SOVIET OFFICIAL ON KAMPUCHEA AND SEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: February 18, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90BO137OR000801030021-7
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RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1062
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1310
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SCOW 01894
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, CB, VN, CH, ASEAN, XC
SUBJECT: SOVIET OFFICIAL ON KAMPUCHEA AND SEA
2. SUMMARY: A HALF HOUR AFTER THE ANDROPOV DEATH
ANNOUNCEMENT, POLCOUNS MET AS SCHEDULED WITH SOVIET MFA
SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEPARTMENT CHIEF ZAYTSEV, WHO OFFERED
A LARGELY ORTHODOX PRESENTATION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THE
KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM. ZAYTSEV REPEATEDLY STRESSED CHINA'S
ALLEGED "EXPANSIONIST" AMBITIONS AS THE ROOT CAUSE
OF SEA INSTABILITY AND TENSION. HE INDICATED SOVIET
INTEREST IN VARIOUS EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT,
BUT SAID HANOI COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ROLE FOR POL POT.
ZAYTSEV, AN EX-AIDE OF GROMYKO. CAME ACROSS SOMEWHAT
WARMER THAN MOST SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS ON FIRST MEETINGS
WITH AMERICAN EMBOFFS. HE APPEARS TO HAVE CLOSE TIES
TO SOVIET MFA DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPITSA. END
SUMMARY.
~an~reENTrs~
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3. POLCOUNS MET FEBRUARY 10 WITH SOVIET MFA SOUTHEAST
ASIAN DEPARTMENT CHIEF ANATOLIY SAFRONOVICH ZAYTSEV
FOR A DISCUSSION WHICH CENTERED ON KAMPUCHEA. EMBOFF
AND SOVIET MFA COUNSELOR FOR THAI AND KAMPUCHEAN AFFAIRS
MIKHAIL MIKHAILOVICH BELIY TOOK NOTES. THE MEETING
TOOK PLACE ONE HALF HOUR AFTER THE ANOROPOV DEATH
ANNOUNCEMENT. ZAYTSEV ACCEPTED OUR PROFERRED CONDOLENCE
AND THEN WENT SMOOTHLY INTO DISCUSSION. AT ONE POINT
TO ILLUSTRATE HIS POINT THAT THE US AND USSR HAD A COMMON
INTEREST IN KEEPING TENSIONS DOWN IN ASIA, ZAYTSEV
CITED ANDROPOV'S AUGUST 18 DISCUSSION WITH CODEL PELL.
4. THROUGHOUT HIS DISCUSSION OF THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE,
ZAYTSEV HEWED CLOSELY TO THE SOVIET OFFICIAL LINE. HE
STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTS STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA BECAUSE THE AREA LIES ON THE SEA LANES BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN AND ASIAN PARTS OF THE USSR. HE SAID THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE "GUARANTEES"
AS A NON-REGIONAL GREAT. POWER IF A REGIONAL SOLUTION
TO THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM COULD BE FOUND. HE STATED
THAT ASEAN AND OTHERS SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT
VIETNAM MAY BECOME MORE WILLING TO WITHDRAW IN TIME,
CITING SOVIET AND OTHER "ALLIED" AID AS IMPORTANT
SOURCES OF VIETNAMESE SUSTENANCE. WITHOUT SAYING IN
SO MANY WORDS THAT "TIME IS ON VIETNAM'S SIDE," AS
HAVE OTHER SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS, ZAYTSEV ASSERTED THAT
HENG SAMRIN'S REGIME CONTINUES STEADILY TO CONSOLIDATE
POWER IN KAMPUCHEA. HE CONFIRMED THAT KAPITSA HAD
JUST COMPLETED A FOUR-DAY VISIT TO PHNOM PENH AS PART
OF A TWO WEEK SWING THROUGH SOUTHEAST ASIA.
5. ZAYTSEV PORTRAYED VIETNAM AS A BULWARK AGAINST
CHINESE "IMPERIALIST PRETENSIONS" IN SEA. HE POINTED
TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOME ASEAN STATES AND CHINA
OVER THE ROLE OF POL POT AND HIS SUPPORTERS IN A
KAMPUCHEAN SETTLEMENT TO BUTTRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT
CHINA'S GOALS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH REGIONAL HARMONY.
ZAYTSEV SAID IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM WHAT CONCRETELY
HAD COME OUT OF PREMIER ZHAO'S WASHINGTON TALKS ON
KAMPUCHEA. POLCOUNS SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL
HAVE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS KAMPUCHEA DURING THE
UPCOMING MARCH ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS.
COMPROMISE FORMULAE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, CB, VN, CH, ASEAN, XC
SUBJECT: SOVIET OFFICIAL ON KAMPUCHEA AND SEA
6. ZAYTSEV COMMENTED ON SEVERAL COMPROMISE FORMULAE.
HE INDICATED THAT THE 1983 UNGA RESOLUTION ON KAMPUCHEA
WAS SOMEWHAT MORE BALANCED THAN THE 1981 UNGA INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA RESOLUTION. ZAYTSEV
PRAISED ELEMENTS OF COMPROMISE REPORTEDLY ADVANCED BY
FORMER SENATOR CLARK, WHICH ZAYTSEV CHARACTERIZED AS
CALLING FOR GUARANTEES TO VIETNAM (END OF "CHINESE
THREAT" AND END OF AID TO POL POT) TO ALLOW IT TO WITH-
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DRAW FROM VIETNAM. WITHOUT ELABORATION, ZAYTSEV
CRITICIZED WHAT HE TERMED THE "INDONESIAN PLAN," SAYING
IT DID NOT REALISTICALLY ADDRESS THE POL POT QUESTION.
7. ZAYTSEV FAVORABLY MENTIONED THE 1983 NEW DELHI NAM
CONFERENCE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
FOREIGN FORCES FROM SEA. ZAYTSEV SAID FORCES TO BE
WITHDRAWN WOULD INCLUDE CHINESE TROOPS ON THE PARACELS
AND US REGIONAL FORCES. QUESTIONED ABOUT CHINESE
"FOREIGN" FORCES ON THE PARACELS, ZAYTSEV SAID THEY
WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN SINCE THEIR PRESENCE VIOLATED
VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE PARACELS. LATER IN THE
DISCUSSION, ZAYTSEV REFERRED TO THE SEPTEMBER 1983 ASEAN
APPEAL ON KAMPUCHEA, SUGGESTING THAT ASEAN WAS HAVING
PROBLEMS DEFINING ELEMENTS OF THE APPEAL, PARTICULARLY
HOW TO ASSURE THAT POL POT FORCES WOULD NOT SWEEP BACK
IF A POWER VACUUM WERE CREATED.
E. TOWARDS THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, AFTER EXHAUSTING
HIS APPARENT PREPARED BRIEF. ZAYTSEV RETURNED TO THE
GENERAL THEME OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE STRESSED
SOVIET INTEREST IN MOVING THE PROBLEM TC THE NEGOTIATING
TABLE, AWAY FROM THE ANNUAL CYCLE OF UN RESOLUTIONS AND
DRY SEASON MILITARY OFFENSIVES. HE SAID THE SOVIETS
WERE WILLING TO EXPLORE VARIOUS FORUMS -- PREFERABLY
REGIONAL -- FOR ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE AMONG THE
PARTIES, BUT THE ONE THING VIETNAM WOULD HOT ACCEPT WAS
PARTICIPATION BY POL POT, WHOSE FACTION CONTROLLED THE
ONLY SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCE SEEN AS THREATENING
BY HANOI. ANY POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO PRECLUDE
A RETURN TO POWER BY POL POT, AND VIETNAM WOULD HAVE
TO BE ASSURED ON THIS POINT IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO
SUCCEED. ZAYTSEV DID NOT CHARACTERIZE THE OTHER MEMBERS
OF THE DK COALITION.
9. ZAYTSEV NOTED THAT BELGIUM AND AUSTRALIA HAVE
APPEALED TO VIETNAM TO REFRAIN FROM ATTACKING COALITION
FORCES IN THE THAI BORDER REGION DURING THE DRY SEASON.
HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT SOME ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE ASKED
THE SOVIET UNION TO "PRESSURE" VIETNAM TO EXERCISE
RESTRAINT. ZAYTSEV, APPARENTLY HOPING TO PREEMPT A
US APPEAL, SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION WAS RELATIVELY
QUIET SO FAR THIS YEAR. HE POINTEDLY COMPLAINED THAT
COUNTRIES MAKING THESE APPEALS ARE NOT ABLE TO GUARANTEE
OR OTHERWISE INFLUENCE THE COALITION FORCES TOWARD
SIMILAR RESTRAINT. IN FACT, HE SAID, THE COALITION AND
ITS SUPPORTERS ONCE AGAIN THIS YEAR HAVE EMBARKED ON A
CYCLE OF PROPAGANDA AND DIPLOMACY IN CONJUNCTION WITH
THEIR DRY SEASON OPERATIONS.
SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS
------------------ ---------
10. EMBOFF ASKED ZAYTSEV TO EXPLAIN WHAT THE VIETNAMESE
MEANT BY THE "UNITY OF STRATEGIC INTERESTS" UNDERLYING
SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS (83 MOSCOW 12372). ZAYTSEV
DECLINED TO COMMENT ON WHAT THE VIETMAMESE MEANT, BUT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, CB, VN, CH, ASEAN, XC
SUBJECT: SOVIET OFFICIAL ON KAMPUCHEA AND SEA
DENIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ANY KIND OF "STRATEGIC"
OR "SECRET" RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM, MAINTAINING THAT
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90BO137OR000801030021-7
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SOVIET-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS ARE CLEARLY SPELLED OUT IN
PUBLIC AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS. HE INDICATED THAT HE
HAD BEEN TO HANOI WITH ALIYEV LAST FALL, AND THAT
SPECULATION ABOUT ALLEGED SRV UNHAPPINESS OVER SINO-
SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT WAS UNFOUNDED.
11. IN RESPONSE TO POLCOUNS' INQUIRY, ZAYTSEV GAVE A
SHORT AUTOBIOGRAPHIC SKETCH. AFTER SERVICE IN VIETNAM
AND IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEPARTMENT IN THE 1960'S,
WHEN HE WORKED UNDER KAPITSA, ZAYTSEV COMPLETED A
DISSERTATION FOR A PH.D. (KANDIDAT) IN ECONOMICS. HE
RETURNED TO THE SOVIET MFA IN 1971, SERVING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT. LATER
HE WORKED (1972-77) AS A COUNSELOR AT THE SOVIET MISSION
TO UN ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA. HE RETURNED TO MOSCOW
IN 1977 TO WORK ON AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IN THE
SECOND EUROPEAN DIVISION. FROM 1979 UNTIL HIS APPOINT-
MENT AS CHIEF OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN DIVISION IN MARCH
1983, ZAYTSEV WAS AN ASSISTANT TO FOREIGN MINISTER
GROMYKO IN THE MFA SECRETARIAT. HE TRAVELLED WITH
GROMYKO, INCLUDING ONE UN TRIP WHEN GROMYKO MET
SECRETARY HAIG.
HARTMAN
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/20: CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030021-7