CODEL HATCH: ISSUES PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000700900129-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 129
• Publication Date: January 7, 1986
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP90B01390R000700900129-2
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8967
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ISLAMABAD 00165
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP
SUBJECT: CODEL HATCH: ISSUES PAPER
REF: STATE 00264
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE BACKGROUND PAPER
REQUESTED BY CODEL HATCH.
YOURS WILL BE THE FIRST HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF U.S.
VISITORS SINCE THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW ON DECEMBER
30, 1985. IN ADDITION TO THE PRESIDENCY, MOHAMMED
ZIA-AL-HAQ HAS RETAINED THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE ARMY. HOWEVER, HE IS MAKING A CONSCIOUS EFFORT
TO PROJECT PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER OF THE COUNTRY. WHILE, ULTIMATELY, THE MAJOR
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS WILL BE MADE BY
ZIA, IT APPEARS DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT WILL BE IN THE
HANDS OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS CABINET.
THE PARLIAMENT (MAJLIS-E-SHOORA) HAS JUST COMPLETED A
FIVE DAY DEBATE OF FOREIGN POLICY. THE GOVERNMENT WON
WIDE ENDORSEMENT OF ITS POLICIES INCLUDING ON
AFGHANISTAN, BUT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS
GIVEN, INCLUDING BY THE GOVERNMENT, TO THE NEED FOR
PAKISTAN TO ASSURE THAT THE POLICIES IT FOLLOWS ARE
NON-ALIGNED, ISLAMIC, AND TRULY IN THE INTERESTS OF
PAKISTAN. FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN WENT OUT OF HIS
WAY TO EMPHASIZE THAT, ESPECIALLY ON AFGHANISTAN,
PAKISTAN'S POLICIES ARE NOT THE CREATURES OF AMERICA,
BUT ARE, AND WILL REMAIN PAKISTAN'S. HE REITERATED
THAT AT NO TIME HAS THE U.S. SOUGHT TO PRESSURE
PAKISTAN ON AFGHANISTAN, AND THAT THERE WERE NO STRINGS
ATTACHED TO THE 1981 AID PACKAGE, OTHER THAN U.S.
INTEREST IN SEEING A SECURE AND STABLE PAKISTAN, WHICH
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HE CALLED "QUID" ENOUGH.
WE DO NOT EXPECT THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO MAKE ANY MAJOR
DEPARTURES IN PAKISTANI FOREIGN POLICY, BUT THE
MINISTERS' PRIORITIES ARE GENERALLY KEYED TO DOMESTIC
ISSUES. THEY HAVE VERY LITTLE FOREIGN POLICY
EXPERIENCE, EXCEPT FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND FINANCE
MINISTER. THE PM IS A CAUTIOUS INDIVIDUAL, WHO APPEARS
NOT TO BE INTO THE NUANCES OF FOREIGN POLICY. HIS
ACTIONS ON SEVERAL ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE U.S.
(INCLUDING PUBLICIZING CROSS BORDER HUMANITARIAN AID TO
AFGHANISTAN) SUGGEST THAT HE WILL BE SLOW TO ADOPT BOLD
NEW DEPARTURES, ESPECIALLY THOSE THAT COULD POSE RISKS
TO PAKISTAN, EITHER DIPLOMATIC OR MILITARY (IN THE CASE
OF THE SOVIET UNION).
-- CONGRATULATE VARIOUS OFFICIALS ON THE RETURN TO
CIVILIAN RULE. WE SEE REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AS
THE BEST GUARANTOR OF A NATION'S SECURITY AND THE
BEST MEANS TO ASSURE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT
POLICIES.
WE HAVE NO DOUBT THE PRIME MINISTER SEES NARCOTICS AS
A SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVIL BUT HE HAS
NOT YET INDICATED WHAT PRIORITY HE WILL PLACE ON
COUNTERING THE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, IN THE NWFP THIS
YEAR, THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE GRUMBLING IN THE
AREAS WHERE POPPIES PREVIOUSLY WERE GROWN, AND IT IS
A HOT POLITICAL ISSUE FOR THE NWFP GOVERNMENT. SINCE
THE FORMER GOVERNOR, FAZLE HAQ, DOMINATED ALL ASPECTS
OF FRONTIER LIFE, THERE WAS LITTLE PUBLIC
BACKPEDDLING ON THE NARCOTICS ISSUE -- NOR WAS THERE
AS MUCH MOVEMENT FORWARD AS WE WOULD HAVE LIKED. WE
DO NOT YET KNOW WHAT PRIORITY THE NEW CIVILIAN
GOVERNOR, ABDUL GAFOOR HOTI (OR CHIEF MINISTER ARBAB
JEHANGIR) WILL PLACE ON NARCOTICS. HOTI HAD A POOR
REPUTATION AS AN ADMINISTRATOR IN HIS PREVIOUS
INCARNATION AS RAILWAYS MINISTER. THE SWITCH-OVER
FROM MILITARY COURTS TO CIVILIAN COURTS CONSTITUTES
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP
SUBJECT: CODEL HATCH: ISSUES PAPER
ANOTHER POTENTIALLY WEAK POINT IN THE ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS.
-- FLAG U.S. CONCERN THAT OPIUM PRODUCTION CONTINUE
TO BE REDUCED AND THAT GREATER EFFORTS BE MADE TO
DEAL WITH TRAFFICKERS.
-- ENQUIRE HOW THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION INTENDS TO
PROCEED ON THE NARCOTICS ISSUE.
THE GOP IS JUST BEGINNING TO FOCUS ON WHAT GRAMM-
RUDMAN-HOLLINGS WILL MEAN FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN. THEY RECOGNIZE THE U.S. HAS
A SERIOUS BUDGETARY CRISIS, BUT HAVE THOUGHT PAKISTAN
SECRET
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A TOO IMPORTANT U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVE TO BE
AFFECTED. WHILE CONGRESS EARMARKED FY 1986 AID TO
PAKISTAN IN THE CR, IT APPEARS AID IN 1986. NOT TO
MENTION 1987, COULD BE CUT BACK FROM THE LEVELS
AGREED IN THE FIVE YEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT (DOLS
700 MILLION ANNUALLY).
MORE IMPORTANT WILL BE THE IMPACT ON WHAT WE CAN DO
FOR A FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM. THE PRESIDENT LAST FALL
PROMISED ZIA WE WOULD PROPOSE TO CONGRESS A
MULTI-YEAR PROGRAM. THE PAKS )PENING NEGOTIATING
GAMBIT CALLED FOR A DOUBLING OF U.S. AID (TO DOLS 6.5
BILLION FOR FIVE YEARS). WE SEE LITTLE PROSPECT OF
DOING ANY BETTER THAN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS (DOLS 3.2
BILLION), ALTHOUGH WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO
IMPROVE CONCESSIONALITY. THE NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT
IS BOUND TO VIEW OUR AID PROPOSALS AS ONE INDICATOR
OF OUR SINCERITY VIS A VIS PAKISTAN -- THE PM HIMSELF
SUGGESTED LAST FALL TO AMBASSADOR HINTON THAT THE USG
MUST DO MATERIALLY BETTER FOR HIS CIVILIAN
GOVERNMENT, GIVEN WHAT IT DID FOR THE PREVIOUS
MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
-- ASSURE OFFICIALS THAT, IRRESPECTIVE OF OUR FIRM
RESOLVE TO BACK PAKISTAN AND TO HELP IT MAINTAIN ITS
SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE, THERE ARE LIMITS ON THE
RESOURCES THAT WE CAN MAKE AVAILABLE. THE U.S.
BUDGET CRISIS IS REAL.
-- WE BELIEVE A STRONG U.S. ECONOMY CONTRIBUTES TO
WORLD STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT.
THIS IS A CRITICAL AREA OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND PAKISTAN. WHILE WE AGREE THAT A REGIONAL
SETTLEMENT IS THE BEST SOLUTION TO THIS REGIONAL
PROBLEM, WE CANNOT IGNORE DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN.
-- ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT WE SUPPORT HIS PROPOSALS
TO INDIA FOR A REGIONAL SETTLEMENT, BUT ENSURE HE
UNDERSTANDS THAT ANY UNILATERAL ACQUISITION OF A
NUCLEAR DEVISE IN PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE A CATASTROPHIC
IMPACT ON U.S. PAK RELATIONS.
DESPITE STEPPED UP ACTIVITIES BY BOTH THE SOVIETS AND
MUJAHIDIN, THE WAR AT THE END OF 1985 REMAINED
STALEMATED, THE SOVIETS WERE FORCED TO TAKE ON AN
INCREASING BURDEN OF THE FIGHTING FROM THE DRA AND
CASUALTIES WERE UP FOR BOTH THE SOVIETS AND MUJAHIDIN.
THE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE END OF 1985 WERE
NOT ON THE BATTLEFIELD:
0 THE GOP GOT THREE MORE VOTES ON ITS OMNIBUS
RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN (A TOTAL OF 122), AND FOR
THE FIRST TIME THE UNGA ACCEPTED A DAMNING REPORT BY
THE UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR (PROF. ERMACORA), IN WHICH
ERMACORA CATALOGUED A VARIETY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
BY THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN.
0 AT THE GENEVA SUMMIT, PRESIDENT REAGAN HIT HARD ON
THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE WAR, AND
GORBACHEV APPARENTLY AGREED A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
IS PREFERABLE. THAT ASSURANCE DID NOT NECESSARILY
SECRET
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: CODEL HATCH: ISSUES PAPER
TRANSLATE INTO ANYTHING CONCRETE AT THE GENEVA VI
PROXIMITY TALKS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND KABUL (TALKS
CHAIRED BY THE UN). HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO THE GOP,
THERE WAS SOME INCHING FORWARD, AND THE SOVIETS
(THOUGH NOT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS) SEEMED TO BE PLAYING
A POSITIVE ROLE -- MORE SO THAN THE DRA. THE PAKS
HOPE THERE WILL BE MORE MOVEMENT WHEN TALKS RESUME
(LATE JANUARY/FEBRUARY), AND ARE COUNTING ON
SECRETARY SHULTZ TO SOFTEN THE SOVIETS FURTHER WHEN
NEXT HE MEETS SHEVARDNADZE.
0 THE LEADERSHIP OF THE AFGHAN POLITICAL ALLIANCE
SET UP IN MAY 1985 HAS TRANSFERRED SUCCESSFULLY A
THIRD TIME -- TO MODERATE SYED GILANI. GULBADDIN
DURING HIS TENURESHIP LAID DOWN A NUMBER OF MARKERS,
INCLUDING GOAL OF HAVING THE ALLIANCE TAKE THE DRA'S
SEAT IN THE OIC AND UN.
0 THE GOP HAS NOW COMPLETED ITS FOREIGN POLICY
DEBATE, AND THE COUNTRY SEEMS FIRMLY, ALBEIT
NERVOUSLY, SUPPORTIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS SHOULD
HELP THE GOP WITH THE UN AND DRA ESPECIALLY, WHO MAY
HAVE THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FORCED TO CAVE
ON THE DIRECT TALKS ISSUE.
HAVING MADE GOTTEN OVER THE INITIAL HURDLE OF
ESTABLISHING THE AFGHAN ALLIANCE, WE BELIEVE THERE
ARE SEVERAL USEFUL STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN TO
INCREASE THEIR VISIBILITY AND INTERNATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS. (NOTE: HOWEVER, THE GOP SEES PROGRESS
IN THE GENEVA TALKS AND WILL WANT TO AVOID ANY
IRREVOCABLE STEPS THAT COULD SET THAT PROCESS BACK,
THEY ARE MOVING THE ALLIANCE FORWARD.) IT IS CLOSE
TO COMPLETING PLANS FOR AN INFORMATION AGENCY WHOSE
RESPONSIBILITY IT WOULD BE TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY A ND
QUANTITY OF CREDIBLE NEWS AVAILABLE FROM INSIDE
AFGHANISTAN. WHILE THE AGENCY LIKELY WILL BE TIED IN
SOME WAY TO THE ALLIANCE, THE GOP BELIEVES THE TIME
IS NOT YET RIGHT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO OPEN "ALLIANCE"
INFO OFFICES ABROAD. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO HAS A FULLY
ELABORATED CONCEPT FOR ITS NEW AGENCY FOR
COORDINATING CROSS BORDER AID, THOUGH THERE IS A HOLD
ON ANNOUNCING THE DECISION, WE UNDERSTAND PUT IN
PLACE BY THE PRIME MINISTER.
THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW WILL RESULT IN GREATER
TRANSPARENCY FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION. THE PM'S
HESITATION ON FORMALIZING PWI IS LIKELY INDICATIVE OF
THE CAUTION HE WILL SHOW ON PRESSURING THE SOVIETS IN
TOO PUBLIC A WAY.
-- REITERATE OUR SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN, AND ITS POLICY
LEADERSHIP ON AFGHANISTAN. RECOGNIZE THEIR TRIUMPH
AT THE UNGA.
-- REINFORCE OUR rONVICTION THAT THE ALLIANCE IS A
MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT, AND SOLICIT VIEWS HOW BEST WE (THE
U.S.) CAN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE;
-- GET PWI WORKING PUBLICLY, AND NOT ONLY WITH US BUT
WITH THE EUROPEANS, THE JAPANESE, AND ANYONE ELSE WHO
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WOULD PROVIDE OVERT HUMANITARIAN AID; (NOTE: DON'T
BE SURPRISED IF THE PAKS MENTION THE FALL OFF OF
WESTERN DONOR SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN --
THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE 2.5 MILLION AFGHANS INSIDE
PAKISTAN DRAWFS THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE CBA PROGRAM)
-- STRESS THAT. IN THE WEST, MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE TO
PUBLICIZE THE WAR. ON THE ONE HAND THAT MEANS A
CREDIBLE NEWS SERVICE POVIDING QUALITY PRINT AND
PHOTOS. IT MEANS HAVING ALLIANCE REPRESENTATIVES
STATIONED IN KEY WORLD CAPITALS WITH A MANDATE TO GET
OUT THE AFGHAN STORY. IT ALSO MEANS BUILDING UP THE
HUMANITARIAN SIDE OF THE WAR, SINCE THIS IS WHAT WILL
MOST GALVANIZE WORLD OPINION AGAINST THE SOVIETS;
SECRET
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