BANGLADESH: SIX MONTHS OF INDEPENDENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 87
• Publication Date: June 27, 1972
• Content Type: IM

Declassified in Part - 25X1
AMMMMMM~ MOMENT IV
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/04/03
CIA-RDP85TOO875RO01 10013
Declassified in Part -
Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/04/03
CIA-RDP85T00875R00110013
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
0 4917~
intelligence Memorandum
Bangladesh: Six Months of Independence
acre
27 June 1972
No. 2047/72
'*13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7 1
i
WARNING
This documeta ontains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its trans.-nission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
4
OROUP I
UICLbb[b rNoMCLAMIrICAAUTOMATIC
M)MNIII,AbINef) AND
Fr-
ON_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 June 1972
1NTELL I(,'ENCE MEMORANDUM
Bangladesh: Six Months of Independence
The People's Republic of Bangladesh caii:e into existence on 16 Decem-
ber 1971, It faced staggering difficulties. With a per capita annual GNP
below $100, at least 75 million people crowded into an area roughly the size
of Arkansas, and periodic ravages of natural calamities, it had long been one
of the world's most impoverished regions. Then came the natural and
man-made disasters of 1970 and 1971: a cyclone and tidal wave claimed
several hundred thousand lives in the southern part of the country in
November 1970, and a comparable number probably died during the civil
strife and international war that devastated the country in ; 971 ; millions
more were maimed, raped, orphaned, and left homeless.
Mujibur Rahman
Dominated by Prime Minister Muji-
bur Rahman, a charismatic and strong-
wiVea man who commands wide national
supper,'. ;nd aided by massive donations
by foreign countries led by India and the
US, Bangladesh has slowly begun to re-
vive, but monumental problems remain.
The government's efforts to create a func-
tioning socialist, secular society are im-
peded by lack of resources. Endemic
unemployment, commodity shortages,
and inflation are exacerbated by the scar-
city of money, materials. and equipment
required for the revival of agricultural and
industrial activity. Much of the transpor-
tation system has yet to be restored to its
NOTE: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated wi'hin CIA.
^
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 pre.-1971 condition, and the distribution of food and other basic supplies to
many parts of the country is consequently badly impaired. Bangladesh
remains a land of hunger, joblessness, bereavement, and desolation.
The euphoria of independence, the influence of 'Mujib, the presence
first of Indian troops and now of growing domestic security forces, and-
perhaps most important-the people's long familiarity with pain and priva-
tion, so far have prevented economic hardship from spilling over into
uncontrollable disorder. Political stability remair:t fragile, hr-'vever. Anti-
government sentiment is beginning to increase and is likely to rise.
On the international front, Bangladesh has been recognized by over 70
nations. The main holdouts are countries friendly to Pakistan-China, the
other Asian Communist states, and most of the Muslim countries. India and
the Soviet Union, the chief supporters of the Bengali independence move-
ment, are the nations with the greatest influence in Dacca. India has been
Bangladesh's primary source of assistance, and Dacca is likely to remain
heavily dependent on New Delhi for some time. Mujib's government is
nevertheless aware that the US also is a major provider of economic assist-
ance. It has therefore toned down its criticism of American policy and is
seeking to maintain as independent an international posture as circumstances
allow.
Decla
ssified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
C1;CD,GT
sified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
arisal~
Cn no..
Dinaipur
Bogra. rI,l r.....~yrJ Sy hots
Oyymensingh
Rajshahi
S A N, G L A D E S W
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 R 17.T
assified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
Economic Problems...
Much of the war-ravaged Bangladesh economy remains crippled. The
small industrial sector is operating at well below normal, and production in
fiscal 1972 (July 1971 - June 1972) may be as much as 50 percent lower
than the previous year. Industry continues to be plagued by shortages of raw
materials, replacement parts, electrical power, fuel, and managerial expertise.
Nearly all the cotton mills and about a fifth of the jute mills-the country's
main industrial facilities-were still closed as of mid-May, and those that
were open were operating only part time.
In an effort to revive the industrial sector, the government last March
nationalized all jute and textile mills and several other categories of industry
as well. The majority of the nationalized enterprises had belonged to West
Pakistanis and therefore in effect had become ownerless; most other foreign-
owned firms were exempted from nationalization. So far, nationalization has
not helped much; since the take-overs, the regime has made little progress in
coming up with the material and managerial resources necessary to reactivate
production.
Agricultural production, which ordinarily employs 80 to 85 percent of
the working population, is also below normal. Precise data are lacking, but
for the 1971-72 fiscal year the production of rice, the main food crop, has
been estimated at 15 to 20 percent less than in 1969-70, the last disaster-free
year. Yields of the main export crops, jute and tea, are also low. The jute
crop has been estimated at 30 to 40 percent below the previous year, and tea
production is off by about 65 percent. In 1970-71 jute and jute products
accounted for 73 percent of exports, and tea for 8 percent. Among the main
causes of the agricultural shortfalls are the physical damage that occurred
during last year's fighting (some 40 of the 128 tea estates were badly
damaged, for example); the urrooting of millions of rural people which
obstructed planting and harvesting; and continuing scarcities of basic neces-
sities for agricultural production, such as irrigation pumps, fuel, fertilizer,
seeds, pesticides, and draft animals.
The fall in agricultural and industrial output, in turn, has contributed to
serious shortages of consumer goods, an inflationary spiral, and a worsening
of the country's endemic unemployment and underemployment. Many con-
sumer commodities are in extremely short supply, and since independence
prices have risen from 50 to well over 100 percent. Hoarding, black market-
ing, and smuggling have aggravated the shortages and inflation, although
these abuses are probably more a symptom than a cause. The unemployment
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
SECRET
problem is massive. According to some estimates over half the labor force is
without work. Many people have flocked to the cities and towns in a
fruitless search for employment, and new shanty towns have sprung up in
Dacca and other urban centers. A severe housing shortage has affected many
Bengalis, including most of the nearly 10 million who fled to India last year.
Virtually all of these refugees returned to Bangladesh during the first three
months of independence, and many found that their homes had either been
occupied by others or destroyed during last year's strife.
The government has formulated a variety of plans for coping with the
economic situation. It has talked about distribution of land to landless
peasants, providing essential commodities through cooperatives and "fair
price" shops, rationing, job creation, and salary increases for lower paid
workers. For the most part, however, these schemes remain on paper. The
government lacks both the funds and the administrative capability to im-
plement them.
Makeshift Bypass for Destroyed Bridge
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03 :CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
SECRET
Most Bengalis are accustomed to hardship. The unemployment situa-
tion has resulted in some clashes between Awand League and Communist
labor organizations competing for scarce jobs, but violence growing c rectly
out of economic difficulties has otherwise been limited. Famine is the
specter most likely to trigger massive disorders, but thus far large-scale
starvation has been averted. Foreign aid has played a vital role; of the 1.7
million tons of foodgrains pledged by foreign donors, about 700,000 tons
had arrived by the beginning of June. The September-November period when
food supplies in Bangladesh usually are at a low point may be a time of
considerable stringency, The UN has appealed to member nations to pledge
an additional one million tons of foodgrains for delivery during these
months.
Although widespread starvation is not an immediate threat, there may
be pockets of acute huriger.The country's internal distribution system, badly
r:amaged last year, has been only partially restored. The onset of the annual
monsoon rains last month has slowed repair work, and many rail and road
bridges are still unusable. Most waterways, the primary means of transpor-
tation, are unobstructed, but many boats were destroyed during the war and
have not been replaced.
Serious food scarcities and related disturbances have already been
reported in a few localities. The shortages have been most severe in the
northwestern districts, which are isolated by the Ganges and Brahmaputra
rivers. The only bridge connecting this area with the rest of the country was
destroyed last December by the retreating Pakistani Army, and repairs
reportedly cannot be completed before September.
The two main ports, Chittagong and Chalna, have until recently been
unable to operate at full capacity because of sunken vessels and mines left
over from the war. A Soviet salvage team has been clearing the ports, and
early this month Bangladesh officials claimed that normal operations had
be'n resumed at both ports.
...But Political Stability So Far
Some criminal and political groups are trying to take advantage of the
economic and social conditions, but they are not y:t a serious threat to the
regime. Bands of young men have roamed through rural areas, robbing and
extorting. Many of these men are former activists in the fight for inde-
pendence who subsequently found themselves without prospects for work or
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
Ex-guerrilla Leader Turning in Arms
schooling. Some of them are still armed. Despite a government uulip(lign to
collect Al unauthorized weapons, probably fewer than half were turned in.
One official recently estinlate(I that there lily still he 100,000 of more
weapons in unauthorized hands.
The hooligan hands have not been Strong enough to challenge the
government for control of any sizable areas. Earlier fears that much of the
countryside would (luickly fall under the contrl?i of young v.arlor'ds have rot
been borne out. The most prominent strong man Abdul Nader Siddiqui (11-
Tangail district, who received worl(1-wide publicity last I)rcenlher when he
and his supporters publicly executed our men accused of having aided the
Pakistan Arnly has pledged his loyalty to 1lujib.
Dissident political organizations have also failed so far to threaten the
Awanti League government. 'there are several extreme-left, violence-oriented
groups, hut they are small, fragmented, and only sporadically active. None of
these groups is believed to have more than a few hun.lred active nlenlbers.
L,I.i,n I,._,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
25X1
Most of them formerly looked to China for inspiration and help, but
Peking's support for Pakistan last year and the absence of Chinese influence
or representation in independent Ban zlad
known outside assistance.
25X1
Sonie of the extremist
25X1
groups were badly battered in internecine clashes with pro - Awami League
guerrillas last year.
ha
Muzzafar Ahmed
Two larger, Moscow-oriented oppo-
sition parties-the Communist Party of
Bangladesh and Professor Muzaffar
Ahmed's wing of the National Awami
Party-although occasionally critical of
the regime have generally supported it.
The chief of the more radical wing of the
National Awami Party, octogenarian peas-
ant leader Maulana Bhashani, appears to
be trying to carve out a role as a non-
violent opponent of the regime. But he
also is reported to be seeking an alliance
with a violent le:tist group, the Commu-
nist Unity Center. Opposition to the gov-
ernment from the right is virtually non-
existent. Many of the country's conserva-
tive politicians collaborated with Islam-
abad, and very few are active now.
The makeup of the unicameral national legislature-currently in recess
while committees work on a constitution-reflects the weakness of the
political opposition. The legislature is composed of persons elected in De-
cember 1970 to the Pakistan national assembly and the East Pakistan
provincial assembly. Mujib's Awami League won overwhelming majorities in
both elections. When the assembly met briefly in April for its first-and thus
far only-session, all but a handful of members belonged to the Awami
League.
Although Mujib has promised new elections, he has not yet committed
himself to a timetable. Elections presumably will be among the subjects
covered in the new constitution. A government spokesman recently told
newsmen that the draft constitution was approaching completion add that
the legislature would meet in July to consider it. He said the new charter
would come into effect immediately after its adoption.
M SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
SECRET
Within the Awami League itself, only limited dissidence has appeared so
far, even though the party encompasses a diversity of interest groups-
peasants, students, and the urban middle class. Mujib-who is basically a
pragmatic, middle-of-the-road politician-has been the unifying factor; no
other politician enjoys comparable popularity and prestige, and, thus far, no
one has dared challenge him. Mujib, for his part, is sensitive about criticism
and has shown little willingness to tolerate dissent from within the party. He
has kept the relatively few dissident members out of key party posts and has
threatened to expel any who actively oppose his policies. Beneath the
surface, however, a leftist faction led by Finance Minister Tajuddin Ahmed is
trying to increase its influence.
Mujib's popularity with the masses, his determination to maintain
personal control over the government, and his willingness personally to
intervene when trouble occurs have been of critical importance in maintain-
ing stability. The build-up of government security forces has also been a
significant factor. The national police force has been expanded to some
36,000 men. The army has been increased from about 7,500 men in January
to at least 12,000, with an ultimate target of 20,000. Two officially spon-
sored paramilitary groups-the 16,000-man National Defense Force, which
seeks to absorb former guerrilla irregulars who fought against Pakistan last
year, and the 20,000-man Lal Bahini (loosely translatable as Red Guards),
composed of Awami League - affiliated labor union members-have also been
The army and police have small arms, but transportation and commu-
nications equipment are insufficient and qualified support personnel lacking.
Many of the army troops are trained soldiers who belonged to the Pakistan
Army, but large numbers of the policemen are poorly trained. The National
Defense Force reportedly is lightly armed, and US officials have described
the Lal Bahini as "semi-trained." The air force has a few fighter aircraft and
small utility planes captured last December from Pakistan, but most of these
probably are damaged; the naval fleet consists of only a few patrol boats.
manpower targets are 2,000-2,500 and 3,000-3,500, respectively.
formed. A small navy and air force have been established.
There are a number of potentially serious threats to political stability.
The government's strength depends heavily on Mujib's personal popularity.
No successor could command a comparable degree of public support. Mujib,
at 52 years of age, is not known ever to have been seriously ill. He has held
up well under the burdens of office since his return to Bangladesh last
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
SECRET
January from 10 months of imprisonment in Pakistan. He may have been ill
or exhausted during the latter half of April when he was not seen in public
for several days, but otherw,;e lie has been maintaining an energetic pace.
With most of his subordinates lacking both experience and prestige, however,
Mujib must make-or believes he must make-a wide range of governmental
decisions himself. He sees numerous visitors every day and makes frequent
public appearances, speeches, and trips to various parts of the country. His
strenuous schedule, coupled with the frustration of having to grapple with
problems that are intractable, could eventually take a toll on his health.
Even if Mujib remains healthy, the crushing economic burdens may
eventually erode popular support for his government. Some signs of public
disenchantment have already begun to appear. Public criticism of the gov-
ernment began to increase in May. Food shortages in several areas were the
main cause, but the country's other economic problems have also begun to
affect attitudes toward the regime. Additionally, the public more and more
resents the many Awami League officials who are more adept at self-enrich-
mnent than at easing the sufferings of the people. Murders of Awami League
officials by radical leftists and other disgruntled elements reportedly have
been increasing in some towns and villages. Even criticism of Mujib himself is
surfacing, although he still retains wide popularity.
Rising dissatisfaction with the Awami League may eventually lead to
increased strength and cohesiveness among leftist opposition groups-and
perhaps to a leftward shift by the Awami League as it seeks to forestall
defections from its ranks. The most important of the more moderate leftist
opposition groups, Muzaffar Ahmed's National Awami Party faction, is
beginning to become more critical of the regime
Disillusionment with the regime is starting to emerge among university
students, who often are harbingers of Bengali political trends. Students in
Bangladesh are highly politicized; historically they have been in the vanguard
of important political movements, including last year's liberation struggle. In
elections at Dacca University last month, the student arm of Muzaffar
Ahmed's National Awami Party replaced the Awami League's student group
as the university's strongest student political organization. A general leftward
trend among students and a split between leftist and moderate factions in
the Awami League student organization were the main causes of the latter
SFCR FT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 I;li(! R1iT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
group's defeat.
The ruling party Itself' implicitly acknowledged its own vulnerability
late last month. Leaders of the Awami League, Muzuffar's party and the
Communist Party of Bangladesh agreed to establish "all-party committees"
to assist the government at all levels below the cabinet. The Awami League
previously had steadfastly refused to share governmental responsibilities with
other parties and still refuses to consider a coalition government.
Bangladesh has two potentially serious problems involving minority
groups. The more worrisome involves the roughly one million non-Bengali
Muslims-generally known as Biharis-who first came to East Pakistan from
eastern India in the late 1940s when the subcontinent was divided into
Hindu and Muslim nations. Few Biharis, who speak Urdu, have been assimi-
lated. Bengali-Bihari antagonism sharpened last year when many Biharis
collaborated with the Pakistan Army. The Bengalis want revenge.
So far, however, a bloodbath has not occurred, partly because of
Mujib's public urgings that the Biharis be left alone and partly because army
and police forces have been guarding Bihari enclaves. Only one confirmed
large-scale Bengali-Bihari flare-up has taken place since independence-a clash
in March in the town of Khulna in which several hundred Biharis were killed.
Food supplies for most Biharis-as well as for many Bengalis-have bee!i
scant, but large-scale starvation has been averted.
The longer term prospects for the Biharis are bleak. Few Biharis have
jobs, and many are afraid to venture outside their enclaves. Given the
scarcity of basic necessities for many Bengalis and the unlikelihood that
popular anger at the Pakistan Army and its various collaborators will soon
disappear, most Biharis have little hope of becoming self-supporting and of
being accepted by the majority. Nor have significant numbers of Biharis been
able to get out of Bangladesh. Although the Dacca government would
probably be willing to release them to another country, neither Pakistan nor
India-the two most logical possibilities-wants large numbers of jobless
immigrants who would be a drain on the public treasury and a possible
source of conflict with local ethnic or religious communities.
The other significant minority in Bangladesh consists of several hundred
thousand tribal peoples, predominantly Buddhists, who inhabit the Chitta-
gong Hills Tracts in the extreme southeastern corner of the country. The
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
 ^ SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
Dacca government's authority in this area Is somewhat uncertain, Many of
the inhabitants resent what they regard as past discrimination by the Ben-
gaiis, and some collaborated with Pakistan. In March, the weakness of the
government's position in the area was displayed when an armed band, made
up of a fete fugitives from Bangladesh and several hundred dissident Mizo
tribesmen from an adjacent portion of India, was able to overrun two police
posts. A joint effort by the Bangladesh and Indian armies routed the
troublemakers, but the will continue to be an irritant to both governments
in this remote region.
Almost one sixth of the people in Bangladesh are Hindus, and the
Muslim and Hindu communities have clashed violently in the past. But
widespread appreciation among the Muslims of India's role in the liberation
of Bangladesh, together with Mujib's strong advocacy of secularism, have
prevented any serious Muslim-Hindu outbreaks in independent Bangladesh.
Relations with India and Pakistan
India is Bangladesh's closest ally and leading benefactor. Indian Army
troops were welcomed as liberators last December, and developments since
then have further strengthened ties between the two countries.
New Delhi has been the leading donor of economic assistance, budget-
ing some $267 million for aid to Bangladesh. About $217 million has already
been allocated. The Indian pledges include 750,000 tons of foodgrains, of
which 400,000 tons had reached Bangladesh by the beginning of June. The
rest of the Indian assistance consists of a variety of essential commodities on
a grant basis, and of soft loans that cover the establishment of foreign
exchange reserves, the rehabilitation of transport and communications facili-
ties, and the provision of several ships and aircraft.
Two major pacts have been signed between India and Bangladesh. A
friendship and cooperation treaty was signed in mid-March, climaxing a
two-day visit to Bangladesh by Prime Minister Gandhi. The treaty provides
that the two governments will consult with each other immediately if either
is threatened with attack by another party, that they will not enter into
alliances directed against one another, that they will maintain regular con-
tacts on major international problems affecting both, and that they will
cooperate in science, culture, economics, trade, and water usage.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
Mujihur Ralunan and Indira Gandhi
trade agreement signed in April seeks to I, cilitate trade and transpor-
tation between the two countries, both long obstructed by India's unfriendly
relations with the previously unified Pakistan. The economies ol* India and
13;utgladesh are complemc--'ary in some respects: Indian textiles, industrial
products, and some foodstuffs should find a ready market in 13;tgladesh,
and certain 13antaadr~:h products wood, fish, and paper products, and pos-
sibly sonic raw jute may he marketable in India. FUJI if trade tails to
increase markedly both 13angladesh and eastern India could benefit from
cooperative arras; entents that may already he under discussion with regard
to flood control, irrigation, cyclone warning systems, and development and
linkage of power systems.
Some groups in Bangladesh have alluded to what they view as excessive
Indian influence in Bangladesh. For the most part these complaints have
come from businessmen who claim that the trade agreement is weighted in
India's favor and from leftist political elements who believe that Indian
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
assistance to the Awami League government has prevented the left-wing
opposition from expanding its influence. A few Awami League politicians
are also uneasy about India's role, but their concern appears directed more
toward what they perceive as possible fature domination rather than toward
any relationship that has materialized.
The Indians, for their part, have made a considerable effort to avoid the
appearance of excessive interference. The withdrawal of the Indian Army
was completed by mid-March, with New D'..hi apparently even more anxious
than Dacca to get the Indian soldiers out. Some Indian military and technical
advisers probably remain in Bangladesh, however.
Indian combat troops would probably return to Bangladesh should
uprisings occur that the Bangladesh security forces could not handle. F
Indian fighting units have returned to Bangladesh in only one instance.
Several hundred Indian troops have been helping Dacca's forces pursue rebel
bands in the Chittagong Hills, the country's most isolated and primitive
region. Dissidence in this region is a problem for both countries; most of the
active rebels in the area are Mizo tribesmen from India who move back and
forth across the borders between India, Bangladesh, and Bu;Yna.
The people of Muslim Bangladesh have long feared and disliked Hindu
traders from India who dominated Bengali commercial affairs prior to the
partition of the subcontinent. In the weeks immediately following Pakistan's
surrender last December, a number of Indian merchants moved into Bangla-
desh in the wake of the Indian Army. The Indian Government h,is restricted
cross-border movements by these traders, and in the trade agrccment of last
April, New Delhi stipulated that private Indian businessmen would not be
permitted to participate in most categories of trade between the two coun-
tries. New Delhi continues to emphasize that its policy is to minimize private
participation in trade and aid relations with Bangladesh. Additionally, both
governments are trying to reduce smuggling by profiteers seeking to market
goods from Bangladesh in India.
Another potential source of disagreement between New Delhi and
Dacca is the disposition of Pakistani prisoners of war being held by India.
The prisoners number about 93,000, including, more than 70,000 members
of the Pakistan Army, some of whom are alleged to have committed
atrocities in East Pakistan last year. Popular demand for the punishment of
the accused soldiers is strong in Bangladesh, and the Dacca government
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
hopes to start trying them soon. Pakistani President Bhutto, however, has
stressed that the transfer of Pakistani soldiers to Bangladesh would seriously
jeopardize prospects for the Indo-Pakistani summit talks scheduled to begin
later this month. New Delhi, reluctant to provoke a cancellation of the
summit, has refrained from announcing any specific plans for handing
Pakistanis over to Dacca. Nevertheless, Indian officials have asserted publicly
that Bangladesh has the right to try persons accused of war crimes and that
those against whom Dacca has well-documented cases will be turned over. So
far these statements have headed off any conflict with Bangladesh over this
issue.
The accession of Bangladesh to the Geneva Conventions in April re-
moved the main legal obstacle to such a transfer. Under the conventions,
India, as a signatory, was barred from turning over prisoners of war to a
non-signatory.
New Delhi has emphasized that repatriation to Pakistan of the bulk of
the prisoners-those not accused of war crimes-cannot be arranged without
the participation of Dacca. This condition, the Indians hope, will compel
Bhutto to recognize the independence of Bangladesh. Mujib, for his part, has
reiterated that Bangladesh officials will not meet with their Pakistani coun-
terparts to discuss prisoners-or other bilateral issues, such as the division of
assets and liabilities of the formerly unified Pakistani state-until Islamabad
has extended recognition. Dacca also has rejected any possibility of canceling
the war crimes trials in exchange for Pakistani recognition.
Pakistan's strongest bargaining chip in any bilateral negotiations is the
Bengali minority living in Pakistan. Among these 400,000 Bengalis are a few
professional people, 24,000 to 28,000 military personnel, and 12,000 to
16,000 civil servants whose abilities would be useful to a country in which
skills and experience are in short supply. Some of these Bengalis have lost
their jobs and been subjected to living and working restrictions over the past
year, but in general they have not been badly mistreated. A Red Cross
official in Pakistan has estimated that at least half the Bengalis there would
like to emigrate to Bangladesh. Dacca has ruled out a population exchange
with Pakistan involving either Pakistani prisoners of war or the several
thousand Bengalis and Biharis being held in Bangladesh jails on charges of
having collaborated with Pakistan. This stand is mainly a consequence of the
strong popular demand in Bangladesh for punishment of war criminals and
collaborators, but it may also reflect a certain ambivalence about bringing
home large numbers of Bengalis who would compete for scarce jobs.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
Extensive trade was carried on between,.Ie two wings of Pakistan prior
to their separation. West Pakistanis sold foodgrains, tobacco, cotton textiles,
and other manufactured goods in the eastern wing, while jute goods and tea
moved from cast to west. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan still need such
items, but trade is blocked by political obstacles. The resumption of some
commerce using Ceylon or other third parties as intermediaries is possible,
but direct bilateral trade probably will not occur in the absence of Pakistani
recognition of Bangladesh. Some progress may also be necessary on other
bilateral problems, such as the return of Pakistani war prisoners, the appor-
tionment of unified Pakistan's assets and liabilities, and possibly even future
demands by Bangladesh for war reparations, before a significant level of
trade can be re-established.
Closely related to the question of Pakistani recognition are relations
between Bangladesh and China, the only major power that has not recog-
nized Bangladesh. The Chinese did recently offer to buy some $12 to $15
million worth of jute from Bangladesh, but Peking is not likely to extend
diplomatic recognition soon unless its Pakistani ally does so. The Dacca
government has expressed concern that the Chinese might veto Bangladesh's
admission to the UN, but a high official in the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry
recently told the US charge that Dacca had learned from third parties that a
Chinese veto was not likely. Meanwhile, many Bengalis continue to resent
Chinese support of Pakistan. Speeches by Bangladesh officials still sometimes
cite Peking as bearing some of the responsibility for Bangladesh's problems.
Relations with the Soviet Union
Moscow moved quickly to capitalize on the good will created by Soviet
support for the Bengali independence movement. On 24 January the USSR
became the first major power to recognize Bangladesh. Five Eastern Euro-
pean allies of the Soviets and Mongolia were among the first thirteen
countries extending recognition. Shortly after the conclusion of the Indo-
Pakistani war, a trade agreement was signed providing for the exchange of
goods worth about $14 million each way. Trade pacts were also ^igned in
February and March with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria.
By the end of March the number of Soviet officials posted in Bangla-
desh had risen to 75-100 from a pre-independence level of 30 to 40. There
have been visits by a variety of Soviet cultural and academic delegations,
exchange visits by Soviet and Bengali trade union delegations, heavy place-
ment of Soviet articles and films in the Bangladesh media, establishment of
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
SECRET
scholarships for study in the USSR, and participation in the establishment of
Bangladesh-USSR Friendship Society branches around the country. The
public apparently is favorably disposed toward the USSR, and very few
objections have been heard regarding the Soviets' high visibility in the
country.
Mujib's visit to Moscow from I to 5 March marked a high point in
Bangladesh-USSR relations. In a communique issued at the end of the visit
Bangladesh associated itself with the Soviet position on a variety of inter-
national topics, including the Vietnamese Communists' seven-point program,
the 1967 UN resolution on the Middle East, and the proposed conferences
on European security and world disarmament. The Soviets c'mmitted some
$52 million of relief and development aid to Bangladesh, most of this-$42
million-was development aid reallocated from credits extended to Pakistan
prior to Bangladesh's independence. Projects being constru^ted under these
credits are a thermal power plant, an electrical equipment factory and radio
Mujibur Rahman and L. I. Brezhnev in Moscow
-14-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
lranslaliIICrs. ,I'Ite Suvtcls also Ilan to contin(1!. oil atltl gas I,toslrceling
ad ivilirs begun ten years at,o. In a(I(lilion, Moscow exten(le(I at leas) SIO
million ill new reliel' and reIiahifitation assistance. indItl(lin)! I'un(I, loconto-
lives. fishing vessels, t~ar~to ships. an(I Ilse loan of tour M1I-8 Iielicoiiters I'ot.
relict' work, Thu conlntuni(Iue nia(Ie no mention of military assistance.
'11010 11g11 Soviet Defense Minister (Jrecitko's l,articil,utinn in the talks in(Ii-
cale(I that the suhject was probably (Iiscusse(I, The Soviets further strength
ene(I their lies with Raiigla(lesh by uI'Ifering to cle;u? sunken shahs and mines
from the hurts of ('11 itta;~)ng anti ('halm an offer NI ujill accepted alter the
UN delayed in conunittnlt Itself to provide similar assistance,
;AIthouzll the assistance I,Ietlt!e(I by the Soviets is f;u? exceeded by the
521(; million promised thus I'ar by the US, the Dacca ,government has been
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
 ssified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
SLC-;xI T
more voluble in expressing appreciation for the Soviet support. Mujib, when
publicly naming foreign governments to which lie feels a debt of gratitude,
usually places New Delhi and Moscow at the top of the list. Nevertheless, he
has reiterated-even over Soviet television-his determination to maintain an
independent posture in international affairs and to reject any offers of aid
accompanied by political conditions. His endorsement of Soviet positions on
international issues in the March coin inunidur' probably resulted at least in
part from his delegation's inexperience in international dealings, coupled
with the lavish red-carpet treatment the delegation received in Moscow.
Moscow's effort to ingratiate itself with the Bengalis has prompted
some speculation that the Soviets wish to establish a naval base at the
Chittagong port. But Moscow, which already has a number of ships in
Chittagong in connection with its harbor salvage operations, probably would
be reluctant to jeopardize its influential position in both India and Bangla-
desh by pushing for extensive naval privileges. New Delhi and Dacca would
probably interpret anything resembling a naval base as a sigr of excessive
Soviet influence in Bangladesh. A joint India-Bangladesh declaration issued
in March included an assertion that the Indian Ocean area should be free of
great-power rivalries and foreign land, air and naval bases.
Relations with the West
Public and government attitudes in Bangladesh toward Western coun-
tries have been shaped mainly by each country's policies toward the sub-
continent in 1971 and its performance in recognizing and assisting Bangia-
desh in 1972. So far, last year's policies appear rc have weighed more heavily
than this year's assistance. For example, the UK-like the USSR-llas ;;ranted
relatively limited economic assistance, but is viewed sympathetically because
it is regarded as having supported Bangladesh. London-like Moscow--further
strengthened its standing by recognizing Bangladesh relatively soon after
independence. The UK and the Scandinavian countries were the first impor-
tant Western European countries to recognize Bangladesh.
Frequent signs of official hostility toward the US marked the first few
weeks of independence. Even in the early days of independence, however,
Mujib voiced hope for good relations with the US and publicly reiterated his
gratitude for support received from the American public and press. In the
spring, official resentment toward Washington abated somewhat, especially
following US recognition on 4 April. Dacca's awareness that it must rely on
the US for a large part of its economic assistance has probably been the most
important factor muting its complaints about past US Policy. US pledges by
SECRET
classified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130087-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7
SECRET
the end of May to contribute $126 million to the relief efforts being carried
out under the auspices of the UN and private American voluntary agem Ies,
together with a bilateral US grant of $90 million, make Washington second
only to New Delhi among donor countries. Total US assistance was almost
one third of the world-wide sum of nearly $700 million.
A faction within the government, led by Finance Minister Tajuddin
Ahmed, voices strong anti-American views, but most key officials-and most
importantly, Mujib himself-have sought to maintain a pragmatic and gen-
uinely non-aligned foreign policy. A worsening of domestic economic and
security problems, however, might well lead to increasing criticism of Wash-
ington as Bangladesh politicians search for scapegoats.
17-
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP85T00875RO01100130087-7