AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200820001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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'?`"""` ~MASiER FILE COPY
Africa Review
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We estimate that Chad's northern dissidents will be unable, without
direct Libyan military support, to offer much resistance when ~Iabre
begins his planned campaign to reoccupy northern Chad. ~~
temporarily, closer to the West.
President Rene has attempted to give the appearance of being firmly
in command since he preempted a coup attempt on 30 September,
but his concern at the extent of popular opposition to his growing
ties to the Soviet Union probably will cause him to move, at least
alienating Burkina's major Western aid donors.
Chief of State Sankara has used his first year in power to solidify his
control in Burkina and to establish friendly ties with Cuba, the
Soviet Union, and Libya, while at the same time trying to avoid
representatives of an Angolan insurgent group.
Attempts to establish close ties between Angola and Portugal have
foundered over Luanda's charges that Lisbon is harboring
inability to find external funding will hamper his effort.
President Mobutu is moving to create a new Civil Guard to
strengthen security and his own control in Zaire, but we believe his
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President of the Comoros.
Pro-Western President Abdallah faces several challenges to the
stability of his regime as he begins his second six-year term as
November.
Transportation difficulties are threatening efforts by Malawi's
farmers to plant new crops before the onset of rains-due by mid-
Serving in Namibia
Tanzania: Unrest in the Military
Support for the ANC
South Africa: Homeland Troops
Nigeria: Moves To Avert Student Confrontations
Liberia: Banking Reforms in Jeopardy
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Production St~J; Office of ~gJrican and Latin American Analysis,
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief;
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Chad:
Northern Dissidents Weakened
As France and Libya pull out of Chad, we believe that
the country's Libyan-backed northern dissidents-
who spearheaded a southward thrust in 1983 that was
stopped only by French intervention-now pose a less
serious threat to Chadian President Habre than do
Libyan-backed dissidents in the south. The northern
dissidents, grouped together under ex-Chadian
President Goukouni's Transitional Government of
National Unity (GLINT), are beset by ethnic and
personal disputes, and have been weakened by
defections and insufficient logistic support. If
GUNT's forces elect to remain in northern Chad and
are not directly supported by Libyan troops or
aircraft, we believe they will not be able to offer much
resistance when Habre begins his planned campaign
to reoccupy the north.
GUNT's Disarray
GLINT is little more than a paper government
controlled by Libyan leader Qadhafi. He
reconstructed it from remnants of the earlier
Goukouni government=ousted by Habre in June
1982-in order to mount a military campaign aimed
at installing a pliant regime in N'Djamena. GLINT
has always been an uneasy amalgamation of widely
diverse and traditionally antagonistic ethnic, regional,
and religious groups united only by hostility to Habre
and by hopes of sharing the spoils of governing Chad.
Goukouni's removal last August of GLINT Defense
Minister Achiek ibn Oumar, whose Democratic
Revolutionary Council faction contributed the bulk of
GUNT's combatants, is but the latest manifestation
of GUNT's internal rivalries and tensions.
Military Deterioration
The capabilities of GUNT's estimated 3,500- to
4,000-man military arm, the National Liberation
Army, have eroded during the 13-month period of
enforced inactivity that followed the French
intervention in August 1983. Numerous defectors and
other sources have attested to the dissidents' poor
morale, ethnic frictions, inadequate supplies, lack of
discipline, and revolts against heavyhanded Libyan
commanders.
Habre's forces, on the other hand, have been
upgraded somewhat over the past year and have no
doubt reached their strongest level yet relative to
GUNT's forces. As soon as the Libyan pullout is
complete
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dissidents will be outgunned and outmanned by
Habre's army.
What Next for GLINT?
In our judgment, the northern dissidents' diverse
factions and forces will break down further in the face
of Habre's drive north after the Libyans pull back to
the Aozou Strip, probably by mid-November. This
disintegration is likely to involve:
? Rallying to Habre's side of up to several hundred
new defectors as the protective Libyan umbrella is
withdrawn.
? Melting away and returning home by perhaps
another several hundred dissidents, who could pose
a future threat to Habre depending on the strength
of his hold in the north.
? Retreating to the Aozou Strip or to camps in Libya 25X1
by the remaining diehard Habre opponents. We
expect that Qadhafi will maintain these forces and
refurbish them over time with new equipment,
additional training, and fresh recruits. Rebuilding
Secret
ALA AR 84-015
19 October 1984
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the northern dissidents' military capabilities would
provide Qadhafi with anon-Libyan force for hit-
and-run guerrilla attacks in Chad. This would keep
Habre's troops tied up in the north, giving more
operating room to other Libyan-backed, anti-Habre
dissidents in southern Chad.
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Seychelles: Where Is the Coup?
President Rene preempted a coup attempt on 30
September by arresting leaders of a civil
demonstration that elements of the police and Army
had intended to fari into a general uprising. Rene's
initial response to this most recent threat to his regime
has been low-key as he attempts to convince the
country he is firmly in command. Ike is, however,
badly shaken at the extent of popular opposition to his
growing ties to the Soviet Union, one of the
demonstrators' chief complaints. To assuage public
fears, he will likely become more cautious in his
relations with the Soviets and at least temporarily
move more toward the West in a demonstration of
nonalignment. Despite his public image of
moderation, we believe that in the future Rene
probably would not hesitate to move immediately and
harshly to suppress opposition
Rene's suspicion of the West and concern over his
personal vulnerability have heightened over the years
with each unsuccessful effort to unseat him since he
seized power in 1977. In November 1981, about 50
South African mercenaries attempted to enter
Seychelles as tourists to overthrow Rene. Their
discovery at the airport touched off a battle in which
Tanzanian troops stationed in Seychelles to defend
the regime put down the coup attempt. Less than a
year later, the Tanzanians quashed a poorly organized
Army mutiny led by disgruntled junior officers. Since
then, Rene has called repeatedly for Soviet naval
visits to bolster his regime during periods of tension.
Characteristically, he also has sought to implicate the
West-and the United States in particular-in these
plots against him.
The September Plot
Tensions have been high recently over economic
grievances, the disappearance of an antiregime
activist, and foreign press articles highlighting the
growing Soviet presence in Seychelles. Influential
church leaders, who have traditionally been outspoken
opponents of Rene's socialist policies, delivered
sermons protesting "lawlessness" in the country
during the week of the planned coup. According to
US Embassy sources, as many as 2,000 women
planned to march on downtown Victoria after the
scheduled radiobroadcast of Sunday church services
on 30 September. The Embassy reports that, as early
as four days before the event, the Anglican archbishop
learned from the daughter of police commissioner
Pillay of a plan to seize the microphone during the
church services and call for a change in government.
The demonstration, organized independently of the
coup plot, was to serve as the catalyst for the uprising.
Disgruntled junior Army officers and the 100-man
police mobile unit, under the direct command of the
police commissioner, planned to foment a general
uprising once the marchers reached Victoria's
downtown area,
By taking advantage of traffic congestion from the
annual boating regatta and using buses to block major
access routes to the city, the organizers reportedly
planned to prevent the North Korean military
advisers stationed at the airport and Rene's personal
protection forces from reaching the scene. The
plotters apparently believed that the Seychelles Army
and police troops isolated in the city would not use
force against their own people. According to Embassy
reporting, the plotters then planned to arrest Rene
and other government leaders, take control of the
radio station, and appeal for "Western assistance" in
toppling the government.
Why the Plot Failed
In our judgment, the poorly organized plot was
doomed from its inception. Above all, plans for
exploiting the impending demonstrations were not
kept secret. We believe that, while Rene probably did
not have specific foreknowledge of the coup, he almost
certainly was alerted to the potential for unrest at an
Secret
ALA AR 84-015
19 October 1984
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early stage after his efficient security service detected
the widespread rumors of the planned demonstrations.
To defuse the situation, Rene informed church leaders
on 29 September that there would be no
radiobroadcast of Sunday services, placed a ban on all
demonstrations, and had the leaders of the
demonstrations arrested early Sunday morning. The
plotters lacked an alternative plan for a coup attempt
once the demonstrations were canceled.
Rene's return to the country on 27 September from a
monthlong trip abroad was not known to the general
public until the day before the planned
demonstrations. In our view, he had probably delayed
announcing his presence in order to have time to
assess the mood of the people, which was already
uneasy when he left. We believe the plotters seriously
underestimated the intimidating effect of Rene's
presence on the willingness of the people to
demonstrate. Most were cowed by Rene's well-known
intolerance of dissent, the arrest of their leaders, and
their uncertainty over the nature of possible
government reprisals.
The actual forces intending to stage the coup were
probably quite small and hopelessly outgunned by
Army and police units Rene stationed in Victoria as a
precaution on Sunday. This show of force by Rene
was sufficient to intimidate the plotters, particularly
since many of their leaders probably were included
among those detained hours before the planned event.
The Embassy reports that no more than 100 people
protested against the Soviet and North Korean
presence on Sunday. The turnout was not large
enough for those coup plotters still at large to exploit
and they did not follow through with their plan. Police
loyal to Rene, backed by Army troops stationed in the
city, arrested 38 demonstrators.
dissident "Mouvement pour la Resistance"-and
would not have been able to assume immediate and
effective control of the government.
Aftermath and Implications
Rene has probably long expected some opposition to
him from elements of the military whose grievances
he ignored following the Army mutiny in August
1982. In our judgment, however, he probably believed
he had the full support of the people, and his
subsequent actions indicate he was badly shaken at
discovering the extent of public opposition to his tilt
toward the left. He already appears to have begun to
assuage popular fears of growing Soviet influence in
Seychelles and to build up a credible public image of
being nonaligned. For example, he has stated publicly
that he would not allow any foreign power to establish
a military base in Seychelles as long as he remains in
power.
Rene also reaffirmed his support for freedom of
speech for church leaders to speak out against the
government. He has initiated a dialogue with leading
church activist Bishop Felix Paul, purportedly to stay
informed on popular grievances. He must, however,
work harder to convince the people of his sincerity;
Embassy reporting indicates that many believe he has
thus far failed to address their grievances
substantively.
Clearly, the coup attempt will increase Rene's
suspicions of the military, as he recognizes the
dependence of his fragile regime on its support. In
particular, he will attempt to ensure the loyalty of
Defense Minister Berlouis, a close supporter who
Rene, nevertheless, fears could use his influence in the
Army to rally disaffected troops against the
government. Rene's dependence on the Army has
increased since August with the withdrawal of the
Tanzanian troops stationed in Seychelles from 1979.
The Seychelles forces, however, are still supplemented
by about 100 North Korean advisers, who began
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Even if the plotters had succeeded in arresting Rene
and capturing the radio station, they apparently
lacked any followup plan for action. We have no
evidence to suggest they were likely to receive
"Western assistance" once they made their appeal.
Any likely leadership the plotters hoped to install was
probably based in London-headquarters of the
arriving in Seychelles in April 1983
Embassy reporting indicates that Rene has long
believed that the West, and the United States in
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particular, has worked to undermine his regime.
Soviet Ambassador Orlov has direct access to Rene
and almost certainly continues to nurture those
suspicions. The Soviets, again demonstrating their
support, dispatched a Krivak-II-class frigate to the
area in response to the 30 September crisis
Whatever his suspicions, however, we believe Rene
has opted for a tactical shift of public policy toward
improved relations with the West, at least in part
because he realizes the Soviet Union will not provide
the badly needed economic assistance that he now
receives from the West. In addition, Rene does not
wish to intimidate prospective tourists, or lose the
approximately $8 million in annual revenue from the
US Air Force tracking station that has been in
Seychelles since 1964. Nonetheless, we believe that
Rene has no desire to reduce his ties to the Soviet
Union and its allies, from whom he obtains vital
military assistance.
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Burkina: Sankara One Year
Later
Burkinan Chief of State Thomas Sankara, a radical
populist who seized power in August 1983, has used
his first year in power to solidify his control and to
project his impoverished Sahelian country as a
"progressive" voice on the African scene. Sankara has
ruthlessly suppressed or eliminated those elements of
Burkinan society-the military, bureaucracy, civilian
leftists, and labor-that posed a real or potential
challenge to his preeminence. He also has established
friendly ties with Cuba, the USSR, Libya, and an
assortment of anti-Western Third World states.
The strong revolutionary rhetoric that has
characterized Sankara so far has not been translated
into drastic social or economic restructuring at home.
This cautious approach most likely reflects Sankara's
need to avoid alienating France, other members of the
European Community, and the World Bank-
Burkina's major aid donors. Sankara's domestic
pragmatism, however, does not mitigate his aim of
keeping Burkina on a leftward course internationally
or his propensity for radical slogans disquieting to
Western donors. Burkinan positions and votes in the
UN Security Council over the next year and a half
probably will run sharply counter to US preferences.
Sankara Consolidates Power
Sankara has attained a dominant position in his
military government by using repressive and often
ruthless methods that contrast sharply with the
forebearance and restraint practiced by previous
regimes. Alleged coup plotters have been executed
and opponents murdered at the instigation of the
government, which also sends thugs into the streets to
intimidate potential opponents.
On 4 August 1984, the first anniversary of his seizure
of power, Sankara changed Upper Volta's name to
Burkina Faso and proclaimed a new government
purged of formerly influential civilian leftists.
Sankara told the press that the name change-the US
Embassy translates Faso as "Republic of ' and
Burkina as "Home of the Patriots"-represents the
need to rid the country of all vestiges of colonialism.
Assertive nationalism is the predominant theme in
most of Sankara's speeches.
Sankara's readiness to put a personal stamp on every
facet of Burkina's body politic is reflected in his use of
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, citizen
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follow the lines of Cuban, Libyan, and Ghanaian
models. The 59 neighborhood committees in 25X1
Ouagadougou are the most influential. ones, followed
by those in the Army
Sankara's dismissal last August of five leftist
ministers from the Cabinet completed a yearlong
series of moves against other centers of power. The
ministers belonged to the League for Independence,
Progress, and Democracy, a small group of
Communist intellectuals that the US Embassy says
numbers no more than 200 members. Some of the
ministers were mentors of Sankara and his fellow
coupmakers during their student days, indoctrinating
them in the way of Marx and revolution. Leaguers 25X1
played an influential role in the first months of
Sankara's government, and attempted to steer the
revolution along a course that would lead to their
ascendancy.
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made the mistake-as have others-of
underestimating Sankara and believing he could be
manipulated.
The Leaguers' overconfidence masked their lack of a
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Confederation of Voltan Trade Unions, heretofore the
strongest of several previously powerful labor
groupings. By last summer, Sankara had successfully
muzzled all the unions.
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ALA AR 84-015
19 October 1984
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Sankara's move against civilian leftists followed
earlier purges of the military and the bureaucracy,
eliminating those figures most likely to stage a
countercoup. The purges, however, exacted a heavy
price in reduced expertise and leadership, with
particular impact on the government's ability to meet
the country's growing economic crisis
The Faltering Economy
So far Sankara has followed a moderate economic
course aimed at reassuring Western donors and
Burkina's neighbors that he will not institute a
socialist economic system consonant with his radical
populist rhetoric. Sankara's first priority, as expressed
to the US Ambassador, is to make Burkina self-
sufficient in food production. He has stated a
preference for small-scale private-sector programs
aimed at farmers and herdsmen, who comprise 90
percent of Burkinan society. Although our
Ambassador believes the country has good
agricultural potential, the prospect of continued
drought will keep Burkina dependent on Western food
aid for at least several years. In addition, we believe
the government's lack of clear economic blueprints,
trained administrators, and development funding will
hobble Sankara's programs.
Along with adrought-ravaged economy, the
government faces a financial crunch that will increase
further Burkina' dependence on Western donor
countries and international financial institutions. The
US Embassy reports that Sankara needs $22.5 million
by next January to pay Army and government
salaries. France traditionally has provided the bulk of
Burkina's budgetary support, but has made this year's
contribution contingent on Sankara's reaching a
standby agreement with the IMF that would require
unpopular belt tightening. Libya and Algeria have
provided some budgetary support recently, but have
shown no readiness to replace France's largess.
Burkina's economic need to maintain working
relations with its Western-oriented coastal neighbors
is another restraint on Sankara's radical tendencies.
Landlocked Burkina relies on a railroad through the
Ivory Coast and a highway through Togo to move
virtually all its imports and exports. In addition, the
remitted wages of ahalf-million Burkinans working in
Ivory Coast provide a significant portion of Burkina's
foreign exchange earnings. Sankara would have little
recourse if Ivory Coast expelled Burkinan workers, or
if Ivory Coast or Togo closed its borders.
Progessive Image Abroad
Sankara has sought to cultivate a Progessive image for
himself and Burkina in a series of trips abroad,
culminating in a visit to Cuba and an address before
the UN General Assembly this October. Earlier trips
took him to Eastern Europe, Libya, and to several
radical African states. Underlying the hoopla is a
sharp reorientation of Burkina's ideological leanings
from West to East, symbolized by Sankara's embrace
of African liberation movements, his acceptance of
diplomatic representatives from the PLO and
Polisario Front, and his boycott of the Olympic
games. Deeper and somewhat more disquieting,
however, are the increasingly close ties Sankara is
forging with Cuba, the USSR, Libya, and other anti-
Western states.
The Cuban Factor. Burkina's links to Cuba have
expanded rapidly, particularly in the military and
intelligence areas
mandatory Spanish-language study has been
introduced for Burkina's officer cadets and for some
250 Burkinan military personnel who reportedly were
about to depart for training in Cuba at midyear. C
Cuban military instructors
will provide advanced training in Burkina, but their
numbers will be kept small to avoid upsetting Western
aid donors.
Cuba also is becoming involved with the fledgling
Burkinan intelligence service.
(Cuba has
agreed to help establish a new Burkinan service
charged with both internal security and intelligence
collection. The service probably will be headed by
Vincent Sigue, a Burkinan recently released after
Sankara's vigorous intercession from a French jail
where he was awaiting trial on murder charges. Sigue
earlier had received terrorist training in Cuba, and
has close ties with Libya as well. Putting him in
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charge of the new service will give Sankara another
powerful tool to use to maintain internal control and
open a wider door to Cuban influence.
Morocco. Then, in September, Sankara made what
appears to be afence-mending visit to Tripoli, where
he was the only foreign head of state present at
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In the economic sphere, an agreement signed last
June calls for Cuba to provide some 100 specialists to
assist the Burkinans in various fields ranging from
agriculture and transportation to health and
education. Some technicians have arrived in the last
two months.
Soviet Ties. The USSR had been conspicuously
circumspect until recently, apparently waiting to see
if Sankara would be able to consolidate his position.
Evidence suggests that Moscow has concluded
Sankara probably is here to stay and now is sending
limited amounts of military aid. Burkina's Minister of
Defense visited Moscow last May, and we believe he
asked for small arms and uniforms to outfit several
thousand members of the Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution who were being formed into
paramilitary units. Burkina requested similar aid
from the United States earlier and was turned down.
US officials report that several Soviet IL-76 transport
aircraft arrived in Ouagadougou last July and August
with loads of boxes. Sankara's first anniversary
parade on 4 August was attended by a Soviet
delegation and featured newly outfitted Army troops
and units from the Committees armed with AK-47
automatic rifles, according to a senior US official on
the scene.
We do not expect the Soviets to play a major role in
Burkina, leaving that to the Cubans, but they
probably will send modest aid from time to time.
Moscow, in return, no doubt will continue to receive
Burkinan support in international forums, such as the
United Nations
Fluctuating Libyan I~uence. Sankara's relations
with Libya have blown hot and cold, and now appear
on a warming trend. Earlier this year, Sankara
withdrew as many as 45 Burkinan officer cadets from
training in Libya because of the racism and poor
living conditions they encountered there. The US
Embassy in Ouagadougou reports that Sankara also
resisted Libyan requests to send military technicians
to Burkina and openly criticized Libya's "union" with
Qadhafi's celebration of his seizure of power.
We expect that there will be continued swings in
Libyan-Burkinan relations, but that over the long
term Sankara will keep Qadhafi from getting too
close. Sankara knows the French, Ivorians, and
Togolese are watching closely because they fear 25X1
Qadhafi might use Burkina as an entry point for
mischiefmaking in West Africa. After some initial
stumbles, Sankara has pursued a policy of good
neighborliness toward Ivory Coast and Togo by
stressing that Burkina will not become a center of
subversion directed against the two moderate states.
In return, Ivory Coast has at least been correct in its
dealings with Sankara and shows no sign of allowing
numerous Burkinan exiles to use the country as a base
for anti-Sankara operations. Togo has been more
forthcoming, reflecting what the US Embassy in 25X1
Ouagadougou believes to be President Eyadema's
strong commitment to keeping Burkina's Western
options open.
The French Connection. The French have told US
officials that they are not pleased with the turn
Burkina has taken under Sankara, and are watching
the situation closely. However, French officials
indicate that Paris is willing to suffer Sankara's
radical posturing so long as he does not pose a threat 25X1
to regional stability, which is far and away France's
overriding concern. There are few French economic
interests in resource-poor Burkina. The French also
have told US diplomats that Paris hopes to avoid any
action that would push Sankara into a closer alliance
with the Cubans and Libyans.~~ 25X1
Sankara's attitude toward France is ambivalent. He
knows Burkina cannot easily dispense with French
bilateral aid or membership in French-backed
regional organizations, particularly the Franc zone.
At the same time, Sankara is a nationalist who
strongly resents his country's past colonial masters.
He worries that France might withdraw its economic
support, and fears the French will engineer his ouster.
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Implications for the United States
Frequent anti-United States political rhetoric by
Sankara and the government media has brought
Burkinan-US relations to a low point. Last spring, for
example, Sankara accused the United States of
supporting an alleged coup plot. Following denials by
our Ambassador, Sankara backed down and implied
his charges were created for domestic political
reasons. Sankara also said he hoped an official visit
could be arranged for him in Washington. More
recently, Burkina's official newspaper has carried
articles equating President Reagan with Hitler and
again accusing the US Ambassador of subversive
activities. Sankara responded to our Ambassador's
protests with a catalogue of perceived US snubs,
including his failure to receive an invitation to the
White House when he was in New York in early
October, and with requests for more US economic aid.
Sankara's typical juxtaposition of false accusations
and the desire for high-level treatment exemplifies
what successive US Ambassadors have termed
"Sankara's political innocence," coupling intemperate
verbal attacks with an unawareness of their effect on
substantive relations.
Despite the acrimony of recent US-Burkinan
exchanges in Ouagadougou, the main arena for US-
Burkinan confrontations over the next year and a half
is likely to be the US Security Council, where
Burkina holds a seat until January 1986. According to
the US Embassy in Ouagadougou, the United States
has relatively little leverage~ther than verbal
protest-to shift Sankara to a more moderate stance
because our bilateral aid program is modest, and
humanitarian considerations preclude a suspension of
food aid.
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~.ng?la?
T'hw~rted ~ta~r?ehernent
With P?rtu~al
Political relations between Portugal and Angola have
foundered badly since Luanda's ardent courtship,
which began in 1981, ended abruptly in early 1983
following Angolan charges that Lisbon harbors
representatives of the Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA). Luanda and
Lisbon recently have held two separate rounds of
high-level talks designed to improve bilateral
relations, but nothing of value apparently was
accomplished.
Disagreement over UNITA continues to provide the
basis for the chill in political relations. Lisbon refuses
to take the repressive measures against UNITA
dissidents on its soil that Luanda demands, although
it still seeks closer ties. Luanda, for its part, still
complains bitterly that Lisbon lends support to
UNITA and has made the issue a litmus test for
improved bilateral relations.
Blossoming itelations
Angola began a determined effort to seek better
relations with the West in late 1981.
Luanda was motivated by a
strong desire to decrease its heavy dependence on
Soviet and Cuban military and economic assistance.
Moreover, it wanted increased Western trade and
investment to buttress its sagging economy and
enhanced Western political ties to reduce its
diplomatic isolation.
Portugal was one of the first Western countries
Luanda turned to for diplomatic support, investment
capital, and technical advisers. The Angolans found
the Portuguese receptive-lured, we believe, by the
potential economic benefit, a lingering sense of
responsibility toward its former colony, and the desire
to resume the role of an international actor of
consequence. In March 1982, the two sides signed an
aid protocol in Luanda covering agreements in
science, culture, health, agriculture, transportation,
petroleum, and other areas of cooperation.
The relationship progressed further the next month
when Portuguese President Eanes was received
warmly during a visit to Luanda. The two
governments signed more cooperation agreements- 25X1
on tourism, technical aid, university exchanges, and
transportation-and,
discussed limited military contacts.
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In May 1982, an Angolan delegation headed by
economic czar Lopo do Nascimento visited Lisbon,
where it discussed a possible Portuguese oil-
exploration program in Angola, requested the
Portuguese to provide mining technicians (an area 25X1
then dominated by Soviet advisers), and discussed
other programs for aid,
Nascimento also asked the Portuguese
to assist in improving Angola's relations with
members of the European Economic Community. By
the end of the year, Portugal also had agreed to
participate in still other economic projects, including
the financing and construction of a dam expansion
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Throughout 1982 and early 1983, the two countries
discussed other ways to expand mutual cooperation
and credit facilities.
the Angolans also pressed Lisbon for
counterinsurgency training in Portugal and the
dispatch of a military team to Angola.
some in the Portuguese military-
encouraged by President Eanes-were considering
sending a force to Angola to replace the Cubans.
Secret
ALA AR 84-01 S
19 October 1984
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A Pall Sets In
The first problems arose over rumors in the
Portuguese press-which we believe were
misinformation-that South Africa was plotting with
Angolan dissidents in Lisbon and with the tacit
approval of the Portuguese Government to overthrow
the Angolan Government. Although the Portuguese
adamantly denied the story, it cast a pall over the
growing relationship. Bilateral ties began to
deteriorate sharply,
when UNITA established a front
organization in Lisbon in early 1983. In the wake of
an escalating insurgency that was spreading into
eastern Angola, Luanda seized on the opening of the
UNITA front to begin attacking Lisbon in the press
for its "aid" to the insurgents.
Other problems also began to beset the relationship. A
socialist government came to power in Portugal in
June 1983 headed by Mario Soares, who knew and
was impressed by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi,
according to an Embassy reporting source. Prime
Minister Soares soon seriously offended the Angolan
Government by attempting to mediate between
UNITA and the MPLA, according to a diplomatic
report. Another problem may have been that
President Eanes-who was at odds with the Soares
government-had led the Angolans to believe they
would receive more aid than Soares was willing to
offer. Moreover, as one of Europe's poorest countries,
Portugal had only limited resources to invest in
Angola regardless of the ambitions of the Portuguese
Government. At the height of the courtship in mid-
1982, Angolan imports from Portugal had declined
significantly over the same period in 1981.
Portugal also apparently had not provided as many
technical advisers as had been anticipated at the
height of the rapprochement. The chill over UNITA
ties probably had been the main cause for the absence
of more advisers, but Soviet and Cuban
misinformation also may have had some effect.
the Portuguese
believed that Moscow and Havana were attempting to
undermine Lisbon's position by claiming Portuguese
advisers were US spies or agents of insurgents.)
the Soviets
and Cubans complained vigorously to the Angolans
about their opening to the West
By late 1983, Angola announced it would undertake
"economic reprisals" against Portugal and formed a
high-level committee to review all technical assistance
agreements with Lisbon. Angolan enterprises were
told to look elsewhere for purchases, and the
Portuguese oil company PETROGAL was excluded
from participation in Block 4 offshore oil
development, contrary to previous promises
~he Angolans considered
severing diplomatic relations and moving their
Embassy from Lisbon to Madrid. They began to court
Spain in mid-1983, apparently as an alternative
source of Western aid and assistance and, we believe,
to further pressure Lisbon. Plans to shift the Embassy
apparently have been scrapped.
Lisbon was perplexed by
Luanda's volte-face. Portugal denied that it had any
official contact with UNITA and, after a period of
puzzling over how to react, began a sustained effort to
revive relations. Portuguese Foreign Minister Gama
traveled to Luanda in February 1984 where he was
lectured by Angolan Foreign Minister Jorge for his
country's alleged support for UNITA,
While Gama reportedly denied that
his government aided UNITA, he explained that
Portugal could not throw law-abiding Angolan
dissidents in jail. He also apparently assented to a
request for a new line of credit.
Relations seemed to improve briefly last spring. In
April, a Portuguese official announced that Lisbon
would increase its existing line of credit to Angola by
$60 million to finance consumer goods and that
Portugal was negotiating a $50 million increase in
credit for the purchase of other goods. The offer of
new aid apparently brought a brief respite in Angolan
press attacks on Portugal. In May, however, dos
Santos personally criticized the Soares government in
a public interview, leaving Lisbon once again
bewildered.
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Current Relations
Recent high-level political exchanges have apparently
been fruitless. A meeting in September between an
Angolan Politburo member and Soares, according to a
diplomatic report, provided an opportunity for Soares
to stress again his interest in better ties as well as to
make the point that his government would not muzzle
the Portuguese press or abridge the rights of
Portuguese citizens. President Eanes, without the
approval of the Soares government, also sent an
emissary to dos Santos in mid-September to express a
UNITA representatives in Portugal. Portuguese law
prohibits the kind of repression of UNITA
sympathizers-many of whom have dual Angolan-
Portuguese citizenship-that Angola demands. The
political cost of repressing UNITA through legal or
extralegal means also is likely to prove greater than
Soares is willing to pay. If he moves against UNITA,
we believe he would face strident press criticism,
strong attacks from the opposition Center Democrats,
and complaints from his coalition partner, the Social
Democrats.
desire for better relations,
Eanes's overture, however, was greeted with
strong expressions of anger over Portuguese support
for UNITA.
Bilateral trade has improved. Portuguese exports to
Angola during the first half of 1984 were four times
higher than in the same period of 1982 and twice as
high as in the same period of 1983. According to
recent public statements by dos Santos, economic and
We see little prospect that the rapprochement will
develop as both sides had hoped in 1982. With
UNITA representatives still operating freely in
Portugal, we believe that Luanda will continue to
maintain a chill in its relations with Lisbon. In the
two years since UNITA began its dramatic expansion
throughout three-fourths of Angola, the insurgents'
isolation from external aid and refuge has become an
even more important goal in Luanda's foreign policy.
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trade relations are "normal."
Discussions of Portuguese military aid to Angola that
began in 1982 subsequently proved unproductive.
While the Portuguese might have played a limited
advisory role in training the Angolan Army, Lisbon
did not, in our view, have the will or ability to take
over the role of the Cubans. The only military
assistance the Portuguese apparently provide is given
unofficially by a group of some 60 to 80 retired
leftwing military officers and mechanics who serve in
Angola in a training capacity,
The recent showing of a documentary on Portuguese
television favorable to Savimbi is likely to be another
stumblingblock in bilateral relations. Angola had
strenuously opposed its showing, and, under pressure
from the Portuguese Communist Party and the
government, its airing had been delayed three times.
Soares has publicly expressed his disapproval of the
showing, but we doubt that his protest will lessen
Angolan resentment.
Prospects
Lisbon is likely to continue to seek closer ties with
Luanda, but we do not believe that the Soares
government will take any significant measures against
We believe, however, that modest trade relations
between Angola and Portugal are likely to continue
growing despite the strained political ties. Aid ties are
likely to remain limited both by political difficulties
and, in the longer run, by Portugal's own resources.
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Zaire: Plans for a Civil Guard
President Mobutu, spurred in part by Libyan-inspired
terrorist bombings in Kinshasa earlier this year, is
moving to create a new security organization called
the Civil Guard. The Guard appears designed
eventually to replace the National Gendarmerie-
Zaire's ineffective, quasi-military police force.
Mobutu reportedly envisions a 10,000-man Guard
dominated by his fellow Ngbandi tribesmen, raising
the possibility that he may use it as a private militia.
We believe, however, that the new organization will
exist largely on paper for the near term because of
Mobutu's inability to find external funding for its
creation.
Mobutu's Motives
We believe political and personal considerations, as
well as a desire to enhance internal security, are
behind Mobutu's recent decision to create the Civil
Guard. Mobutu's distrust of the existing
Gendarmerie, whose loyalty and indiscipline have
long concerned him, appears to have been the
principal factor in his decision, according to the US
Embassy. The decree providing for the creation of the
Guard assigns the new organization most if not all of
the Gendarmerie's current functions, including border
patrol, counterterrorism, counterespionage, and
disaster relief. In addition
Mobutu has directed that the Guard be
staffed predominantly with men from his own
Ngbandi tribe from Zaire's Equateur I~egion.~
We believe that Mobutu sees the Ngbandi-dominated
Civil Guard, which unlike the present Gendarmerie
would be under civilian control and report directly to
him, as a private militia that would significantly
increase his personal security, patronage ability, and
control-particularly in the more remote regions of
the country. Moreover, in our view, even if the Guard
remains a paper entity or is reduced in scope, Mobutu
will have increased his hold over Gendarmerie leaders
by at least keeping alive the threat of a competing
organization which he can use to play against them.
?bstacies to F?rmati?n
In our view, the primary obstacle to the formation of a
Civil Guard is Zaire's lack of financial resources. We
estimate that a national force with the capabilities
Mobutu envisions would require a minimum of $20
million to implement and $1.5 million per month to
maintain. Mobutu is unlikely to jeopardize Zaire's
IMF-sponsored austerity program by diverting major
public funds, so finding an external sponsor is critical 25X1
for the new organization.~~ 25X1
Zaire has asked West Germany to fund and train the
new unit, but, according to US Embassy reporting,
Bonn has made no firm commitments so far. West
Germany has provided Zaire with police training in
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commission of German experts sent to Zaire last April
to study Mobutu's proposed Guard concluded that
there were several barriers to its creation, including
the prohibitive costs of training and equipping such a 25X1
national force. Moreover, according to a US Embassy 25X1
source, Bonn is hesitant to support an organization
that likely would became involved in human rights 25X1
abuses. To our knowledge, Mobutu has not 25X1
approached any other country for assistance with this
project.
Mobutu's planned organization, according to US
Embassy reports, faces strong opposition within the
regular military and,
has created near panic among members of the
Gendarmerie. many 25X1
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ALA AR 84-O1 S
19 October 1984
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Gendarmes in the Kinshasa area are reacting to
Mobutu's plans by spending more time seeking
support among their political, and military patrons
than performing their duties.
Prospects
In our judgment, the financial resources needed to
fund the Guard will not be forthcoming from West
Germany or any other external source. West
Germany, however, may agree to train and equip a
smaller police force for Kinshasa or a counterterrorist
unit. Even if the Guard is reduced in scope and
limited to Kinshasa, Mobutu probably would have
enhanced his personal security and, perhaps more
important, would have involved another Western
country in responsibility for a key security unit. Other
Western countries whose advisers command or closely
work with key military units include Israel, Belgium,
and France. The United States, although not taking
as direct a role, also works closely with Zaire's
military.
If West German training and equipment enabled
Mobutu to establish a national force, we believe he
would face determined opposition from within the
military and the National Gendarmerie. Even a
version of the Guard limited to the Kinshasa area
might encounter some resistance from the elite
Presidential Guard. Mobutu, however, has
reorganized his security and military services several
times in the past despite opposition, and we expect
that he will have few problems in doing so again.
Moreover, we believe Mobutu probably would not
scrap the Gendarmerie but only reduce its scope,
while incorporating many of the displaced Gendarmes
into the Civil Guard. In any event, unless it is
financed on a continued basis by West Germany and
provided with foreign supervision at least at the
brigade level, the Guard probably would soon
resemble the current National Gendarmerie-
underfunded, ill disciplined, and ineffective.
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Comoros:
Abdallah's Second Term
President Ahmed Abdallah, who was unchallenged in
his bid for a second six-year term in the 30 September
elections, now faces several challenges to his regime's
stability. Although the staunchly pro-Wester-n
Abdallah is unlikely to deviate significantly from the
moderate political course he has charted over the past
six years, economic and nationalistic pressures may
lead him to undertake foreign policy initiatives that
could affect Western interests in the southwest Indian
Ocean region.
The Mayotte Issue
We believe Abdallah continues to view the integration
of French-administered Mayotte into the Comoros as
his most pressing foreign policy concern. Mayotte is
the most prosperous of the four islands and bringing it
under Comoran administration would dramatically
boost the country's economy. Furthermore, Abdallah
has been working to improve his reputation in the
region as a nationalist leader, and believes that
unification of the four islands would go far in
legitimizing his mercenary-backed regime, both
domestically and in other African countries
The Mayotte issue, however, is unlikely to be resolved
soon. Mayotte's inhabitants voted to remain a French
protectorate after Abdallah declared unilateral
independence in 1975. They have since voted against
integration, fearing their healthy economy would
suffer after union with the other less developed
islands. Abdallah's commitment to acquire Mayotte
has long strained Comoros' otherwise good relations
with France. He has accused the French of foot-
dragging and insists that they should do more to
persuade inhabitants of the island to opt for
integration. He also is suspicious of French initiatives
to install television and communication links between
Mayotte and Reunion, thereby strengthening cultural
ties to France among Mayottes' predominantly Creole
population.
A second referendum on Mayotte is tentatively
scheduled to be held in 1985. Spurred by growing
domestic criticism over his failure to expedite the
island's return, Abdallah is unwilling to accept
another "no" vote on union with the Comoros. We
believe, however, he would not sever relations with
France, which has a defense agreement with Comoros
and is the country's leading bilateral aid donor. He
may ask the French to postpone the referendum,
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Assuring Internal Stability
Abdallah has enjoyed considerable popular support
over the past six years, in spite of the taint of his
mercenary-installed government. Comorans
seemingly prefer this benign, authoritarian regime to
that of the repressive Ali Soileh, whom he deposed. To
assure continued stability in Comoros, we believe he
must now successfully ameliorate concerns over his
succession, the role of the mercenaries in the
government, and sources of foreign economic
assistance. His failure to resolve these problems could
afford potential opponents an opportunity to
destabilize the regime.
Should he die while in office, the 25X1
constitution provides that government control passes
to the pro-Western President of the National
Assembly, Mohamed Taki. Taki would then organize
new elections, that US Embassy officials say he would
be likely to win. In our judgment, however, Abdallah's
hostility to Taki, a longstanding political opponent,
might lead Abdallah to groom as a loyal heir apparent
a junior politician who has not yet established a
Secret
ALA AR 84-015
19 October 1984
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political base of support. We believe worsening health
problems might then cause Abdallah to retire
voluntarily and install his handpicked successor. If
Abdallah does not clearly establish a successor in
advance, US Embassy reporting indicates that the
.constitutional provisions for succession might well be
ignored as a power struggle ensues with uncertain
prospects for the pro-Western moderates.
The Mercenaries
For security, Abdallah relies almost entirely on
mercenaries, who returned him to power in 1978, and
a 250-man Presidential Guard. He has dispersed the
Comoran military and gendarmerie throughout the
three islands to minimize the possibility of an
internally based coup attempt. However, the loyalty
of the mercenaries to Abdallah is questionable; many
of them, under the leadership of Bob Denard,
overthrew Abdallah's one-month-old government in
1975 and installed Ali Soileh as dictator.
The ambitions of the approximately 50 mercenaries
who train the President's personal protection unit pose
a potential threat to Abdallah. According to Embassy
reporting, some of the mercenaries are agitating for a
greater behind-the-scenes role in determining foreign
policy. Abdallah already has bent to their pressure as
he initiated moves toward closer diplomatic and
economic relations with South Africa. Despite the
rising friction, Abdallah probably will continue to rely
on the mercenaries and respond to their demands
while at the same time attempting to disassociate
himself from them publicly.
Search for Foreign Aid
The Comoros, one of the world's least developed
countries, is heavily dependent on foreign assistance
for economic development. In the coming year, we
expect Abdallah will try to expand on traditional
sources of foreign economic development assistance,
confined largely to France. He is actively seeking
increased aid from moderate Arab countries. Because
Abdallah believes Communism and Islam are
incompatible, we believe it is unlikely he would accept
substantial offers of foreign aid from Communist
countries. He has long expressed his disappointment
to Western officials over low levels of US and French
economic assistance to his country, however, arguing
that in contrast to his left-leaning neighbors, his pro-
Western leadership has not been rewarded. He
probably chose to accept a token level of Soviet aid-
the Soviet Ambassador's recent offer of scholarships
for study in Moscow-to express mild displeasure
with the West and demonstrate that he has
alternatives to Western support.
Outlook
Abdallah appears reasonably secure in his position for
the near term, although we cannot exclude the
possibility of a successful coup attempt. We know
little about the external opposition to Abdallah's
regime, but we believe that it is small, fragmented,
and has little internal support. Nevertheless, Abdallah
probably will continue to press the West-
particularly the United States and France-to accept
his longstanding offer to establish military facilities
on the islands as he believes a sizable Western
military presence would deter external coup plotting.
According to the US Embassy, internal political
opponents agree that Abdallah is the only leader with
sufficient national stature to maintain internal
stability at this time. His ability to remain in power
over the longer term, however, rests on his success in
resolving domestic difficulties and expanding military
ties with the West.
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Malawi: Transport Problems
Threaten Crops
Malawi, which normally produces enough food to feed
itself and export maize to its neighbors, now faces
transportation problems that threaten farmers' ability
to plant their crops. The new crops must be planted
before the onset of rains-due in mid-October in the
south and mid-November in central Malawi.
In early August, Zambia informed Malawi that the
amount of oil which it normally supplies would be cut
in half due to leaks in the Tanzanian/Zambian
pipeline and a shortage of foreign currency to pay
Tanzania. Malawi's efforts to obtain oil via other
routes have been thwarted. Mozambican insurgents
have closed the major rail lines leading to the ports of
Beira and Nacala. In addition, a shortage of
locomotives in Zambia has prevented Malawi from
importing South African fuel. While Zimbabwean oil
is close at hand, its price is some 25 percent higher
than Zambia's. Moreover, the reluctance of truckers
to travel dangerous routes from Zimbabwe through
Mozambique's insurgent-infested Tete Province-
even under Zimbabwean Army escort-also makes
the regular purchase of Zimbabwean oil unlikely.
As an interim measure, Zimbabwe agreed in early
October to lend Malawi approximately 15,000 barrels
of diesel fuel and 6,000 barrels of gasoline. Based on
Malawi's average consumption, the gasoline will last
about eight days and the diesel approximately 10
unless some form of rationing is imposed. Although
Zimbabwe promised immediate delivery of the fuel,
shipping may be hampered by the continuing
transport difficulties.
According to US Embassy reporting, a South African
trucking firm also has tried to assist Malawi by
donating rubberized bags which allow oil to be
shipped from South Africa to Malawi on ordinary
trucks. Malawi would then export tea and tobacco on
the backhaul, offsetting at least part of the cost of the
transportation. Transport authorities, however,
believe the new system will take at least two months
to put into operation.
Unless the transport crunch is eased, the smallholder
farmers, primarily in outlying regions where diesel
fuel has already run out, will be unable to obtain
fertilizers or use gas-powered farm machinery. The
shortage already has placed strains on the rest of the
Malawian economy as fuel prices rose 20 percent in
August, following a 14-percent increase only four
months earlier.
Over the longer term, the situation should be
alleviated with the completion of a 50-kilometer road
from northern Malawi to southwestern Tanzania that
connects to other roadways leading to the port of Dar
es Salaam. Until the road is completed-now
scheduled for early 1985-Malawi will be forced to
scramble for routes to transport oil and other imports
in addition to any agricultural exports.
Secret
ALA AR 84-01 S
19 October 1984
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Africa
Briefs
Tanzania Unrest in the Military
Despite President Nyerere's efforts since the aborted military coup in January
1983 to disarm opposition, discontent remains prevalent, particularly among the
junior ranks. This is forcing Nyerere to deal cautiously with a military that was
once solidly behind him:
? Treason trials for those arrested in connection with the coup plot last year-
mostly low-ranking military personnel-have surfaced allegations that senior
officers who are still in office were involved in the coup attempt.
? Widespread discontent among junior and noncommissioned officers has led to
rumors of renewed coup plotting in the lower military ranks.
? The Chief of Defense Forces, a strong Nyerere supporter, has been severely
criticized by the Minister of Defense for alleged "lack of discipline" in
commanding the troops,
they step down,
Nyerere undoubtedly realizes the political importance of retaining the military's
support. Consequently, he must carefully weigh the demands of senior officers for
privileges traditionally accorded them against growing resentment over their
treatment among lower ranking officers. The treason trials could serve as a
catalyst for the same antiregirne sentiments that led to the coup attempt last year.
Support for the ANC
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The Tanzanian People's Defense Force has agreed to provide athree-month
training course in sabotage and explosives to African National Congress (ANC)
guerrillas. the first group of 50 trainees will begin 25X1
the course in November. After completion, they are expected to infiltrate South
Africa to carry out attacks. Senior Tanzanian military personnel have stipulated,
however, that they will not train armed guerrillas or provide weapons to ANC
members. In addition, Tanzanian President Nyerere traveled to Zimbabwe in
August in an attempt to convince Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Mugabe to join him
in providing military training for the ANC. Nyerere's actions are a followup to his
acceptance of ANC guerrillas ousted from Mozambique following the signing of
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Tanzania has traditionally provided military support to the Pan-Africanist
Congress (PAC), while assisting the ANC in a nonmilitary capacity. The loss of
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providing military support to the ANC.
Mozambican backing for the ANC, coupled with the realization that the PAC
does not have the wherewithal to carry out an effective military campaign against
the Pretoria regime, however, probably motivated Nyerere's decision to begin
Approximately 150 soldiers returned from duty in northern Namibia to the black
African "homeland" of Ciskei on 2 October 1984, according to the press and a
source of the US Consulate in Cape Town. They probably are members of Ciskei's
South African-trained counterinsurgency or paratrooper units. Another
homeland, Venda, announced its intention to send troops to Namibia last year.
Although such small contingents add little to the nearly 20,000 government troops
in Namibia, Pretoria probably encourages the homelands to assign troops there
because the counterinsurgency experience they receive in Namibia improves their
capability to intercept guerrillas who pass through their territory en route to South
Africa.
provoking a white backlash.
Two South African blacks were commissioned as lieutenants on 5 October, making
them the first black regular officers in the South African Defense Force, according
to the US defense attache in Pretoria. They are members of the 21st Battalion, the
first black unit in the Army's permanent (career) forces. This showcase battalion of
blacks, mostly from urban areas according to the white commander, is based near
the black township of Soweto and has served in Namibia. It frequently is displayed
by Pretoria as evidence of reform and opportunity for blacks in the military.
Pretoria has long had Colored and Asian officers in command of troops, but,
according to an authoritative academic study, it has assigned its only two other
black officers to serve as a public relations officer and a chaplain. The new
lieutenants almost certainly will have no whites serving under them for fear of
deteriorates still further.
The Buhari regime has delayed university openings, probably through the fall
semester, to avoid possible confrontations with students unhappy over sharp hikes
in boarding fees, according to the US Embassy. Lagos's determination to decrease
its burgeoning federal budget deficit by ending costly university subsidies will push
student food costs five times higher than last year's 65 cents a meal. Buhari is
taking precautions to avoid a repeat of bloody student riots in 1978 triggered by an
earlier military government's attempt to increase school fees. The US Embassy
believes that for now student leaders are resigned to cost hikes and are not anxious
to spark a violent protest for fear of government reprisals. Student attitudes could
change, however, if the economy continues to decline and the government's image
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secret
Liberia Banking Reforms in Jeopardy
The US Embassy reports Monrovia is circumventing recent banking reforms
designed to shore up the country's dollar-based financial system. The Doe
government has managed to skirt commercial bank restrictions on deficit
spending-intended to keep the regime from consuming all available dollar
assets-by issuing rubber checks to pay its bills. The government also may be
preparing to issue unbacked Liberian coins to alleviate cash shortages when the
initial phase of the reform program expires next month,
Head of State Doe's major concern, according to the US Embassy, is to
meet the government payroll. We believe he is unlikely to reduce public spending
when he is counting on heavy voter turnout for his party in the upcoming 1985
elections. Despite Doe's actions, the banks probably will renew their arrangement
with the government next month in the belief that the present monitoring system is
better than nothing at all.
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