THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY: ITS ROLE AND MISSIONS UNDER MUBARAK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000700820001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Egyptian Military:
Its Role and Missions
Under Mubarak
An Intelligence Assessment
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AIESA87-10037
July 1987
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Directorate of
; IA, Intelligence
The Egyptian Military:
Its Role and Missions
Under Mubarak
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may directed
to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA
Reverse Blank
Secret
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NESA 87-10037
July 1987
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 8 July 1987
was used in this report.
The Egyptian Military:
Its Role and Missions
Under Mubarak
Peace and shifting national priorities since the 1970s are altering the role
and missions of the Egyptian armed forces, but these changes probably will
not alter Cairo's dependence on the United States over the next several
years. The military sees no acceptable way of replacing the large volume of
aid supplied by the United States. Moreover, the military sees Egypt's
strategic interests as closely linked to those of the United States.
The military under President Mubarak is Egypt's single strongest institu-
tion, the ultimate arbiter of political power, and the key to the regime's sur-
vival. When the country's paramilitary units?the Central Security
Forces?cannot or will not keep order, the military is tasked with
protecting the regime. The armed forces are loyal to Mubarak and will
respond to government calls to reduce public tensions and suppress civil
disturbances. Even so, if public disorder began to seriously threaten
Egypt's stability and the regime failed to act decisively to restore calm, the
military almost certainly would seek to replace the regime with another it
believed would be more competent and stable.
In defining its external mission, the military has assumed a much more de-
fensive posture in comparison with its offensive orientation during the
1960s and early 1970s. Moreover, Cairo does not appear overly worried
about near-term threats to national security:
? The military continues to regard Israel as its most important adversary,
but it does not see the threat as immediate.
? Concern about Libyan capabilities has declined in the wake of the US air
raid in 1986 and the Libyan military debacle in Chad.
? Cairo appears resigned to dealing with Sadiq al-Mahdi's government in
Sudan even though it will remain wary of Libyan interference.
? The military probably believes near-term threats to the Red Sea
approaches to the Suez Canal and from expanding Islamic radicalism
will be countered by US actions.
Over the next few years, Egypt's limited finances most likely will prove the
most serious challenge to the military leadership in maintaining morale
and carrying out the military's assigned tasks. In an attempt to insulate the
military from shortages, to protect its elite status, and to reduce criticism
of military outlays as a drain on the national economy, the military has as-
sumed a much more active role in the domestic economy. It is involved in
massive building projects and in running farms, food-processing plants,
factories, and many other ventures.
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NESA 87-10037
July 1987
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Slow absorption of new equipment, maintenance deficiencies, declining
military prestige, and weaknesses in overall military planning will pose
additional challenges to the armed forces in the years ahead. The variety of
equipment in Egypt's inventory is causing problems for maintenance
personnel. Training, although improving with US assistance, is hindered in
part because many troops are illiterate. Many in Egypt consider military
service an interruption in their lives to be passed as quickly as possible,
obliging the armed forces to turn to less skilled candidates from poor, rural
backgrounds.
A desire to reassert Egypt's political and military prestige in the Arab
world over the next few years might prompt Cairo to expand its regional in-
volvement. Cairo probably will consider using its military as a mercenary
force to earn foreign exchange, to protect Egypt from instability in the
Persian Gulf, and to improve its relations with other Arab states. The
military leadership probably would resist committing Egyptian forces to
combat in behalf of another country, but declining threats along Egypt's
immediate borders would diminish the military's concern about diverting
resources for small-scale assistance to the Arab Gulf states to strengthen
their defenses.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
Internal Role of the Military
1
Power and Political Loyalty
1
Civil Defense
2
Growing Economic Power
4
External Role of the Military
5
Threat Perceptions Shaping External Mission
6
Constraints
10
Prospects for Change
1 2
Economic Austerity Measures
12
Fundamentalism
12
Commitments to Other Arab States
12
Involvement in Sudan
1 3
Military Cooperation With Syria
1 3
Better Weapons
13
Implications for the United States
1 3
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The Egyptian Military:
Its Role and Missions
Under Mubarak
The Egyptian military under President Mubarak re-
mains what it has been since the revolution in 1952:
the country's strongest institution and the ultimate
arbiter of political power. We believe its continued
loyalty to and support for Mubarak in the face of
economic and political troubles will be the key to the
regime's survival.
Nonetheless, the sequence of war with Israel in 1973,
the break with the Soviets, and the peace with Israel
meant wrenching changes for the Egyptian armed
forces. We believe their role and mission have shifted
considerably. The military has moved from its exten-
sive political involvement in the 1950s to become the
far less politicized institution it is today, and from its
central role in the Arab-Israeli confrontation to its
current strong focus on defense and deterrence.
Internal Role of the Military
Power and Political Loyalty
Under the Mubarak regime, the military continues to
exert pervasive influence over Egypt's political life,
and it has the ability to protect or replace the current
regime. The Army's rapid action in February 1986 to
suppress the Central Security Force riots in Cairo
reaffirmed its loyalty and ultimate importance to
Mubarak's troubled government. Continued political
strains and economic hardship leading to widespread
civil disorder quite likely would oblige the military to
intervene again.
Nonetheless, we believe the military prefers to remain
above politics.
efforts begun
by President Nasir after 1967 to foster professional-
ism in the armed forces succeeded in reducing the
military's interest in running the government. Defense
Minister Abu Ghazala has repeatedly stated that the
armed forces are a professional body with no role in
politics. For example, following the riots in February
1986, the Defense Minister adjured commanders that
1
Figure 2. Egyptian Army tanks patrol the streets
during the riot by members of the Central Securi-
ty Forces in February 1986.
the military's role is to obey and defend the civilian
government, expressing Mubarak's appreciation for
their help during the riots and warning them not to
try to exploit the situation.
Even though Abu Ghazala overstates the case, we
believe the military is continuing to move away from a
politicized role. Egyptian leaders since Nasir have
sought ways to dilute some of the power of the
military:
? Nasir tasked senior commanders with preparing a
professional and strong military for the next war,
reduced the number of military men serving in the
Cabinet in favor of civilians, and emphasized com-
petence more than political connections when choos-
ing senior commanders. He also created the Central
Security Forces, decreasing the direct responsibility
of the armed forces for maintaining domestic order.'
' Egypt's Central Security Forces?probably at least 350.000
men?are responsible for maintaining internal security in Egypt
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Figure 3. Army armored personnel carriers are
parked in the courtyard of the main railway
station in Cairo during the relaxation of the
curfew imposed after the Central Security Force
riots in February 1986.
? Sadat expanded Nasir's efforts to curb the influence
of the military, declaring that "the Army has no
political role." Soldiers were denied the right to
vote, and the military presence in the Cabinet
continued to decline. The Camp David agreement--
accompanied by massive US assistance to help
rebuild the Egyptian armed forces?also made a
highly visible political role less attractive to the
military.
? Mubarak has focused on keeping the military loyal
and out of politics by ensuring that military benefits
are protected and supporting improvements in the
conditions of service.
We believe these efforts have fostered a degree of
professionalism that has kept the military largely
content with its role of a "behind-the-scenes" power.
Moreover, the military's emphasis on modernization,
absorption of Western equipment, and protection of
its status by pursuing economic self-sufficiency proba-
bly will continue to reduce its interest in political
issues. Although a crisis in the regime if it proved
incapable of reversing a downward spiral of adminis-
trative paralysis and widespread civil unrest, for
example probably would oblige the military to take
an active role in Egyptian politics, we believe it would
prefer to again fade into the background once it
restored stability.
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Figure 4. Egyptian riot police beating students
during a demonstration at 'Ayn Shams Universi-
ty in October 1985. The Army does not become
involved in quelling civil disturbances unless
other sublic authorities will not or cannot do so.
Civil Defense
The military is tasked, as part of its internal mission,
with stepping in to restore calm and to protect the
regime in times of civil disorder when the Central
Security Forces cannot or will not do so.
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Defense Minister Abu Ghazala
Abu Ghazala
Field Marshal Mohamed Abdel Halem Abu Gha-
zala, Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister,
is popular with the armed forces and has emerged as
one of the most charismatic and effective leaders in
Egypt. The 57-year-old artillery officer is a veteran
of four wars. Between 1976 and 1980 he served as
defense attache in Washington, where he was an
advocate of US-Egyptian defense cooperation. He
became Minister of Defense in 1981 and was made
Deputy Prime Minister and promoted to Field Mar-
shal in 1982.
Molding the Military
Abu Ghazala, in our view, is the key person shaping
the military's understanding of its current role and
missions. In July 1986 he publicly described the
military's charge as:
? Confronting possible hostilities against Egypt.
? Defending the security of the Nile sources, especial-
ly in Sudan.
? Assisting friendly Arab states.
? Safeguarding Red Sea shipping.
? Assisting civil authorities during disasters.
? Conducting civil defense.
? Defending constitutional legitimacy in cooperation
with Egypt's internal security forces.
Abu Ghazala sees
his highest priorities as Defense Minister to be meet-
ing the military's needs for munitions and consumer
goods and making the armed forces as self-sufficient
as possible by involving them in the civilian economy.
He also has continued to emphasize the military's
need to improve its deterrent capabilities and has
consistently backed military modernization through
cooperation with the United States.
Strong Support of the Military
The Defense Minister's dynamic style and his ability
to protect the military's institutional interests have
gained him broad support in the military.
officers respect Abu Ghazala
because of his efforts to keep them informed, his
extensive social and personal contacts with officers
and their units, and his constant efforts and successes
in increasing military benefits.
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would be reluctant to accept the position of vice
president because he would be drawn into too many
nonmilitary matters affecting the Egyptian Govern-
ment, which would detract from the time and effort
he could devote to managing military affairs. Despite
his protests about the demands of political life, we
believe Abu Ghazala would quickly step into power if
Mubarak stepped aside or died.
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Despite the military's reluctance to become involved
in civil disturbances, we believe military leaders are
concerned about new internal threats and will follow
orders to commit regular forces to keep order.
during a strike of
Egyptian railroad engineers in July 1986, Military
Intelligence went on full alert, and the Defense
Minister dispatched buses and trucks to the central
railway station to transport stranded passengers.
Some trains were staffed by military personnel in
order to ease tension. We believe such activity
designed less to respond to strikes and other antigov-
ernment actions than to prevent massive popular
support and participation in them?will continue as
economic problems and public dissatisfaction
increase.
The government, however, will act cautiously in using
the military to break up riots. We believe that, for the
most part, the armed forces have neither the equip-
ment nor the tactical doctrine designed specifically to
counter civil disturbances. The military can send large
numbers of men into the streets with small arms and
move them rapidly with trucks and armored vehicles,
but units are not normally supplied with nonlethal
riot-control gear such as tear gas, water hoses, batons,
and shields. Troops also do not receive instruction in
crowd control, because the Army trains to protect
Egypt from external rather than internal threats.
Growing Economic Power
An increasingly significant aspect of the military's
role is its contribution to Egypt's economic progress.
The Egyptian Government estimates that between
1980 and 1987 the armed forces have been involved in
some 300 projects in the civilian sector. Apparently
believing the military stands a much better chance of
increasing its prestige by the scythe than by the
sword, Abu Ghazala has said publicly that "Egypt
cannot afford to look for foreign adventures" because
"the main mission we must have ... is to solve the
economic problem." Since 1979 the armed forces have
participated in the National Services Projects Organi-
zation, established to use surplus military labor and
equipment for civilian projects. It has expanded its
efforts beyond this program and is involved in a
variety of business enterprises.
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The Military's Agro-Industrial Complex
The Ministry of Defense has emphasized expanding
its agro-industrial complex since the late 1970s, and
the National Services Projects Organization, an inde-
pendent agency in the armed forces that is run to
make a profit, has grown substantially. It employs at
least 100,000 soldiers and civilians in various pro-
jects and is headed by Defense Minister Abu Gha-
zala, according to US Embassy reporting. Among
other ventures, military personnel are operating
farms that produce a variety of meat and vegetables,
building large "cities" designed to house and provide
basic services to military personnel and their fam-
ilies, sponsoring military resorts, and running fac-
tories that produce items for defense and consumer
needs. For example
I the military agricultural complex as of
December 1986 was producing some 7 million tons of
milk daily and 60 million eggs, 50,000 tons of
vegetables, and 8,000 tons of meat annually as well
as fodder, edible grains, and fruit, some of which it
sold on the civilian market. The military also is
involved in many other ventures that earn revenue,
including arms and land sales.
We do not know the full amount earned by the
military, but limited evidence suggests that profits
are being used to help protect the military from
economic austerity by augmenting salaries and pro-
viding benefits not covered in the official budget.
about two-thirds of military profits
from arms deals support military housing, mainte-
nance, and purchases of spare parts.
The military is seeking to expand its economic
activities, according to US Embassy sources. Al-
though National Services Projects Organization fac-
tories do not export any goods, they hope to broaden
their market. Among other enterprises, the organiza-
tion is studying the feasibility of a joint venture to
produce steel bars and is interested in tapping into
US Agency for International Development?funded
projects.
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Figure 5. A military bakery and an overpass
built by soldiers. The military is increasin its
involvement in Egypt's economy.
By involving the military in economic ventures, mili-
tary leaders probably hope to insulate the armed
forces from civilian shortages, use excess military
labor to complete projects quickly and less expensively
than civilian contractors, and reduce possible civilian
criticism of the military as a drain on scarce public
resources. Abu Ghazala and other senior officers have
publicly stated that the military's aim is to eventually
attain economic self-sufficiency. Moreover, we sus-
pect that senior officers also see economic activities as
a means of protecting the military's elite status
because the enterprises give the military access to
large sums of money that are beyond the control of
elected officials. According to US Embassy reporting,
military ventures in some cases deprive the private
sector of potentially lucrative opportunities, but, be-
cause the military is not wholly accountable in the
budget process to the People's Assembly and the
Cabinet, civilian re ulation of military economic ac-
tivities is limited.
5
Table 1
Egyptian Military Forces
Total
Army
Navy
Air Force
Air Defense Command
Paramilitary
449,000
320,000
20,000
29,000
80,000
350,000 to 500,000
External Role of the Military
The Egyptian military sees its external role as defen-
sive, and it has little interest in returning to war, full-
scale or limited.
Egypt's military enjoys the
status quo?a relatively comfortable existence with
perquisites to improve military life. Many senior
officers remember the high human and economic
costs of the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel and are
content with the peace arrangements. Moreover,
much of the Egyptian
military believes it is unprepared for another war,
especially with Israel, in terms of its weapons and
training. US Embassy reporting says that Egyptian
officers regret their country's intervention in the
North Yemeni civil war during the period 1962-67
and oppose Egyptian military involvement in foreign
adventures.
The armed forces, with massive US military aid, are
trying to overcome the decline in its combat capability
that resulted after the 1973 war and Soviet arms
cutoff in 1975. It is continuing the process, which
began following the Camp David agreement, of reor-
ganizing and reequipping units along Western rather
than Soviet lines. Official Egyptian Government doc-
uments prepared in support of Egypt's request for US
security assistance during the 1988 fiscal year include
a set of ambitious goals that the military wants to
achieve by the 1990s:
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Figure 6. Soviet-made T-62 tanks in the Egyp-
tian inventory. Egypt has been replacing T-62s
with
? The Army intends to create a smaller, high-technol-
ogy force structured primarily for defense and
deterrence. It hopes to reduce its forces from some
449,000 to 350,000 by 1992 while upgrading its
armored, mechanized, and artillery units with com-
paratively sophisticated US-supplied equipment?
mainly M-60A3 medium tanks, M113 armored
personnel carriers, and 155-mm self-propelled
howitzers.'
? The Air Force is attempting to acquire significant
firstline technology and to retain a good surface-
attack capability while rebuilding units with a
smaller mix of US, French, and Chinese aircraft
primarily the F-16, Mirage 2000, and F-7,
respectively.
? The Air Defense Command wants to replace its
Soviet-origin surface-to-air missiles with US-made
improved Hawk and Chaparral systems and to
integrate air defense weapons into an advanced
command, control, communications, and intelli-
gence system.
? The Navy would like to upgrade all of its surface
combatants but wants especially to develop its anti-
submarine warfare forces to deal with long-term
threats to its Mediterranean and Red Sea waters.
Nonetheless, the Navy is last on the list for Egypt's
limited defense money.
Egypt also has agreed with the
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The military realizes that progress in switching from
aging Soviet to more modern Western equipment will
be slow, despite US assistance, because of Egypt's
continuing economic difficulties. Moreover, plans to
reduce the size of the armed forces, in our view, will
not be realized in the near term. Cairo will continue to
be reluctant to release large numbers of young men
because of concerns about the economic and social
dislocation such an action would cause in the civilian
sector.
Threat Perceptions Shaping External Mission
Most Egyptian officers still regard Israel as the most
important long-term threat to Egyptian security.
Egyptian
military planners see Israel's military superiority?
including its potential to use nuclear weapons?as a
threat to the balance of power in the region. The
alarmists among them do not rule out the possibility
of a preemptive Israeli strike on Egypt as part of a
larger conflict in the Middle East. We suspect that
some Egyptian officers are concerned that a more
militant Israeli leadership may emerge that will be
less interested in preserving the peace and that will be
increasingly tempted to take advantage of Israel's
military superiority over Egypt.
The majority of Egypt's ground and air forces are
committed to protecting the eastern part of the coun-
try where the bulk of Egypt's population and econom-
ic and industrial resources are located. Cairo contin-
ues to give its best equipment to units along the Suez
Canal and in the Northern and Central Districts. For
example, all US armored vehicles acquired since 1982
have been delivered to units in the east. The majority
of Egypt's Air Force and air defense assets also are
concentrated in the east.
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Figure 7. Egyptian F-I6s.
Egypt is restructuring its Air
Force and hopes to acquire 160
F-16s and 20 Mirae 2000s by
the 1990s.
The military publicly recognizes Libya as the most
important short-term threat to Egyptian national
security.
commanders generally refer to Libya as the enemy
when motivating their troops to perform.
Nonetheless, we believe that Egyptian commanders
inflate the Libyan threat for domestic and US con-
sumption and that they worry very little about a direct
Libyan attack across the Western Desert.
after the US air raid last year
senior Egyptian officers said they no longer believed
Libya has the intention or the capability to mount
large attacks on Egypt. President Mubarak in mid-
August 1986 said that he believed the threat from
Libya had declined. The Libyan military's poor per-
formance in Chad has further reduced Egyptian
military concern about a direct attack from the west,
in our view. Cairo, however, will remain wary of
possible terrorist attacks and Libyan efforts at subver-
sion.
Cairo apparently believes its forces in the west are
adequate to deter the Libyans and feels no strong urge
to immediately strengthen units near its western
border.
even Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ibrahim
Abdel Ghaffour EI-Orabi, who occasionally com-
plains bitterly about the low readiness rates of units in
7
the west, believes his forces could halt a direct Libyan
attack. Units in the Western District are among the
last in the Egyptian military to receive new equip-
ment. Armored battalions in the Western District, for
example, are supplied with old Soviet T-62 and
T-54/55 tanks at a time when units in eastern
districts are being upgraded with US-origin equip-
ment. Air defenses in the west also depend upon less
effective weaponry.
The military may be
reluctant to reinforce units in the Western District
because such moves would stretch already limited
financial resources and cause significant morale prob-
lems. Most soldiers and officers regard assignment to
the west as punishment, given the area's isolation,
heat, and lack of facilities.
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z \ I
We believe that the military continues to see Egypt's
access to the Nile River waters as a key security
interest. According to US Embassy reporting, in July
1985 Abu Ghazala ordered the operations branch of
the armed forces to pay more attention to threats
from the south to Egyptian strategic interests. He has
linked Egyptian and Sudanese military interests, say-
ing publicly in mid-July 1986 that the armed forces
are determined to "withstand any influence or hostili-
ties" that threaten the security of the Nile sources.
Cairo appears resigned to dealing with the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in Sudan.
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Figure 8. The E-2C Hawkeye. Egypt recently
took delivery of the first two of five E-2C Hawk-
eye airborne early warning aircraft. Egypt plans
to eventually integrate the Hawkeye into a na-
tionwide air defense command and control sys-
tem.
The Egyptians are concerned, however, about Libyan
interference and a possible insertion of Libyan troops
in support of a pro-Tripoli coup in Khartoum.
The military will continue to watch events in Ethiopia
carefully because some 85 percent of Egypt's water
comes from Ethiopia's Blue Nile and Soviet influence
is strong in Addis Ababa. Diplomatic relations be-
tween Cairo and Addis Ababa are reasonably good,
and comments by Mubarak suggest that Egypt will
continue this course unless Ethiopia interferes with
the Nile's flow.
We believe the Egyptian military, with few surface
combatants, is dissatisfied with its capabilities to
counter threats to the Red Sea approaches to the Suez
Canal, but resource constraints will limit its ability to
improve them. Instead, Egypt is likely to continue its
efforts to improve its military relations with countries
near the Bab el Mandeb entry to the Red Sea. The
armed forces already are sending instructors to the
North Yemen Command and Staff College, according
to US Embassy sources in Cairo, and Cairo signed a
protocol with Djibouti in March 1987 for military
cooperation and limited assistance.'
Most Egyptian military leaders, in our view, recognize
that Egypt's small Navy can do little to secure
freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, particularly
against the Soviets.
we judge that Cairo
' Egypt seems to be putting less emphasis on improving ties to
South Yemen, probably because of the unsettled political situation
there.
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Table 2
Estimated Weapons and Equipment in
Egypt's Inventory
Number
2,400
Equipment
Ground Forces
Tanks (M-60A3, T-62, T-54/55)
Armored personnel carriers
3,400
Field artillery (100mm and above)
1,300 to 1,700
200
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Multiple rocket launchers
Navy
Diesel submarines
10 to 12
Destroyers
Frigates b
6
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Missile boats
30
Mine warfare ships (oceangoing)
17
Amphibious warfare ships (oceangoing)
13
Patrol boats, Hovercraft, and support ships
72
Air Force
Combat aircraft
430
Transports
30
Helicopters
Trainers
160
100
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Reconnaissance
20
Air Defense
SA-2 launchers
360
SA-3 launchers
350
SA-6 launchers
70
SA-7 launchers
1,300
Crotales (not deployed)
16
I- Hawks
72
a Operational rate varies.
b Includes two light frigates.
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none have been deployed.
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Figure 10. Chief of Staff of the
Egyptian Armed Forces
Lt. Gen. EI-Orabi.
would depend on the US Navy?since US strategic
interests would be affected?to protect freedom of
passage against significant threats. We believe this is
a primary reason why the Egyptian Navy is the last
on the list to acquire new equipment.
The military also is concerned that Islamic radicalism
will spill over from Iran to the Arab Gulf states. Abu
Ghazala in April 1987 commented publicly that "the
security of the Gulf and Egypt is indivisible."
Egypt is providing Iraq with arms
and advice and is seeking to improve military coopera-
tion with the Arab Gulf states.
of modern equipment already are being delayed?as
in the case of the Mirage 2000 aircraft from France?
until Egypt can find the cash for payments.
Constraints
Egypt's limited finances most likely will prove the
most serious obstacle to the military's fulfillment of
its roles.
officers and
conscripts continue to complain that their salaries are
not keeping up with rising prices.
in August 1986 about 35
percent of middle-level and junior officers maintained
second jobs outside the military in order to make ends
meet. Problems in acquiring more Western equipment
will increase as Egypt's economy worsens. Deliveries
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Army
officers must deal increasingly with obsolescent and
broken-down equipment, and some believe the Egyp-
tian military is weaker now vis-a-vis Israel than before
1973.
The Egyptian military's ability to carry out its mission
effectively will be hampered by its slow absorption of
new?and in some cases, unnecessarily sophisticat-
ed?equipment. Besides that furnished by the United
States, Egypt is seeking equipment from other West-
ern suppliers, and it is reluctant to scrap Soviet
equipment acquired in the 1970s because of limited
finances and because older Soviet weapons often are
easier for troops to operate than complex Western
items. The variety of equipment in Egypt's inventory
is causing serious problems for maintenance personnel
and in obtaining spare parts.
Egyptian maintenance procedures are poor, and
equipment often is out of operation for long periods
because the military lacks skilled repairmen and
technicians. Training, although improving with US
assistance, still is insufficient to bring the military up
to Western standards, in part because many troops
are illiterate. Egypt also lacks a sufficiently large and
dedicated noncommissioned officer corps, and much
of the instruction must be done by junior officers, not
all of whom are skilled.
The decline in the military's prestige will reduce
human and economic resources available to the armed
forces. Before 1973, supporting and improving the
military were widely shared goals. Following the 1973
war and the Camp David agreements, the immediate
impetus for a strong military declined. Former Presi-
dent Sadat's attempts to foster private enterprise also
created new and potentially more lucrative opportuni-
ties outside the military for ambitious, well-educated
young men. President Mubarak and Abu Ghazala
have attempted to promote and protect the military's
interests, but privileges and benefits usually do not
extend to conscripts, who are poorly paid and often
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used in menial, nonmilitary tasks. According to US
Embassy reporting, many consider military service an
interruption in their lives to be passed as quickly and
painlessly as possible. As a result, fewer highly quali-
fied men want to remain in the military, obliging the
armed forces to turn to less skilled candidates from
poor, rural backgrounds who still see the military as a
means of moving up in the world.
We suspect that the Egyptians, in the absence of a
clear and immediate external threat, have become lax
in their strategic planning. The Defense Minister
publicly stated in March 1987 that Egypt's military
strategy is "a peaceful defense" based on the teach-
ings of "Islam, the Koran, and the Prophet." He
pointed indirectly to a weakness in Egyptian overall
military planning, however, calling on the government
to draw up a military doctrine defining "the supreme
national objectives" so that the armed forces can more
appropriately assess threats and develop force plans.
In our judgment, at least part of Cairo's procrastina-
tion in undertaking strategic military planning stems
from a belief that the United States, through the
Camp David accords, has committed itself to support
Egypt during future conflicts or attacks against its
territory.
Prospects for Change
Economic Austerity Measures
If economic austerity measures significantly reduce
military pay, perquisites, or standards of living, senior
officers will at a minimum put greater pressure on the
civilian leadership to reverse the steps or provide
exemptions for the armed forces. The military be-
lieves it should be exempt from economic belt-tighten-
ing by virtue of its importance to national defense,
and Cairo's failure to increase salaries in order to
account for inflation already is generating pressure
for improvements in compensation. Even small de-
creases in less critical military programs, training,
and nonessentials like base maintenance would cause
professional officers to increase their pressure on
political leaders to restore the military's budget.
Fundamentalism
A general increase in Islamic fervor or demonstrations
by other than extremist groups would not cause the
military to expand its domestic role, in our view.
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a renewal of
religiosity, mainly among conscripts and junior offi-
cers, that mirrors the growth of Islamic observance in
civilian society. For this reason, we believe the mili-
tary would not take a stand against general displays of
religious fervor among civilians but would expect the
Central Security Forces to keep order.
On the other hand, we believe the military would
respond to a government call for assistance to sup-
press civil disturbances instigated by extremist Islam-
ic groups. We have little evidence of support in the
military for radical Islamic elements. US Embassy
reporting says Military Intelligence carefully moni-
tors conscripts to prevent the growth of militant
Islamic or extremist groups in the armed forces.
officers suspected of
radical tendencies are eventually expelled, retired
from active duty, or put in positions of little influence.
The military also is likely to back the regime against
radicals because the adoption of a rigorous Islamic
code?which at least in theory prescribes austerity,
equality, and rigid forms of social behavior?would
threaten important military perquisites and privileges.
Commitments to Other Arab States
With the decline in the immediacy of threats from
Israel, Libya, and Sudan, the Egyptian military may
be more willing to look beyond its borders to provide
limited assistance, for a price, to other Arab states.
The impetus for increased involvement will come from
the regime's desire to use its military as a tool to gain
foreign exchange, protect itself from instability in the
Persian Gulf, and improve its status in the Arab
world. Cairo is likely to continue its military coopera-
tion especially training and joint exercises with
Jordan. The Egyptians are concerned about Iraq's
ineffectiveness in the Iran-Iraq war, and additional
Iranian victories that threatened Saddam Husayn's
regime quite likely would cause the Egyptian military
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to consider ways to play a bigger role in the Gulf.
Nonetheless, we believe that it would continue to
resist committing forces to Iraq. The Egyptian mili-
tary probably would be willing to send more men and
equipment to assist the Gulf states to strengthen their
defenses if called upon by the Gulf Cooperation
Council or Saudi Arabia. Such requests would have to
be accompanied by large financial disbursements and
possibly commitments to resume joint defense produc-
tion in Egypt under the auspices of the Arab Organi-
zation for Industrialization or a similar body.
Involvement in Sudan
Barring Libyan attempts to overthrow the Sudanese
Government or to attack the Sudanese Army, the
Egyptian military is unlikely to dramatically expand
its external mission in the south. According to US
Embassy reporting from Cairo, General El-Orabi said
in January 1987 that Egypt has resumed military
assistance and training with a view to maintaining
close links to the Sudanese military and creating a
more professional Sudanese Army. The Egyptians
probably hope this cooperative effort will improve the
Sudanese Government's ability to engage the rebels in
the south and foster stability. Since the military
probably would be involved if another coup were to
occur in Sudan, the Egyptian armed forces probably
believe that cooperation will now improve their influ-
ence in such a contingency. Moreover, good relations
with the Sudanese military would be essential if
Egypt had to intervene to assist Khartoum in defend-
ing against a Libyan incursion.
Military Cooperation With Syria
Egyptian military cooperation with Syria is highly
unlikely in the foreseeable future. The military,
has welcomed
the respite from war and has no desire to abrogate
Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. The armed forces
also would be extremely concerned that hostilities in
an Israeli-Syrian conflict would eventually involve
Egypt. We believe the Mubarak regime, if confronted
with such a situation, would call on the United States
to fulfill its security commitments while increasing its
military readiness to defend against a possible Israeli
strike.
Better Weapons
The military's acquisition of additional weapons with
enhanced capabilities?from the United States or
13
other countries?probably will not cause it to alter its
strategy of defense and deterrence. For the foresee-
able future the military will continue to have difficul-
ty integrating new and sophisticated equipment into
its inventories as well as training its troops to operate
it. Weapons with enhanced capabilities, however,
might make some officers more willing to recommend
strikes against Libya if tensions increase or to respond
to Libyan terrorism or attempts at subversion.
Implications for the United States
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We see little likelihood in the short term that further
shifts in the role and missions of the armed forces will
alter Egypt's strong dependence on the United States.
According to Egyptian documents requesting US
assistance for FY 1988, US military and Foreign
Military Sales grants accounted for some 69 percent
of all Egyptian defense expenditures in FY 1986. As
economic problems grow and the military focuses
more of its energies on modernization and increasing
professionalism, it will look to the United States for
even greater assistance. Any expansion of the mili-
tary's internal role arising from the instability of the
Egyptian Government would prompt urgent requests
for US aid to enable the military, as official Egyptian
Government documents say, to "protect the social
climate in which democracy can flourish."
Although some officers resent the fact that the United
States supplies Israel with more and better weapons
than it does Egypt, we believe the military sees no
acceptable way of replacing US aid. Egypt would
welcome spare parts from the USSR to repair its old
Soviet-origin equipment, but we doubt that many
officers envision a return to Egypt's pre-1973 relation-
ship with the USSR. The military would find it
particularly awkward to switch suppliers now that it is
committed to integrate US equipment into its inven-
tory and to eventually phase out its Soviet-supplied
weapons.
An expansion of the military's mission in the Persian
Gulf probably would improve Egypt's access to funds
from the Arab Gulf states. The Egyptian military
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probably would use this financial assistance to pur-
chase other Western equipment to supplement that
provided by the United States?more Mirage 2000s,
for example. The military would not see a stronger
security relationship with the Gulf states as dramati-
cally altering its dependence on the United States. On
the contrary, the military would not want to become
involved in combat in the Persian Gulf and probably
would expect US forces to step in if the situation there
deteriorated markedly.
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