THIRD WORLD LAND REFORM AND POLITICAL STABILITY

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• Document Release Date: January 9, 2012
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• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
F-
Intelligence
A *..t& Pmpw
Sam
010-10017
JMawy 1985
c 404
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Directorate of Secret
i Intelligence 25X1
Third World Land Reform
and Political Stability
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This paper was prepared by
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of the Office of Global Issues.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Research Director, OGI,
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Secret
G185-10017
January 1985
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Overview
Information available
as of 1 December 1984
was used in this report.
and Political Stability
Land redistribution is widely seen as one way to achieve or preserve
political stability in developing nations, and, for this reason, the US
Government is often asked to assess, plan, or otherwise support such
efforts. The actual land reforms, however, have had mixed political results,
and such efforts can backfire against the interests of both the implement-
ing regime and the United States. This study briefly examines several
dozen land reforms and identifies conditions under which reform is
politically effective.
Our more detailed assessments of three ongoing land reform programs
suggest that:
? Despite continuing problems, land reform in El Salvador is increasingly
gaining the support of the peasants, limiting the opportunities of the
insurgents, undermining the power of the landed oligarchy, and improv-
ing the government's image overseas.
? Zimbabwe's revolutionary regime is gambling that the economic benefits
of slow land redistribution will outweigh the political costs of reneging on
promises and revolutionary principles. Given the tribal dynamic of the
country's politics, the government is unlikely to lose much Shona support
or gain much Ndebele support no matter what action it takes with regard
to land reform.
? The Philippine land reform, largely because of its modest scope, cannot
be considered either a political success or a political failure for the
Marcos government. While many Luzon peasants have benefited from
the reform, others regard it as an unwanted disturbance of traditional
patron-client relationships. Because the program is limited to rice and
corn land and is generally well supported with extension services,
landlord opposition has been minimal and the economic costs have been
low.
Secret
GI 85-10017
January 1985
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Third World Land Reform
and Political Stability
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Because the US Government is often called upon to
advise-and sometimes to help finance and adminis-
ter-land reform in developing nations, it is important
to understand the conditions under which land reform
has bolstered or undermined political stability. This
study-based on several dozen reform attempts
worldwide-looks at the varied political purposes,
notes the different categories of winners and losers,
and underlines potential pitfalls. After a brief discus-
sion of the often-conflicting demands of economics
and politics, it takes a close look at ongoing land
reforms in El Salvador, Zimbabwe, and the Philip-
pines. Finally, it suggests rules for judging whether a
proposed land reform will be stabilizing or destabiliz-
ing.
The Political Purposes of Land Reform
Land reform is usually undertaken for some combina-
tion of the following reasons:
? To calm a potentially rebellious rural population.
? To undermine the political and economic power of
the landowning class or some segment of it.
? To reward government supporters.
? To obtain international publicity or the support of a
foreign power.
? To meet an ideological or moral commitment.
mystique is largely dead in most areas of the Third
World, however, and the modern peasant is usually
more interested in economic security and improving
his standard of living than in owning a scrap of land.
Therefore, land reform, unless backed with substan-
tial resources to improve peasant life may not calm
peasant unrest
banking) reform
Rulers ranging from Lenin to the Shah of Iran have
long used land reform to undermine the political power
of the landlord class. In many cases, such action was
necessary to eliminate conflicting centers of political
power and establish central government rule in rural
areas. Examples may be drawn not only from the
USSR and Iran, but also from China, Bolivia, Mexi-
co, and Zimbabwe. The present centrist government
in El Salvador owes a part of its ability to rule to a
weakening of the extreme right through land (and
Closely related to the use of land reform to undermine
the power of the landlord class is the use of land to
reward friends of the government or co-opt powerful
independent forces. During and after the Mexican
Revolution, the distribution of land to potentially
rebellious revolutionary generals (who, in turn, dis-
tributed it to their potentially rebellious followers) was
a stabilizing factor of considerable importance. More
recently, Guatemalan governments have rewarded
military supporters with choice sections of newly
opened lowland agricultural areas.
Although most land reforms have had the stated
purpose of gaining the active support of the rural
population, this has rarely been the final result. The
most that has generally been achieved is the political
neutralization of the population-but this in itself can
foster stability. During the Bolivian Revolution of
1952, for example, after the revolutionary government
acquiesced in Indian land seizures, the previously
radical peasantry opted out of the fighting, thereby
allowing the government to be stabilized and averting
further radicalization of the Revolution. Similar ex-
amples can be found in areas of Mexico from time to
time during the Revolution of 1910-20. The old land
The use of land reform to gain favorable international
publicity and influence foreign governments is also
common. This was at least a secondary purpose in the
land reforms of Peru, Iran, South Vietnam, and El
Salvador. Indeed, it has been argued by certain
political writers that the greatest benefit of Salvador-
an land reform may be its effect on US public and
Congressional opinion.
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The Iranian land reform, although it eliminated
serfdom and materially aided large numbers of peas-
ants, remains a model of politically destabilizing
government action. Indeed, a major cause of the
Islamic Revolution of 1979 can be found in the
antagonisms and dislocations created by the Shah's
land reform. The Shah instituted his massive pro-
gram to create a rural middle class in place of the
traditional landowning class and to release rural
capital and labor for use in the industrial sector as
part of a more general national modernization. He
apparently gave little or no thought to the enemies
that such a program would engender, nor did he
effectively organize the beneficiaries into a source of
support.
The losers-the potential enemies of the govern-
ment-included not only the landlords (many of
whom were part of the religious establishment) but
also large numbers of middlemen, hangers-on, and
landless workers who had been accommodated in the
former system. Many from these latter groups mi-
grated to city slums, where, as their poverty and
alienation increased, they became the willing agents
of religious and political extremists. The winners, for
their part, found themselves adrift in a new and
nontraditional world that they had neither the re-
sources nor the knowledge to exploit. Although the
land reform perhaps helped to keep rural Iran from
becoming a hotbed of anti-Shah feeling, it in no way
created a body of supporters that the Shah could rely
upon to counter other groups.
It is interesting to note that the Communist govern-
ments of Afghanistan made most of the same mis-
takes as the Shah with regard to land reform. Like
the Shah, they let an ideology of modernization
outweigh political pragmatism in devising their meas-
ures. The results were also similar-massive migra-
tion to the capital and great hostility from the
Muslim clergy and other traditional sectors of the
population.
Finally, land reform may be instituted for ideological
or moral reasons, that is, simply because a govern-
ment has promised to do so or believes that it is
ideologically the "right thing" to do. Apart from
obvious cases in the Communist world, examples
include Peru, Zimbabwe, Tanzania (a disaster), and
El Salvador
Except in rare cases where the government owns large
stretches of underutilized land, land reform creates
both winners and losers. Land that is distributed to
peasants or organized into cooperatives or state farms
must be taken from its owners. These owners may
range from feudal barons to small holders who them-
selves live on the edge of poverty. Much of the
political effectiveness of any land reform, therefore,
depends on the relative power of the winners and
losers. In other words, a land reform cannot be said to
be politically successful if it creates more-and more
powerful-enemies than friends for the government.
Even among the peasants whom it is supposed to help,
land reform may create more losers than winners. In
most of the Third World, agricultural land is in short
supply and populations are large and growing. Usual-
ly there is not enough suitable land to supply all
peasant families with viable plots. Under these cir-
cumstances, one of three things can happen. First, a
limited number of peasant families can be given
economically viable plots, thereby accentuating dif-
ferences between the lucky and the landless, with the
landless holding the government, rather than the
landlords or fate, responsible for their position. Sec-
ond, a greater number of peasant families can be
given inadequate plots that trap them in their poverty.
Third, a large number of peasant families can be
grouped into uneconomic (because of overstaffing)
cooperatives or state farms, in which the landlord is
replaced by a government official. Although any of
the three courses could be stabilizing under special
circumstances, all risk creating more instability than
stability.
In many cases, the urban poor should also be counted
among the losers from land reform. If the new peasant
landholders revert to subsistence farming-as they
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Two Politically Successful
Land Reforms: Taiwan and Egypt
When the Nationalist government and Army of main-
land China retreated to Taiwan in 1949, they found
themselves surrounded and outnumbered by an alien
and hostile population. Only two years before, the
Nationalists had had to put down an islandwide
revolt, and resentments still smoldered. With Com-
munist forces threatening invasion from the main-
land, the Nationalists had both to win the support of
the island population and to establish an economic
structure that could support a strong defense. More-
over, they wanted to create a "model province" that
would serve as a form of propaganda by example in
their battle against Red China.
They were aided by three factors: unlike on the
mainland, there were no Nationalist landowners to
object to reform; the loss of the mainland had made
them realize the need for strong measures against
corruption and inequality; and they received massive
US aid that could be directed to the agricultural
sector. Within a very few years, they tripled the
number of landowners, reduced the size of average
holdings from 1.3 to 1.0 hectares, and increased
agricultural output and foreign exchange earnings.
The Taiwanese peasants, although still somewhat
resentful of the Nationalists, realized that a Commu-
nist takeover could jeopardize their higher standard
did in Bolivia in 1952-food will become scarce and
expensive in the cities. If discontented slumdwellers
constitute a greater threat to stability than discontent-
ed peasants, the overall effect of the land reform will
be destabilizing.
Once the winners and losers of a particular land
reform have been identified, there are several things
that a regime can do to increase political benefits and
cut political losses. The peasant beneficiaries can be
organized into a mobilized bloc of government sup-
porters. This was done from time to time during and
after the Mexican Revolution and during the Arbenz
government in Guatemala. Attempts are currently
being made along these lines in Nicaragua, Zimba-
bwe, and El Salvador. Land reform also can be used
to co-opt independent forces that have more power or
of living. The former Taiwanese landowners were
compensated partly in industrial shares and therefore
gained a stake in what was to become one of the
Third World's most thriving industrial economies. As
planned, the reform won the support of both peasants
and landlords for the Nationalists without disrupting
the economy
Shortly after taking over the Egyptian Government in
1952, the group of officers around Nasir established
a land reform that destroyed the economic power of
many supporters of the old political order and gained
the support of much of the rural population. In most
cases, the landowners had supplied nothing but land
to the peasants before the reform and thus were in no
way responsible for the high yields that were tradi-
tional in Egyptian agriculture. Therefore, the reform
meant an immediate increase in peasant earnings (by
the amount of the landlord's share) without the kind
of economic losses that have taken place in countries
where landlords were important sources of agricul-
tural input and technical know-how. Although coop-
eratives were established in many cases, the govern-
ment was more concerned with enhancing peasant
incentives than with imposing an ideological structure
on Egyptian agriculture.
constitute a greater threat to the government than the
landlords or other losers. In Mexico, for example, it
was clearly stabilizing to reward quasi-independent
generals at the expense of the rural aristocracy.
Finally, additional steps can be taken to neutralize the
losers. Here the contrast between Mexico and Iran is
instructive: the Mexican revolutionary government
deliberately destroyed the political power of the
Church at the same time it was taking over Church
property, while the Shah left a wounded but still
powerful religious establishment looking for revenge.
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Country
Period
Peasant
Support
Nonpeasant
Attitudes b
International
Attitudes
Effectiveness of
Administration
Physical The
Security Upshot
Afghanistan
Since 1978
1
2
5
1
1
1
5
2
NA
6
Bolivia
1952-54
10
3
5
2
NA
6
Chile
1965-70
2
5
8
5
NA
5
Chile
1970-73
7
5
5
5
NA
6
Egypt
1952-62
8
8
5
5
NA
8
Malaysia
1957-65
8
8
6
9
5
8
Mexico
1910-40
9
10
9
2
4
9
Mexico
Since 1940
5
5
6
3
NA
5
Nicaragua
Since 1979
6
5
6
4
4
5
Peru
1968-74
6
7
6
4
NA
6
Philippines
Since 1972
6
5
4
6
3
5
Taiwan
1949-52
9
9
5
9
NA
9
Tanzania
Since 1967
1
5
6
1
NA
2
Vietnam
1955-75
5
4
4
6
4
5
Zimbabwe
Since 1980
3
5
7
7
NA
5
a Ratings reflect our judgments of overall political effects on a scale
ofIto10:
1 = negative political effect; 5 = neutral political effect; 10 =
positive political effect.
b Reflects our judgment of how successful the land reform was in
either co-opting or suppressing the nonpeasant opposition. Thus,
Mexico is given a high rating in this category because it destroyed
the political power of those hurt by the reform, while Iran is given a
low rating because it enraged but did not suppress those groups hurt
by the reform.
c Under US occupation.
Land reform, at least in its initial stages, is almost
always harmful for the economy. Therefore, a major
question for potential land reformers is whether the
political benefits will outweigh the economic costs.
Most attempts to create land reforms that were both
politically effective and economically efficient have
failed on both counts. Such attempts generally have
involved the creation of state farms or other large
agricultural units that, in the eyes of many peasants,
merely exchange one landlord for another. These
efforts have rarely been as efficient as the private
farms they replaced. They have been politically effec-
tive only in those few cases where the government has
been willing to supply enough resources to make a
clear improvement in the peasants' standard of living.
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lion from the right.
Governments contemplating land reform are usually
strapped for funds to supply credit and other re-
sources to the new landowners and to compensate the
former landowners. At the same time, the political
necessity to hold down prices in urban areas may
prevent satisfactory prices for agricultural products.
Moreover, many governments must maintain or in-
crease agricultural production and exports to obtain
hard currency for needed imports. Given such contra-
dictory demands, the political gains must be both
great and relatively assured to justify extensive land
reform. If a decision is made to implement reform, it
is a false economy for the government to be niggardly
in compensating the losers, unless the ousted landlords
and their allies have been thoroughly destroyed as a
political force-which is not usually the case. Gener-
ous compensation can neutralize potential opponents,
whereas low compensation paid in doubtful bonds
redeemable in the distant future openly courts rebel-
support.
In this section, we examine ongoing land reforms in El
Salvador, Zimbabwe, and the Philippines. Peasant
support refers to support for the land reform program.
This may well be a precondition for peasant support
for the government, but it is not identical to such
implementation.
El Salvador
El Salvador's agrarian-reform program was initiated
in 1980 by an alliance of Christian Democrats and
military officers who had staged a coup to bring about
fundamental political and social reforms. From the
beginning, agrarian reform was intended to destroy
the traditional oligarchy and reduce the attraction of
leftist insurgents by improving the economic and
political status of the peasantry. The program is
divided into three phases, each focusing on a different
size of landholding and setting a different schedule for
Phase I expropriated properties over 500 hectares
(1,235 acres). These plantations were subdivided into
317 cooperatives-about 40 have since been aban-
doned-benefiting an estimated 188,000 people. Im-
plementation of this phase has been completed.
Phase II will affect properties between 245 and 500
hectares (605 to 1,235 acres). Implementation of this
phase has been postponed because of disagreement
over the size of property targeted and strong resist-
ance to breaking up highly productive coffee planta-
tions, many owned by members of the middle class. In
late December 1983, the new Constitution set the
maximum size and gave owners three years to sell
excess acreage.
Phase III allows renters or sharecroppers to claim up
to 7 hectares (17.3 acres) of land they cultivate. This
phase has been extended three times, enabling 60,723
peasants to file petitions for land. The deadline for
filing petitions was 30 June 1984.
ous nation.
According to AID, over 92,000 Salvadorans have
received title to over 23 percent of the country's
arable land since 1980; these beneficiaries and their
dependents represent more than half of El Salvador's
landless rural population. This major shift in land
tenure is particularly noteworthy because of the rela-
tively small amount of arable land in this mountain-
Peasant Support. Phase III of El Salvador's agrarian-
reform program receives significant peasant support,
as indicated by the fact that thousands of peasants
have defied landlord threats and made formal land
claims to the government. This judgment is also
supported by a 1983 AID contract study. The evi-
dence is less convincing with regard to Phase I. On the
one hand, the financial and organizational problems
of many Phase I cooperatives, compounded by peasant
ambivalence toward collective landholding, in some
cases appear to have nullified any favorable political
impact. For example, peasants in an Ahuachapan
Department cooperative have complained to visiting
Embassy officials that they were better off as planta-
tion workers and that their living conditions deterio-
rated greatly when the plantation was transformed
into a worker-managed cooperative under Phase I. On
the other hand, a recent Inspector General (IG) audit
claims that Phase I beneficiaries are in a better
position than Phase III beneficiaries to "substantially
improve their economic and social positions" and thus
have a vested interest in the program. On balance, we
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would agree with independent peasant leaders who
claim that the large-scale transfer of landownership
represented by both phases has been a major factor in
preventing an insurgent-led uprising in the country-
side.
Independent peasant organizations-the largest com-
prising 75,000 members-play a major, voluntary role
in formulating and implementing the agrarian-reform
program. These organizations not only lobby in the
Salvadoran legislature but also stage mass demonstra-
tions to influence national public opinion. They propa-
gate information on reform laws in the countryside,
persuade peasants to make formal land claims to the
government, and monitor implementation of the pro-
gram by, among other things, keeping their own
statistics on illegal evictions. The existence of inde-
pendent peasant organizations-which have survived
despite terrorism from both the extreme left and the
extreme right-underscores that the land reform is
not a case of change originating solely within the
government or an elite sector. When earlier reforms
were frustrated in the 1970s, one of the main peasant
organizations, FECCAS, joined the insurgency; the
failure of the insurgents to attract major groups since
1980 suggests that the current program is meeting at
least one of its political goals.
Nonpeasant Attitudes. The principal opponents of the
land reform are, as one would suspect, the affected or
soon-to-be-affected landowners and their political al-
lies, such as the ARENA party. While some landown-
ers object to land reform on principle, most base their
objections on the perceived inadequacy of compensa-
tion. Although the valuation of the properties appears
to have been fair in most cases, the method of
compensation-partly cash and partly low-interest
bonds with terms of up to 30 years-is considered
tantamount to expropriation by many ex-owners. In
many cases, some because of litigation by the land-
owners themselves, the cash portion has not been paid.
The more radical of the landowners-especially the
small landowners affected by Phase III-and their
allies are using legal and extralegal means to under-
mine both the land reform and the government that
supports it
The forces of the extreme right, however, have not
been able to overturn the reform legislation or its
implementation. Indeed, even overt opponents of the
program now concede that the land distribution ac-
complished to date is "irreversible." All but the most
hard line appear to realize that the recent election of
the Christian Democratic leader, Jose Napoleon
Duarte, and the continued support of reform by the
Catholic Church and the US Embassy make a major
retreat on the land issue unlikely. Although the Army
is no longer as involved in agrarian reform as it was in
the past-in 1981 it played a key role in enforcing
Phase I expropriations and in 1982 it stemmed the
tide of illegal evictions and violence against reform
beneficiaries-it continues to support the program,
largely because of its advantages for counterinsur-
gency
International Attitudes. The international press ap-
pears to be overcoming its initial tendency to down-
play the seriousness of the reform effort and the
degree to which it is supported by the peasants, and on
balance the reform has boosted the international
reputation of the Salvadoran Government. The re-
form has also been an important factor in obtaining
military and economic aid from the US Government.
Fffectiveness of Administration. Uncertainty and
confusion among both landlords and peasants have
characterized the implementation of the reform. Peas-
ants often do not understand the qualifications or
procedures. The landlords are uncertain as to the
criteria for expropriation-particularly concerning
Phase 11-and this has prompted many to cease
renting, investing, or planting. In one case, a peasant
group petitioned the government not to implement
agrarian reform because the new laws allowing rent-
ers to claim ownership were resulting in the refusal of
local landlords to rent-a clear example of how an
agrarian-reform program can promote instability.
Adding to the confusion, rural land surveys and
recordkeeping are generally inadequate. With US
assistance, the Salvadoran Government is attempting
to remedy this shortcoming through maps based on
aerial photography,
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speed up the process.
Phase I of the agrarian reform-designed to trans-
form El Salvador's largest plantations into coopera-
tives-was completed relatively quickly; however, im-
plementation of Phases II and III has involved
considerable delays. The slow-moving bureaucracy
has engendered numerous complaints from both peas-
ants, who want faster action on their petitions, and
from landlords engaged in appeals. Embassy reporting
on Phase III implementation states that structural
deficiencies in the apparatus for implementing reform
are responsible for the slowness. Determining bound-
aries, establishing land values, compensation, and
titling are all complicated by the small size of the
individual plots, their geographic dispersion, and the
requirement that each be visited and legally adjudi-
cated. The US Embassy states that the entire legal
land-registry system must be "radically changed" to
remain profoundly divided over what role the govern-
ment should play in providing services to the masses.
The Salvadoran Government lacks the funds and the
political power to systematically follow up land redis-
tribution with infrastructure programs and credit.
While the government has been able to provide
services in some areas, the combination of years of
economic decline and guerrilla warfare impede the
expansion of this effort nationwide. Moreover, the
agrarian reform represents a fundamental break with
the indifference to rural welfare exhibited by Salva-
doran regimes in the past, and Salvadoran elites
marketing arrangements
The failure to provide adequate government services
may have limited the effectiveness of agrarian reform
as a tool for garnering rural political support in some
areas. For example, although the Christian Demo-
cratic Party (PDC) is the foremost advocate of reform,
many peasants vote for the conservative ARENA
party. We believe that this does not reflect opposition
to land reform but rather widespread unhappiness
over government coffee-price controls, differing ex-
change rates for exports and imports, and mandatory
Noncompliance with Phase III implementation ap-
pears to be common,
concludes that the actual number of illegally evicted
Phase III beneficiaries is probably higher than indi-
cated in the survey because of the likelihood that
"landowners and guerrillas alike" are disregarding
Salvadoran Government decrees in insecure areas. In
contrast, noncompliance with Phase I was minimized
because the Army occupied the large properties.
Despite the popular image of wealthy oligarchs using
all means at their disposal, including death squads, to
block land redistribution, the government has general-
ly succeeded in imposing its authority over the largest
landowners. In Phase III implementation, however,
the landlords usually are not wealthy oligarchs but
rather small landowners with limited economic pros-
pects. the 25X1
poorest landlords are those most likely to employ
violence to discourage their tenants from filing land
claims. Even where there is no threat of violence,
many peasants apparently are reluctant to file claims 25X1
for fear of disturbing traditional relationships with
landlords who provide credit, employment, and other
help in a depressed environment where opportunities
are scarce. According to AID, approximately half of
the peasants eligible to file claims under Phase III
have not.
Physical Security. The Salvadoran Government has
failed to provide adequate security against both right-
ist and leftist attacks. Guerrilla violence has directly
hurt the agrarian reform, forcing the abandonment of
many Phase I cooperatives in the eastern part of the
country. A government survey conducted in San
Vicente Province cited insurgent violence as the prin- 25X1
cipal cause of the exodus of peasants from the coun-
tryside. Rightist violence has also damaged agrarian
reform, not only through such dramatic acts as the
assassination of the first president of the Salvadoran
Institute for Agrarian Reform but, more important,
through selective attacks on local peasant leaders.
Nevertheless, the agrarian-reform program continues
to function, and violence against peasants has de-
clined to the lowest level in several years.
The government has not seriously attempted to imple-
ment agrarian reform in territory controlled by the 25X1
insurgents. In many areas where agrarian reform is
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being implemented, the insurgents are active but do
not control the population. Press reports that in
certain localities the guerrillas give propaganda ses-
sions in government-built schools, use public health
clinics, and require local authorities to seek their
approval before implementing national government
programs do not reflect the typical situation. Unlike
the Viet Cong and other insurgents, the Salvadoran
guerrillas have not developed a clandestine political
infrastructure in rural areas that allows them to
infiltrate government agencies at the local level and
manipulate agrarian reform to their own advantage.
Nonetheless, insurgent ability to forcibly recruit
young men and women and to seize supplies drama-
tizes the weakness of government control in many
areas.
The Upshot. The Salvadoran land reform has shown
itself increasingly effective in gaining the support of
the peasants, in limiting the opportunities of the
insurgents, in undermining the power of the landed
oligarchy, and in improving the government's image
overseas. Nevertheless, peasant disenchantment with
some aspects of life in Phase I cooperatives and small
landowner opposition to Phase III redistribution re-
main serious problems.
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe's agrarian-reform program was initiated in
1980, the year that newly elected Prime Minister
Robert Mugabe ushered in black majority rule. Re-
distribution of the land-primarily the large farms
owned by whites-to black African peasants had been
one of the principal rallying cries of the insurgents
during their long war against the white-settler govern-
ment. The concentration of more than 4 million
impoverished peasants in overcrowded and eroded
Tribal Trust lands was seen as an unjust consequence
of white minority rule that required immediate re-
dress. Under the 1979 Lancaster House peace confer-
ence, which ended the insurgency, the British Govern-
ment agreed to provide some funds for compensating
white farmers. Once in power, however, Mugabe
became concerned over the economic impact of break-
ing up the large white farms that account for three-
fourths of national agricultural production and more
than half of foreign exchange earnings. Thus, Zimba-
bwe's agrarian-reform program relies largely on vol-
untary sale of property by whites and emphasizes the
creation of a modern infrastructure to complement
the resettlement of peasants from Tribal Trust lands.
This slow approach has benefited about 30,000 fam-
ilies-approximately 38 percent of the estimated
80,000 families residing in communal lands-far less
than originally anticipated.
The current drought has set back government efforts
to redistribute land and increase the number of viable
black-owned small farms by necessitating the diver-
sion of funds from rural development to food imports.
(Although Zimbabwe has long been a food surplus
country, the drought has made it necessary to import
some basic grains.) The allocation for agrarian reform
was slashed from $26.1 million in 1982 to $6.5 million
in 1983. Moreover, the 3-percent population growth
rate exacerbates ecological, social, and economic
strains, leading Zimbabwe's independent Whitsun
Foundation to describe agrarian reform as a "short-
term measure to relieve temporarily the enormous
pressure of an already degraded land base." Many
peasants are abandoning the countryside for urban
centers, where their prospects for employment are dim
at best.
Peasant Support. The agrarian-reform program ap-
pears to receive significant support from Shona tribes-
men, who constitute 70 percent of the population and
form the bulk of the ruling ZANU party. Press and
Embassy reporting concur that land redistribution is a
popular goal and that peasants want the present
program accelerated. Spontaneous land invasions of
white farms dramatize the intense land hunger among
the Shona and indicate that government efforts may
not satisfy popular demands. Even projects of the
agrarian-reform program itself are affected by squat-
ting; at the Chiniyika project, for example, about
2,500 families have moved illegally into an area
reserved for the 1,570 families already resettled there.
The minority Ndebele, constituting 16 to 18 percent
of the population and forming the bulk of the opposi-
tion ZAPU party, also favor the idea of redistributing
land. However, as they have benefited little so far,
they probably do not strongly support the current
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program. This reflects differing ecological and cultur-
al conditions between the two tribal areas, as well as
political conflict. The Ndebele prefer cattle herding to
farming and live on dry terrain; their main interest is
the expansion of an open range. The Shona are
primarily farmers living in more fertile territory, and
the thrust of the agrarian-reform program is geared
toward them. Relations with the whites differ; in
contrast to the continuing prosperity of whites in the
Shona areas of Zimbabwe, many white ranchers in
Matabeleland are selling or abandoning their proper-
ties in response to violence, peasant squatting, and
drought. Harsh government reaction to antiregime
activity in Matabeleland, combined with the reform
program's emphasis on farming, precludes Ndebele
support for the government based on agrarian reform.
ruling ZANU party is committed to land redistribu-
tion as a fundamental goal of the revolutionary
regime. White farmers whose large landholdings are
potential targets of expropriation are mollified-for
the moment, at least-by the present government
emphasis on voluntary sale of property. The fact that
white agricultural interests have not been seriously
harmed has reduced the incentive for noncompliance
with the laws. The whites are disturbed, however, by
recurring talk of compulsory expropriation of under-
utilized lands without compensation, and the presi-
dent of the largely white Commercial Farmers' Union
has publicly opposed such proposals. Nonetheless,
white political power is minimal, and the whites
appear to believe that their best protection is the
Mugabe regime's favorable perception of their eco-
Agrarian-reform beneficiaries interviewed by journal-
ists generally affirm that their welfare has improved,
especially since the government endeavors to provide
seeds, fertilizer, credit, and other aid. Those peasants
given individual plots of 12.5 acres, in contrast to
those in collective projects, appear to be most support-
ive. The evidence on peasant support is thin, however,
and strong factors-notably the drought and declin-
ing economic growth-militate against the economic
progress of beneficiaries. AID officials caution that
there are no statistics on the numbers of beneficiaries
who have failed in farming after being resettled and
who have returned to communal lands in frustration.
The peasants have little input into the formulation of
the program. No national, independent organizations
exist to articulate peasant grievances or pressure the
authorities. ZANU sees itself as a mass-based party
with a grassroots organization keeping national lead-
ers in touch with the aspirations of the people. While
this theoretically obviates the need for independent
peasant groups, the efficiency of the ZANU organiza-
tion is questionable, and some State Department
officials argue that ZANU's ability to mobilize the
masses and gauge their attitudes has been steadily
deteriorating.
Nonpeasant Attitudes. There is no significant opposi-
tion to the principle of land redistribution today. The
The moderate implementation of the reform program
has created conflict among Zimbabwe's leaders.
Many within ZANU disagree with Mugabe's policies
and continue to call for the breakup of white farms to
accomplish the revolutionary goal of restoring lands to
Africans. The regime has resisted this pressure, fear-
ing that the ensuing flight of white farmers would
seriously damage the national economy and compli-
cate efforts to attract foreign investment; the naming
of a white Minister of Agriculture underscores the
current commitment to safeguard white-dominated
commercial agriculture. Nonetheless, disagreements
over the pace and goals of agrarian reform represent
conflicting economic, social, and political priorities
within the ruling party that could develop into a
destabilizing crisis.
International Attitudes. The moderation of the land
reform program and its apparent acceptance by many
white farmers help give the Mugabe regime a rela-
tively favorable image with Western governments and
aid donors. If this image erodes-as it may now be
doing-it will be as a result of a complex of events
and government actions, with land reform probably
playing an unimportant role compared with the gov-
ernment's international orientation, its treatment of
minority tribes, and its respect for democratic
practice.
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F, ectiveness of Administration. Although Zimba-
bwe's authorities have made strenuous efforts to
explain government policies to both peasants and
landowners, considerable confusion remains. This
confusion stems from disagreements within the gov-
ernment over policy direction, which are reflected in
Mugabe's public statements alternating threats of
expropriation with reassurances that white farms are
integral to the well-being of the national economy.
Addressing the Commercial Farmers' Union, a gov-
ernment minister admitted that official statements on
agrarian reform had "either been misunderstood or
misinterpreted." Numerous press reports on land in-
vasions by African peasants mention confusion over
government policies as a factor promoting these illegal
acts.
In terms of its own publicly announced goals, the
implementation of land redistribution has been slow.
In light of the government's financial and administra-
tive inadequacies, the press has characterized regime
promises of resettling 162,000 families by 1985 as
"almost certainly unreachable," and "unattainable,
given the slow pace of the program so far." Academic
studies and press reports concur that a widespread
expectation existed among peasants that, once the
Mugabe regime was installed, land redistribution
would be extensive and speedy. These expectations
have been frustrated. The disparity between revolu-
tionary promises and government policy could, in
conjunction with discontent over deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions, undermine Mugabe's popular ap-
peal and the stability of his government.
Zimbabwe has a good record of following up land
redistribution with government services. Stating that
it "did not intend to create rural slums," the adminis-
tration has maintained a strong emphasis on infra-
structure and support projects-wells, granaries, and
roads-as integral elements of the reform. Agricul-
tural extension services are also provided. The recent
success of small farmers in increasing production
substantially, in response to price rises of certain
crops, suggests that government efforts are working.
Physical Security. Physical security is not a major
factor in Zimbabwe's land reform because no insur-
gency exists. Although sporadic violence-based on
ity-has broken out in Matabeleland, it does not
affect the reform program outside of the minority
area, where implementation was already minimal
The Upshot. Zimbabwe's revolutionary regime is
gambling that the economic benefits of going slow on
land redistribution will outweigh the political costs of
reneging on promises and revolutionary principles.
Given the tribal dynamic of the country's politics, the
government is unlikely to lose much Shona support or
gain much Ndebele support no matter what actions it
takes with regard to land reform. The wisdom of
subordinating politics to economics in the Zimba-
bwean case is further underlined by the fact that
Zimbabwe is one of the few Sub-Saharan countries
that usually produces enough to feed itself despite
Africa-wide droughts.
The Philippines
President Ferdinand Marcos initiated the current
agrarian-reform program in the Philippines soon after
the declaration of martial law in 1972. According to
official statements at the time, both measures were
necessary to head off instability and create a "New
Society." The program aims to increase the number of
small landowners by limiting landholdings to 7 hec-
tares and allowing tenant farmers and sharecroppers
to gain ownership of the land they cultivate. Only
lands producing rice or corn are covered by the
measure, and beneficiaries do not receive legal title
before paying off 15-year mortgages to the govern-
ment the reform
affects 1.5 million acres tilled by approximately 1
million peasants (out of an estimated total rural
population of 34 million). As of 1983, however, only
345,000 farmers had received Certificates of Land
Transfer (stipulating ownership upon payment of the
mortgage) and 1,800 had actually gained title
National economic deterioration is depressing living
conditions for peasants regardless of whether they
have benefited from agrarian reform. Real income is
not keeping up with inflation, and income distribution
seems to be worsening. A February 1984 AID report
concludes that the "Philippine economy is in its most
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serious crisis since World War II," exacerbated by
rapid outflow of capital and a virtual cessation of new
investment and commercial loan inflows. The com-
mon Third World problems of low international prices
for agricultural commodities, massive indebtedness,
and shrinking foreign exchange reserves are worsened
in the Philippine case by government mismanagement
of agricultural pricing and marketing policies.
Peasant Support. The agrarian-reform program ap-
parently has promoted favorable peasant views of the
national government in Luzon and a few other areas
where it has been most active. On islands such as
Mindanao, where peasants are concerned about loss
of land to agribusinesses and big landowners produc-
ing crops other than rice and corn, the program is
irrelevant. Support for the agrarian reform in Luzon
is enhanced by the following factors:
? Luzon, as the principal ricegrowing area, has the
most land eligible for redistribution.
? Luzon, with one of the highest percentages of
landless peasants in the Philippines, has a big
constituency for land redistribution.
? Luzon's history of agrarian agitation and peasant
support for insurgency, coupled with the fact that
the national capital is on the island, heightens
government concern over threats to rural stability
and results in greater efforts to provide benefits to
the peasantry.
? President Ferdinand Marcos, from the northern
Luzon region of Ilocos, demonstrates special interest
in his native island, in keeping with the Philippine
tradition of local loyalties.
From the beginning of the program, Marcos has used
agrarian reform to legitimize his regime and increase
rural support. Although there is much less emphasis
on agrarian reform today than 10 years ago, the
President until recently continued to personally hand
out certificates of land transfer at local ceremonies.
Although several community studies conclude that
tenant farmers and sharecroppers-at least on Lu-
zon-appreciate the program, other research has pro-
duced conflicting results. Many tenant farmers
reportedly are unwilling to jeopardize rent and credit
arrangements with local landlords to petition the
national government for landownership. One academ-
ic study concludes that traditional sharecropping con-
tinues to be viewed favorably by the peasantry be-
cause it entails "sharing costs and risks ... landlords
and tenants share proportionately in farming costs
and in good or poor harvests." In another study, 25X1
conducted in the Bicol River basin, half of the farmers
classified by the Department of Agrarian Reform as
landowners actually perceived themselves as tenant
farmers or renters. In their own eyes, their status had
not been altered by the reform program.
Independent peasant organizations do not participate
in the formulation or implementation of the program,
as the Marcos regime fears that peasant groups not
sponsored by the government would be influenced
either by the activist sector of the Catholic Church or
by the Communists. The regime has attempted to
counteract nongovernment peasant organizations by
promoting a national system of village associations,
Samahang Nayon, which include consumer and pro-
ducer cooperatives and are a "mechanism for mass
mobilization." Although Embassy reporting on the
impact of the Samahang Nayon is inconclusive, it
appears that many of the problems encountered by
the agrarian-reform program stem from lack of peas-
ant input and inadequate government awareness of
local conditions and aspirations
Nonpeasant Attitudes. The agrarian-reform program
is neither strongly supported nor strongly opposed by
nonpeasant sectors. The Catholic Church and the
ruling party offer lukewarm support for the program,
while voicing doubts that it adequately addresses the
social and economic problems of the rural population.
On the other hand, business and commercial interests
that might be expected to oppose land redistribution
tend to be indifferent, because of the program's
provisions limiting redistribution to lands producing
rice or corn. The most active opposition comes from
small landowners; the less wealthy the landowner, the
greater his opposition to losing land. Opposition from
WII
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avoid expropriation.
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International Attitudes. Foreign public opinion and
the international press have not been greatly im-
pressed by the Philippine land reform, regarding it
somewhat unfairly as little more than a sham. The
land reform is not a major factor in the support or
lack of support of the Philippine Government by other
governments.
Effectiveness of Administration. The implementation
of the program has created considerable uncertainty,
with the most serious confusion relating to the stipula-
tion that the 15-year mortgage must be paid off
before legal ownership is conferred. As the certificates
of land transfer are not titles of ownership, peasants
receiving such documents can be considered either
small landowners or renters of government property.
Moreover, the great majority of beneficiaries are in
arrears in their payments, which, according to an AID
contract study, is a major source of anxiety. Given the
present state of the national economy, it is probable
that most beneficiaries will not be able to pay off their
mortgages. Although the authorities have not articu-
lated a policy to deal with this problem, some observ-
ers downplay its importance, saying that it is highly
unlikely that the government will declare beneficiaries
in default and take their land. The large number of
beneficiaries in arrears further diminishes the likeli-
hood of drastic government action
Implementation of the program has been slow.
Lengthy delays-caused by bureaucratic inefficiency
and landlords' legal appeals-reportedly are common.
Bureaucratic inefficiency is compounded by the seri-
ously inadequate system of land registry. Many Phil-
ippine farms have never been surveyed, and many
landowners do not possess clear title to their lands.
This absence of clearly defined boundaries and re-
corded titles not only delays agrarian reform but
invites landgrabbing by wealthier landowners. Em-
bassy officers suspect that the limited scope and the
slow pace of land redistribution, juxtaposed with
heavy rhetoric touting agrarian reform as the corner-
stone of the "new society," have produced profound
public cynicism.
The Marcos record is better with regard to the
systematic followup of land redistribution with public-
sector programs. The government considers the re-
form to be a package involving credit, agricultural
extension services, and assistance in marketing pro-
duce and purchasing fertilizers and other goods.
Technical aid has had a particularly noticeable im-
pact. By promoting new seeds, herbicides, fertilizers,
and irrigation systems, the government has helped
achieve a considerable increase in rice production.
Formerly an importer of rice, the nation has achieved
self-sufficiency in this basic staple-a fact that gov-
ernment officials frequently point to as a success of
the agrarian-reform program. The introduction of this
new technology has also raised costs significantly,
however, thus widening the disparity in wealth be-
tween those peasants who can afford the necessary
investments and those who cannot. In this respect, the
Philippine program is following the pattern observed
elsewhere of strengthening the rural middle class
while doing little to help landless laborers. Academic
studies of revolution identify the "middle peasant" as
the type most politically active-and most likely to
revolt-so this middle-class focus of the Philippine
program can be expected to enhance its political
effectiveness.
Noncompliance with the agrarian-reform laws appar-
ently is extensive, especially among small landowners.
Such landowners reportedly abandoned rice and corn
cultivation to make their land holdings ineligible for
redistribution. Some landowners also prohibit tenants
from planting rice on unused land for the same
reason. Some landlords are terminating traditional
patron-client relationships with tenants and share-
croppers and turning to wage labor, removing renters
who might someday file petitions for land redistribu-
tion. Thus, while agrarian reform is achieving its goal
of increasing the number of small landowners and
decreasing the percentage of tenant farmers in the
countryside, it is also increasing the number of land-
less wage laborers. This widening of economic dispari-
ties suggests that, while agrarian reform may be
creating a progovernment rural middle class, it is also
establishing a new framework for social conflict and
instability
Physical Security. Insurgency conducted by guerril-
las of the Communist Party of the Philippines' New
People's Army (NPA) is increasing in many areas.
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areas.
The guerrillas usually focus their attacks on the
security forces, government officials, and landlords,
and they do not harass agrarian-reform beneficiaries.
Nevertheless, the psychological climate of insecurity
reduces the program's political effectiveness. The
NPA has further eroded the regime's political control
in the countryside by constructing a clandestine infra-
structure parallel to that of the government in many
US Embassy officials argue that the insurgents are
strongest in areas where agrarian reform has not been
implemented. NPA guerrilla activity seems to be
correlated with land conflict-for example, in areas
where the expansion of commercial and agribusiness
enterprises is displacing large numbers of tenant
been low.
The Upshot. The Philippine land reform, largely
because of its modest scope, cannot be considered
either a political success or a political failure. While
many Luzon peasants have benefited from the reform,
others regard it as an unwanted disturbance of tradi-
tional patron-client relationships. Because the pro-
gram is limited to rice and corn land and is generally
well supported with extension services, landlord oppo-
sition has been minimal and the economic costs have
Conclusion: The Lessons of Agrarian Reform
1. Weigh the impact on the economy. The short-term
economic costs of land reform are almost always
high. If economic goals-maintaining foreign ex-
change earnings from agricultural exports, for
example-are more important than political goals,
a land reform should not be attempted.'
' Land reform can be undertaken for purely economic reasons. Such
economically oriented reforms-which usually entail measures such
as seizure of unproductive land, forced peasant migration to
unattractive "virgin areas," and forced change of traditional agri-
cultural methods-are almost always unpopular with landlords and
2. Agree on political objectives. Certain goals pre-
clude others. All involved in the design and admin-
istration of the program should agree on which
goals come first. Otherwise, officials acting in good
faith can counteract each other's moves and under-
mine the program.
3. Do not try to do too much. A program that
attempts to simultaneously destroy the landowners, 25X1
mobilize the peasants, reward supporters, gain
favorable publicity abroad, teach democracy, and
increase production can only fail.
4. Do not overpromise. It is better to leave the peasant
his "apathy" than to create unrealistic
expectations.
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5. Identify the winners and the losers. If the program 25X1
creates more-or more powerful-enemies than
friends for the regime, it should be reconsidered.
6. Mobilize the winners. Those who have clearly
benefited from the land reform can become a
strong support for the government, but only if
mobilized, directed, and (under some circum-
stances) armed. As the Shah and others have
learned, gratitude alone will at best create passive
rather than active support for the regime.
7. Co-opt the losers. Another lesson the Shah learned
too late is that an important segment of the
population wounded by land reform is dangerous.
If the losers cannot be co-opted-a prompt and 25X1
generous compensation for land is usually the best
method-then it is necessary to divide them, un-
dermine their other sources of power or influence,
and separate them from their potential allies.
8. Give the peasants individual plots, under most
circumstances. All peasants appear to prefer indi-
vidual plots over membership in cooperatives or
state farms. Sometimes, however, it is necessary to
establish collectives to maintain expropriated plan-
tations as productive units and safeguard the peas-
ant's standard of living. Modern peasants are
unlikely to consider landownership as sufficient
recompense for a decline in living standards.
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9. Support land reform beneficiaries with credit,
training, and infrastructure. If the peasant is to be
satisfied in the long run, he must have an improved
chance of raising his living standards. In effect, the
government must take the place of the traditional
patron in a patron-client relationship.
10. Watch out for the urban poor-and the urban
middle class. Land reform that reduces supplies of
food to the city can prove very costly in political
terms.
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