EUROPEAN REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301230001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 21, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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European Review
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EUR ER 86-026
21 November 1986
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European Review
Nordic Countries: Responses to the Reykjavik Talks
Norway: Debate Over Defense Budget
Yugoslavia: Political Tensions Heighten in South
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Cracking Down on Illegal Aliens
Getting Tough on Drugs
Articles 25X1
Greece: A Balancing Act on Counterterrorism
taken to improve the country's counterterrorist capabilities.
Prime Minister Papandreou appears to be following a two-track
strategy on terrorism aimed at appeasing both the West and the
Arab world. Although his government has been slow to take joint
action against countries suspected of abetting terrorism, over the
past year Papandreou has increasingly become aware of the threat
posed to Greek security and economic interests, and steps have been
Secret
EUR ER 86-026
21 November 1986
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Belgium: Fleming-Walloon Antagonism-Impact
on the Military ~
Belgium's armed forces have made great strides in equalizing
treatment of their Dutch-speaking Flemings and French-speaking
Walloons, but the linguistic problem-with all the social and
cultural differences it symbolizes-remains potentially divisive. In
wartime, the maintenance of separate Flemish and Walloon combat
and support units could well obstruct the effectiveness and cohesion
of Belgium's NATO corps.
Yugoslavia-Libya: Ties Strong Despite Recent Strains
Yugoslavia continues to maintain close relations with Libya since
the US airstrike last April, although the ties have suffered new
tensions. Tripoli remains an important economic partner, and
political and security relations are strong.
East Germany-China: Honecker's Visit
East German leader Honecker's trip to China in late October was
hailed by both sides as ushering in a new era in bilateral relations.
The Soviets had to be on board for the visit, but Honecker's
avoidance of touchy political subjects and the absence of a
communique suggest an attempt to lower the profile of the trip.
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Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but
the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other
offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views
of a single analyst; these items will be designated as uncoordinated
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Briefs
Nordic Countries Responses to the Reykjavik Talks
Nordic reactions to the 11-12 October meeting between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev have swung from unrealistic expectations to
pessimism to guarded optimism. Typical of the presummit anticipation was a 10
October Norwegian news headline, "Missile Agreement in Sight," accompanied
by a photograph of the President disembarking in Reykjavik. The high
expectations gave way to deep disappointment, however, when the US and Soviet
leaders left without reaching any specific agreements. While Nordic governments
made generally balanced statements of dissatisfaction, the press and leftist
politicians quickly labeled the meeting a fiasco and failure. Government and
opposition parties both believed the reason for the failure was Washington's
unwillingness to negotiate on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Moscow,
however, was credited with taking the lead in putting forth proposals. Official and
press commentaries also expressed fears that the collapse of the talks might lead to
a "new cold war."
Disappointment turned to cautious optimism, however, as both US and Soviet
public statements noted the progress made in a number of areas and highlighted
the fact that the proposals made in Reykjavik remain on the table in Geneva.
Postmeeting briefings to the Nordic governments from both sides hammered at
these points even more clearly. Although the media still characterized SDI as the
major obstacle to an arms control agreement, the upbeat analyses that surfaced
around 15 October implied that Washington need not be blamed unduly for any
failure. Indeed, some conservative editorials blamed Moscow for deliberately
holding generous concessions hostage to demands to restrict defense testing that
they knew Washington would reject.
While the media made no mention of Soviet strategic defense programs, SDI was
frequently paired with such sweeping, negative terms as "militarization of space,"
"space weapons," "arms race in space," and "star wars." Finnish Prime Minister
Kalevi Sorsa-who is also chairman of Socialist International's Disarmament
Committee-questioned why one would reduce strategic arsenals if "new strategic
weapons would be developed which can be used for both defense and attack."
Soviet compliance with arms agreements was not questioned, but US compliance
with the ABM Treaty was a topic of considerable interest to policymakers and the
media. While many papers finally acquitted the United States of blame for the
Reykjavik failure, the harshest criticism of the Soviet Union came not from
NATO Allies Norway, Denmark, and Iceland but from the conservative press in
Sweden-a neutral country.
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EUR ER 86-026
21 November 1986
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Norway Debate Over Defense Budget
In a break with tradition, the Chief of the Defense Staff has entered the public
debate on Norway's future defense spending. According to the US Embassy,
General Bull-Hansen has released a Defense Commission study concluding that
because of inadequate funding Norway's armed forces will be incapable of meeting
their wartime commitments. He has warned publicly that, unless the planned
annual real growth in defense spending is doubled from 3 percent to 6 percent,
government officials will be forced to choose between defending the remote but
strategically important north or the populous south.
Bull-Hansen is frustrated by his lack of success in increasing the defense budget
and hopes that his scare tactic will generate additional public support for increased
spending. The General's comments may give the Conservative opposition a
stronger argument for increasing the Labor government's spending plans during
the parliamentary debate on the defense budget scheduled later this month.
Although Bull-Hansen has violated the traditional prohibition on policy
pronouncements by the military, Defense Minister Holst-himself controversial
for his stance on security issues-is unlikely to reprimand the popular defense
chief.
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France New Military Program
continue to set annually.
France's new defense program is an ambitious attempt to modernize most of its
armed forces and to increase funding for programs delayed under the previous
Socialist government. According to US Embassy reporting, the French Cabinet
early this month approved a five-year military program law that includes funding
for a new submarine, a new mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile, and a
number of conventional arms programs. According to the Embassy, the plan calls
for equipment expenditures of more than $70 billion-an average annual real
growth rate of 6 percent, although only 4.5 percent after 1988. The program law
makes no projections, however, for operating expenditures, which Paris will
to preserve funds for military procurement.
The new program maintains President Mitterrand's emphasis on strategic forces
but also gives Defense Minister Giraud substantially increased funding for other
forces. The planned sharp increases in military spending are an attempt to give
substance to Prime Minister Chirac's commitment to defense and to highlight the
differences between his administration and the Socialists in preparation for the
1988 presidential election. Fiscal constraints probably will force Paris to scale
back some goals after 1988, slipping some programs-particularly conventional
arms projects-curtailing operating expenditures, and paring military manpower
Programs That Will Be Funded
Under the Military Program Law
Nuclear Forces
Modernization of existing SLBMforce.
Development of new M5 SLBM.
Construction of seventh nuclear missile submarine.
Development of SX mobile IRBM (a lower priority
than SLBM modernization).
Production of Hades tactical nuclear missile.
Conventional Forces
Construction of new nuclear aircraft carrier, the
Richelieu.
Production of new Leclerc main battle tank.
Development of new military observation satellite.
Purchase of airborne early warning aircraft.
Development of Rafale fighter and of new attack
helicopter.
Press reports indicate the new law includes plans to
develop chemical weapons; the US Embassy reports it
is unclear whether the law contains a commitment to
produce them.
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Getting Tough on Drugs
The Chirac government has proposed new antinarcotics measures featuring stiffer
penalties for drug traffickers and users, but interagency squabbling will probably
continue to hamper French efforts. Other measures provide for new youth
treatment facilities, a national drug abuse institute, and an additional $40 million
for antinarcotics efforts. A proposal to imprison drug users who fail to complete
treatment programs has provoked controversy, but the
two parties that control the National Assembly support all of the measures and
will probably pass the package. The emphasis on punitive measures is new but in
line with the government's tough stance on law and order and its campaign
promises.
The measures will probably lead to greater French cooperation with regional and
international antidrug efforts.
does not support a new international convention on drug trafficking because it
views the draft convention as too ambitious. Given their hesitant attitude toward
international collaboration of any sort, however, French cooperation is still likely
to be limited.
Cracking Down on Illegal Aliens
Human rights activists across France are reportedly gearing up for an assault on
the Chirac government's most controversial tactic for handling the problem of
illegal immigration. some 1,700
foreigners were expelled from France since 9 September under new legislation that
permits quick expulsions by streamlined administrative action. Acting on
suspicions of terrorist links, the government expelled Basques to Spain and
assorted Middle Easterners-most notably Lebanese-to their native countries.
The largest number of expellees were Africans, some of whom were suspected of
drug trafficking.
The Chirac government is unlikely to be intimidated by the protests of leftist
politicians and antiracist groups and will probably expel even more illegal aliens in
the future. Expulsions appear to be popular with French voters, who apparently see
them as an effective tool for intimidating terrorist sympathizers. Chirac, moreover,
almost certainly believes that expulsions will prove valuable in stealing the anti-
immigrant thunder of the extreme right National Front.
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Yugoslavia Political Tensions Heighten in South
Increasingly assertive ethnic nationalism in the southern Republic of Serbia is
aggravating tensions among the country's many regions and ethnic groups. Several
recent developments have added to nationwide concern:
? The media in September exposed a draft study by Serbian intellectuals that
claims Yugoslavia is ruled by an anti-Serbian coalition.
? Serbian officials have renewed calls for greater control over the republic's two
independent-minded autonomous provinces.
? In early November ethnic Serbs from Serbia's province of Kosovo protested in
Belgrade against the nationalist behavior of Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority.
Both individual regions and the federation have taken unusually strong steps to
show displeasure. The highest federal state and party bodies early in November
issued a sharp public warning about nationalism, citing Serbia by name. Officials
in the Serbian province of Vojvodina have publicly and bitterly attacked Serbian
leaders, while other regions have joined in with media criticism. The southern
Republic of Macedonia has proved an exception, focusing instead on problems
caused by its own ethnic Albanian minority and purging several Albanian officials
for allegedly nationalist activities.
The Serbian leadership for now appears unlikely to move against the republic's
ethnic nationalists. Top officials have rejected outside criticism as unacceptable,
and some apparently tacitly support nationalist activities. Sentiment in other
regions to try to force a Serbian crackdown-by applying pressure through the
federal party, for example-is likely to grow, particularly if Serbian nationalism in
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Greece: A Balancing Act on
Counterterrorism
Prime Minister Papandreou appears to be following a
two-track strategy on terrorism. His government has
been unwilling to point a finger at or take joint action
against countries suspected of abetting terrorism-a
position highlighted most recently by his refusal to
support the EC's condemnation of Syria. Over the
past year, however, Papandreou has become
increasingly aware of the threat posed to Greek
security and economic interests by international
terrorism and has adopted a position of explicit
condemnation of terrorism in general. His government
has also moved to strengthen its counterterrorist
capabilities.
The net effect of this dualistic approach to terrorism
is to raise questions about Papandreou's motivations
and intentions. We suspect that Greek thinking on
terrorism has not entirely crystallized and that
Papandreou, to some extent, has molded his approach
to fit the exigencies of the moment. Yet, to the extent
that Papandreou has a policy, we suspect it is meant
to reflect what he believes is a middle ground:
? To uphold historical Greek ties to the Arab world
and his own leftist credentials, Papandreou has set
himself apart from the United States and the other
EC countries by refusing to agree to impose EC
sanctions against Libya or to condemn either Libya
or Syria by name.
? To placate Greece's Western allies and counter the
domestic terrorist problem, he has taken a number
of steps suggesting a greater commitment to
combating terrorism on Greek soil.
The International Stance
Seen in the context of a political career extending over
more than two decades, the Papandreou government's
latest pronouncements in the EC are consistent with
Papandreou's past positions and what we know of his
world view. We have no reason to doubt that
Papandreou views the world through ideological
spectacles and that his instinctive reaction to any
situation involving conflict between a major power-
particularly the United States or, by extension, the
United Kingdom-and a representative of the Third
World is to identify with the latter. This is all the
more true when it is an Arab Third World country
because he envisions a unique mission for Greece as a
bridge to Western Europe. Although it plays only a
minor role in the Middle East, Greece has sought
closer ties to the Arabs and has supported the Arab
case against Israel since the 1970s.
In addition, from Papandreou's perspective there are
compelling political, economic, and security reasons to
try to avoid aligning himself with the United States
against Libya or Syria, however convincing the
evidence:
? For domestic political reasons, Papandreou may feel
it necessary to assert his leftist credentials after his
Socialist party's relatively poor showing in the
recent municipal election. Because his standing with
leftist voters has been undermined by his economic
austerity program and efforts to seek better
relations with Washington, he may try to mollify
them with rhetoric and support where he thinks he
can afford it.
? Simple fear is another likely motive-fear of
reprisals and of various Arab threats to Greek
security. Greece has a large resident Arab
population, and Athens has already been the scene
of numerous Arab-sponsored terrorist incidents.
Papandreou may also fear direct military
retaliation, given Greece's proximity to the Middle
East and the presence of US bases on Greek soil. A
US naval base on Crete, for instance, is only 160
kilometers from the Libyan coast.
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EUR ER 86-026
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? Greece also stands to lose vis-a-vis its rivalry with
Turkey if any of its Arab friends turn against it.
Greece and Turkey compete for Arab support, and a
break with any Arab state could provoke a
movement to grant official recognition to the
Turkish Cypriot "state" in northern Cyprus.
? Trade has traditionally been the prime motivation
for Greece's policy of expanding ties to the Middle
East-its dependence on Arab oil, its desire to
attract sorely needed investment, and the prospect
of lucrative markets for its agricultural products
and technical services. Although exports to Libya
and Syria are now insignificant-amounting
together to only about 2 percent of total Greek
exports-Athens has been slow to give up hope that
political friendship can be converted into economic
rewards. As part of this strategy, Papandreou
recently signed a bilateral agreement with Syria
that he hopes will quintuple bilateral trade to $250
million in two years.
Improved Counterterrorist Capabilities
Greece's stance against terrorism in general has
improved markedly since the hijacking of the TWA
airliner from Athens and the subsequent issuance of a
US travel advisory last year. This improvement
results from a convergence of factors including the
dramatic drop in US tourism, a genuine desire to
maintain a workable relationship with the United
States and the EC, and an increase in domestic
terrorist activity directed against the government.
Potentially the most significant action the government
took was to put Antonios Drossoyiannis in charge of
Greece's counterterrorist effort in April and further
centralize that effort within the Ministry of Public
Order. In the past, counterterrorist responsibilities
were spread across several ministries with the result
that the government was hampered by interservice
rivalry, compartmentalization of information, and
operational coordination problems. Drossoyiannis told
US officials that his ministry is now meant to take
special responsibility for counterterrorism and that he
is planning to create special antiterrorist police
response teams.
Since his appointment as Minister of Public Order,
Drossoyiannis has taken strong antiterrorist positions
and made a number of personnel changes at the top of
the ministry, which suggests he is trying to improve
police effectiveness and competence. The US
Embassy has reported, for example, an appreciable
improvement in police response to mission requests for
protection and investigations. In addition, over the
past year Greece has agreed to participate in three
US-sponsored counterterrorist training programs and
a terrorism intelligence exchange program with the
Italians, a vast improvement over former training
programs
The government has also upgraded security at Athens
international airport since the TWA hijacking.
Physical improvements include an increase in trained
manpower, better screening equipment and
procedures, and the stationing of armored vehicles
and police patrol cars around the airport perimeter at
all times. The airport was previously considered the
least secure in Europe.
Outlook
The Papandreou government's counterterrorist policy
is still fluid and subject to change. To the extent that
a policy has been developed, however, it appears to be
a two-tracked one aimed at appeasing both the West
and the Arab world. This will not always be possible,
and we are likely to see more instances-such as in
the recent Syrian case-where Greece irritates its
West European allies for seemingly little gain in its
relations elsewhere.
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Belgium: Fleming-Walloon
Antagonism-Impact on
the Military
The Belgian armed forces have made great progress
in equalizing treatment of the country's dominant
linguistic groups, the Flemings and Walloons, but the
language problem-with all the social and cultural
differences it symbolizes-remains a potentially
divisive issue. The complex of legal requirements and
customs protecting the rights of ethnic groups within
the military services has placed a heavy burden on the
Belgian defense effort, increasing its costs and
reducing its efficiency: military procurement
programs have been delayed and their costs increased
because of a requirement to allocate contracts
between Flanders and Wallonia; the necessity of
providing instruction in both French and Dutch has
increased training costs; and assignments and
promotions have been affected by the need to
maintain a Fleming-Walloon balance. In addition, the
maintenance of separate Flemish and Walloon
combat and support units could well have a serious
impact on the overall effectiveness and cohesion of
Belgium's NATO corps under the stress of wartime
combat conditions.
The Belgian Army: Mostly Unilingual Units
The principal combat units of the Belgian Army are
concentrated in its I Corps, made up of two divisions.
The Belgian 1st Mechanized Infantry Division,
redeployed from Germany to Belgium in the 1970s,
contains a Flemish mechanized infantry brigade at
Leopoldsburg and a Walloon mechanized infantry
brigade at Marche-en-Famenne. The Belgian 16th
Mechanized Division, forward deployed in West
Germany, has a Flemish mechanized infantry brigade
at Soest and an anomalous mixed-language armored
brigade at Siegen. In wartime the Belgian I Corps
would be augmented by two reserve brigades deployed
from Belgium: the Flemish mechanized infantry
brigade based at Zonhoven and a Walloon
mechanized infantry brigade from Eghezee. The I
Corps also has a number of unilingual artillery, air
defense, reconnaissance, and logistic units stationed in
the Federal Republic of Germany, which reflect a
balance of Flemish- and French-speaking units. The
elite Paracommando Regiment, also capable of
reinforcing the corps in wartime, is the other major
mixed-language combat unit: of its three active
battalions, one is Flemish, one is Walloon, and the
third has troops of both linguistic groups.
Belgian enlisted troops are organized in unilingual
units, but all Army officers are required to have at
least a working knowledge of their nonnative tongue.
Considerable fluency in the second language is
required for promotion to major and beyond. In
addition, many officers speak at least some English,
which is the language of artillery and air defense fire
commands in the Belgian Army. These measures to
assure a bilingual officer corps that can also converse
with its NATO allies have drastically reduced the risk
of language-based tactical communication problems
between units. Division and higher headquarters are
officially designated as mixed-language units as are
the headquarters of the 17th Armored Brigade and
the Paracommando Regiment
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The Language Problem in Historical Perspective
Origins. The Belgian military's language problem
finds its roots in the 18th century period of Austrian
rule. At that time, French-the language of the
Austrian court as well as the native tongue in
Wallonia-was adopted by the upper classes in
Dutch-speaking Flanders as well. This development
was later to spawn the language problems of the
Belgian Army since its officer corps would be drawn
until the 1970s largely from the French-speaking
aristocracy of both Flanders and Wallonia.
World War I. Agitation for equal status for the
Flemish language began in the 1840s. By 1914
growing Flemish nationalist sentiment had forced the
use of Dutch in the courts and more broadly in the
schools-but not in the Army. In 1914 neither the
commanders who gave the orders nor the doctors who
treated the Belgian wounded spoke Dutch. After
overrunning most of the country the Germans
shrewdly promoted Flemish rights in occupied
Belgium to gain support, and some Flemings
collaborated. As the war lengthened, Flemish study
and discussion groups appeared in the ranks of the
Belgian Army and these gave birth to a defeatist
Front Movement. In 1917 several mutinies erupted
among Flemish enlisted troops. Imperial Germany
collapsed in 1918, but the deep-seated Fleming-
Walloon animosity had been revealed as a serious
Belgian vulnerability. An enemy had been able to
exploit this weakness, and linguistic grievances had
been a major factor in declining Belgian combat
strength beginning in 1917.
The Interwar Period. Following World War I,
continued agitation by Flemish nationalists forced
the Belgian Government to resume its efforts to
equalize the status of the two languages in the
administration and in the schools, and in 1930 a new
law provided for division of the Belgian Army into
unilingual French- and Dutch-speaking regiments.
The two languages were also given equal status in the
Military School in Brussels, and officers were
required to know the language of the troops they
commanded. These reforms, however, were not fully
implemented: the Belgian officer corps in 1940 was
still predominantly French speaking.
World War II. Following Belgium's collapse in 1940,
the Germans again moved quickly to exploit
linguistic antagonisms in Occupied Belgium: Flemish
enlisted POWs were released, while officers and
Walloon troops remained captive, and the Germans
again promoted Flemish interests in education and
administration. As a result, the Belgian resistance
movement was primarily Walloon-indeed, pro-
German Flemings organized antisabotage groups to
help the Nazis against the Resistance. Although only
a minority of Flemings collaborated, the experience
of the second occupation served to reinforce ethnic
antagonisms.
The Postwar Period. The reconstituted Belgian Army
was still led by a predominantly French-speaking
officer corps until the early 1970s, but since then the
balance has greatly improved. Today about 60
percent of the officers list Dutch as their original
language, which reflects closely the overall Fleming-
Walloon split among Army personnel. Belgian
military laws establish the right of the citizen to use
his native tongue while performing his military
service, and Flemish units are now commanded by
Dutch-speaking officers. There is even a single
German-speaking company to accommodate the
small German minority living in Belgium's eastern
cantons. According to attache reporting, this
exceptional unit often is in demand as an aggressor
force for other units' exercises. The unit is well
integrated into a Walloon battalion, whose
headquarters and other two companies are French
speaking.
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Almost all Air Force officers are trilingual in French,
Flemish, and English-the operational language of
the pilots. Many enlisted maintenance and support
personnel, however, know only French or Flemish.
The Air Force's growing pilot shortage has been
aggravated by a nearly complete lack of new Walloon
pilot candidates, and the mix of pilots is skewing
sharply in favor of Flemings.
practical solutions.
an t e tr orce is t e y to ave mcreastng
difficulty finding pilots for the wing at Florennes,
deep in Wallonia. At the same time, the maintenance
and support troops of the mixed-language 3rd
Tactical Wing are now approximately two-thirds
French-speaking Walloons. Because of these trends,
we believe the Air Force could face a resurgence of
Fleming-Walloon tensions in its ranks if the mix of
personnel in dual-language units gets too far out of
balance-a problem for which there appear to be few
The Belgian Navy: Mostly Fleming But Not a Problem
Although the overall Fleming-Walloon mix in the
military is officially set at a ratio of 60:40, the Navy is
unofficially authorized a 70:30 split in favor of
Flemings because of Navy recruiting problems in
Wallonia. Young Walloons are reluctant to volunteer
for the Navy because they would have to live near the
naval bases on the Flemish coast. As a result, all Navy
draftees are Walloon just to maintain the language
balance-and Fleming naval volunteers must be
rejected. The Navy has been able to meet the
language balance requirement for junior officers, but
senior officer ranks are skewed much more sharply
toward Flemings with 87 percent of the captains, 75
percent of the commanders, and 79 percent of the
lieutenant commanders. The Navy's Chief of Staff,
his deputy, and the only two captains considered
eligible for flag rank selection in the next two years
are Flemings, so it is probable that the Navy's top
leadership will remain Flemish until at least 1990.
This imbalance, however, does not seem to concern
' Flemish pilots are willing to serve at these two bases, which are
near Flemish areas where their children can be educated in the
tongue.
Walloons, according to attache reporting. Many
Walloons believe that their Navy is naturally a
Flemish service because the coast is Flemish. Despite
the Flemish dominance, we believe that the Belgian
Navy has no major language communication problem.
The navy officer corps and many of the petty officers
are bilingual, and English is used exclusively in
NATO maneuvers. Some nonrated personnel are
unilingual, but they generally are assigned the less
technical tasks and are addressed in their mother
Impact of the Language Problem
The complex of legal requirements and customs
regulating the rights of ethnic groups in the military
seriously burdens the budget-constrained Belgian
defense effort. The government's freedom to choose
the best officers for senior positions is restricted by
the need to balance promotions between Flemings and
Walloons, and the requirement to provide training in
two languages is costly. Defense procurements are
delayed by the protracted government negotiations
that allocate the economic benefits of defense 25X1
contracts between Flanders and Wallonia. Potentially
most important, the organization of Flemings and
Walloons into separate ethnic units could hamper
tactical flexibility on a future battlefield.
Slower, More Costly Defense Procurement.
In 1983, in
an attempt to speed up the contracting process and
improve cost efficiency, the coalition government
grouped six high-tech procurement programs before
making the regional allocations.' The agreed formula
allocated 55 percent of economic benefits to Flanders,
35 percent to Wallonia, and 10 percent to Brussels.
Theoretically the region with the best qualified or
2 The projects involved acquisition of attack helicopters, heavy
trucks and buses, two types of radios, artillery, and a follow-on buy
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most cost efficient firms might receive 100 percent of
one contract because the other areas could be
compensated with a bigger slice of the other projects
in the omnibus agreement.
The new plan has not worked well in practice,
however. At the start Wallonia got the biggest single
contract, for the additional F-16s, because the
original lot was produced there. The Walloons also
got part of the other early awards-the artillery and
HF radio contracts-and Flanders was in line to get
most of the rest. After the 1985 national elections,
however, Walloons replaced Flemings as Ministers of
Defense and Economic Affairs. The new Defense
Minister-anxious to improve procurement cost
efficiencies and concerned that Flanders lacked the
aeronautical expertise to handle the helicopter
contract efficiently-announced that the new
government coalition (Martens VI) was not bound by
the 1983 six-project agreement. This action incensed
the Flemish community, and Prime Minister Martens
had to reconfirm the previous allocations. By this
time, however, the contracts had been delayed for
months. Because of budget constraints the Defense
Minister next chose to maintain defense spending for
unit training rather than fund the attack helicopter
procurement, which was deferred. The helicopter
affair has thoroughly antagonized the majority
Flemish interests, and we expect the next major
defense contract negotiations to be long and difficult.
Negative Effect on Promotion and Assignment. The
need to maintain agreed Fleming-Walloon balances in
the military has a pervasive negative impact on both
promotions and assignments. The Belgian Army's six
lieutenant general slots are split evenly among
Walloons and Flemings, and each change of
assignment is watched closely, particularly by the
hypersensitive Flemish segment of the press. The
regional sensitivities thus prevent the government
from chosing the Army's high command solely on the
basis of leadership qualities. The National Police
cannot add a needed fifth general officer slot because
a balance now exists between Fleming and Walloon
police generals. The Belgian Navy must take Walloon
draftees rather than more highly motivated Flemish
volunteers to preserve the necessary ethnic mix.
Increased Training Costs. The guarantee that every
Belgian may perform his military service using his
native tongue increases training costs at many levels.
Field grade officers at the Belgian War College insist
on using their native language even though they all
are bilingual. The college must prepare course
materials in both languages and teach each subject
twice. Sometimes two different guest speakers must
be invited and paid to lecture on the same subject in
two languages. Fleming-Walloon anxieties have also
prevented full consolidation of F-16 flight training at
Beauvechain, requiring costly duplication of part of
the training program at the two unilingual airbases.
This duplication prevails throughout the Belgian
military education and training establishment.
Ethnically Homogeneous Units May Limit Tactical
Flexibility. A bilingual officer corps and a broad
operational use of English minimize the risk that
language problems will hamper tactical
communications. The maintenance of unilingual,
ethnically homogeneous units and the way they are
grouped, nevertheless, suggests that the Belgian
leadership must have doubts about the willingness of
Flemings and Walloons to cooperate effectively in
wartime. Fleming and Walloon brigades are
supported by same-language logistic companies
integral to each brigade. Flemish brigades are
supported by Flemish artillery battalions, Walloon
brigades by Walloon artillery. The mixed-language
17th Armored Brigade can be broken down into two
unilingual, balanced armor-infantry task forces of two
battalions each.
The care Belgium has taken to organize its Walloons
and Flemings separately for battle is significant
because we believe the Belgian Army's officers corps
lacks ethnic cohesion. While the officer corps is
thoroughly professional, its two ethnic components
reflect the same divisions apparent throughout
Belgian society. Walloon and Flemish officers work
together, but they do not socialize. These officers
jealously protect their language rights as they pass
through the military education system even though
they are bilingual. They are still quick to take offense
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if not addressed or answered in what they consider the
proper language. An officer corps that takes offense
at such trivial matters is one that we believe ethnic
animosities could divide in periods of national stress.
The failure of the Belgian Army experiment with
ethnically integrated units in the 1950s increases our
concern. At that time, there were ethnically motivated
riots among the troops as well as scuffles and
incidents of noncooperation between Walloon and
Fleming officers. The attempt at ethnic integration in
the Army was a serious failure that had to be
abandoned
The apparent intention of employing the Belgian I
Corps in battle with units grouped ethnically could
mean tactical delays and complications under the
pressure of a heavy Soviet attack. Many experienced
observers of the Belgian Army disagree, noting that in
peacetime exercises, Fleming and Walloon units are
routinely directed to support each other. The latest
example of cooperation between different ethnic units
occurred during the September 1986 Crossed Swords
exercise in West Germany. Yet, the ethnic hostilities
that permeate Belgian society caused the Belgian
Prime Minister to submit his resignation a month
later, and the Belgian military is acutely aware of
such developments. Despite the evidence of ethnic
cooperation in peacetime, the corps command must
question how well Fleming and Walloon units would
support each other in combat, and whether units and
artillery support could be quickly shifted between
brigade sectors. While training and equipment
deficiencies of the Belgian Corps might be more
significant in wartime, the sudden reemergence of
ethnic mistrust among Belgian units might also be an
important factor degrading Belgian combat
performance. Poor cooperation between Fleming and
Walloon units could become increasingly likely if the
Belgian Corps were being pushed back and were in
danger of being cut off or routed.
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Yugoslavia-Libya: Ties Strong
Despite Recent Strains
Yugoslavia has continued to maintain close, extensive
ties to Libya since the US airstrike last April,
although the relationship has undergone new strains.
Qadhafi miffed the Yugoslavs with his behavior at the
recent Nonaligned summit in Harare, and Tripoli's
poor record in paying its bills has caused more open
Yugoslav dissatisfaction. But Libya remains an
important economic partner, and overall political
relations remain sound. We believe Belgrade would
distance itself from Tripoli-and then perhaps
selectively or for a limited period-only in the event
of more egregious Libyan international actions or
severe complications in bilateral economic ties.
Political Relations-Ruffled by Minor Irritants
Yugoslav officials in private have long indicated
discomfort with Colonel Qadhafi's behavior and
policies, but they have appeared unusually annoyed
with his actions during the past seven months.
Although Belgrade gave Tripoli exceptionally strong
public support after the US bombing last April, senior
officials in Belgrade told the US Ambassador that
they do not defend the "stupidities" of Libyan policy.
Since that time, Qadhafi on at least two occasions has
called into question the very policy of nonalignment, a
sacrosanct principle of Yugoslav foreign policy:
? Belgrade appears particularly unhappy with
Qadhafi's proposal, made after the airstrike, that
Libya abandon the Nonaligned Movement and join
the Warsaw Pact. US diplomats report that senior
say that Belgrade refused to grant transit
rig is to Soviet supply aircraft after the April
airstrike, apparently because of concern about an
expanded Soviet role in Libya.
senior officials were
angered by Qadhafi's heavily publicized assertions
at the Harare summit last August that the
Nonaligned Movement, which Tito helped found, is
ineffective. The Yugoslav media, presumably with
the government's blessing, strongly criticized
Qadhafi's speech-extremely unusual treatment for
the head of a fellow nonaligned country. Moreover,
a Yugoslav journalist recently told US diplomats
that, in response to the speech, Belgrade is ignoring
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These signs of Yugoslav discomfiture, however, have
not yet had a broader impact on political relations.
Despite media criticism, no Yugoslav official has
publicly criticized Tripoli. Belgrade labeled the
atmosphere during the Libyan Foreign Minister's visit 25X1
to Belgrade last June as cordial and friendly. And
press reports emphasized satisfaction with bilateral
cooperation during Yugoslav Deputy Premier
Zemljaric's visit to Tripoli last September.
Economic Ties-Solid Despite Problems
Much of Yugoslavia's interest in Libya stems from its
lucrative economic dealings with Tripoli. However,
Libya's mounting financial difficulties caused by soft
oil prices have taken their toll on this relationship over
the past year and a half:
? Yugoslav exports to Libya of nonmilitary goods fell
to $100 million in 1985, roughly half the level of
1984.
? The value of new civilian and military construction
contracts awarded to Yugoslav firms was also
reportedly off sharply last year. The figures for
1986 probably will be no higher.
? Yugoslav exports of military goods and services
also appear to be falling.
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Nonetheless, Libya remains a relatively attractive
market for Yugoslavia largely because financially
strapped Belgrade lacks good alternatives:
? Despite the drop in exports, Deputy Foreign
Minister Loncar recently told the US Ambassador
that trade with Libya-apparently excluding most
military goods and services-is worth about $500
million a year and is too important to abandon.
? Despite the slowdown, Libya has signed new
contracts for civilian construction and repair
projects and is negotiating on some military-related
contracts. Yugoslav construction firms are
estimated to be involved in some $2-3 billion worth
of ongoing projects, placing Libya second only to
Iraq in terms of Yugoslavia's foreign construction
earnings. This comes at a time when the volume of
new construction business is down steeply both in
Yugoslavia and worldwide.
? While Yugoslav military-related exports to Libya
are down, the Libyan market retains its importance
because estimated worldwide Yugoslav military
exports have also dropped sharply.
Yugoslavia will continue to supply Libya
with small numbers of trainer aircraft, minisubs,
and small surface ships. Yugoslavia reportedly will
also continue to train pilots, technicians, and
officers.
Yugoslav media reports have indicated Belgrade's
dissatisfaction over its financial dealings with Tripoli,
particularly Libya's failure to pay in a timely fashion
for work completed. Such difficulties, however, are
not new. Negotiations over each side's mutual debts
and overdue claims have dragged on for some time.
Belgrade has grudgingly accepted Libyan oil in
payment for Yugoslav goods and services. Given
Libya's large debt to Yugoslavia and lack of options,
Belgrade has been in no position to reject
compensation in oil, which it can use to meet domestic
needs or sell for hard currency.
US Concerns-An Inhibiting Factor
Although military-security and commercial relations
continue between Yugoslavia and Libya, the US
stance toward Tripoli may induce Belgrade to take
stock of its policy. A Deputy Foreign Minister told the
US Ambassador last September that he was painfully
aware that Belgrade's good ties to Qadhafi have
caused problems in its relations with the United
States. But Belgrade apparently believes it can
continue to exercise considerable latitude in its
existing relationship with Tripoli without significantly
damaging its ties to Washington.
Outlook
Belgrade probably will continue its current level of
dealings with Libya in political and military areas for
the foreseeable future barring major changes in the
international scene. Belgrade almost certainly would
back Libya in the event of increased US military
pressure and would probably pass to Tripoli
information it acquired on Western knowledge of
Libya's terrorist-related activities. Belgrade is
unlikely to push Tripoli very hard over payment
problems for fear of losing profitable construction
contracts and may try to show even more flexibility
concerning payment and trade arrangements, such as
more actively seeking countertrade deals with third
parties. In our view, only a dramatic turn in Libyan
foreign policy inimical to Belgrade's interests-such
as withdrawal from the Nonaligned Movement,
public official backing for terrorist attacks in the
West, or a complete halt in Libyan payments for
Yugoslav exports-would sour the relationship, and
even such a downturn could be selective or of short
duration.
Belgrade, nonetheless, is likely to be sensitive to
Washington's concerns, and Yugoslav leaders will
probably avoid specific transactions-such as selling
Western military equipment or actively assisting
Libyan-organized terrorist operations-that they
believe would result in dramatic political or economic
sanctions from Washington. But Belgrade would
almost certainly reject demands from Washington to
cut back on most of its other ties to Libya, including
sensitive military-security arrangements.
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East Germany-China:
Honecker's Visit
East German leader Erich Honecker's unprecedented
`official friendly" visit to China during 21-26
October was hailed by both sides as "serving the
cause of socialism" and ushering in a new era in
bilateral relations. While the atmosphere was
excellent, the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
and the People's Republic of China (PRC) played
down the matter of restoring party ties, and the
tangible results appear limited to a long-term
economic agreement. The Soviets had to be on board
for the visit, but Honecker's avoidance of touchy
political subjects and the absence of a communique
suggest an attempt to lower the profile of the trip.
East Germany's Ostpolitik
Honecker's visit to China, the first ever at that
protocolary level by a GDR party and state chief,' was
the high point in the steady improvement of bilateral
ties that began in 1983. During the last 12 months
alone, Vice Premier Li Peng and Foreign Minister
Wu Xueqian visited the GDR, and Volkskammer
President Sindermann, number-three ranking
Politburo member, and Margot Honecker, Minister of
Education and wife of the East German leader, visited
China. The steady stream of other ministerial visitors
in both directions has testified to the desire of both
sides to revive a once flourishing relationship that had
been largely moribund since the mid-1960s as a result
of the Sino-Soviet split.
Honecker's formal visit was meant to pave the way for
a larger Soviet and East European reconciliation with
China while at the same time pursuing East German
interests. The GDR is eager for expanded ties to
China's developing economy and increasingly wants
to profile itself politically as a player in world affairs.
Honecker was welcomed like an old friend by the
senior Chinese leadership. He had three rounds of
talks with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General
Erich Honecker and Deng Xiaoping embrace: the The Eco,wmi :
closer they get, the better each looks to the other.
Secretary Hu Yaobang and further meetings with
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, President Li
Xiannian, and Premier Zhao Ziyang. Honecker and
Hu kissed, embraced, and recalled old times together
in the international youth movement over cups of
Chinese tea (pronounced the best in the world by
Honecker). Similarly, Deng reminisced about his
contacts during the 1920s with Communists in
Germany. Hu and Zhao accepted the ritual invitation
to make a return visit to the GDR; Zhao most likely
will visit next year, while Hu probably will not visit
'The East German news service ADN reported that Deng had also
accepted such an invitation. This is probably a miscue, however, as
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Unpleasantness Avoided
Deng sidestepped the sticky issue of how to restore
party ties by averring to Honecker that since these
ties had never actually been severed, there was no
point in discussing anything except moving them to a
higher level. An East German diplomat in Beijing
later remarked to a US Embassy officer that the
GDR considered it significant that Deng chose to
make this remark himself. The heads of the respective
Central Committee international relations
departments were directed to consult on arranging
new delegation exchanges. Deng's tactic, which could
be used with other East European states, served to
play down the significance of the issue.
When not reminiscing about the distant past,
Honecker and his hosts spoke about future prospects
for developing relations from the new foundation
established by the visit. Left unreported-if not
unsaid-was any mention of the deterioration in their
relations in the past two decades because of the Sino-
Soviet split or of the existing "three obstacles" to
better ties between the USSR and PRC. The principal
reference to the Soviet Union was in Honecker's
fitful-and apparently unsuccessful-efforts to get
the Chinese leaders to endorse the Soviet version of
Reykjavik. There was no separate meeting between
the foreign ministers.
While avoiding references to China's reforms per se,
Honecker praised Chinese economic accomplishments
in general. Similarly, he implicitly acknowledged
China's independent foreign policy. This is not
surprising since it is the stock in trade of Honecker's
foreign policy rhetoric that countries with different
social systems should find ways to coexist. By this
logic, what applies to relations with capitalists should
certainly apply to fellow-if deviant-Marxists. In
the end, Honecker told Chinese reporters that both
sides reached unanimity on bilateral relations and
"some" international issues. Honecker doubtless
enjoyed hearing his Chinese interlocutors extol the
GDR's Westpolitik, in particular Hu's praise for the
East German leader's unremitting efforts to bring
about international dialogue. The Chinese
presumably regard the Honecker Westpolitik as a
seemingly independent tendency to be encouraged,
especially in view of the GDR-Soviet friction it caused
Economic Deals
Honecker's visit also focused on economic relations.
The delegation contained two economic principals-
party secretary for economics Mittag and Foreign
Trade Minister Beil-and the major formal
agreement was a 15-year economic, scientific, and
technological accord. Both sides expressed optimism
that the pact will help boost trade above the expected
record of about $500 million this year, double the
1985 level.
China's modernization plans afford East Germany
with an opportunity to boost its sales of industrial
machinery and other manufactured goods to raise the
PRC's share of trade above the paltry 0.4 percent
registered in 1985. The East Germans offered mining
technology in September and probably hope to sell
strip mining equipment. During the visit, the two sides
concluded another deal for 300 East German rail
passenger cars worth $100 million. East Berlin also
sees China as a source of raw materials and light
manufactures including consumer goods.
No Communique: Soviet Concerns?
In contrast to an earlier working visit to Beijing by
Polish leader Jaruzelski, there was no communique
issued at the end of the Honecker visit. Also unlike
Jaruzelski, Honecker did not stop in Moscow on his
way home, a stopover that would have signaled quite
clearly that the roads from China to Eastern Europe
lead through Moscow. While there is no question that
the Soviets approved of the long-discussed Honecker
visit, some recent events may have stimulated Soviet
unease about the pace of such developments:
? The haste with which Jaruzelski arranged his visit
to China in order to arrive there ahead of Honecker
may have given the impression of undisciplined
action in East European efforts to cultivate ties to
the PRC.
? Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev
apparently did not make much progress on any of
the points dividing the two sides during his 6-14
October visit.
in 1984.
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? In the aftermath of the Reykjavik presummit, the
Soviets may want to concentrate on organizing. their
arms control policy and not be diverted by the
necessity to oversee closely the relationships of their
allies with China.
For whatever reason, Honecker appeared to take his
cue and considerably lowered the political profile of
his visit by avoiding a communique and by taking
along a relatively low-key delegation of political
advisers that did not include either party international
relations chieftain Hermann Axen or "crown prince"
North Korea and Mongolia Also on the Itinerary
Honecker sandwiched his China visit with stops in
North Korea (18-21 October) and Mongolia (26-28
October). Again in contrast to Jaruzelski (who had
preceded him on this leg as well), Honecker and Kim
Il Song issued no communique, most likely because
the GDR is reluctant at this time to undermine the
1988 Olympics by supporting North Korea's demand
for cohosting with South Korea. Commentaries on
both brief visits were positive, and the economic
agreements signed in each place unremarkable.
Outlook
Neither the GDR nor the PRC is likely to have been
surprised by go-slow signals from Moscow and will
assume that even these are temporary. In any case,
Honecker will have viewed his visit as a personal
triumph. The new cooperation agreement should pave
the way for at least modest growth in trade over the
next few years, and Soviet concerns should not
seriously affect routine commerce. The East German
Consulate General established in Shanghai seven
months ago, for example, will soon grow into one of
the city's largest in the estimate of the US Consulate
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Economic News in Brief
Western Europe
250 aircraft projected to be $9.55 billion.
West German Bundestag released $115 million to
begin design definition phase for Eurofighter and pay
for already completed technology, components
development ... total cost for country's planned 200 to
percent.
Greece announced price freeze until February ... will
ease discontent with government restrictions holding
wage increases below inflation, but shortages may
result ... prices over past year rose at rate of 24
for Iceland to resume imports from Soviets.
Trade dispute resolved when Soviets agreed to
maintain level of herring purchases from Iceland ...
herring one-third of Iceland's exports to USSR ...
price concessions angering producers ... clears way
Eastern Europe
issues.
CEMA's international Investment Bank has received
$250 million loan from international banks, according
to source of US Embassy in Moscow ... unusually
long, 15-year term may foreshadow future bond
wake of Chernobyl.
Hungary reportedly exploring prospects for closer ties
to US nuclear industry ... seeking technical guidance
and, possibly, components ... prompted by concern
about reliability of their Soviet-designed plants in
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