AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301450001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 25, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
ASTi FILE COPY
110 NO T GI E CUT
OR MX ON
Africa Review
25 July 1986
ALA AR 86-015
25 July 1986
Copy 3 8 6
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Africa Review) 25X1
Articles Zambia-Angola-Zaire: Trying To Help and Not Get Hurt
Zambian President Kaunda's strong public support for Angola,
acting in his role as the chairman of the Frontline States, has
brought him into conflict with UNITA-the Angolan insurgent
group-and Zaire.
Relations between Kenya and Uganda are generally good, but sharp
differences of policy toward Libyan leader Qadhafi, bilateral
economic issues, and the role of Kenyan Foreign Minister
Mwangale are liable to test the relationship soon.
two Angolan leaders-Pedro Van-Dunem and Manuel Rodrigues-
appear unusually well positioned to replace President dos Santos in
the unlikely event he passes from the scene.
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LZDAI
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Ghana: Prospects for Libyan Influence) 11 25X1
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Ghanaian Head of State
Rawlings has tried to maintain good ties to Tripoli to preserve his
revolutionary credentials and to bolster his regime against what he
views as regional threats.
Escalating domestic drug abuse and narcotics trafficking in
Mauritius have tarnished the image of Prime Minister Jugnauth's
moderate government. Several prominent politicians belonging to
the governing coalition have been arrested for drug smuggling.
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25 July 1986
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Secret
Secret
ALA AR 86-015
25 July 1986
Ivory Coast: Lebanese Wearing Out Their Welcome) 17
country.
The government is troubled by the Lebanese community's ties to the
Iranian Embassy in Abidjan, its contacts with representatives of
military factions involved in the Lebanese civil war, and the popular
animosity toward.the more well-to-do Lebanese living in the
Liberia: Politics of the Lebanese Community I 19
stir anti-US activity or carry out terrorist attacks.
The Lebanese in Liberia have generally maintained a low profile,
but we believe this relationship may be upset if Lebanese factions
transfer their political quarrels from their homeland to Liberia. In
particular, the Iranian-backed Hizballah organization may try to
Sierra Leona: The Politics of Rice
Angola-Brazil: Closer Relations
Kenya: Calling the Envoys Home
Angola Chronology
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
22
23
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
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Zambia-Angola-Zaire: Tryi
To Help and Not Get Hurt
Zambian President Kaunda's strong public support
for Angola, acting in his role as the chairman of the
Frontline States, has brought him into conflict with
UNITA-the Angolan insurgent group-and Zaire.
Zambia's unofficial contacts with UNITA have
soured over the past few months amid open threats by
insurgent leader Jonas Savimbi to retaliate if Zambia
allows its territory to be used by Angolan forces to
attack UNITA-held areas in southeastern Angola.
Lusaka has reacted angrily to the threats, and
charged UNITA with planting landmines in Zambia's
Northwestern Province. Meanwhile, Kaunda's
accusations that Zaire is allowing its territory to be
used as a conduit for US aid to UNITA have strained
relations with Kinshasa and will hinder his efforts to
bring about talks between Luanda and Kinshasa. In
the event that Angola's civil war spills into Zambia,
we judge Zambian forces would be ill-prepared to
respond.
Support for Angola
Zambia, despite maintaining informal contacts with
UNITA in recent years, has lent diplomatic support
to Angola ever since the MPLA government seized
power in 1975. Since the repeal of the Clark
Amendment and his assumption of the chairmanship
of the Frontline States, Kaunda has become more
sharply critical of Washington. Kaunda publicly
condemned Savimbi's visit to the United States last
January, and he has charged that Washington is
trying to destablize the internationally recognized
government of Angola.
Trading Accusations
In early May, UNITA leader Savimbi launched the
opening salvo in what has become a war of words with
Zambia. In our view, Savimbi probably fears Kaunda
may give Angola more active support and probably is
trying to intimidate Kaunda. UNITA has publicly
accused Zambia of having a secret agreement with
Angola whereby Angolan or Cuban troops could use
Zambian territory to attack UNITA-controlled areas.
During a press interview last May, Savimbi stated
that he would not hesitate to retaliate if Zambia
allowed its territory to be used as a staging point for
attack. Zambia responded by calling the threats
unwarranted and by labeling Savimbi a dangerous
puppet of the South Africans. UNITA then claimed
that Zambian police had fired across the border on
UNITA trucks in Angola. Zambia subsequently
accused UNITA of planting landmines in Zambia's
Northwestern Province that killed three people, and of
kidnaping seven people.
moved some military units from its border with Zaire
to its border with Angola in an effort to strenghten
border security. In our view, this move was probably
taken to reassure Angola that cross-border operations
would not be necessary.
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UNITA suspects that Angola uses Zambian territory
with or without the consent of Lusaka, which we
cannot confirm. A top UNITA official told a reporter 25X1
earlier this year that the insurgents had discovered an
Angolan effort to resupply its forces via Zambian
territory in the Cazombo area that ajoins the Zairian-
Zambian border. Moreover, he claimed that Cuban
and Soviet troops had been in Zambia temporarily in
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 connection with this resupply effort. This same
official told the US Embassy in London that, if
Angola's resupply efforts through Zambia continued,
UNITA would strike across the border to hit the
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convoys.
lines of communication.
believe Mobutu now would be reluctant to allow
Kaunda to play a mediating role between Zaire and
Despite the growing bellicosity between UNITA and
Lusaka, both sides appear willing to keep up informal
In addition, Lusaka has established a working
relationship with UNITA elements that control
Angola's southeastern border with Zambia.
Problems With Zaire
As part of his Frontline leadership to provide
diplomatic support to Luanda, Kaunda has publicly
accused Zaire of being a transit point for US arms
shipments to UNITA. During a televised interview in
April, Kaunda said he had been informed by Angolan
authorities that the United States was shipping arms
to UNITA through Zaire. Mobutu has publicly
denied that Zaire is a transit point for arms going to
Angola.
UNITA, for fear of UNITA retaliation.
Outlook
We judge that Kaunda's principal concern probably is
to keep the civil war from spilling over into Zambia.
For this reason, he can be expected to try to stay on
reasonably good terms with both Angola and Zaire
while maintaining some distance in relations with
both of his neighbors. In our view, Kaunda's public
support of the Angolan Government probably stems
largely from his desire as leader of the Frontline
States-of which Angola is a member-to project
low-cost support for the Luanda regime. He will
probably continue to turn down Luanda's requests to
use Zambia as a staging area for operations against
If the war does spill over into Zambia, we believe that
Zambia's forces are ill prepared to stop it. Should
Angola conduct hot pursuit operations despite
Lusaka's objections, Zambian forces would be able to
put up only token resistance. Zambia's Army is far
outclassed by the more experienced and better
equipped Angolan forces. Zambia also is poorly
equipped to deal with an experienced insurgent group
such as UNITA.
informal communications with the group.
We believe the fiery rhetoric between Kaunda and
Savimbi threatens to disrupt their otherwise business-
like relations. If the cycle of accusations and counter-
accusations continues, it could lead Kaunda to
suspend the liaison contacts between ZISS and
UNITA, and kick out the insurgents' representatives
from Lusaka. However, until then, Kaunda probably
views those ties as necessary for maintaining some
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Secret
The tensions between Lusaka and Kinshasa resulting
from Kaunda's accusations of Zairian support for
UNITA has made it more difficult for Kaunda to act
as the middleman for meetings between Mobutu and
dos Santos. Communications between Zambia and
Zaire have already broken down over this matter, and
Mobutu is awaiting a conciliatory move from
Kaunda. There is some possibility-which we judge to
be small at this time-that these tensions could lead
to a flareup of border problems. Zambian and Zairian
troops occasionally clash over the poorly defined
border, but the two countries have so far been able to
resolve such conflicts diplomatically. Cross-border
smuggling in both directions is the primary cause of
periodic border incidents, according to US Embassy
reporting.
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Secret
Kenya-Uganda:
Good Relations To Be Tested
1986.
Relations between Kenya and Uganda are generally
good, but sharp differences of policy toward Libyan
leader Qadhafi, bilateral economic issues, and the role
of Kenyan Foreign Minister Elijah Mwangale are
liable to test the relationship soon. The positive basis
for current relations dates from the second half of
1985 when Kenyan President Moi brokered peace
talks in Nairobi between the government of former
Ugandan Head of State Tito Okello and rebel leader
Yoweri Museveni. During the five-month talks, Moi
tilted increasingly toward Museveni, and he publicly
welcomed the overthrow of Okello by Museveni's
National Resistance Movement (NRM) in January
Museveni has worked hard to cultivate regional
recognition, respectability, and security in his six
months in office, and he has been especially attentive
to his relationship with Moi, who is currently East
Africa's leading statesman. The Kenyan President
helped mend Museveni's fences with Zairian
President Mobutu, encouraged other chiefs of state to
attend the African minisummit presided over by
Museveni in Entebbe on 20 March, and was host to
the Ugandan President in Nairobi on 16 June.F-
In our view, Moi has good reasons to cultivate
Museveni:
? The Kenyan President wants to encourage
Museveni's moderate behavior in hopes of avoiding
another despotic Ugandan regime and the resultant
disorder in Kenya's backyard.
? Moi wishes to discourage Museveni's deepening
relations with Libya. Moi fears that Qadhafi may
obtain a foothold in Kampala that can be used to
destabilize Uganda's neighbors like Kenya and
Zaire.
? Moi hopes that a rebounding Ugandan economy will
pay dividends for Kenya in the form of expanded
export opportunities, transportation contracts for
the movement of goods to and from Uganda, and
increased revenues at the Kenyan port of Mombasa.
Security Cooperation
Security cooperation between the Museveni
government and Kenya began in May when Kenyan
and Ugandan military forces conducted a joint sweep
against armed bands operating in the Mt. Elgon
border area. The Ugandan Army captured over 80
armed individuals who were largely remnants of
Okello's defeated army, cattle rustlers, and bandits.
Although the Kenyans made fewer arrests, Moi was
so impressed with the results of the exercise that he
proposed that such cooperation become the norm for
the entire Kenyan-Ugandan common border,
Secret
ALA AR 86-015
25 July 1986
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Outlook
Over the coming months, relations between Kenya
and Uganda are likely to become more complicated
and less congenial, in our view. Despite Kampala's
dire economic straits, Kenya is unlikely to make
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 major progress soon in reducing its EAC debt to
Uganda, and Museveni is apt to become increasingly
unsympathetic to Kenyan excuses, especially because
1986 has been an excellent year for the Kenyan
economy as a result of record grain harv ests, high
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coffee prices, and low oil costs.
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Angola: Potential Successors
to dos Santos
Since President dos Santos became head of state in
1979, he has moved gradually to consolidate power
and to promote those colleagues he views as loyal and
competent. The major personnel changes in the
hierarchy of the MPLA government that took place at
the party congress last December, as well as a
subsequent Cabinet reshuffle, marked the
Angolan leaders appear unusually well positione to
replace dos Santos in the unlikely event he passes
from the scene.
The Angolan Constitution states that in the event of
the death or incapacity of the President, the MPLA
Central Committee will select a provisional chief of
state from among its 90 members. An MPLA party
congress-which chooses Angola's president for a
five-year term-presumably would be called into
extraordinary session to ratify the provisional choice.
Because of the unwieldly size of the Central
Committee, we suspect that a smaller group of
Angolan leaders-possibly the 13-man Politburo-
would select dos Santos's successor. The Central
Committee almost certainly would rubberstamp his
candidacy.
Officials holding senior positions in the party,
government, and military-such as Pedro Van-
Dunem (Loy)' and Manuel Rodrigues (Kito) are
probably the strongest contenders and best
representatives of the dominant coalition of black,
relatively middle-of-the-road Marxists. Dos Santos
recently appointed Van-Dunem as the number-two
man in the government with the title of State Minister
for Production and Economic Coordination.
Rodrigues has retained his prestigious slot as Interior
Minister despite the large number of personnel
changes.
' Names in parentheses were given to individuals during the
preindependence guerrilla struggle. Today, many officials are
Lt. Col. Pedro Van-Dunem
(Loy)
Lt. Col. Pedro Van-Dunem, "Loy"
Lt. Col. Pedro Van-Dunem, who is both the State
Minister for Production and Economic Coordination
and the Minister of Energy and of Petroleum, is the
fastest-rising star in local politics. This vast portfolio
of production puts him in effective charge of the
ministries of oil, agriculture, industry, transport,
public works, and fisheries. In December 1985, Van-
Dunem was appointed a member of the MPLA's
Politburo. Van-Dunem is one of the most influential
Van-Dunem was appointed State Minister in
February 1986 and has been Minister of Energy since
1980 and of Petroleum since 1981. He was born about
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Lt. Col. Manuel
Rodrigues (ICito)
1940 and, like most MPLA leaders, is a member of
the Kimbundu tribe and comes from a prominent
family in Luanda. The nickname "Loy"-which is the
last name of a famous Belgian bicycle racer-was
given to him by President dos Santos. Van-Dunem
joined the Youth of the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola-the MPLA youth movement-
in 1961. He studied engineering in Moscow with dos
Santos, joined the military wing of the MPLA in
1972, and was appointed to the General Staff two
years later. In 1975 he became staff director of the
Minister of Defense. Van-Dunem served as Third
Deputy Prime Minister from 1976 until 1978 and as
Minister of Provincial Coordination from 1979 until
he was named Energy Minister. Van-Dunem is widely
regarded as a competent technocrat who tries to avoid
MPLA political disputes within the party. In
December 1985 he joined the Central Committee and
was appointed a member of the Politburo. He is one of
only four officers to hold the rank of lieutenant
colonel, the highest rank in the Angolan armed forces.
orientation.
special relationship he enjoys with dos Santos and
because of his flexible, moderate foreign policy
Rodrigues served during 1976-78 as inspector general
of the Angolan Army, with concurrent responsibility
as chief of the Office of Finance. Before assuming his
current position, he worked in what was then the
Ministry for Internal Order as secretary of state
(1977-79) and deputy minister (1979-80). Born in
1943, Rodriques is a member of the Kimbundu tribe.
Rodriques, who is often called Kito, his nom de
guerre, is both a member of the Central Committee
and the Poliburo. Both UN and US State Department
officials have described him as candid and reasonable
during official discussions.
Like Van-Dumen, Rodrigues is a lieutenant colonel in
the armed forces.
Rodrigues frequently assumes
responsibility for the daily affairs of state during the
President's absences from the country.
After the party congress in December, it was rumored
that he would be named as one of the three "super-
ministers" in dos Santos's new government. But
Rodrigues, preferring to play a behind-the-scenes
role, retained his previous position of power.
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Lt. Col. Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues, "Kito"
Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues has been Interior
Minister since July 1980. The Interior Ministry is
generally charged with maintaining internal order but
has specific responsibilities overseeing the police,
prisons, firemen, economic police, and the criminal
investigation division. Rodrigues has carried out
informal sensitive "special tasks," such as talks with
US and South African officials. He has been
entrusted with such initiatives largely because of the
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Secret
Ghana: Prospects
for Libyan Influence
Ghanaian Head of State Rawlings
gave a cool reception to Colonel Qadhafi
during his official visit to Accra last December.
Nevertheless, Rawlings has tried to maintain good
ties to Tripoli to preserve his "revolutionary"
credentials and to bolster his regime against what he
views as regional threats. Meanwhile, a review of US
Embassy reporting indicates that radicals in key
security and foreign policy posts-led by Provisional
National Defense Council member Kojo Tsikata-are
working behind the scenes to press Accra into a much
closer alliance with Tripoli and to encourage Ghana's
use as a base for subversion against neighboring Togo
and Nigeria.
Initial Warmth
Following the coup by Rawlings in December 1981,
Ghana and Libya quickly forged close ties. Rawlings
initially saw Qadhafi as a radical "soulmate"-he
called Libya a "revolutionary dream"-who would
assist in his regime's survival. Qadhafi responded in
early 1982 by providing Ghana with 500,000 barrels
of oil on liberal credit terms, as well as 47 tons of food
and drugs, according to US Embassy sources.
Moreover, following appeals by the Ghanaian
Government, which feared that supporters of the
former regime would launch a countercoup, Libya
donated substantial quantities of arms and
ammunition, includin mortars, antiaircraft weapons,
and armored cars.
(provided some
initial security training, particularly in the use of
electronic monitoring equipment.
Strains in the Relationship
Since 1983, however, Libyan support for Rawlings's
"revolution" has been largely rhetorical, and mutual
suspicions permeate the relationship, according to US
Embassy reporting.
Despite frequent
assurances, Tripoli has failed to provide long-term
supplies of crude oil and has repeatedly rejected
Ghana's requests for easy credit terms, according to
the Embassy. The Embassy also reports that most
Ghanaians-even in the leadership-were offended
by Qadhafi's behavior when he visited Accra last
December, particularly because his men took over all
security arrangements.
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for military bases in Ghana and a joint defense pact.
According to US Embassy reporting, in 1983 Accra
rejected Qadhafi's request for a jungle warfare
training center in Ghana because of Tripoli's
unwillingess to provide petroleum at discount prices.
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indicated that most Army officers were strongly
opposed to the Libyan proposal. According to the
Embassy, Qadhafi unsuccessfully pressed for a
mutual defense pact during his visit to Accra in
December.
Since Tripoli's initial arms deliveries in 1982, Libya
has provided only small arms, ammunition, jeeps,
uniforms, and recoilless rifles, failing to meet Ghana's
expectations for advanced weapons. According to a
variety of Embassy and
as repeatedly rejected Ghanaian requests for
tanks, helicopters, and MIG-21 aircraft. Although
Libya agreed last December to train 15 Air Force
pilots, the Western-leaning Ghanaian military is
generally wary of Libyan intentions and only accepted
the offer because free training was not available
elsewhere, according to Embassy and
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1983 Libya turned down a Ghanaian request for a
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Secret
The Radical Connection
Despite these differences, Accra and Tripoli maintain
outwardly close ties, and radicals in the Ghanaian
Government are pressing for an even closer
relationship. The US Embassy says that Rawlings has
been one of Qadhafi's strongest public supporters,
partly to demonstrate his own "revolutionary"
credentials and to placate regime leftists. For
example, Ghana strongly denounced the US bombing
of Libya in April as "state terrorism," and declared
one week of mourning for the Libyan casualties.
Regime radicals-led by Kojo Tsikata, who is
responsible for security and foreign affairs-are
committed to an alliance with Tripoli, and, according
to Embassy reporting, Tsikata publicly lauds
Qadhafi's actions and policies.
Tripoli-probably in concert with Tsikata-carefully
exploits Rawlings's obsession with external threats,
and, as a result, is able to use Ghana as a springboard
for regional subversion. A survey of US Embassy
reporting indicates that, although Rawlings has not
actively sought to topple his neighbors, he permits
Ghana to serve as a conduit for limited Libyan aid to
Nigerian and Togolese dissidents.
AtAt oug wehweh
lack hard evidence, we suspect Libya probably
provides the Accra-based Togolese dissident group,
the Movement for Democracy in Togo, with some
financial aid and, possibly, limited training.
Tripoli advertises in the Ghanaian
press for employment in the Libyan Army and its
Islamic Legion, which comprises some 2,000 lightly
armed and poorly trained Third World nationals used
to support Libyan military intervention in Africa.
Last March five Ghanaians, who were under the
direction of a Libyan intelligence officer, were
arrested in Pakistan for bombing the Pak-Lib Holding
Company offices, according to US Embassy and press
reporting. Embassy reporting suggests that Libyan-
trained Ghanaian terrorists appeared in Spain and
Portugal earlier this year. We also believe Ghana may
serve as a transit point for Libyan arms and assistance
to non-African radical groups as a result of Tsikata's
close ties to Tripoli.
Outlook
Although Rawlings distrusts the Libyans, he is likely
to maintain close ties to them in an effort to placate
the extreme left and ensure his own security.
Rawlings, who believes that neighboring Togo and
Nigeria are aiding Ghanaian dissidents, almost
certainly will allow Libya in turn to funnel aid
through Accra to dissidents in these countries.
Moreover, we believe Rawlings-vulnerable to
Tsikata's advice-will be receptive to Libyan
proposals for greater security and intelligence
cooperation. However, he is unlikely to give in to
Tripoli's demand for a mutual defense pact or allow a
permanent Libyan presence in the country for fear
that it would undermine his political independence
and spur opposition from among moderates in the
12,000-man Army.
For its part, Libya almost certainly will continue to
offer small military and economic packages from time
to time, although we doubt that Qadhafi-failing to
obtain the concessions he seeks-will offer major
financial aid or oil credits to Ghana. Qadhafi will
probably focus his efforts on Tsikata, who is building
an independent power base, as a means of influencin
Ghanaian developments.
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Secret
Mauritius: Drug Dealing
on the Rise
Escalating domestic drug abuse and narcotics
trafficking in Mauritius have tarnished the image of
Prime Minister Jugnauth's moderate government.
Several prominent politicians belonging to the three-
party governing coalition, the Alliance, have been
arrested for drug smuggling. Embassy reporting
indicates that the majority of the narcotics smuggled
into Mauritius-traditionally a small-scale cultivator
of marijuana-is consumed in the country.
the island could
evolve into an alternative transshipment point for
illicit narcotics, primarily from Southwest Asia,
destined for mainland African, European, and, to a
lesser extent, North American markets.
The Scope of the Domestic Problem
Accurate figures on local drug abuse are not
available, but the government estimates that there are
about 25,000 users in the population of 1 million, and
that drug addiction probably affects one out of every
eight teenagers. According to Embassy officials, drug
users often resort to petty theft and prostitution to
support their habit. The US Embassy reports that the
hardships posed by the 20-percent unemployment
rate-almost 50 percent for males under the age of
25-has helped to make narcotics trafficking a big
business. A government study in 1985 identified over
100 sites where drugs are sold within the capital, and
local observers note that drug deals often are made
publicly.
Mauritians apparently use a variety of narcotic
substances. According to the Embassy, marijuana is
the most plentiful, inexpensive, and widely used
narcotic. Marijuana crops often are cultivated within
sugarcane fields and can easily escape police
detection. the
supply of the domestic crop may be falling short of
local demand. For example, local officials note that
marijuana currently is being imported from
Madagascar and India. Other substances, such as
opium, cocaine, heroin, and methaqualone-a
synthetic depressant-are smuggled in from abroad.
Local authorities believe that most of these narcotics
are brought in from India, Pakistan, and South Africa
either on private yachts, cruise ships, or through the
VIP lounge at the country's single airport.
The government's inadequately trained and poorly
paid Police Force thus far has been unable to clamp
down on the domestic drug trade. Drug enforcement
duties are divided between the Criminal Investigation
Unit of the Police Force and the Anti-Drug and
Smuggling Squad of the customs office. The Embassy
reports, however, that the policy of rotating
experienced enforcement officials every two years
contributes to low morale among officials who feel
overwhelmed by the extent of domestic trafficking.
The authorities also are hamstrung by scarce
resources and frugal budgetary allotments. The three
police patrol craft cannot adequately patrol the
approximately 100-mile-long coastline. The Embassy
reports that about 30 customs officials, with little or
no specialized drug enforcement training and no
trained dogs, process an average of 3,000 tourists at
the airport weekly. In addition, checks of private
yachts in the local harbor are rare. Despite
operational constraints, however, enforcement
officials have arrested more than 500 people and
confiscated close to $2 million in narcotics since the
beginning of this year, according to the Embassy.
High-Level Political Connections?
The evidence to date is fragmentary and often
circumstantial, but we believe that it points to official
involvement in the drug trade. In late December
1985, four Alliance members of parliament were
arrested in Amsterdam for smuggling drugs. Three
were released for lack of evidence, but their
companion-who was carrying a suitcase full of
heroin-remains in detention. Last May, authorities
on the nearby French-administered island of Reunion
uncovered a drug smuggling network between the
islands that allegedly involves several prominent
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Mauritians with political connections, according to
the arrested dealers. The Embassy reports that a
French commission is investigating the drug ring.
Political Fallout
The drug scandals pose a significant threat to the
Alliance's ability to hold on to power until the
scheduled end of its mandate in 1988.' The fractious,
proleft Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM)-the
leading opposition party-sought to capitalize on
Jugnauth's wavering parliamentary support to call for
a vote of no confidence, which the government
defeated by a slim majority in May. Despite the
victory, Embassy reporting indicates that the
government's image is still being damaged by the
MMM's muckraking campaign. Moreover, we believe
that another government crisis could arise should
evidence come to light implicating other high-ranking
Alliance officials.
To minimize the damage, Jugnauth has toughened his
public stand on corruption and narcotics trafficking.
After considerable foot-dragging, he has agreed, for
example, to establish his own commission of inquiry
into alleged high-level involvement in drug dealing,
The
government is working with legislators to establish a
special court to deal with drug-related cases, and has
proposed the death penalty for traffickers, a measure
that the Embassy reports is unlikely to pass, however.
The government is launching a multipronged
campaign with some assistance from the United
States to combat domestic drug abuse and narcotics
trafficking. The Prime Minister's wife and the
Foreign Minister have traveled to the United States to
participate in drug awareness conferences, and are
prominently involved in drug education programs and
plans to establish drug treatment and rehabilitation
centers. The government has approached the United
States for help in training customs officials, setting up
a regional customs workshop, and identifying the
country of origin of confiscated narcotics. Authorities
have begun to crack down on corruption in drug
enforcement circles and recently arrested several
police and customs officials involved in drug
trafficking, according to the Embassy.
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Outlook
Despite the government's tougher stance, the
narcotics issue will remain a touchy political problem
as long as the high unemployment rate provides
economic and psychological incentives favoring drug
abuse and trafficking. Jugnauth almost certainly will
face some difficult decisions when the results of his
drug commission and the French investigative
commission are made public. He may be forced to call
for early general elections-which he could well lose
to the opposition-if the commissions expose
corruption and drug dealing at high levels of his
government. If only a few low-level officials are
indicted, however, we believe that Jugnauth probably
will hold on to his position as long as he takes decisive
action, such as purging the Alliance and prosecuting
those involved
Over the longer term, the inability of the authorities
to control the borders may encourage international
smugglers to use Mauritius as a regional
transshipment point for narcotics destined to other
markets. Sources of the US Drug Enforcement
Agency report that traffickers now are directing some
shipments of heroin and methaqualone destined for
South Africa through Mauritius because of a
crackdown on smuggling in traditional routes through
mainland southern African countries, such as
Zambia. In our view, the use of Mauritius as an
alternative regional transshipment point to Western
markets could expand further because of its location
and extensive air links to Africa and Europe and with
heroin-producing countries in Southwest Asia. On
balance, however, we believe that the government's
recent willingness to crack down on traffickers,
combined with efforts to seek foreign assistance for
border control, could help limit the flow of drugs
through Mauritius and reduce its potential as a
transshipment point.
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Ivory Coast: Lebanese
Wearing Out Their Welcome
Almost 26 years of political stability, relative
economic prosperity, and liberal immigration laws
have made Ivory Coast a haven for some 300,000
Lebanese migrants, now the largest community in
Sub-Saharan Africa, according to US Embassy
reporting. Lebanese ties to the Iranian Embassy in
Abidjan have alarmed government officials concerned
over expanding Iranian influence and propagation of
Islamic fundamentalism among Ivorian Muslims, who
compose 25 percent of Ivory Coast's 11 million people.
The government is troubled by the Lebanese
community's contacts with representatives of military
factions involved in the Lebanese civil war and the
movement of substantial amounts of illicit money
through Abidjan to support them. Moreover, despite
some improvement in the Ivorian economy last year,
the preceding four years of recession, heavy debt
burden, and continuing government austerity have
substantially reduced Ivorian living standards and
fueled popular animosity toward the prosperous
Lebanese community, according to the Embassy.
Iranian Influence
Abidjan has banned the distribution of Islamic
fundamentalist propaganda and has threatened to
close the Iranian Embassy if it becomes too active in
the Lebanese community, according to the Embassy.
The Embassy reports that Ivorian authorities ordered
Lebanese merchants in March to remove publicly
displayed pictures of Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini.
The Lebanese Connection
Abidjan's prosperous Lebanese community serves as a
major conduit for funds from Lebanese in Ivory Coast
and other West African countries to various factions
in Lebanon, in our view. The Embassy reports that
the Ivorian security service monitors the flow through
Abidjan of visitors and large sums of money violating
exchange controls. The security service confiscated
US $515,000 last March from a member of Amal
leader Nabih Barri's entourage as it traveled through
the Abidjan airport. The Embassy reports Barri was
on his way to meet with West African Amal
supporters in Sierra Leone to discuss plans for
systematically collecting money from Lebanese
Jealous of Lebanese Success
Lebanese migrants, taking advantage of the country's
free market policies, have developed extensive real
estate and commercial holdings in Ivory Coast,
according to press and Embassy reports. Over half the
gas stations and a quarter of the grocery stores in
Abidjan are owned by Lebanese, and they are
responsible for creating about 20 percent of the new
companies registered annually in Ivory Coast,
Nevertheless, the Iranian Charge continues actively
to seek contacts in the Lebanese community and to
recruit Ivorians to study in Iran, according to the
Embassy. In February, the Iranian Charge attended a
meeting of West African Amal' supporters in Sierra
Leone, according to the Embassy. In addition, a local
Lebanese religious leader discussed with the Iranian
Embassy officials the possibility of using diplomatic
channels to transport" money to Lebanon.
according to press reports.
Mounting Ivorian resentment of Lebanese prosperity
has prompted some government officials to consider
curbing their immigration and commercial activities.
The Ivory Coast Democratic Party-the country's
' Pro-Iranian Shia faction reportedly holding Americans hostage in
Lebanon.FI
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sole political party-last fall pushed for stricter
immigration laws and limits on Lebanese business
actvities. Aging President Houphouet-Boigny, who
has long supported liberal immigration policies,
rejected the party's proposals, according to the
Embassy. Nevertheless, some Ivorians continue to
claim that local banks favor the Lebanese and that
they increasingly dominate the economy, according to
the Embassy. Press reports note an increase in
robberies in Lebanese neighborhoods over the past
several years, which the Lebanese attribute to
mounting anti-Lebanese sentiment.
Outlook
We believe that the Lebanese community in Ivory
Coast will continue to facilitate Iranian efforts to gain
influence among the Ivorian Muslim population and
to propagate Islamic fundamentalism. In our view,
however, Ivory Coast is probably less vulnerable than
many other West African states to the destabilizing
effects of the fundamentalist movement because of its
relative prosperity and political calm. In the not too
distant future, Ivorians will be faced with a possibly
contentious struggle to succeed Houphouet-Boigny,
and Iran will be better positioned to exploit political
unrest. Any replacement for Houphouet-Boigny-
who has paternalistically ruled the country since
independence from France in 1960-will find it more
difficult to control Iranian activities.
We also suspect that popular resentment toward the
visibly wealthy Lebanese community is likely to grow
over the next several years, particularly as living
standards gradually deteriorate for the average
Ivorian. Ivorians probably will take an increasingly
dim view of Lebanese funds-earned in the Ivorian
economy-being channeled to Lebanon to support the
civil war. A new, less experienced successor regime,
which is unlikely to enjoy the former president's
unquestioned authority and therefore be more
sensitive to popular pressure, may opt for stiffer
government controls on Lebanese immigration and
opportunities in the economy.
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Lebanese Community
The Lebanese in Liberia have generally maintained a
low political profile, focusing attention on their
substantial business interests. According to US
Embassy reporting, they have carefully avoided
disputes with the central government and have not
alienated the Liberians by openly displaying their
wealth. Nonetheless, we believe that this relationship
may be upset if Lebanese factions-reflecting the
bitter divisiveness of their homeland-transfer their
political quarrels to Liberia. In particular, the
Iranian-backed Hizballah organization may attempt
to stir anti-US activity or launch terrorist attacks.
According to academic studies, the Lebanese-who
number some 6,000-began to migrate to Monrovia
around the turn of the century. The Lebanese civil
war of the 1970s spawned a new exodus to Liberia
and to other West African countries. Occasionally,
the Lebanese have been singled out by Liberians for
their considerable economic influence: in the 1950s
then President Tubman blamed a food shortage on
some Lebanese merchants and temporarily expelled
them from the country. Some residual anti-Lebanese
resentment erupted during the rice riots in 1979 in
Monrovia, when Lebanese shops were attacked,
according to press reports. For the most part,
however, the Lebanese have quietly cooperated with
expatriate capital, and that a large-scale withdrawal
of Lebanese business interests would be disastrous for
the economy.
Relations With the Doe Regime
A variety of Embassy reporting and sources indicate
that the Lebanese have carefully cultivated President
the Lebanese community publicly thanked Doe for
protecting their businesses and expressed confidence
in his government, press reports indicate.
Amal, the best organized and most active Lebanese
organization in Liberia, consists of about 100
members who focus on fund raising for its parent
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Embassy and press reporting indicates that three
groups dominate the Lebanese political spectrum in
Liberia: Amal, which was founded in the early 1970s
and is now the leading political force in Lebanon's
Shi'ite community; the Shi'ite Hizballah (Party of
God), which calls for an Islamic state based on the
Iranian model in Lebanon, and the mostly Sunni
Syrian Socialist National Party, which advocates the
union of all greater Syria under a socialist regime. We
have no indication that Christian Maronite groups,
such as the Phalange, maintain a presence in Liberia.
According to the US Embassy and open sources, the
Lebanese dominate Monrovia's retail sector and own
some 500 firms, including cement and furniture
factories, as well as many of the country's restaurants
and hotels. The US Embassy reports that Liberians
generally do not appear to resent the Lebanese conti of
of the economy, but appreciate their badly needed
business expertise. According to the Embassy, the
government believes that there is no alternative to the
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information office in Monrovia last August to recruit 25X1
supporters within the Lebanese expatriate
community. According to the US Embassy
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terrorist activity in Liberia for fear of jeopardizing its
business interests. Amal leader Fawwaz believes that
the survival of the Lebanese community would be
threatened if Hizballah launched terrorist operations.
source, party leader Kamal Ezedine strongly opposes
any political or military activities in Liberia so that its
extensive business holdings are not threatened, and
like Amal, he fears that Hizballah activities may
prove counterproductive.
Hizballah, although a relatively small organization of
about 30 active supporters, has the greatest potential
to cause trouble in Liberia, in our view. Hizballah
receives some funds from Iran,
Prospects
In our view, the Lebanese expatriate community and
the Liberian people will continue to coexist peacefully
in the near term. The Lebanese, however, run the risk
of isolation should they identify themselves too closely
with the Doe regime and risk retribution-such as the
confiscation of their property-from a post-Doe
government. We suspect, nonetheless, that the
Lebanese could be hedging their bets, and quietly
providing funds to elements of Doe's political
opposition.
We have no evidence that Hizballah has sought to
recruit within the 400,000-strong Liberian Muslim
community,' and believe it is unlikely to make
significant gains in the near term, should it decide to
step up its activities. According to US Embassy
reporting, all Liberian Muslims are Sunnis, are
generally apolitical, and receive limited funding and
religious training from conservative Gulf states,
We believe that Hizballah is a potential threat to the
Liberian Government and the 650-strong US
diplomatic community. Liberia, which is staunchly
pro-American and pro-Israeli, would be an inviting
target should Iran and Hizballah decide to launch
activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. We believe the
Liberian security apparatus would be ill equipped to
handle terrorist activities, such as an attack on the US
Embassy or military installations or the hijacking of
an airplane at the airport in Monrovia.
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The Syrian Social Nationalist Party is the most
affluent and largest Lebanese organization in Liberia
with more than 200 members, according to the US
According to a US Embassy
' About 75 percent of Vai and 90 percent of the Mandingo tribes
are Muslim. Small numbers of several northwestern-based tribes-
the Kissi, Gola, Gbande, and Mende-are also Muslim, according
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Africa
Briefs
short notice for crisis meetings
ordered Kenya's ambassadors and high commissioners to return to Nairobi on
President Moi, angry over foreign press coverage of Kenya's internal problems, has
Moi has become increasingly sensitive to criticism in the Western
media of Kenya's one-party political system, rumored unrest in the military, and
Corporation's coverage of Kenyan affairs.
when the Paris-based Indian Ocean Newsletter highlighted an outburst of ethnic
tensions in Parliament. He has since banned the French publication, along with the
9 April issue of Britain's Africa Confidential, which made detailed charges of
government corruption in Nairobi, and criticized the British Broadcasting
morale and poor performance in Kenya's ministry of foreign affairs.
Foreign Minister Elijah Mwangale's emotive and often
abroad.
Furthermore, Moi may suspect that some of his envoys are somehow involved in
foreign support for Mwakenya, or are engaged in financial mismanagement
Recent diplomatic and commercial developments indicate that Angola and Brazil
are strengthening their bilateral ties. In May, Angola designated an ambassador to
Brazil, and became the first Portuguese-speaking country in Africa to exchange
ambassadors with Brazil. Brazilian President Sarney marked the occasion by
calling for increased support for the Angolan Government and the cessation of
foreign assistance to the UNITA insurgents. He plans to visit Angola on a tour of
several other African countries next year. Angola has also expanded its
commercial relationship with Brazil, most notably in the area of military sales.
Earlier this year, an Angolan military and economic delegation visited Brazil to
sign credit agreements with the Bank of Brazil and Brazil's largest military
manufacturer, ENGESA. Thus far, Brazil's arms sales to Angola have been
limited to military trucks and jeeps. Meanwhile, Brazilian oil firms seek to expand
their interests in Angola, A consortium
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exports.
of Brazilian and Belgian companies operates an exploration program in Angolan
coastal waters, and Brazil annually purchases about 10 percent of Angola's oil
The two countries are advancing their separate interests under the rubric of
enhanced Lusophone solidarity. Brazil wants to expand its influence in the region
and is aggressively seeking additional Third World markets for its burgeoning
arms export industry.
notice that Moscow should not take Angola for granted.
despite its political and military dependence on Moscow, probably wants to
encourage limited competition for the Communist Bloc arms monopoly and serve
Angolan military officers have long complained about the
advanced arms such as armored vehicles and aircraft.
quality and endurance of Soviet military equipment and would like to develop
supplemental sources of arms for use in the war against UNITA. In addition,
Angola probably sees Brazil as a credible intermediary with nonaligned credentials
that can provide support on Namibia and other key issues. We expect the warming
trend to continue as Angola, facing diminished oil earnings and growing credit
difficulties, looks increasingly to Brazil for expanded trade relations and more
locusts, as has Kenya, for the first time in 50 years.
Good rainfall in 1985 and 1986 has provided excellent breeding conditions for
grasshoppers and locusts in Africa-posing the most serious insect threat to Africa
in 60 years. The major threat is in Sudan, where the US Ambassador has declared
an emergency because of an infestation of African migratory locusts spreading
east and south of Sudan and desert locusts ranging east and west. Despite earlier
control efforts in Sudan, migratory locusts have spread to Uganda, Kenya, and
Ethiopia, as well as to South Africa-the first sighted there in 45 years. Burundi,
Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique have reported sightings of red
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola next year.
but with favorable rains, locust populations could increase and spread to
The US Embassy in Burkina has warned of a potential calamity resulting from the
Senegalese grasshopper. Niger, Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania are also
threatened. Although the West African problem is under control, favorable rains
could cause the insect populations to increase quickly. Brown locusts are at a
20-year high in both South Africa and Botswana. Despite extensive spraying
efforts, control has been poor. Major agricultural areas have thus far been spared,
International control efforts seem coordinated in West Africa, but
countermeasures in East Africa are moving slowly. We believe that, unless control
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shortages than the recent famine.
measures start in Sudan by August, the continued spread of the migratory and
desert locusts is highly probable. Damage in surrounding countries could be
significant, and in Sudan the loss could approach that of past plagues-as much as
one-third of the first year's crop and more in subsequent years. If uncontrolled, a
locust plague could last nearly 15 years and could cause greater hunger and food
President Momoh, who reluctantly eliminated rice subsidies last month to
accommodate some of the IMF's recommendations for a standby agreement, is
facing increasing public unhappiness over the s iraling rice price and hoarding by
merchants. military personnel-which until
recently have been Momoh's principal source of support-have refused to pay the
new price, and are insisting that traders accept the former rate.
Liberia, which uses the US dollar, according to the Embassy.
Rice production in Sierra Leone has declined steadily in the past decade, and the
US Embassy believes the drop will continue in the next few years. Since 1975,
imports have increased fourfold; last year Sierra Leone imported more than one-
third of its rice needs-some 111,000 metric tons- according to international
economists. Although the government has raised producer prices over the past two
years, the official price is roughly equal to production costs, offering farmers little
incentive to increase output or sell to the government. Significant smuggling
continues to neighboring Guinea, where the French franc is available, and to
trebled their prices, according to press reports.
Rice has been a volatile political issue in West Africa in recent years. Almost all
governments in the region heavily subsidize rice-a staple food-in order to ease
the burden of rising food costs on the urban population. In 1979 in Liberia more
than 100 people died in riots ignited by a proposal to increase the price of rice. The
coup in Guinea-Bissau in 1980 was dubbed by some foreign observers as the "rice
coup" because it came at the peak of chronic shortages in main towns. Within
hours after Nigerian head of state Babangida announced a ban on rice imports last
year, there was a massive run on remaining stocks, and traders doubled and
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Angola Chronology
Foreign Minister Van-Dunem Mbinda states publicly that Luanda will no longer
negotiate regional settlement initiatives with the United States and rejects any
linkage to Cuban troop withdrawal.
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later explained as reference to economic sanctions.
Soviet statement terms 5 June attack on two Soviet merchant ships an act of
terrorism by Pretoria. Moscow declares such actions cannot be left unpunished,
cautious Angolan air tactics.
UNITA claims downing of MIG-23 and two helicopters in central Angola with
surface-to-air missiles. Insurgents air defense successes are likely to auger more
facilities probably forced UNITA to attack softer targets
UNITA insurgents attack government buildings in the provincial capital of
Cabinda, according to press reports. Increased security around important oil
and fighting probably continues.
town of Munhango in central Angola. Munhango, Savimbi's birthplace, lies
astride important logistics routes for both sides. UNITA forces remain in area,
government forces have occupied the UNITA-held
standard confirmations of friendship and cooperation.
Angolan press reports President dos Santos receives Soviet Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Luanda for four day official visit. Details of visit limited to
serious negotiations soon.
Unconfirmed press and UNITA reports indicate senior UNITA and Angolan
Government representatives recently met in Europe. Previous intermittent contacts
have been fruitless. Luanda probably keeping options open, but not ready to pursue
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