AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200790001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 3, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
ALA AR 84-012
3 August 1984
Copy J 5 i
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Africa Review) 25X1
Articles South Africa: Colored and Indian Elections Preview 1 25X1
The government's plan to co-opt Coloreds and Indians will face a
major test later this month in the elections for the newly created
Colored and Indian chambers in Parliament.
South Africa: The Cost of Namibia I 5 25X1
The financial burden of Namibia is not now great enough to compel
Pretoria to seek a quick political settlement, but Prime Minister
Botha's recent statements on the subject are intended to prepare
white South Africans for the territory's eventual independence
should Pretoria negotiate a settlement to its liking.
Dissension among the leadership and dissatisfaction in the ranks
have plagued the two antigovernment dissident groups in Somalia.
Pressure from Ethiopia and Libya to merge the groups has proved
unsuccessful because of tribal and political differences.
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Angola: UNITA's Foreign Hostages) 9 25X1
UNITA's tactic of seizing foreign hostages and then negotiating
their release has attracted international recognition to the group-
an advantage not generally accorded anti-Marxist movements
challenging indigenous, leftist, postcolonial regimes. F__]
President Houphouet-Boigny-Ivory Coast's 78-year-old founding
father and only president-continues to delay resolving the issue of
who will be his designated successor despite mounting concern
among politically aware Ivorians.
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South Africa: Attitudes of Black Workers I 17
A recent academic survey of black factory workers in South Africa
suggests that this important component of the labor force strongly
supports continued foreign investment in South Africa. F__1
Zimbabwe-Brazil: Major Arms Purchase 19
Zimbabwe's recent purchase of 90 Cascavel armored cars from
Brazil for $41 million is the largest defense acquisition by Harare
since independence in 1980.
Briefs South Africa: Deploying Advanced Artillery
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Secret ii
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Articles
South Africa: Colored and Indian
Elections Preview
The government's plan to co-opt Coloreds and Indians
will face a major test later this month in the elections
for the newly created Colored and Indian chambers in
Parliament.' The government is hoping for a large
voter turnout that it can use as evidence of support for
its controversial new constitution due to be
implemented in September. Many nonwhite groups in
South Africa, angered by the exclusion of blacks from
the new Parliament, are urging a boycott of the
elections and some violence has already occurred.
Labor Party Favored in Colored Contest
The Labor Party-the oldest and predominant
political group among South Africa's some 2.7 million
Coloreds-probably will win a majority of the 80
Colored chamber seats in the elections on 22 August,
although most of its candidates are not well known to
the public. The best organized of the Colored parties,
the Labor Party has branches nationwide and publicly
decries violent methods of bringing about political
change, according to the US Embassy. It is the only
Colored party contesting all 80 seats, and four of its
nominees running in unopposed districts already are
guaranteed seats in Parliament.
The party's leader, Rev. Allan Hendrickse, has
spearheaded an active campaign, and he recently told
the press that he is optimistic that the new
constitution will allow nonwhites to attain meaningful
reforms. We suspect that the government is giving
some covert financial assistance to the Labor Party.
The People's Congress Party (PCP) is the principal
challenger to the Labor Party, although
independents-some of them ex-Labor Party
members who did not gain party nominations-will
win some seats and make other races close. The PCP
this spring claimed a membership of 3,000 but has
greatly expanded its organization in the last few
months and now looms as a strong competitor for
control of the Colored chamber. The party has
publicly promised to play an aggressive role in the
Colored chamber by vigorously challenging apartheid.
Some 900,000 Coloreds have registered to vote,
according to press reports, and we expect the voter
turnout to be good. Forty-two percent of eligible
Colored voters surveyed last year in Cape Province-
where most Coloreds reside-said they would
participate in the elections.
Close Indian Race
The Indian elections on 28 August will be a two-horse
race. One main contender is the National People's
Party (NPP) led by Amichand Rajbansi, chairman of
the South African Indian Council (SAIC).2 Although
the US Consulate in Durban describes Rajbansi as a
rather unpalatable and unscrupulous politician, a
survey conducted in the Indian community last year
by a respected South African academic indicated that
Rajbansi is the most popular Indian leader.
2 The government established the SAIC in 1964 and long regarded
it as the only representative body for the Indian community at the
national level. The first general elections for the SAIC were held in
1981 with a low voter turnout of about 10 percent.
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ALA AR 84-012
3 August 1984
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New Parliamentary Elections
Indian
J. N. Reddy 40 a
Solidarity
National People's Party Amichand Rajbansi 38 a
Progressive Independent Party N. Sewchuran 8 a
National Federal Party
Independentb
a Unconfirmed.
b Some "independents" are in fact affiliated with parties.
The NPP's stiffest competition will come from
Solidarity, a party formed this past January with
widespread support in the Indian business community,
according to the US Embassy. There are few
philosophical differences between Solidarity and the
NPP: both desire a democratic, nonracial South
Africa and intend to use their seats in Parliament to
press for black political rights and for improvements
in the general welfare of the Indian community,
according to press reports. The ruling National Party,
however, has given some limited assistance to
Solidarity, apparently believing that its candidates-
rather than Rajbansi and his cronies-would add
more respectability to an Indian parliamentary
chamber, according to the US Embassy.
We believe the NPP may win a slight edge in seats
but agree with the US Embassy that the more
important issue is voter turnout. Predictions by local
observers have ranged widely, but we believe that the
government will be satisfied with a turnout of at least
25 percent, and that the final tally probably will be
much higher. The US Consulate in Johannesburg
reports that more than 350,000 of the estimated
600,000 eligible Indian voters have registered for the
elections. Both the NPP and Solidarity, however, have
publicly accused the government of gross
incompetence in administering the Indian voter rolls.
Rajbansi told a US Embassy official that many
Indians who had registered cannot find their names
on the rolls.
The personalities of the candidates will be an
important factor because the NPP and Solidarity
platforms are almost identical and genuine party
politics do not exist yet in the Indian community. The
US Embassy reported last month that a large number
of Indians were switching parties to get on a ballot.
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Opposition to the Elections
Clashes between nonwhite groups opposed to the new
constitution and those who support it have broken out
in recent weeks and some candidates have been
targets of attacks. The United Democratic Front' has
led the opposition to the tricameral Parliament, and
its members have been accused of disrupting several
meetings of the Labor Party and other groups that
intend to participate in the elections. The homes of
five Colored and Indian electoral candidates were hit
with gasoline bombs in late July, according to press
reports.'
In our view, violence is likely to escalate as groups
urging a boycott intensify their efforts before the
election dates. Members of groups that have
condemned the new constitution may even seek
confrontations with those entering the polling areas,
despite recent government warnings that police will
take quick action against any "anarchists" who try to
disrupt the elections. Moreover, the African National
Congress may attempt an attack against a symbolic
target connected in some manner with the new
constitution.
If the turnout of Indian and Colored voters is large, it
may provide the impetus for the formation of more
antigovernment groups with all black African
memberships. Tensions between black and other
nonwhite communities could increase, especially if the
new Indian and Colored representatives in Parliament
focus on the narrow concerns of their own constituents
rather than pressing for reforms that will benefit
blacks as well.
' The UDF was formed last year to oppose the proposed
constitution. It claims to represent over 500 groups and 2 million
individual members.
" A new group calling itself the South African Suicide Squad has
claimed responsibility for many of these attacks, which have usually
involved unsophisticated bottle bombs. The SASS appears to be a
group of amateurs unconnected with the major guerrilla groups
based outside of South Africa, according to press reports.
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South Africa:
The Cost of Namibia
In our judgment, the financial burden of Namibia is
not now great enough to compel Pretoria to seek a
quick political settlement. The territory's financial
drain is increasing, however, and, although we do not
believe that financial considerations alone will
determine South Africa's desire for a settlement, we
expect Namibia will become a much larger economic
liability. We believe Prime Minister Botha's recent
statements about the heavy financial burden of
Namibia are intended to prepare white South
Africans for the territory's eventual independence
should Pretoria negotiate a settlement to its liking.
Botha's remarks are also directed to the outside world
to demonstrate Pretoria's sincerity and self-interest in
pursuing an internationally acceptable settlement.
Budgetary and Other Financial Support to Namibia
South Africa will provide Namibia with about $310
million of financial support for fiscal year 1985,'
according to press reports. This figure consists of $220
million in direct budgetary subsidies, $60 million for
the operations in the territory of the parastatal South
African Transport Services, and an estimated $30
million in subsidies on Namibian imports. Pretoria
also may provide subsidies through other parastatal
operations, but we do not have such data
Interpreting the Botha Claim. Prime Minister Botha,
during his recent trip through Europe, claimed that
South African support for Namibia in fiscal year
1985 will total $450 million. In a judgment we share,
South African economic writers have concluded that
the Botha figure includes the $310 million cited above
(out of a total South African Government budget of
$17 billion), and approximately $140 million in
customs and excise duties collected by South Africa
on behalf of Namibia, which is not a cost to the South
African taxpayer.'
Security Costs
In addition to Pretoria's direct financing, Botha has
stated that the Namibian operations of the South
Africa Defense Force cost his government between
$270 million and $340 million in fiscal year 1984. We
do not have the data to prove or disprove this claim. In
our judgment, however, South Africa probably would
continue to incur much of this expense for its own
defense following Namibian independence. Moreover,
there would be startup costs associated with
establishing new defense installations along the South
African-Namibian border. The claimed cost of 25X1
Namibian military operations represents 10 to 15
percent of South Africa's defense budget.
Foreign Exchange Benefits and Other Remittances
In addition to political and military interests in
Namibia, South Africa has an important economic
stake there. Pretoria earns foreign exchange from
Namibia's exports, at least two-thirds of which flow
through South African ports. While the amount
fluctuates according to market conditions, Namibia
exported over $1 billion worth of goods in 1981, the 25X1
last year for which data are available. South Africa
keeps most of the foreign exchange from these exports
and remits the earnings to Namibia in rand.F__ 25X1
2 Pretoria allocates Namibia a $170 million share of Southern
African Customs Union duties based on the Namibian imports that
come through South Africa. According to press reports, Namibian
officials claim that only $30 million of this share represents a
subsidy. F___-]
Secret
ALA AR 84-012
3 August 1984
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The South African economy also receives royalties,
profits, dividends, and worker remittances from
Namibia. The magnitude also fluctuates, but we
estimate that it topped $400 million annually during
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Namibian
debt to banks of BIS member countries totals only
$30 million.
the late 1970s.
Trends
The size of Pretoria's direct budgetary contribution to
Namibia has grown dramatically from $102 million in
fiscal year 1981 to $216 million for fiscal year 1985.
Nearly one-third of this increase reflects changes in
the accounting format for South African assistance to
Namibia. Pretoria transferred to Windhoek certain
spending obligations for items such as police and
defense that previously did not appear in Windhoek's
budget. Aside from this accounting change, the South
African contribution has grown as domestic
Namibian revenues have declined and Windhoek has
had to increase its expenditures to support 11 ethnic,
second-tier administrations established by Pretoria.
Civil service salaries alone account for 60 percent of
current expenditures in the Namibian budget.
Namibian internal revenue has slumped primarily
because of drought and depressed export prices. Real
gross domestic product fell by 2 percent last year. The
contribution of mining, fishing, and agriculture to
gross domestic product dropped from 43 percent in
1982 to 34 percent in 1983, with a corresponding
reduction in tax revenues. Taxes on the diamond
industry, for example, contributed over half of total
domestic revenue four years ago, but a fall in world
diamond prices was largely responsible for lowering
this share to 14 percent by fiscal year 1984. Prospects
for a significant recovery of domestic revenues seem
slender because, in our judgment, the markets for
diamonds, uranium, and lead probably will remain
fairly soft over the next couple of years.
The Debt Problem. The deterioration of Namibian
finances has raised Windhoek's outstanding debt from
$12 million in March 1979 to $550 million in
February 1984. We believe that nearly all of this debt
is to South African financial institutions and
presumably would be repaid in rand, not in foreign
exchange. According to statistics published by the
Interest and capital repayment from the Namibian
budget is projected to grow from $63 million in fiscal
year 1985 to $122 million in fiscal 1987, according to
press reports. In the absence of a significant economic
recovery in Namibia, this growing debt service will
necessitate much larger South African subsidies.
Moreover, South Africa has unconditionally
guaranteed the debt accumulated since 1966 and
potentially will be held accountable for at least $550
million should an independent government repudiate
the debt. An International Court of Justice opinion of
1971 states that, from the time of the revocation of its
mandate in 1966, South Africa has had no authority
to grant economic rights or create economic claims in
respect to Namibia. An independent Namibia might
decide therefore that a repudiation of this debt need
not call into question its intent to honor its own debts,
and thus need not close off credit.
Resolution of the debt issue could become an
important point in future negotiations for Namibian
independence. The potential future burden grows
larger each day that the issue of Namibian
independence remains unresolved. South Africa has
continued to guarantee loans to Namibia in the hope
that other parties will bear some portion of this
repayment burden after Namibian independence. In
this way South Africa is keeping down the size of its
current budgetary support to Namibia.
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Somalia: Status of the
Dissident Movements
Serious internal problems continue to enfeeble the two
antigovernment dissident groups in Somalia.
Dissension among the leadership and dissatisfaction
in the ranks have plagued both the Somali
Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF), which numbers
some 2,500 men, and the smaller Somali National
Movement (SNM), which commands at most a few
hundred hardcore adherents. Pressure from Ethiopia
and Libya to merge the two groups has proved
unsuccessful because of tribal and political
differences. Even though neither the SDSF nor the
SNM are likely to pose a strong threat to President
Siad's government, the dissident groups probably will
continue to harass isolated Somali garrisons and force
Siad to deploy military forces in the central and
The SDSF's close ties to Ethiopia, its Marxist
rhetoric, and its continuing almost exclusive
association with the Majertain clan have prevented
the group from attracting significant support among
other tribes. The SDSF was formed in 1981 by
merging the Somali Salvation Front-an earlier
organization dominated by the Majertain clan-and
two small Marxist exile groups. The merger was
intended to broaden the tribal base of the Salvation
Front and to give it a political character that would
appeal to Marxist ideologues in the Somali
Government and ruling party. The unification was
brokered by Ethiopia and Libya,
northern regions.
The SDSF
Infighting among the leadership of the SDSF, which
draws its support primarily from the Majertain clan,
has led to low morale and declining troop strength in
the group. Many Majertain are now at loggerheads
with Abdullah Yusuf, the Ethiopian-installed
chairman, and his Omar Muhummed subclan. The
tribal feud has increased since last year, when Yusuf
ordered the arrests of several senior SDSF members
who advocated a change in the SDSF leadership.
Yusuf has come under heavy criticism in the SDSF
for his arbitrary and authoritarian rule. Many in the
group have defected, either taking advantage of an
amnesty program Siad offered in 1982, or,0
simply rejoining their nomadic
tribal units or becoming bandits in the Ogaden. In the
largest defection so far, 95 SDSF cadre surrendered
in May to Somali authorities, bringing along tanks,
weapons, and ammunition. This defection, apparently
stemming from a factional dispute, probably has done
Libyan and Ethiopian economic and military support
enabled the SDSF to grow to its peak strength of
nearly 5,000 men by early 1982,
By September 1983, however, SDSF
strength had declined to less than 3,000
SDSF continued to lose strength and now totals about
2,500.
The SNM
The second major anti-Siad group, the Somali
National Movement, also has suffered from
leadership quarrels and morale problems. Since its
formation in 1981, the group has been unable to
exploit tribal unrest among the northern Issaq, its
further damage to Yusuf's position.
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ALA AR 84-012
3 August 1984
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primary supporters, because it lacks an effective
military arm. Although military officers replaced the
civilian leaders last December, they have been unable
to expand significantly their operations along both the
northern and southern Somali-Ethiopian border
regions. They remain based in Ethiopia and rely on
small cross-border operations to strike at isolated
targets and to support intertribal fighting in the north.
The new military leaders appear no better equipped
than their civilian predecessors to consolidate control
of the organization. In talks with US Embassy
officials outside Somalia, former SNM leaders have
indicated that dissident troops are disappointed with
the movement's failure to pose a serious threat to
Siad. Although the military leadership promised to
hold a convention last April, they reportedly have
postponed it for fear that dissatisfaction among the
The SNM also has had difficulty obtaining military
and economic assistance. Although it receives the
bulk of its aid from Ethiopia and South Yemen, the
group is not as strongly tied to Addis Ababa as the
SDSF and does not receive as much Ethiopian
assistance as that group. The conservative Muslim
leadership moved its organization from London,
where it was formed in 1981, to Ethiopia in 1982 in an
effort to obtain more aid from Ethiopia and Libya. In
January the new head of the SNM visited Libya and
Syria seeking aid and indicated that the group plans
to move away from its conservative religious views of
the past, If the
SNM carries out this plan, it probably would further
distance the group from its potential base of support
in Somalia.
Prospects
US Embassy reporting indicates that Tripoli and
Addis Ababa apparently hope that a merger between
the SDSF and the SNM would revitalize the
dissidents and allow them to expand operations
against Siad. The Libyans apparently have cut off
funds periodically to express their displeasure over the
failure of the groups to merge. Mengistu recently
levied harsh criticism against the SDSF for its failure
to resolve its internal conflicts and demanded that it
take immediate action to unite with the SNM,
We believe Tripoli is likely to use the promise of
increased aid to persuade the SNM to agree to a
merger, but the Issaq, who deeply resent the
domination of Somali politics by both Siad's Marehan
clan and the previous Majertain regime, would be
unlikely to join with the SDSF. The SDSF, for its
part, appears willing to discuss a merger only if it
In our judgment, even if the dissidents could obtain
more extensive support from Libya and Ethiopia by
agreeing to some sort of political merger, they would
be unlikely to consolidate their efforts. Moreover,
both organizations probably will continue to suffer
defections. Nevertheless, we believe the dissidents will
maintain the capability to mount small hit-and-run
raids intended to harass the Somali Army and police,
as they did in 1983. In addition, tribal violence in the
northern and central regions will continue to offer
opportunities for the dissidents to exploit opposition to
the Siad regime.
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Angola: UNITA's
Foreign Hostages
Although many insurgent movements have seized
foreign hostages during the course of a conflict, the
use of this tactic by the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) is unique in scale
and purpose. UNITA's military capabilities permit it
to capture large numbers of foreigners in single
operations. We estimate that UNITA has captured
250 to 300 foreigners over the past 18 months. The
most spectacular operations occurred in March 1983,
when UNITA seized 86 foreigners at Alto
Catumbela, and in February 1984, when it captured
77 at a diamond mine in Cafunfo. UNITA uses these
prisoners and the negotiations for their release to
attract favorable international media attention and to
gain international recognition-advantages not
generally accorded anti-Marxist movements
challenging indigenous, leftist, postcolonial regimes.
Improved Capabilities
The upgrading of UNITA's military capabilities-
from guerrilla to semiconventional units-and the
expansion of its operations have allowed it to pursue
this tactic with some success. UNITA has aimed some
of its larger operations at agricultural, mining, and
industrial complexes where foreign civilians are
working as technicians or advisers. Furthermore,
UNITA has used its well-developed logistic system to
move prisoners in good order over hundreds of miles
of difficult terrain to Jamba, UNITA's main base
camp in southeastern Angola
Strategic Considerations
UNITA's President, Jonas Savimbi, has tailored the
taking of hostages to the group's strategic goals:
? Economic Sabotage. UNITA seeks to drive away
foreign technicians, who provide the expertise that
the government desperately needs to revitalize the
country's economy and to ameliorate social
conditions. UNITA has repeatedly warned
foreigners living in Angola that it cannot guarantee
their safety and has advised them to leave for the
duration of the war. In line with this policy,
UNITA has begun to require prisoners to sign,
before their release, a statement that they will not
return to Angola until the war is over.
? Recognition. UNITA insists on face-to-face
negotiations for the release of prisoners with
governments it deems to have paid insufficient
attention to its interests. UNITA has even required
high foreign officials to travel to Jamba to witness
the prisoners' release and the accompanying
propaganda extravaganza.
? Publicity. UNITA enhances its international
image-tarnished by a continuing reliance on South
African support-by bringing in journalists to 25X1
interview foreign captives. As a rule, the prisoners
have praised the group's military organization and
acknowledged that they have been well treated by
their captors. At the same time, their reports cast
doubt on the Angolan Government's ability to
provide effective security. Government military
forces are portrayed as undisciplined, unreliable,
and unwilling to stand and fight.
Short-Term Gains ...
UNITA's leaders believe that the tactic of seizing
foreign hostages has gained the group respect and de
facto recognition from governments that count in the 25X1
affairs of southern Africa. For example, the British
envoy who recently traveled to Jamba to collect
British prisoners stated that he was impressed by
UNITA's organizational skills and the competence of
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ALA AR 84-012
3 August 1984
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Major UNITA Hostage-Taking Operations, 1983-84
3 Americans
8 Portuguese and Colombians
10 Portuguese
3 Bulgarians
46 Portuguese
16 Britons
15 Filipinos
December 1983
Cacolo
18 Portuguese, Brazilians, Spaniards, Japanese, Poles, and Italians
13 November 1983
Cazombo-Cavungo
12 Portuguese
5 Britons
2 Canadians
its armed forces. He also praised Savimbi's diplomatic
skills and grasp of political realities. Similarly,
Czechoslovakia, as a condition for the release of its
nationals, issued a communique acknowledging that it
had held negotiations with UNITA in Prague during
which it had been informed about UNITA's struggle
in Angola
The Angolan economy has suffered as a result of this
tactic. A Czech official has reported that the few
remaining Czech advisers-vital technical
assistants-have been withdrawn either to Luanda or
to areas far away from the fighting. According to a
recent unsubstantiated report from the US Embassy
in Gabon, dependents of Soviet advisers in Luanda
are also being evacuated in large numbers in response
to UNITA's threats.
66 Czechoslovaks
20 Portuguese
The captives have attracted media attention to
UNITA. Many journalists have accepted invitations
to travel to Jamba to witness the release of prisoners.
Savimbi, in particular, has taken advantage of their
presence to extol the virtues of UNITA-high
morale, discipline, competence, and humaneness. The
journalists have often filed reports substantiating this
view of UNITA.
UNITA's practice of taking hostages also appears to
be consistent with the objectives of South Africa,
UNITA's patron and principal military supplier.
Pretoria has often served as the middleman between
UNITA, the International Red Cross, and foreign
governments in arranging the release of hostages. We
believe that South Africa probably supports UNITA's
tactic of seizing foreign nationals in the belief that it
contributes to UNITA's growing international
stature.
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... But Long-Term Risks
From the perspective of UNITA's overall strategy,
however, we believe UNITA's assessment is too
optimistic. In taking foreigners hostages, UNITA
runs risks and expends scarce resources for payoffs
that may not be as clear-cut as UNITA would have
them:
? This tactic does little damage to the Angolan
economy above what is already accomplished by
UNITA's other acts of economic sabotage.
? International recognition in the long term, in our
view, depends primarily on continuing military
successes, not on the political payoffs UNITA has
received so far from its foreign captives.
? Although UNITA has, by taking hostages, received
media attention it would not have otherwise, in
absolute terms the prisoners have prompted little
international concern. Major Western news media
still run stories on UNITA only infrequently.
Moreover, the continued use of this tactic could turn
international opinion against UNITA. Should several
captives succumb to the ordeal, or Cuban or
government forces recapture them en route to Jamba,
the resulting publicity could damage the image of a
humane and competent organization that Savimbi
seeks to convey
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Ivory Coast: Growing Concern Over
Unresolved Succession
President Houphouet-Boigny-Ivory Coast's 78-year-
old founding father and only president-continues to
delay resolving the issue of who will be his designated
successor despite mounting concern among politically
aware Ivorians. Events last April in Guinea, where a
coup occurred before a successor could be picked for
the late President Toure, and in Cameroon, where
northerners mounted an unsuccessful coup against
former President Ahidjo's chosen successor, have
compounded fears among Ivorians that their country's
stability could quickly erode if Houphouet should die
or become incapacitated before a legal successor is
chosen. Houphouet created the post of vice
president-who would serve as the president's legal
successor-through constitutional amendment in
1980, but the position remains vacant and Houphouet
has indicated that he does not intend to fill it until the
next presidential election in 1985.
Transition: Influencing Factors
According to the US Embassy, political infighting
among contenders for Houphouet's mantle has
widened in the past year, increasing the possibility of
a contentious transition should the presidency become
vacant before 1985. In the event of Houphouet's
death, the length of time required to fill the office and
the smoothness of the change of leadership will be
influenced by an interplay of several factors.F_~
Ethnicity and Religion. Although Houphouet has
been careful to balance the allocation of political
patronage among the country's 60 tribal groups, the
US Embassy reports that many Ivorians believe that
his southern minority Baoule tribe has received more
than its fair share of influential positions and wealth.
We suspect that Ivorian Muslims-the largest
organized religion in the country-are unhappy with
the present system. Christians dominate the
government and business sector, although Muslims
are double their number, representing at least 25
percent of the 8.9 million population. Embassy
officials do not believe religion will become a major
source of conflict during the transition, in part
because Ivorian leaders have been careful to prevent
the spread of Islamic fundamentalism to Ivory Coast.
Economic Recession. The country is in the fourth year
of its worst economic slowdown since independence.
Squeezed by low prices for exports, mounting external
debt, and reduced economic activity, the country faces
negative growth and another debt rescheduling in
1985. The government had to cut investments this
year from $605 million to $425 million because of a
sharp decline in tax revenues and oil receipts. It has
had to lift subsidies on some consumer goods and hold
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ALA AR 84-012
3 August 1984
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a tight lid on salaries and benefits for public workers.
In addition, the US Embassy reports that the local
banking sector is in a bind because of unpaid loans
and a flight of private capital. The Embassy believes
that further increases in unemployment and cutbacks
in government spending are likely in the short term.
Although the slowdown is likely to continue over the
next year, the Embassy points out that, if the current
debt rescheduling proves successful and prices of
coffee and cocoa-the country's two principal
exports-continue to improve, an economic recovery
could begin by 1986. F__]
The Opposition. Although there are no organized
opposition groups inside or outside the country, the
US Embassy repots that some Ivorians, particularly
those among the younger generation, are unhappy
with Houphouet's paternalistic rule and hope that a
successor government will reduce the pervasive
influence of France and adopt more progressive
policies. The teachers' unions represent the closest
thing to an opposition group, according to Embassy
reporting. Last year both university and secondary
school teachers joined with students in a strike that
highlighted their economic grievances. The Embassy
indicates that the rest of the labor movement is closely
tied to the government, but is likely to become more
politicized and restive in the post-Houphouet era-
particularly in the event of a contentious succession
struggle.
The Military. Although the Ivorian armed forces
have a reputation as one of Africa's most apolitical,
the US defense attache believes that conservative
senior officers might intervene if an unresolved
succession struggle jeopardized public order or the
country's economic life. Their aim would be to
intervene only "temporarily" in order to oversee the
installation of a new civilian leadership acceptable to
the country at large. The US defense attache reports
that Minister of Defense Jean Konan Banny convened
senior officers after the Army takeover in Guinea to
discuss implications for Ivory Coast. The officers
allegedly agreed on the need to take control of the
government if conditions threatened stability. Banny,
55, is considered by the US Embassy to be a
darkhorse in the succession race. He is also a fellow
Baoule tribesman and close friend of Houphouet.
Informed Ivorians regard him as an experienced
administrator and politician, who could probably rally
the military behind him if necessary, according to the
Embassy.
The French
Although Paris and Abidjan have maintained a
mutually profitable relationship since Ivory Coast
gained independence in 1960, the US Embassy points
out that the French presence and influence are
gradually declining because of poor economic
conditions for French business interests 2 and
Abidjan's efforts to bring growing numbers of
educated Ivorians into positions held by French
technicians. According to the Embassy, the size of the
French community has dropped from a high of some
65,000 to about 37,000 in the past few years.
Although French advisers remain in almost every
government ministry, the total number of cooperants
will have dropped by one-third by 1985. Moreover,
the Embassy predicts that the French presence will
continue to decline in the post-Houphouet era
Nevertheless, under a 1961 mutual defense accord-
theoretically designed to protect Ivory Coast from
external threats-France keeps a 450-man marine
infantry battalion at Port Bouet airfield near Abidjan
and about 90 advisers in the Ivorian military. The US
' There are about 2,400 NCOs and 600 commissioned officers in
the 5,500-man Ivorian military
' The French own about 30 percent of Ivory Coast's manufacturing
industry.
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Embassy believes that, if a succession struggle
threatened French citizens or economic interests,
France would quietly support intervention by senior
Ivorian military officers or intervene itself to restore
order as a last resort. Moreover, the French military
presence acts as a deterrent to coup plotting against
Potential Successors 3
Although no one individual can be identified as a
leading candidate to succeed Houphouet, the US
Embassy believes that the next president is likely to
come from a relatively small group of figures in the
existing political elite. The two leaders most often
mentioned as contenders are former National
Assembly President and secretary general of the
country's only political party, Philippe Yace, and the
current National Assembly President, Henri Konan
Bedie. Yace, 64, is one of the few leaders with a
political base made up of longtime party officials,
former National Assembly deputies, and government
ministers. Although these older generation individuals
are currently out of power, they retain significant
influence among the ruling elite. The Embassy reports
that Yace also enjoys wide support among the general
populace. He is a member of the small coastal
Alladian tribe. Nevertheless, he
would have to contend with enemies he
made during a period when he served as Houphouet's
chief troubleshooter and hatchet man
National Assembly President Henri Konan Bedie, 50,
also has a political base composed of National
Assembly deputies, businessmen, and younger
members of the elite-many of whom were educated
in the United States under Bedie's sponsorship. He
has a reputation for competence and hard work, and
as former Finance Minister is credited as
instrumental in the country's past economic success.
Although Bedie is a Baoule tribesman like
Houphouet, the Embassy suggests that his popularity
might transcend tribal loyalties
Outlook
With economic recovery at least a year away, we
believe that a transition to new leadership before the
elections in 1985 could be stormy. Jockeying and
infighting probably would erupt among presidential
contenders and their supporters in the political elite,
leading to the strong possibility of a takeover by
senior military officers. Unrest among less fortunate
sectors of Ivorian society-students, labor, or the 2
million plus foreign workers-could coalesce around
economic grievances in the absence of Houphouet's
firm rule. A worst case possibility is that
inexperienced, populist-oriented junior officers and
enlisted men, who have benefited less from the
current system, could attempt to exploit a succession
struggle to seize power.
Over the medium and longer term, however, the
prospects for a smooth transition improve, in our view.
The election should fill the succession void, and
improvements in the economy may be apparent by
1986. If Houphouet remains in power after the
election, a vice president would have time to establish
or strengthen his political base and prepare for
Houphouet's passing.
Except in a worst case scenario, a change of
leadership is unlikely to affect seriously Ivory Coast's
excellent relations with the United States, afford real
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openings for the Soviets or Libyans, or drastically 25X1
reduce French influence. All the identifiable civilian
contenders and senior military leaders are moderate 25X1
and pro-Western, committed to the existing political
and economic system, and favorably disposed toward
the French. A new Ivorian leader, however, probably
such as cocoa and coffee.
agreements for Third World agricultural commodities
would be less automatically pro-French than
Houphouet and would move foreign policies toward
the African mainstream of nonalignment, including
some expansion of diplomatic and commercial ties
with Communist and African socialist states. A new
president may also be somewhat more critical of US
policies in southern Africa, US reluctance to provide
bilateral economic aid, and Washington's stance on
the issue of guaranteed international pricing
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South Africa: Attitudes
of Black Workers
A recent academic survey of black factory workers in
South Africa' suggests that this important component
of the labor force strongly supports continued foreign
investment in South Africa. The survey also indicates
a high level of dissatisfaction and politicization. Most
of the workers harbor militant attitudes tempered by
an appreciation of the economic benefits offered by
capitalism in general and by employment with US
firms in particular.
A somewhat surprising aspect of the survey is the
overwhelming endorsement of US economic ties to
South Africa. Three out of four workers surveyed
favor continued foreign investment in South Africa,
despite calls for disinvestment by numerous
antigovernment black groups. The unpopularity of
disinvestment seems to be a result of practical
considerations: most black workers surveyed
apparently doubt that disinvestment would succeed in
forcing the government to alter its racial policies, and
they believe that US firms in South Africa provide
more training, pay, and fringe benefits than local
companies.
The social and political frustrations of black workers
are clearly evident in the survey. Sixty-six percent
indicate that they are unhappy, angry, or impatient
with their lot in general, and 60 percent believe their
standard of living is worsening. Their frustrations
have led many of them to adopt militant attitudes. For
example, the majority of those polled disagree with
the statement that blacks should be cautious in
politics and not risk losing what they have gained, and
40 percent admit that they support the efforts of the
ANC. Other surveys in recent years have also
indicated the ANC is the most popular opposition
group among South African blacks.
' The University of Natal surveyed 550 black factory workers-
skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled-in various industrial areas of
South Africa.
Black workers, nonetheless, apparently are mindful of
the constraints now facing the emerging black labor
movement.' When the factory workers were asked
what black trade unions should try to achieve, only 15
percent gave answers that included involvement in
political or community activities. Some 70 percent,
however, anticipate that black workers will eventually
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2 Since the government decided in 1979 to recognize black unions
and allow their participation in collective bargaining, the new black
labor groups have generally eschewed an active political role to
avoid the government harassment that usually results when a black
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ALA AR 84-012
3 August 1984
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Zimbabwe-Brazil:
Major Arms Purchase
Zimbabwe's recent purchase of 90 Cascavel armored
cars from Brazil for $41 million is the largest defense
acquisition by Harare since independence in 1980.
The deal-part of a five-year program announced in
early 1983 to replace obsolescent army vehicles-
includes spare parts as well as training for gunners,
drivers, and maintenance personnel. The Cascavels
will increase Zimbabwe's capability to conduct
antidissident operations and to patrol its long borders,
but they will do little to improve the odds against
South Africa's far larger and better equipped forces.
The purchase almost triples Zimbabwe's inventory of
armored cars, which now consists of an aging fleet of
45 South African Elands and 15 British Ferret scout
cars. Although Prime Minister Mugabe announced
that the vehicles will be assigned to a single new
armored regiment, we believe they will be deployed in
small numbers for antidissident operations in
Matabeleland. The Cascavels enhance Zimbabwe's
capability to protect truck convoys bringing food
supplies from Malawi. These convoys have been
attacked by guerrillas of the Mozambique National
Resistance as they pass through Mozambique.
Zimbabwe took over escort responsibilities from
ineffective Mozambican troops several months ago. F_
The new relationship with Brazil further diversifies
Zimbabwe's sources for arms but complicates training
and logistic support. The Cascavels are incompatible
with equipment provided by Zimbabwe's principal
suppliers-the United Kingdom, China, and North
Korea-and will require special procedures and parts.
A Controversial Purchase
The purchase was controversial because it has
aggravated Zimbabwe's already severe shortage of
foreign exchange. Finance Minister Chidzero, in
particular, was angered by the Army's handling of the
deal. He told the US Ambassador in February 1984
that the Cascavels had been scheduled for delivery in
two batches in order to spread the payments over two
fiscal years, but that military officers conspired to
have all 90 vehicles delivered at once.
officials to approve the purchase. If true, Army
Commander Rex Nhongo, who headed the first
Zimbabwean military delegation to visit Brazil in late
1981, probably was involved. Nhongo ignored a
detailed staff study that recommended buying either
the French Panhard or the British Scorpion armored
cars, according to an informant with good access. He
also replaced the author of the study with another
officer who supported buying from Brazil.
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ALA AR 84-012
3 August 1984
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Armament 90-mm main gun of Belgium
design manufactured in Brazil,
7.62-mm coaxial-mounted and
optional 12.7-mm external
machineguns
Engine Mercedez Benz 6-cylinder diesel
Wheels 6
Crew 3
Maximum speed 100 km/hr (on roads)
Range 1,000 km (cruising)F__-]
Outlook
The military continues to explore possibilities for
acquiring other major defense items, but, in our
judgment, it will increasingly feel the pinch of
budgetary and foreign exchange constraints. Army
and Air Force plans to acquire costly items, including
additional air transports, helicopters, and fighter
aircraft, are likely to depend on the willingness of
potential suppliers to provide concessionary financial
terms-which many West European and Third World
suppliers are increasingly reluctant to do. The
situation might provide an opportunity for the Soviet
Union to expand its incipient arms relationship with
Zimbabwe, something which Harare has so far
resisted.
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Africa
Briefs
South Africa Deploying Advanced Artillery
The military has placed its new G-5 155-mm towed artiller
unit has deployed troops to northern Namibia in the past and is strategically
located to defend South Africa's borders with Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The
G-5 incorporates advanced ballistics technology 25X1
which enables it to achieve a range of 25X1
approximately 40 kilometers, superior to that of any gun in the hands of South
Africa's neighbors. Defense Minister Magnus Malan told the South African
Parliament in May that it will be 10 years before the armed forces are fully
equipped with the G-5. A self-propelled version is scheduled roduction in
South Africa Prime Rate Rises Further
Major South African banks have raised their prime lending rate to a record high
22 percent-up from 16 percent one year ago. This increase follows credit-
tightening moves by the South African Reserve Bank aimed at slowing economic
growth, which in turn should reduce imports and buttress the South African rand.
The rand has fallen to record lows relative to the dollar because of the weak price
of gold-South Africa's leading export-and the strength of the dollar. The gold
price is hovering around $350 per ounce, down from $395 as recently as March.
The rise in the prime interest rate and the low value of the rand should constrict
imports, but probably will cause inflation to rise from its current rate of 11 percent
toward last year's peak of 15 percent.
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3 August 1984
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