WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 31, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Declassified in Part 25 )/75
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Secret
Weekly Summary
met
No. 0005%75
January 31, 1975
Copy 149. - 65
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The WEEKLY SUMMAkY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current In'elligence, reports and analyzes signif.
Scant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequenUy includes material cochdinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore
published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
contents. 25X1
CONTENTS (January 31, 1975)
EUROPE
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
INTERNATIONAL
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
SPECIAL
REPORT
1 Egypt: Sadat to Paris
3 Greece-Turkey: Arbitration Proposal
4 United Kingdom: EC; Economy
6 SALT Resumes in Geneva
6 Denmark: A New Government
7 USSR-Cyprus: Seeking a Role
3 italy: Moro's New Year Agenda
9 Portugal: Tensions Decline
10 soviet Union: Containerization; Salyut
12 Cambodia: The War of Nerves
13 Laos: Refugee Resettlement
13 Vietnam: Anniversary Lull
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15 Thailand: An Uncertain Mandate
16 Philippines: Talk, Fight
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18 Bangladesh: Presidential Rule
18 Somalia: Discouraging Dissidents
19 Malagasy Republic: Internal Rumblings
20 OPEC Meeting in Algiers
21 Peru: Old Faces, New Jobs
22 Nicaragua:
Opposition Gains Confidence
23 Ecuador: Tuna Boats Again
24 Argentina: Protesting Lopez Rega
(Published separately)
International Relationships in
the Arctic Basin
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Egypt
SADAT GOES TO PARIS
President Sadat's visit to France this week?
the first by an Egyptian president?gives sub-
stance to his determination to expand relations
with the West and to diversify the sources of arms
for Egypt's military forces, now Soviet-equipped.
He came away with an apparently large arms
package and a promise by the French to study
participation in a wide range of economic projects
in Egypt.
Although the joint communique issued on
January 29 noted only that President Giscard has
agreed to sell Egypt arms "to compensate in part
for losses suffered" during the 1973 war, Sadat
announced at a press conference in Paris that this
equipment includes Mirage F-1 aircraft. He would
not divulge the number, saying only that the
package consists of far fewer than the 120 planes
raised in earlier press speculation. Unnamed
French sources have told the press that 50 planes
are involved. Egypt is already taking delivery of
older versions of the Mirage under earlier agree-
ments concluded on Egypt's behalf by Arab oil
Droducees.
Sadat at French missile factory
Sadat did not mention other types of arms
covered by the new agreement?which will un-
doubtedly also be financed by Arab oil money?
but he was interested in a wide range of equip-
ment, including surface-to-air missiles, tanks,
helicoprs, and radar components. While in Paris,
Sadat made a much-publicized tour of the
Thomson-CSF industrial? facility, which produces
C rota le surface-to-air missiles and electronic
equipment. Egypt's war production minister has
remained in France for further discussions with
Thomson's directors.
.3adat is undoubtedly pleased with the mili-
tary agreement and particularly with the heavy
publicity the arms negotiations have received. The
communique's pointed reference to partial com-
pensation for war losses was probably inserted at
Sadat's request for Soviet benefit. He has made
much in recent public statements of Moscow's
failure to provide Egypt with replacement equip-
ment, and he made the most of this opportunity
to remind the Soviets that he can go elsewhere to
obtain at least some of Egypt's military needs.
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V Low " 1??? I
Sadat also hopes that the image of a mili-
tarily stronger Egypt will buttress his negotiating
position with Israel. At the same time, however,
he seemed to take pains during his press corner-
ence to avoid giving the impression that the new
arms will impede the progress of talks. He repeat-
edly emphasized that delivery of the Mirages will
take several years. He also reiterated his position
that Egypt and Syria have no intention of starting
a new war.
Giscard's domestic political interests are
probably served by limiting the arms deal tc
"partial compensation" for Egypt. Anticipated
criticism from pro-Israeli elements in France may
be blunted by the impression that the deal only
makes up some Egyptian losses rather than
heavily rearming it.
Although Sadat and Giscard held extensive
discussions on ecc,nomic cooperation, few firm
agreements appear to have been made. Sadat had
announced that he intended to request a nuclear
power station, but the communique referred to
this only as one of many projects in which French
participation was "reviewed." French Industry
Minister d'Ornano, in a statement that coincided
with Sadat's visit, announced that France would
not sell nuclear reactors unless guarantees
"satisfying the international community" were
provided. Agreement was reached on construction
of a conventional electric power pla-t and on a
system for color tF.levision.
On Middle East peace issues, th? com-
munique called for "secure, recognized, and
guaranteed borders" for all states in the area?a
refinement, inserted at Giscard's request, on UN
Resolution 242, which calls for secure and rec-
ognized borders. Giscard's use of the key phrase
"guaranteed borders"?he repeated it several
times before and during Sadat's visit?reaffirms
once again France's desire to take part in settle-
ment efforts. Sadat, however, firmly discounted
rumors that he would ask for French involvement
in current negotiations, noting only that "in a
coming stage" France and all of Western Europe
should play a role.
GROMYKO TO CAIRO AND DAMASCUS
Foreign Minister Gromyko's trip to C.idro
next week appears to be an attempt by the
Soviets to keep the lines of communication open
following the postponement late last monEl of
Brezhnev's Middle East trip. Gromyko will frob-
ably not offer to reschedule Brezhnev's visit,
given the strains in Soviet-Egyptian relatior.:, and
the party chief's uncertain health. A Soviet press
officer recently told a US eribassy ofThial in
Moscow that he did not expect a Brezhnev trip to
the Middle East soon.
:3oviet officials have been expressHg irrita-
tion with President Sadat's continue) public
criticism of Moscow's failure to meet Egypt's
arms needs. Cairo has good grounds for its com-
plaint about arms deliveries. Despite a pledge to
Foreign Minister Fahmi last December to speed
up deliveries, only two ships carrykg military
cargo have arrived since the end of the year, avid
neither apparently carried major weapons
systems. The equipment sent to Egypt since mili-
tary deliverie3 were resumed last August has been
limited to spare parts, ammunition, and ground-
wpport materiel rdered prior to the October
1973 war.
The Soviet foreign minister may attempt a
reading on the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement
talks, particularly in view of Secretary Kissinger's
plans to visit the Middle East in February.
Although Moscow has continued to snipe at
Egyptian support for the US-sponsored step-by-
step approach, it seems doubtful that the Soviets
exper:t to turn Sadat from his chosen course at
this tirnn.
Gromyko will stop in Damascus before ar-
riving in Cairo, perhaps in the hope of fanning
President Asad's suspicions of an Egyptian sell-
out in the negotiations. Gromyko will also be
seeking to soothe the Syrians, who were miffed
by the abrupt manner in which the Soviets
canceled the Brezhnev
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Greece-Turkey: Arbitration Proposal
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis this week
proposed that the potentially explosive Aegean
dispute with Turkey be taken to the International
Court of Justice. Turkish Prime Minister !mak
responded that, in principle, the Greek proposal
was acceptable, but that Turkey remained dete-.-
mined to explore for oil in the Aegean. In the
past, .^.iikara has pointed to earlier court decisions
to hslp sui.:-rort its claim to a share of the mineral
resourcc:. under Aegean.
The Turks argue that the division of mineral
resources under the Aegean seabed should be
determined by drawing a median line between the
Greek and Turkish mainlands, ignoring the Greek
islands. The Greeks, on the other hand, maintain
that the islands themselves have continental shelf
rights and that the median line should, therefore,
be drawn between the easternmost Greek islands
and the Turkish mainland. This effectively ex-
cludes Turkey from access to the Aegean seabed
and any possible oil deposits.
BOTH SIDES AGREE ON A MEDIAN LINE
TO DIVIDE MINERAL RESOURCE AREAS,
BUT NOT ON 41410 DRAWS iT AND
WHERE.
The controversy has heated up in recent
weeks as the Turks responded to what they
viewed as provocative remarks by the Greek
defense minister. Ankara has announced that it
would soon begin oil exploration in the disputed
area, and it has alerted several Turkish air and
ground units.
The Greek government has taken pains to
put down rumors of emergency military prepara-
tions and of a sharp deterioration in Greek-
Turkish relations. At the same time, Greek of-
ficials have privately expressed growing concern
that the Aegean dispute might get out of hand.
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Turkish nudien line (Islands ignored as bosepoints)
- Greek median line (Islands used as besepoints)
Tirana
?
Istanbu
ALBANIA
GREECE .t), A E N
then
D 0
ipo t. on
o Ko ee.
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UNITED KINGDOM
COOLING THE EC ISSUE
Prime Minister Wilson and the Labor Party
leadership have made several proposals that
should help prevent a split in the government and
the party over the EC membership issue. Mean-
while, renegotiation of the British terms of EC
membership continues.
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ECONOMY IN DOLDRUMS
In addition to such divisive political issues as
EC membership, Wilson also must cope with the
British economy, which has been in the doldrums
for some time. There is little promise of relief this
year from rising prices and wages, spreading
unemployment, flagging business confidence, and
a large balance-of-payments deficit.
Gross national product declined by 0.6
percent in 1974 and is likely to show little growth
this year. The investment upswing of recent
months has begun to fizzle as low profits, high
interest rates, and uncertain demand dampen
business hopes. Consumer spending, stagnant for
about a year, will at best hold its own. Although
wage hikes are outpacing inflation, real disposable
income is being held down by taxes and un-
employment. Export demand has been declining
since mid-1974.
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Government spending is the only buoyant
alement of domestic demand. Public investment
plans have been maintained, and operating out-
lays.?particularly for subsidies on food and public
services--have been increased. The current budget,
revised twice, will wind up showing a $14.6-
billion deficit at the end of the fiscal year in
March.
Wilson
As for foreign trade, the current-account
deficit will probably match last year's $8.7 bil-
lion?the largest in the world. Weak foreign
demand, rapid domestic inflation, delays in
developing North Sea oil, and higher interest pay-
ments will inhibit improvement. The trade deficit,
a staggering $12.1 billion in 1974, is likely to be
nearly as high in 1975. Even though small
quantities of North Sea oil will begin to flow late
this year, large cuts in the oil import bi:1 are at
least two years away.
Inflation, which stood at 20 percent at the
end of 1974, will continue to move up at least
through mid-1975. Price controls and subsidies
had previously concealed the full force of infla-
tionary pressures. Labor has already been given
wage boosts of 20 percent or so to cover
anticipated inflation in 1975.
These strong inflationary pressures will
bedevil the Wilson government this year. If
London continues to hold growth in the money
supply below the inflation rate, the private sector
could be starved for funds, leading to massive
layoffs. Yet if the government eases its monetary
policy, the speedup in inflation and the decline in
interest rates could result in increased reluctance
of foreigners to hold sterling. Already, Euro-
market bankers and oil-producing states are
growing more leery of financing Britain's deficits
through loans and sterling deposits.
In the event of a selloff of sterling by private
holders, London is unlikely to use its reserves of
$6.8 billion, its unused drawing rights of $2.8
billion in the International Monetary Fund, and
its credit lines with central banks to prop up the
pound. Rather than expend its reserves to defend
an overvalued currency, London most likely
would choose depreciation through a controlled
downward float though a sharp drop in the rate
cannot be ruled out. It would also seek assistance
under various recycling schemes and, possibly,
new bilateral deals with oil-producing coun-
tries./
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SALT RESUMES IN GENEVA
The Strategic Arm Limitations Talks re-
sume in Geneva on January 31 to hammer out the
details of the understandings reached at Vladi-
vostok. In the wake of the recent setbacks to
US-Soviet trade, the talks will be watched closely
as a measure of Moscow's commitment to de-
tente. The Soviets, well aware of this linkage, are
touting the importance of cooperation on arms
control by the super powers. In view of the
present, somewhat strained state of detente, they
may be more difficult negotiators than they
would otherwise have been.
The November summit at Vladivostok set
ten-year ceilings on the number of strategic
delivery vehicles permitted each side-2,400?and
on the portion of the missile force that can be
equipped with MI RVs-1,300. These ceilings will
form the backbone of a treaty that could be
ready for signing at a US-Soviet summit later this
year. For this schedule to be mei, the SALT
negotiators must agree on a number of difficult
issues, including:
? Which weapons systems will count to-
ward the allowable totals, and which will be
excluded.
? What mutual restrictions and interpreta-
tions will be necessary to ensure verifiability
of compliance with the terms of the treaty.
Ample opportunity still exists for serious
differences to arise on both of these items, al-
though there is no evidence that Moscow has
qualms about the Vladivostok accords. On the
contrary, the Soviets have recently re-emphasized
their initial, strongly positive public assessment,
partly in an effort to offset the negative effect on
detente of US-Soviet friction elsewhere.
At the same time, Moscow has been stressing
the significance of US recognition of Soviet stra-
tegic parity, taking occasion to reassure domestic
skeptics that the Vladivostok agreements will not
lead to unilateral disarmament by the Soviet
Union. Soviet media also have asserted that future
talks on reductions of strategic arms would have
to take into account the existence of other nu-
clear powers. Moscow has given no indications
that it intends to reintroduce at the coming ses-
sion the issues of third-country nuclear powers,
US forward-based systems, or so-called 'geo-
graphic factors"?issues it failed to press at Vladi-
vostok. 25X1
DENMARK: A NEW GOVERNMENT
Denmark is headed for a new period of polit-
ical uncertainty. Prime Minister Hartling's mi-
nority Moderate Liberal government fell on Janu-
ary 28, when the Social Democrats?Denmark's
largest party?tabled a successful no confidence
motion only five days after the new parliament,
elected on January 9, convened. The final vote
was 86 to 85. The Radical Liberals voted against
the government, and some members of both the
Center Democrat and Conservative parties ab-
stained. All had supported Hartling on critical
votes in the past.
The Queen appointed Karl Skytte, president
of the Folketing (parliament) and a member of
the Radical Liberal Party, to try to form a govern-
ment. Even if he is successful, Skytte will not
necessarily be the next prime minister as Social
Democrat leader Jorgensen is also a front-runner.
Skytte's selection was recommended by
both Hartling and Jorgensen. Radical Liberal
Party leader Baunsgaard, who has advocated an
increasingly independent role for the Radical
Liberals, was apparently passed over in favor of
Skytte, who hes advocated closer association with
the Social Democrats. Skytte may be able to act
as a bridge between the opposing socialist and
center parties. A Radical Liberal - Social Demo-
crat minority coalition would appeal to more
parties than would the alternative, a Social Demo-
crat minority government.
In any case, the Social Democrats are likely
to form the core of the next government. The
most effective government would be a Social
Democrat - Moderate Liberal coalition, but the
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mutual dislike between Hartling and Jorgensen,
together with Jorgensen's role in toppling the
Moderate Liberals, 311 but precludes such a combi-
nation for the time being.
The next government's most difficult task
will be coping with Denmark's economic prob-
lems. Both the Radical Liberals and the Social
Democrats have been vague about their plans but
have vigorously opposed R.-,rtling's economic
crisis plan. The new government may try to adopt
a watered-down version of Hartling's austerity
program that would be palatable to several of the
parties of the left and center. 25X1
A government led by the Social Democrats
would be favorably disposed toward the US, but
would not support US policy to the degree that
the Hartling government did. There may be a
slight shift to the left on oreign policy matters,
but the Atlantic alliance will remain the basis of
Danish security policy. For the time being, the
next prime minister will be too busy putting his
own house in order to focus on foreign policy.
25X1
USSR-CYPRUS: SEEKING A ROLE
The Soviet Union is showing renewed in-
terest in the Cyprus situ,:4tion. During the past
two weeks, Soviet diplomats have made de-
marches to Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot leaders
repeating Moscow's views regarding a settlement
and re-emphasizing its desire to play a role in
guaranteeing the future sovereignty of the island.
The Soviets, who have thus far been unsuc-
cessful in gaining a role in the settlement process
or in influencing the negotiations, are no doubt
eager to get their oar in before talks on a settle-
ment proceed further. Since the coup last sum-
mer, Moscow has been worried that the island
would be divided into two ethnically based re-
gions that could eventually end up as the basis for
"double enosis." The Soviets have therefore been
pressing for a cantonal arrangement and for
stronger guarantees of Cyprus' independence by
the UN Security Council.
Before the coup last summer, the Soviets
had made considerable progress toward estab-
lishing a mutually beneficial working relationship
with President Makarios, and they publicly sup-
ported his return. Now that he is apparently back
in full control of the Greek Cypriot portion of
the island, the Soviets are in a stronger position to
press their proposals. Because of the lack of
progress in the intercommunal talks, Makarios is
apparently consulting with his advisers on how to
make best use of Soviet supporti
Despite Makarios' general agreement with
the Soviets on the terms of a settlement, he is
undoubtedly aware that the Soviet desire to keep
relations with Turkey on an even keel places a
limit on how far Moscow will go on behalf of
Cyprus. 25X1
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ITALY: MORO'S NEW YEAR AGENDA
Since the end of the holiday respite, a num-
ber of problems have emerged that could refuel
conflicts among Italy's governing parties.
For the moment, however, most party
leaders seem to have their sights set on nation-
wide local elections next June that will provide a
definitive test of party strengths. The tendency to
look ahead to the elections was probably
strengthened by the recent settlement of the
labor-management disputes that had posed the
most pressing tangible problem for the Moro gov-
ernment. After a long campaign by labor that
featured four brief nationwide general strikes, the
employers paid a very high price for a tenuous
labor peace. Labor received a substantial increase
in the cost-of-living allowance, a lump sum pay-
ment to all workers for past losses in purchasing
power due to inflation, and a hike in the family
allowance.
The new benefits will raise the average work-
ing man's pay by at least 7 percent, and there is
no evidence that the unions promised to mod-
erate future wage demands. More than half of the
industrial work force's contracts come up for
renewal later this year, including those of the
most militant unions. These negotiations,
combined with other factors, could jeopardize the
government's goal of holding wage cost increases
to 16 percent this year.
Relations between the governing parties and
the Communist opposition remain the most con-
tentious political issue in the pre-election period.
This problem was highlighted in late December
when Christian Democrat officials in Venice
broke ranks with the party's national leadership
and invited the Communist opposition to help
formulate major municipal legislation. Christian
Democrat organizations in three other localities
have since begun to move in the same direction. If
the Communists do as well as expected this spring
in the local elections, such arrangements will
probably proliferate.
Christian Democrat chief Fanfani has played
down the significance of these developments. This
probably reflects his inability to stem a revolt
against his leadership by left-wing elements within
the party who are largely responsible for the
closer relations with the Communists. As part of
his effort to keep the initiative within the party,
Fanfani has recently focused national attention
on his proposals for tougher law-and-order
measures. Fanfani probably hopes that spotlight-
ing the law-and-order question will help divert
attention from some of the bread-and-butter
issues on which the Christian Democrats are
vulnerable in the coming elections.
Reforms that would weaken the Christian
Democrats' traditional control of the state radio-
TV network are also proving troublesome. The
Christian Democrat leadership had agreed to give
several of the other parties, including the Com-
munists, more influence in communications
policy. Right-wing Christian Democrats, however,
joined thl Neo-fascists and the conservative
Liberal Party in blocking approval of the law in
parliament. Government leaders are trying to
work out a more acceptable version and
reportedly will call a parliamentary vote of
confidence on the issue soon.
Meanwhile, the question of whether to
legalize abortion was pushed to center stage by
the recent arrest of the operators of an illegal
abortion clinic in Florence. The publicity sur-
rounding the event forced party leaders to take a
stand on the issue?a development they had
hoped to avoid. A Socialist-sponsored bill calling
for legalization has languished in parliament for
over two years. The Socialists and the other anti-
clerical parties?Communists, Social Democrats,
Republicans, and Liberals?are under pressure to
speed up the campaign for legalization. The
Christian Democrats are opposed but, after being
stung badly in the divorce referendum last year,
they are not eager for a showdown. A court
decision on the constitutionality of the present
law is imminent, however, and no one is likely to
force the issue before that outcome is
known. 25X1
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PORTUGAL: TENSIONS DECREASE
Political tensions in Lisbon, which had built
up over the past week in anticipation of demon-
strations scheduled for January 31 by the Social-
ists and the Communists, are subsiding in re-
sponse to the Armed Forces Movement's state-
ment that the rallies should not take place. If the
parties abide by the cancellation?as all but a
small number of radical parties have said they
will?the chances of violence over the weekend
will be reduced. The Movement's decision to call
off the demonstrations does not resolve the
deeper conflicts between the political parties or
within the Armed Forces Movement.
The Socialists had planned their rally as a
show of strength following their defeat last week
on the unitary labor law. The Communist: later
scheduled a demonstration at the same time.
When radical left-wing groups forced cancel-
lation of the first congress of the Social Demo-
cratic Center Party last weekend, government
leaders were alerted to the possibility of street
violence. Party delegates and observers from sev-
eral European parties were trapped overnight in-
side a meeting hall in Oporto, Portugal's second
largest city. Police kept demonstrators from
breaking in, but the crowd could not be dispersed
until security forces arrived from Lisbon early the
next day.
The inability of a center-right party to meet
in Portugal without harassment by left-wing ex-
tremists raises doubts that free and orderly elec-
tions can be held this spring. The Social Demo-
cratic Center, dubbed "fascist" by the left, has
been under constant pressure from extremists.
Last week, the extremist groups held further
demonstrations calling for the dissolution of the
Social Democratic Center, but party leaders re-
sponded that they will not quit and will try to
reschedule their interrupted congress for late
February.
Apprehensions were raised further when the
left-wing extremists announced they also planned
a demonstration on January 31 at the same loca-
tion as the Socialists. The Socialists, determined
to make their show of strength in spite of com-
petition, changed locations to avoid conflict. The
announced times and places of the three demon-
strations, however, were so close that planned or
spontaneous clashes were still possible.
The Armed Forces Movement's decision to
call off the demonstrations, although reflecting
the Communists' desire, has taken e heat off a
potentially explosive situation. The announce-
ment, made by Minister Without Portfolio Vitor
Alves in a televised address, indicates that the
Movement can still act as a body, even though it
is seriously divided between moderates and radi-
cals. Alves, a moderate, was reportedly in political
trouble and on his way out, but the fact that he
made the announcement may indicate that the
moderates' fortunes are rising.
Although the Socialist leader, Foreign Min-
ister Soares, told Ambassador Carlucci early this
week that his party would proceed with its plans
despite a government ban, the Socialists appear to
have backed down to preserve public order after
meeting with military leaders and Communist
Party head Cunhal on January 29. The Commu-
nists and their front organization, the Portuguese
Democratic Movement, also canceled their
demonstration. Two extremist groups will prob-
ably proceed with plans to hold their rallies on
January 31 as scheduled, but the chances of a
violent confrontation have diininished.i
Demonstrators in Oporto
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THE SOVIET UNION
A BETTER MERCHANT FLEET
The Soviet Union is making ambitious plans
to develop its containerized transport capabilities.
Moscow has allocated over $500 million for the
ncixt few years to add fast, modern containerships
to its growing merchant fleet. The introduction of
these vessels and the development of modern con-
tainer-handling facilities at Soviet ports will en-
able the Soviet fleet to compete more effectively
along key international trade routes as well as
enhance Soviet military sealift capabilities.
The Soviet merchant fleet is the seventh
largest in the world with more than 14 million
deadweight tons. Its containerships are primitivc
by Western standards, consisting of about 50
small, slow vessels capable of handling a total of
only 10,000 containers. In contrast, the container
fleet of developed Western maritime powers?
mostly under US, UK, Japanese, and West Ger-
man flags?consists of 340 large, modern ships
that can carry 360,000 containers.
Moscow currently has more ship orders
placed than any other country. At least 30 large
containerships capable of handling more than
20,000 containers will be built in domestic, East
European, and other yards. These additional ships
will bring the Soviet container fleet to 5-10 per-
cent of world capacity by 1978.
Included in current Soviet orders are full
containerships and roll-on/roll-off ships designed
to carry vehicles as well as containers. Some of
these ships are capable of speeds up to 25 knots,
and are able to handle 700 to 1,400 containers?
similar to ships ordered by Western fleets. Larger
ships capable of hauling 1,800 to 2,500 con-
tainers at speeds of over 30 knots?equal to the
current stz.te of the art?may be added to the
fleet, perhaps as early as 1980. At this time, such
vessels are beyond both the demonstrated techni-
cal capabilities of Communist yards, where most
Soviet containerships are constructed, and of cur-
rent Soviet commercial needs.
Containerized cargo
Leading European containership builders,
facing tapering demand as the expansion of the
world container fleet slows, are anxious to exploit
the Soviet market. West Germany has proposed
changing the Coordinating Committee restrictions
on the export of full containerships?which carry
only containers?with speeds up to 33 knots, up
from the current limit of 26 knots. The fastest
and most sophisticated full containerships cur-
rently in operation are 33-knotters built in West
Germany and Holland and operated in US trade.
By enlarging its containership fleet, Moscow
will increase the capacity of feeder services at
both ends of its Trans-Siberian Landbridge, the
direct rail link between Leningrad and Nakhodka,
with sea connections to other European and Far
Eastern ports. The Landbridge competes with the
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JC?..01-1L- I
increasingly larger and faster containerships run
by Western shipping firms along the all-sea route
between Europe and the Far East.
Moscow also intends to compete directly
along the all-sea route; three containerships will
be assigned to this route in the spring. Two Japa-
nese companies have been contacted for a possi-
ble joint service. Moscow is concerned that the
all-sea route will become more attractive to ship-
pers if the Suez Canal is reopened this summer.
Sea transit times between Western Europe and
Hong Kong, for example, could be shortened
from about one month to three weeks, roughly
the shipment time via the Trans-Siberian Land-
bridge.
Moscow is trying to capture more of South
Asia's seaborne trade with Europe by rate-cutting,
but it needs an efficient container fleet to do so.
Taking advantage of a decision by the Far Eastern
Freight Conference?a shipping cartel of 26 ship-
ping lines operating between Europe and the Far
East?to increase rates by 18 percent, Moscow
formed a joint Soviet-Filipino shipping company
offering 15-percent lower rates to Europe. Singa-
pore, Thailand, Indonesia, and other countries in
the area have threatened to switch to Soviet ves-
sels to avoid the conference's rising rates. Moscow
may want to join the conference, however. In at
least one other trade system, the Soviet Union
established itself with substantially lower rates
and then, threatening to reduce rates further,
applied and was accepted for membership in that
conference.
Soviet containerships would prove a growing
irritant to containership operators in other trade
systems, particularly those involving the US. The
Soviet Union is an important non-conference
competitor on Trans-Pacific routes, and three of
six Soviet scheduled services to the US already
offer partial container service. Within a few
months, Moscow plans to begin upgrading its
trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic services to North
America by replacing older vessels with its first
new high-speed containerships.
Fast Soviet containerships will also enhance
the military support capabilities of the Soviet
Page
merchant fleet. Roll-on/roll-off containerships
can be pressed into service to carry light tanks
and trucks. Although full containerships require
extensive modifications to carry personnel or
heavy equipment and must rely on specialized
container terminals to load or discharge, they can
speed the tram -1rt of ammunition, food, and
spare parts.
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SALYUT 4 MISSION CONTINUES
The crew of Soyuz 17 is nearing the end of
its third week in orbit aboard the Salyut 4 space
station. The two cosmonauts are performing a
wide variety of scientific experiments, including
tests in biomedicine, astronomy, and astro-naviga-
tion.
1The
two cosmonauts may remain in space for about
30 days, with recovery in the USSR occurring
during the second week of February. Another
team of two cosmonauts probably will rendez-
vous and dock with Salyut 4 in March.(
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CAMBODIA: THE WAR OF NERVES
Two more heavily escorted resupply convoys
reached Phnom Penh this week after running a
gantlet of Khmer Communist fire along the lower
Mekong River. Communist gunners sank one
tanker and so damaged two other vessels that
they had to be beached. The 12 ships and barges
that made it through brought badly needed rice,
fuel, and ammunition to the capital. Rice and fuel
will continue to be rationed to civilian consumers,
but the arrival of the convoys belied the claims of
Communist propagandists that the river was
closed and buoyed morale on the government
side.
Despite daily rocket attacks, life is proceed-
ing in a relatively normal fashion in Phnom Penh.
A direct hit on one school resulted in a temporary
suspension of classes, but the school reopened in
a few days. oilembers of the capital's large French
commilniLy?roany of whom packed up and left
during the artiillry attacks last spring?have re-
mained calm as have most foreign diplomats. The
city's airport is as busy as ever although foreign
airlines have canceled flights on some days.
Meanwhile, fighting continues to sputter
along Phnom Penh's outer defenses, but govern-
ment forces are still holding their own. At week's
end, army commanders were preparing to send
armored units into an area used by Communist
rocket crews northwest of the airport. Govern-
ment clearing operations along the Mekong near
the city and along Route 5 were also beginning to
gain some momentum. In the countryside, the
Communists launched small-scale attacks against
the southwestern coastal city of Kampot and are
harassing government positions along highways in
the far northwest. With major insurgent units
concentrated around Phnom Penh and along the
Mekong, however, these provincial flare-ups are
not serious. 25X1
Ammunition barges with special screens
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LAOS: REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
Nearly two years after the cease-fire, major
steps are finally being taken to resettle the coun-
try's large refugee population. The initial group of
refugees opting for resettlement was scheduled to
be flown from Vientiane to Communist-con-
trolled territory on the Plaine des Jarres in north-
ern Laos this week.
Estimates of the total number of refugees in
Laos vary widely. USAID, which has for years
been deeply involved in providing assistance and
food for refugees in the non-Communist zone,
estimates that there are some 700,000. Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma, on the other hand,
claims that fully one third of the nation's popula-
tion of 3,000,000 fall into the category of dis-
placed persons or refugees. Other coalition gov-
ernment officials believe the figure to be in the
range of 400,000 to 500,000. Whatever the speci-
fic figure, refugees constitute a significant per-
centage of the Laotian population.
The Pathet Lao?who control two thirds of
the country but less than one third of the popula-
tion?are fully aware of the refugees' potential
significance. Many belong to mountain-dwelling
tribes whose ancestral homelands are in the Com-
munist zone. Should large numbers choose to
return, the Pathet Lao would be in line for a
population windfall that could prove extremely
valuable when national elections are eventually
held.
The Joint Central Commission--the coalition
body responsible for refugee resettlement?would
like to wrap up the entire resettlement operation
by the end of March to enable refugees to plant
their rice crop before the rainy season begins.
Given the enormous logistic problems involved
and the extreme weakness of the coalition govern-
ment's administrative machinery, however, it is
likely that only a small number of refugees will
actually be resettled in the next few months.
During the negotiations on refugee resettle-
ment, the Pathet Lao successfully resisted non-
Communist demands for prior inspection of pro-
posed resettlement sites in Pathet Lao areas as
well as for guarantees of freedom of movement
for the refugees after settlement. The Commu-
nists did agree, however, to permit representatives
of the UN High Commission for Refugees?which
is footing the lion's share of the resettlement
bill?to accompany Joint Central Commission
teams on inspection tours of refugee villages in
the Pathet Lao zone after resettlement has been
achieved.
VIETNAM: ANNIVERSARY LULL
The second anniversary of the cease-fire
agreement on January 29 with;ssed a temporary
lull in the fighting, but most indi..--tions point to
a resumption of heavy Communist attacks di-
rected at vulnerable government areas throughout
the country.
Vietnamese Communist commentary con-
tinues to blame Saigon and Washington for the
persistent warfare. President Ford's request for
supplemental military assistance for the Saigon
government was vigorously attacked as a clear
indication of US unwillingness to implement the
Paris accords. The article also attempted to por-
tray continuing US assistance to Saigon as justifi-
cation for the current Communist military cam-
paign in the South. The Viet Cong's Provisional
Revolutionary Government issued a communique
on January 17 repeating its demand that Presi-
dent Thieu resign and all US aid to South Viet-
nam be ended before serious consideration could
be given to resuming negotiations. The North
Vietnamese repeated their support of these de-
mands in a commentary on January 24.
Meanwhile, Hanoi acknowledged for the first
time that a 23rd plenum of the Lao Dong Party
Central Committee was held last summer. The
decision to make President Thieu's resignation a
condition for new negotiations and to carry out
the present military campaign in the South may
have been ratified by this body. The plenum also
endorsed a new agricultural reform program
aimed at improving management and crackin
down on free-market sales in grain.
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THAILAND: AN UNCERTAIN MANDATE
Thailand, in an ambitious attempt to adopt a
parliamentary system of government, emerged
from its first election with results so mixed that it
may take weeks before a government can be put
toylther. Any government that is formed is likely
to be highly unstable.
Candidates from 22 parties were elected to
the 269-seat lower house. Most Thai political pun-
dits had predicted a sweep by the four leading
conservative parties?an outcome that would have
allowed the existing elite to retain its monopoly
on political power. Instead, the Democrat Party,
Thailand's oldest political party and best known
for its opposition to military rule, walked away
with the largest number of seats in the parlia-
ment-71. Its nearest competitor, the conservative
Social Justice Party, gained only 46 seats, al-
though it had been the pre-election favorite of
almost everyone. Both parties are far short of the
135 seats needed for a majority in the lower
house.
THE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY ARE
NO BETTER THAN THEY WERE 15
YEARS AGO.
The Democrats presumably will attempt to
form a coalition government, but the odds are no
better than even that the party's leader, Seni
Pramot, will succeed. Leaving potential personal-
ity clashes aside, the political mathematics of the
situation suggest that Seni would have to work
with as many as seven other parties to gain a
like-minded majority. Seni has said that he would
like to avoid a center-right coalition, partly be-
cause of his party's long-standing opposition to
the military and their political henchmen, and
partly because the election clearly showed that
the old elite lacks the voter's confidence. He will
find it difficult, however, to form a viable coali-
tion without some conservative support.
Seni might attempt a center-left coalition,
but it is questionable whether he could persuade
Checking names and faces
the Socialist Party of Thailand, which has charac-
terized the Democrats as a "capitalist, feudalist"
party, to cooperate. Were he to succeed, however,
the prospects of a leftist government eventually
emerging would immediately raise fears among
the still powerful military.
If Seni fails to put a government together,
the initiative will almost certainly shift to the
conservative bloc. It, too, would be faced with an
unwieldy coalitionperhaps as many as 12 parties
would have to participate to give it a majority in
the assembly if parties from the center grouping
were excluded.
Whatever the outcome?and the US embassy
believes the possibility of a minority government
cannot be discounted?the prospects for political
stability in Thailand are no better today than
they were immediately after the Thanom military
regime was toppled 15 months ago.
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PHILIPPINES: TALK, 1ALK, FIGHT, FIGHT
During the past month, the Philippine gov-
ernment and Muslim insurgents have confronted
each other on the battlefield and at the bargaining
table, but there has been no breakthrough in
either arena.
Two weeks of talks in Jidda with leaders of
the radical insurgent group, the Moro National
Liberation Front, apparently brought the two
sides no closer than before. At the same time,
insurgent forces in the southern Philippines in-
creased their guerrilla operations, causing a sub-
stantial number of government casualties.
The talks in Jidda began in mid-January un-
der the auspices of the secretariat of Islamic na-
tions and were the first discussions between gov-
ernment representatives and Nur Misuari, leader
of the Liberation Front. President Marcos' execu-
tive secretary, Alejandro Melchor, a well-known
moderate on Muslim issues, led Manila's dele-
gation.
Last year, a meeting of the foreign ministers
of Islamic nations called for direct talks between
Manila and the Front. Marcos does not accept
Misuari as the sole Muslim spokesman, and is
seeking talks with other rebel leaders. Misuari's
group is the best known of the insurgent organiza-
tions, however, and a settlement with it would be
a major breakthrough.
? In a public speech on January 28, Marcos
charged that the Muslims were seeking to wreck
the negotiations by their unreasonable demands
and by their recently renewed attacks on govern-
ment troops. Marcos claimed that he had pre-
viously ordered his forces to stop fighting during
the negotiations, but that the insurgents had
taken advantage of this decision to ambush gov-
ernment units.
Marcos' speech undoubtedly is directed at
both domestic and foreign audiences. He pointed
to the renewed fighting as another reason why
martial law is necessary, an obvious reference to
the upcoming national referendum on the contin-
uation of martial law. But more importantly, he is
probably trying to press the Arabs to lean on
Misuari to moderate his negotiating position.
Marcos is also making sure that, in the aftermath
of a failure at Jidda, the Philippine government
will appear as the party of reason and moderation
and the Muslims will be the villains.
25X1
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Muslim rebels in southern Phi;ippMes
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BANGLADESH: PRESIDENTIAL RULE
Mujibur Rahman, the founding father of
troubled Bangladesh, has implemented his plan
for converting the country to a more author-
itarian form of government. On January 25,
Mujib was sworn in as president with near-dic-
tatorial powers, following swift approval by the
legislature of his proposal for constitutional
changes shifting the colintry from a parliamentary
to a presidential systelo.
The constitutional changes circumscribe op-
portunities for members of parliament to oppose
the government, and they empower Mujib to
declare Bangladesh a one-party state if he chooses
to do so. They also give Mujib extensive control
over the judiciary. Another bill passed on January
25 institutionalizes emergency regulations under
which many basic civil rights were suspended last
month. The president is to be popularly elected
under the new system, but neither Mujib nor the
current parliament are required to run for elec-
tion until 1980.
The main obstacle to Mujib's long-harbored
plan was removed last week when the ruling
Awam i League's parliamentary group unan-
imousy authorized him to take whatever steps he
deemed necessary to cope with the country's
severe economic and social problems. Previously,
leading party members had opposed a shift to a
presidential system for fear it would reduce ?heir
influence. Mujib, who is still the most popular
leader in Bangladesh, finally convinced them to
accede to his wishes.
The new system gives Mujib increased power
to deal with smugglers, hoarders, terrorists, and
corrupt officials. In the past, however, he has
been slow to clamp down on friends and relatives,
some of whom have been deeply involved in cor-
ruption. A failure to act forcefully now could
make Mujib appear ineffective, focus popular dis-
content on him ponalIy
25X1
Mujib's choices for his new cabinet do not
offer grounds for expecting bold mw approaches
soon to the country's problem. The cabinet con-
tains little fresh talent. A majority of the 17
ministers are holdovers from the previous cabinet,
and most of the six new members appear to have
been chosen mainly for their political reliability
rather than for any administrative talents they
might have. Power is now centered in the pres-
idency, not the cabinet. Yet even strong presi-
dential action may do little to resolve Bangla-
desh's massive economic troubles.i
25X1
SOMALIA: DISCOURAGING OPPONENTS
President Siad's leftist regime last week sum-
marily executed a group of Muslim religious
leaders who had openly opposed a recent govern-
ment move to carry out reforms that run counter
to the teachings of Islam, the country's dominant
religion. The harsh punishment may increase
domestic unrest and also jeopardize Somalia's cur-
rent efforts to obtain financial aid from conserva-
tive Arab states.
Traditionalist religious leaders were aroused
by a government decree, issued without warning
on January 11, that granted Somali women equal
political, social, and economic rights. In making
the announcement, Siad characterized Islam
regulations regarding women as anachronistic and
inconsistent with the "principles of scientific
socialism," which allegedly guide the regime.
The religious leaders, already distrustful of
the government because of its socialist policies
and ties with the Soviet Union, reacted by de-
nouncing the decree during their sermons in the
mosques on January 17 and calling for Siad to
s,ep down as president. A wholesale arrest of
disgruntled religious leaders followed; ten of them
were executed by a firing squad on January 23
and others were given lengthy prison terms.
The general populace, long cowed by the
government's strong internal security apparatus,
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has remained relatively quiet throughout the
episode, although numerous clashes occurred be-
tween police and conservative Muslims during the
roundup of religious leaders and the closing of
some mosques. Prior to the Friday services on
January 24, the government effectively gagged
the religious establishment by prohibiting all
prayer leaders, except state appointees, from
delivering sermons in the mosques.
Popular resentment has now apparently been
directed toward Soviet personnel in Mogadiscio.
The homes of Soviet citizens are being guarded by
police and the Soviets are keeping off the streets.
Many Somalis associate the Soviets with the
decree as well as with the government's socialist
policies. Arab diplomats in Somalia were angered
by Siad's actions against his religious critics. Some
Arab governments may react by reducing or
canceling financial assistance to the hard-pressed
Somali government. The Arab League's decision
to hold its next summit meeting in Mogadiscio
ma also have been ?lar.ed in jeopardy.
Malagasy Republic
INTERNAL RUMBLINGS
General Rarnanantsoa, the head of govern-
ment, eissolved the cabinet on January 26 and
promised to form a new government. His move
was an attempt to end a recent resurgence of
tribal and rr ilitary unrest highlighted by an unsuc-
cessful coup attempt on January 1 by officers
from disaffected coastal tribes. Ramanantsoa,
who is still the most powerful figure in the re-
gime, apparently intends to give the coastal tribes
a bigger role in the new government.
In his announcement dissolving the govern-
ment, Ramanantsoa made no mention of the
animosities that sparked the plotting and unrest;
he claimed his move was prompted by the coun-
try's economic difficulties. The plotters resent
domineion of the government by Merina tribes-
men of central Madagascar. Until Ramanantsoa?a
Merina?came to powe: in 1972 after student and
labor demonstrations helped topple his predeces-
sor, coastal people had long dominated the gov-
ernment.
Some of the cou lotters were arrested
25X1
Ramanantsoa's position does not appear to
have been challenged by the recent events. None-
theless, in moving cautiously against the plotters
he has also hoped to avoid aggravating similar
differences among his key subordinates. Colonel
Ratsimandrava, interior minister and head of the
gendarmerie, and army Colonel Rabetafika, the
director general of the government and Rama-
nantsoa's right-hand man, have been rivals since
Ramanantsoa came to power. Their conflict
partly reflects traditional animosity between the
gendarmerie and the ar ny, an extension of
coastal-Merina rivalry; the gendarmerie is predom-
inantly coastal, and the army is a Merina preserve.
Ratsimandrava and Rabetafika may also have dif-
fered on how to deal with the current problem,
raising the possibility of a clash between the army
and gendarmerie.
The faltering economy and food shortages
have also contributed to the surge in unrest. The
new cabinet promised by Ramanantsoa, there-
fore, may try to improve the situation and en-
courage more Western aid by diminishing govern-
ment involvement in the economy and allowing a
larger role for private enterprise.
Regardless of any economic changes, Mada-
gascar will probably continue to follow a foreign
policy of radical nonalignment, which replaced
the conservative, pro-French position favored by
the pre-1972 government. Foreign Minister
Ratsiraka, the driving force behind the current
policy, is likely to retain his position. During his
three years in office, Ratsiraka has won wide
support among government colleagues and the
people for his nonaligned policies, which include
a ban on visits by foreign naval ships.r
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OPEC MEETING IN ALGIERS
The foreign, finance, and oil ministers of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
took a relatively moderate line on oil-related top-
ics at their meeting in Algiers between January 24
and 26. The conference agreed to hold an OPEC
summit in Algiers, probably between February 21
and March 8, to be followed by a meeting with oil
consumers.
To a large extent, the outcome of this first
gathering of OPEC's foreign?finance, and oil min-
isters seems to reflect a decision to postpone until
later a possible airing of differences among the
cartel members. The Algerians had proposed the
conference in an effort to advance their own
political and economic goals; Foreign Minister
Bouteflika, elected conference chairman, tried to
sound the keynote with his opening attack on
Western industrialized nations.
The Algerians, who for some time have been
calling loudly for a "new economic order," appar-
ently had hoped the conference would take up a
wide range of topics in detail. More moderate
delegates, including the spokesmen for Iran and
Saudi Arabia, managed to head this off and engi-
neer an early end to the conference, allowing
further substantive preparations for the summit
to be made more carefully and away from Algiers'
politicized atmosphere. An "experts" meeting is
to be held in Vienna on February 8, and the oil
ministers are to confer there on February 19.
Algeria surfaced a proposal on oil pricing
that appears to be relat;vely moderate. It would
involve a continuation of the present freeze on
prices through 1975; price increases in 1976 and
1977 would be correlated to "certain factors to
be defined" and to the rate of inflation. The price
issue was not mentioned in the final commu-
nique, hovvever.
Tie final communique said that OPEC wel-
comed a dialogue between the industrialized and
developing countries and was prepared to partici-
pate in a conference such as France proposed.
Participants from Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and
Nigeria told US officials that the conference had
decided OPEC would adopt a position of coopera-
tion rather than confrontation in its dealings with
the industrialized countries. Saudi oil minister
Yamani has suggested that a preliminary ex-
porter-importer meeting could be held as early as
March to set an agenda for a full-scale confer-
ence.
OPEC dele ates
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PERU. 01 D FACES NEW JORS
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than compromise and be associated with what he
would interpret as a sell-out of the revolution's
goals.
Although Morales Bermudez will be a
moderating force and, as prime minister, will
probably play a greater role in the decision-
making process than his predecessor, the basic
thrust of the revolution will not change dras-
tically. For some time to come Peru will be con-
trolled by an authoritarian, nationalistic, and
socialist-oriented military. Tactics may be mod-
erated somewhat depending on personalities, but
the strategy of the process will remain essentially
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Nicaragua
OPPOSITION GAINS CONFIDENCE
President Anastasio Somoza is faced with
increasing disaffection and an opposition on-
couraged by the success of the terrorists who
seized government officials last month and bar-
tered their freedom for a flight to Cuba. Somoza's
power and control are not in any immediate
danger but the growing dissidence could weaken
his hold.
Nicaraguan politics, historically contested by
liberals and conservatives, have been dominated
by the Somoza family through the Liberal Party
since 1937. Despite losses to anti-Somoza fac-
tions, this party still constitutes a principal part
of the President's power base. Recently, however,
legitimate opposition groups including the Con-
servatives, too weak or fragmented in the past to
pose any real threat, have increasingly turned to
coalition as the major tactic in challenging the
Somozas. Nine organizations that had endorsed
abstention in the last election recently formed the
Union of Democratic Liberation. Ranging across
the political spectrum from right to left, the
group includes dissident liberals and conserva-
tives, Social Christians and Communists. Their
objective is fn force Somoza to uphold all consti-
tutional liberties or, failing that, to break the
family's firm grip on the sources of power.
The kidnaping of some of Somoza's closest
aides and family on December 27 by members of
the Sandinist Liberation Front demonstrated to
many dissidents that the regime is vulnerable, and
that violence is a viable means of protest. In fact,
sympathy for the hitherto ineffective Sandinists
has grown, particularly among the repressed
peasants of northern Nicaragua, university
students in Managua and Leon, and even middle-
class professionals. Furthermore, the well-
executed act quickened the polarization between
supporters and opponents of the Somozas.
Opposition party leaders want to take advan-
tage of the momentum and psychological climate
created by the Sandinists, but they hesitate for
fear of government reprisals. Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro, Somoza's principal antagonist and
leader of the new opposition coalition, may soon
have to answer to a military court for distributing
a document that blames the government for the
country's violence and calls for the immediate
termination of martial law. So far, the anti-
Somoza front has concentrated on justifying itself
as a non-violent alternative to the Sandinists.
Now, however, it is planning several rallies that?if
carried out?could signal a readiness to risk a
confrontation.
Future protests?through violence, the
media, or bureaucratic channels?will be largely
determined by how the government attempts to
defuse public disaffection. If the administration
expands civil liberties and allows for freedom of
expression, dissident groups may soften their
attack. The trend toward unified dissidence, now
motivated by extreme outrage, may then be
reversed. On the other hand, strong man tactics,
such as vindictiveness by National Guardsmen,
could bring on student and labor strikes and an
upsurge of terrorism.
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ECUADOR: TUNA BOATS AGAIN
The Ecuadorean navy seized four US tuna
boats on January 25 and three days later fined
their parent companies for unlicensed fishing in-
side Ecuador's claimed 200-mile territorial sea
limit. The fines totaled $253,920 for the confis-
cated 1,130-ton catch, which the authorities have
apparently offered to sell back to the companies
for an additional $230,000. A fifth boat was
seized on January 29.
These are the first su:h incidents since the
1972-73 fishing season. Thy occurred as Ecua-
dor, with Venezeula, was aharging that the new
US Trade Reform Act unreasonably discriminates
against the two Latin American nations because
of their membership in the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries. Although there is no
evidence that Quito was actively seeking a cause
celebre, the government showed no hesitation
when naval units stumbled upon the tuna boats.
lnitiai government announcements of the
seizures claimed that the boats had been captured
40 miles offshore," placing them on the limit
between two distinct fishing zones established by
the revised fishing law of January 1. From 40 to
200 miles, fishing operations are permitted when
licensed, but within 40 miles, foreign fishing is
prohibited altogether. Fines and probably confis-
cation are the expected penalties for unlicensed
fishing; these and more severe penalties, including
imprisonment of crews, may result from fishing in
the prohibited zone.
By pegging the capture of the tuna boats to
the 40-mile limit, Quito appeared to be reserving
the option to increase the penalty, depending on
the reaction of the companies involved and the
US government. Determination of the precise lo-
cation of the seizures?ostensibly to be settled
after careful study of the boats' logs and naval
data?could be postponed almost indefinitely.
Disposition of the first four cases could be ad-
versely affected by the January 29 seizure. The
fifth boat had already been captured t-ree times
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prior to this season. It also exceeds the net regis-
tered tonnage limit stipulated for fishing vessels in
Ecuadorean waters.
The Ecuadoreans are particularly interested
in US congressional reaction in view of the Fisher-
men's Protective Act. This legislation provides for
US government compensation to companies fined
for fishing in foreign territorial seas, so long as the
incident takes place outside the US-recognized
12-mile limit. The amount of compensation is
then to be deducted from US military assistance
to the country involved. During the 1972-73 tuna
season, compensation for fines levied in Ecuador's
claimed seas reached the level of our military
assistance to that country, and the assistance pro-
gram was suspended. It was reinstated in January
1974.
However bilateral relations may be affected
by this new incident, such seizures play a major
domestic role in Ecuador in their reflection of
army-navy rivalries. Two of the country's most
important sources of foreign exchange, fishing
and petruleum, until last October were under the
authority of powerful and ambitious Admiral
Gustavo Jarrin in his capacity as minister of
natural resources. President Rodriguez, an army
gene121. replaced Jarrin with a lesser light, and
more recently appointed another army officer as
governor of coastal Guayas Province, traditionally
a navy position. The navy is also miffed that the
central government is spending grandly on army
and air force weapons and materiel while the
navy's fleet remains antiquated and barely service-
able.
In this combination of circumstances?tying
Ecuador's international relationships to domestic
military discord and intra-government warfare?it
appears likely that the navy will continue to
assert itself. As long as the tuna continue to run
well, the navy's self-assertion will cause greater
friction in relations with the US./
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ARGENTINA: PROTESTING LOPEZ REGA
The military's growing concern over the
steadily expanding power of presidential adviser
Jose Lopez Rega may soon bring the issue to a
head. According to the US embassy, the three
armed forces commanders met with the defense
minister last week to protest Lopez Rega's exces-
sive influence in the government. The military
high command apparently has not issued any
ultimatum, but the possibility of demands being
made on President Peron is greater now than at
any time since she assumed office last year.
President Peron is resting at an Atlantic
beach resort. Her absence from the capital has
probably stimulated speculation that Lopez Rega,
alone, is running the government?a conclusion
that may not be too far off the mark.
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Her reliance on the controversial minister is
also increasing alarm in Peronist labor and opposi-
tion political circles. Prominent opposition leader
Ricardo Balbin reportedly has taped a TV inter-
view in which he denounces recent heavy-handed
actions by the government and criticizes the con-
centration of power within the newly created
presidential secretariat headed by Lopez Rega.
The embassy reports that Ba!bin's party has been
in contact with armed forces leaders during the
past few weeks and that they may have agreed to
a joint stand against the President's key adviser.
If Mrs. Peron does not take some action
soon to curb Lopez Rega's authority, she may
well be headed for a conf-ontation with the
power groups she needs most to guarantee sup-
port for her government.
? ? ?
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