ,giridi sub-
tribe ojabout 70,000.. .
biggest landlord of the Khyber
Agency ...close ties to the
Kabul regime ... s eaks Dari
and Urdu.
25X1
LJ/~ I
25X1
25X1
traditional tribal smuggling activity-including 25X1
narcotics production and distribution-in order to 25X1
curry tribal favor and to disrupt Pakistani security 25X1
and antinarcotics efforts in the border regions.
the US Embassy in 25X1
Islamabad, major Pushtun narcotics traffickers, 25X1
especially Wali Khan Kukikhel, have for several years
received the backing of the Afghan Government and 25X1
have been provided with refuge from Pakistani
security personnel. Press accounts report that poppy 25X1
production has increased along the border region
because poppy fields are rarely disturbed by combat
operations. 25X1
25X1
Pakistan Responds
Pakistan has reacted to the destabilization campaign
by upgrading its air defense capabilities, launching
military operations against errant tribesmen, and
trying to reassure a skittish civilian population that
25X1
L~X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
Islamabad also launched operations against Wali
Khan Kukikhel-leader of one fractious clan of the
Afridi (Pushtun) tribe who has had longstanding ties
to Kabul. The Frontier Corps sent 3,000 men to
subdue the Afridi and Shinwari tribes in the Khyber
Agency. This operation followed a security sweep last
March in which the fortified home of Wali Khan was
destroyed. While publicly aimed at capturing Wali
Khan and curbing the narcotics smuggling trade, the
December campaign was intended to signal to the
tribes that challenging Islamabad's authority in the
NWFP and cooperating with Kabul would not go
unpunished.
We believe the forceful Pakistani response to Wali
Khan's challenge has successfully undermined the
support he had from other border tribe leaders:
? The fate of Wali Khan-now bottled up between
insurgent forces and the Pakistani Frontier Corps in
a remote, inhospitable region of the NWFP-will
probably discourage other tribal leaders seeking to
follow his example.
? Many tribesmen now blame Wali Khan for inciting
the Pakistani military response through his abuse of
Pakistani provincial leaders and his acceptance of
money and arms from Kabul.
? The increased presence of paramilitary Frontier
Corps in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies has
created economic hardship and loss of traditional
freedom of movement for all of the tribal groups.
? Prominent Muslim religious leaders have reacted
negatively to the apparent alliance of Wali Khan
with the atheistic, communist government in Kabul.
Outlook
Many tribal groups find it expedient to accept bribes
temporarily without abandoning their tacit support to
the Afghan resistance. The Soviet effort to flood the
border regions with arms is likely to be
counterproductive because many of those weapons
will probably be turned against the Soviets and their
Afghan colleagues. Nevertheless, the Soviets and the
Afghan Government will probably find the
opportunities for splitting the insurgency from its
supporters sufficiently enticing to continue the effort.
If the border situation in the North-West Frontier
Province were to deteriorate rapidly, civilian criticism
of the lack of security along the border would
probably push the issue to the top of the government's
foreign policy agenda. Civilian authorities will also
continue to be apprehensive about the potential for
sophisticated arms spilling over into the troubled Sind
and Baluchistan Provinces. Although President Zia
and Prime Minister Junejo would probably face more
domestic pressure to alter Islamabad's support for the
insurgents in order to gain a respite from Soviet
pressure, we do not believe they would back away
from their support for the insurgents. Pakistan's
leaders, however, are likely to use any deterioration in
the border situation to justify its requests for
increased US military assistance
25X1.
r
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2
Top Secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/04 :CIA-RDP89T01363R000200240004-2