STAFF NOTES: SOVIET UNION EASTERN EUROPE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 5, 2012
Sequence Number: 
26
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 7, 1975
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4.pdf469.97 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05 : 14 CIA-RDP86T00608R00040007 w Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05 : CIA-RDP86T00608R00040007 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 HOUE Soviet Union Eastern Europe 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 To Secret Top Secret 158 25X1 Feilruarv 7. 1975 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 I SOVIET UNION ? EASTERN EUROPE This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com- munity by the USSR ? Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel- ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of hitch lonnco. Comments and Queries are welcome. CONTENTS February 7, 1975 25X1 Berlin: The Endless Negotiation 1 25X1 Moscow's Unofficial Artists Plan Another Exhibit 6 Polish Views on Soviet-US Relations 8 Bulgaria: Tightening the Screws on Youth 9 Romanian Defense Minister in Yugoslavia 11 i. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 25X6 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 Berlin: The Endless Negotiation In a time of detente, Berlin is no longer the bunion that the Soviets, in Khrushchev's phrase, could step on whenever they wanted to give the West a pain. Tho passing of the age of sharp confronta- tion, and the signing of the 197' Quadripartite Agree- ment on Berlin, do not mean, however, that the Berlin question has disappeared, merely that the debate is now conducted on a different level and in more muted tors. The Quadripartite Agreement incorporates each side's philosophy--stating with benign inconsistency that West Berlin is not a constituent part of West Germany and shall not: be governed by it, but ties be- tween West Berlin and the FRG shall be strengthened. Differences in interpretation of the agreement are therefore inevitable, and, in fact, were anticipated. In recent weeks, the Soviets have made a number of complaints about Berlin matters in conversations with West German and Allied diplomats. They have protested: --Plans to establish an EC vocational center in West Berlin. The Soviets maintain that since West Ber- lin is not itself a member of the EC, establishment of the center can be interpreted to mean that it is a con- stituent part of the FRG, a violation of the Quadripar- tite Agreement. --Establishment last year of the FRG Federal En- vironmental Agency office in West Berlin. The issue here is similar to the EC vocational center, but more direct since it is a purely FRG institution. As far as the Soviets are concerned, the environmental office is still operating illegally, although they are not trying to keep it from functioning. --West German extension of the 1972 FRG-Austrian consular treaty to "Land Berlin." The Soviets contend February 7, 1975 -1- 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 that too extension of this and other FRG treaties to Woft Berlin is illegal. They regard the designa- tion "'sand Berlin" as invalid because it implies that West is a constituent part of the Federal RepuLA.c. --Nomination of West Berlin Governing Mayor Schutz as a plenipotentiary in cultural matters under the A63 French - West German friendship agreement. The 3oviets, as might be expected, protested the in- volvement of a West Berlin official in a Federal Ger- man. agreement. The French have responded that the plJoipotentiary has only limited functions and, at any ra..e, is appointed by individual Lando, not by the Wevt German Federal Government. --Decisions by the Western Allies to grant landing 11.ghts in West Berlin to airlines not three-powers. This is a long-standing controversy. Occasionally ;;Ile Soviets claim that the Allies are letting the com- mercial airlines of other countries use the established flight corridors to West Berlin, but generally their complaints are limited to the grant of landing rights in the city. This, then, raises the question of whether East Germany will grant overflight rights to these air- lines; the result is often sterile debates over which pqrmission should be obtained first. --Allied toleration of the right-wing Bund Freies Deutschland party in West Berlin. The Soviets have sug- gested that this group should be banned as a fascist party, but have not pressed the issue when the Allies have denied it was fascist. The Soviets have also expressed disappointment over the cool Western response to their proposals for a lavish celebration in Berlin of the 30th anniversary of V-E Day. The Soviets apparently intended these February 7, 1975 -2- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 ceremonies to take place entirely in West Berlin, thereby strengthening their role there without a corresponding increase in the residual Allied pres- ence in East Berlin. 25X1 ? 25X1 /the West Germans thought that Schmidt had obtained the Soviets' agree- ment that individual West Berliners would be covered by agreements the FRG made with third countries. In a broader sense the sniping on Berlin issues reflects a nagging Soviet suspicion that the idea of a united Germany is still a long way from extinction in the minds of West Germans. Recent West German pro- tests over the concept of an East German citizenship in the consular treaty between the GDR and Austria may have aroused underlying Soviet concerns that the German re- unification issue can still influence West German policy and, indeed, may never vanish. The FRG-Soviet dispute over the "peaceful change" formulation at CSCE has prob- ably had a similar effect, since the problem essentially concerns West German efforts to leave open a legal path to eventual reunification of the two Germanies. The foreign policy line of detente and their desire for good relations with West Germany affect the means the Soviets employ, but Moscow's basic objective of de- fining West Berlin as a separate entity will remain un- changed. The Soviets may tolerate certain actions with which they disagree, such as establishment of the Fed- eral Environmental Agency in West Berlin, but they will never legally recognize any step that seems to violate the dictum that West Berlin is not a constituent part of the FRG. In a sense, the adversary process of seek- ing precedents and establishing limits amounts to a con- tinuous renegotiation of the Quadripartite Agreement. February 7, 19/5 -3- 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: DIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 . eb V0046?1 40 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 25X1 Moscow's Unofficial Artists ---MFIEBTher Exhibit Dissident artist Oscar Rabin told a US embassy officer on February 6 that an exhibit of works by Moscow's unofficial artists has been approved "in principle" by city officials. According to Rabin, who arranged two such exhibits last September a group of unofficial artists has been negotiating-over the past several weeks with the city Committee of Graphic Artists for authorization to stage an exhibit in Moscow's Exhi- bition of National Economic Achievements. At this stage, the major sticking point seems to be the selec- tion of an exhibit hall. The hall offered by the com- mittee, Rabin said, is not ideal for an art exhibit be- cause of poor lighting and inadequate space. Rabin apparently believes this problem can be resolved soon, however, and he expects the exhibit to open the first part of next week. Some 20 local non-conformist artists are expected to exhibit their works, and they have allegedly been promised that the exhibition will run for about one week. In contrast to September's art show at Izmaylovo Park, not all non-union artists will be allowed to par- ticipate. The artists' works are being reviewed, and only the "best" will be included. The city committee, also, has rejected the works of several artists. some, if not all, artists who participate In the exhibit will be invited to join the Graphic Artists Committee, which is con- oidered one step below the Moscow Union of Artists. Authorization for the exhibit seems to be a posi- tive step for the artists, but has caused further splits in the ranks of unofficial artists. Some have argued that 25X1 25X1 February 7, 1975 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: DIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 the offer should be accepted only if all artists are allowed to participate. Others do not wish to miss the chance to attain greater acceptability in the eyes of the authorities and thereby more oppor- tunities to show their works publicly. At this point, however, both groups seem to be willing to accept a compromise with city officials. The aim of the au- thorities seems to be to bring the most prominent artists into officially sanctioned structures in order to exert greater control over them. 25X1 February 7, 1975 25X1 -7- 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 Polish Views on Soviet-US Relations Immediately after Moscow's rejection of the 1972 US-Soviet trade agreement, Polish media were noticeably reluctant to discuss US-Soviet relations. In the last two weeks, however, the media have picked up the theme that detente prevails despite the temporary setbacks caused by a "minority of congressmen." Although proclaiming the "correctness" of the Kremlin's decision to renounce the agreement as an unwarranted attempt at interference in Soviet in- ternal affairs, the media have emphasized that the US administration is still working to improve re- lations with the Soviet Union. Warsaw's low-key approach to Moscow's abroga- tion of the trade agreement was to be expected. Gierek has based his program of economic develop- ment and modernization on creating a balance be- tween increased trade and contacts with the West and a strong alliance with the Soviet Union. The Poles will look for ways to play down the signifi- cance of any event that might make this balancing act more difficult. February 7, 1975 -8- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 Bulgaria: Ti htening the Screws on Youth The Council of Ministers has recently announced tough new regulations to improve the "labor educa- tion" of Bulgarian youth. These restrictive mea- sures seem indirectly aimed at two problems--a nag- ging labor shortage and a fear of ideological de- generation among Bulgarian youth. Each young person upon completing his primary education or military service must now register with a bureau of manpower, which will give out job as- signments according to the "needs of the national economy." Aspiring students must hold a "steady job" for at least eight months--and in some cases up to two years--before they are eligible to enroll in higher educational institutions. Failure to regis- ter or the abandonment of assigned positions makes either the young people or their parents liable to a sizable fine. The regulations are designed to correct prob- lems that the regime has recently stressed in press commentaries: --The lax and parasitical attitude of young people who neither work nor study and who are supported by their parents. --The distaste of youth for "socially useful labor." --The growing gulf between young Bulgarians who consider themselves white-collar bureaucrats and "socialist workers." --The need to improve labor productivity, which was stressed at a national party conferenco and sev- eral BCP Central Committee plenums last year. February 7, 1975 -9- 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 74, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: 1A-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 Sofia is worried about the commitment to Com- munism of Bulgarian youth, particularly in an ora of expanding East-West coatacts. "Idle youths" are thus warned against assimilatinr "intern ways and losing the),e socialist militancy. The new legislation also betrays the regime's concern with manpower problems. The country's chronic labor shortage has been aggravated because young Bulgarians remain in school longer and thus enter the labor force ct an older age. The as- signment to the USSR of some 15,000 Bulgarian workers, who could find employment at home, com- pounds the problem. The regime probably expects that the new decision will pum at least som workers into the economy. February 7, 1975 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 25X1 pomanian Defense Minister in Yugoslavia Defense Minister Ionita arrived in Dubro4nik on Thursday for what has been announced as three days of talks on coopezation between the "friendly armies" of Yugoslavia and Romania. Ionita's visit follows on tilt. heels of top-level party talks in Romania last weekend between Romanian party boss Ceausescu and the number-two man in the Yugoslav party, Stan? Dolanc. Dolanc and Ceausescu probably discussed a wide range of issues of mutual concern, including: --The state of US-Soviet relations and their implications for stability in the Balkans. --Rumors about Brezhnev's health and Soviet leadership changes. --Preparations for the European Communist Conference. --The unstable situation in the Middle East. Ionita is spending his time on the Adriatic coast, not far from Tito's current residence at a Montenegrin spa. The Romanian Defense Ministey: could meet the Yugoslav President before his departuvi on Saturday. There is no firm explanation of the upsurge in Yugoslav-Romanian contacts, but we may soon have more information. Some Romanian chiefs of mission in the West have been recalled to Bucharest for consultations next week. When they return to their posts, their reading of the situation could filter out. February 7, 1975 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 R Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/05: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400070026-4 25X6