WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001000070021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: September 13, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Weekly Reviev~
25X1
1~ September 1974 25X1
c?pY N ?_ 6 4 3
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CONTENTS (September 13, 1974)
The,,WEEI4LY;~`R~VIEU1-, fs~nlr~f every'Frli~ay~ttt~rriCna,bv'tti
devalop~r~ants . D~ the,-GJe~k th'rt+uah :
nopn on T#~>t~'sd>ty' !t
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frequently includes ~aSerial ~tibrdinbted wltti',;or ~repbred bpi,
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the OffCc~ of 'Etbngrt(c aesearva. ~;ttie, Offfc~ ~f'5#r~taglc<
.contents:
3 South Vietnam: Fighting May Get H~a
4 Japan -South Korea: Crisis Worsens
5 New Zealand: New Leadershia
6 Mozambique: Independence Set
7 Egypt: Nudging the PLO
8 Iran-Iraq: The Kurdish Problem
10 Ethiopia: End of a Reign
11 India-USSR: Asking for Food
~'URO~E 25X1
11 Soviet Nuclear Submarines
12 UK: Election in Prospect
13 Cyprus
15 EC: The Dubious Prospect
16 Portugal: Domestic Ftux
17 Bulgaria: The 30th Anniversary
17 Gromyko Sets Visit to Bonn
18 Argentina: The Peronist Left
19 OAS To Consider Cuba
20 Bolivia: Elections-Promise or Ruse?
20 Mexico: Kidnaping Victims Saved
21 Chile: A Year Later
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cwiNa
For a while last week, it looked as though
the deathwatch over ailing Peen-,ier Chou En-lai
had begun, but press speculation proved to be a
false alarm. Chows physical condition is report-
edly worse than it was last July, when he received
Senator Henry Jackson in a hospital room. Later
Rumors that ~hou's health had taken a sud-
den turn for the worse were sparked by inac-
curate press reports that several high ranking
Chinese officials had been abruptly called away
from a banquet given by the visiting US congres-
sional delegation. In fact, the two relatively low-
level officials who left the banquet had explained
in advance that they would be agile to stay only
long ~anough tr; greet their hosts.
Both officials--one ~s reputedly Mao's
niece-=eem to Have frequent and ready access to
the Chairman. It a possible that their brief ap-
pearan~e at the banquet, excused on the grounds
of prior official commitments, was related to a 25X6
meeting with Mao. The Chairman has been vaca-
tioning at a resort area outside Peking. Although
he usually receivers foreign visitors it his own
residence, his meeting last week with the visiting
Togolsase President was not said to have taken
place at his re:~idc~nce, and it appeared from
photographs to have been held at another site.
Meanwhile, vice premiers Teng Hsiao-ping
and L_i Hsien-Wien continue to divide representa-
tional duties in Chou's absence. Both have re-
cently played host to visiting heads of state and
have stated explici*.ly that they were acting on
Chows behalf. The Premier's wife, who herself
Chou En-lai ano others leave re:cept.im~ in Aiis;ust
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has been ailing for se~~pral years, has also Veen on
hand to greet the visir~rs.
Chinese media continue to keep Chola's
name before the public in an apparent effort to
convey the impression that the Premier 's still
functioning and, more importantly, to forestall
STRENGTHENING THE SOUTH SEA FLEET
As part of a broader attempt to improve the
capabilities of its South Sep Fleet, Peking may
have permanently reassigned the three East Sea
Fleet Riga-class destroyer escorts it sent south last
January. The ships passed through the Taiwan
Strait at the time the Chinese occupied the
Paracel Islands. Their prolonged stay in the south
suggests that their presence is no longer solely
related to supporting Chinese operations in the
islands.
The Chinese have relaxed their defensive
posture in the Paracels, but they are still showing
interest in strengthening the southern fleet.
Eefore the arrival of the Rigas, the only major
surface unit equipped with guided missiles in the
South Sea Fleet Wl~ l I I1tA_('~:a cc nine+rnvor~
rengthening the South Sea Fleet would
facilitate Chinese operations in the South China
Sea. Petrolum deposits are believed to exist in the
area, and this strengthening of the fleet may be
designed to buttress Peking's claim to them. The
navy has so far confined its activity primarily to
coastal waters.
The Chinese are producing aboat 3~J guided-
missile patrol boats a year and are stationing more
missile boats along the entire coast i~lcluding the
northern entrance to the Taiwan Strait. The Osa
boats near the strait will not only help to keep
open access to the South Sea ~=1eet but will also
serve to offset the guided-missile firepovver lost
when the Three Rigas were sent sou'~h. Peking h`25X1
not used the rl~issile boats provocatively, but the~t
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South Vietnarn
FIGHTINf; MAY GET IiEAVIER
Fighting continues to be brisk in the nurt;i-
err, provinces, but has slackened off in the south.
Communist forces have not s~tempted to make a
major pusf'r against the former imperial capital of
iue, but they have forced the government to
withdraw from positions south of the city that
were close to populated areas and Route 1. On
two occasions, North Vietnamese troops have
temporarily interdicted Route 1 between Da
Nang and Hue, demonstrating their potential for
disrupting I- ~d resupply of government forces in
the north in fhe event of heavier action.
A more interesting development, involving
main forces on both sides, could be shaping up
near the former district capital of Thuong Duc in
Quang Nam Province. The First Brigade of the
government's crack Airborne Division has been
cautiously preparing to retake this district town,
which was captured by the Communists this sum-
mer. The government forces have been moving
slowly to contro; the high ground before mount-
ing an assault on the town, whir_h lies at the head
of a valley.
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gade, which they believe would adversely affect
the morale of other South Vietnames
e s n an ry Division, has taken
eavy casualties in fi
hti
d
g
ng
uring the past 'two
weeks in southern Thua Thien Province. Two of
its regiments are now said to be "almost combat
ineffective." If both the 1st and Airborne n;vi-
sions sustain substantial losses, this would con-
stitute aserious setback for th~a government.
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Positional battles such as the one that may
be developing around Thuong Duc have become
increasingly characteristic of the war since the
first of the year. In the past, South Vietnamese
counterattacks usually quickly forced Communist
forces from towns they had captured. Now, the
Communists have the advantage of a logistic net-
work developed since the cease-fire, which pro-
vides them with the maneuver and supply capa-
bility to defend some of the positions they have
captured. Also, recent reductions in the amount
of ammunition and air support provided to gov-
ernment infantry forces will further restrict South
Vietnamese efforts.
The Communists would like to inflict a sub-
stantial defeat on the crack First Airborne Bri-
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I I
JAPAN -SOUTH KOREA: CRISIS WORSENS
The crisis in South Korean -Japanese rela-
tions deepened this week when Seoul rejected a
draft of a personal letter from Prime Minister
Tanaka to President Pak Chong-hui. The Sou#h
Koreans are pressing Tokyo hard to assume
explicit responsibility for the incident last month
when a Korean from Japan killed Pak's wife and,
further, to agree publicly to take strong measures
against anti-Pak activists in Japan. These demands
have been accompanied by large anti-Japanese
demonstrations, including the partial ransackin
cf
Tanaka's draft, which the Japanese agreed to
send via atop-level envoy to Seoul, refer~~ad to
the question of "moral responsibility" fair the
August ircide~.t and promised efforts to prevent
further plotting against South Korea from Japan.
The Japanese maintain that it is their final offer.
Seoul has countered that the letter is
"obscure" and "too weak." If Tokyo will not
reconsider, the South Koreans warn that they are
prepared to recall their ambassador to Tokyo and
issue an ultimatum.
President Pak is taking an extremely hard
line, especially on the need for a crackdown on
Chosen Soren, the association of pro-Pyongyang
Koreans in Japan, in order to:
? put the organization on the defensive,
and reinforce his claim that opposition to his
regime is inspired by outside elements,
? divert attention from his own domestic
troubles,
? and perhaps most important in the
longer term, cause bad blood between Japan
and North Korea, as Chosen Soren is an in-
strument of the Pyongyang regime. Pak may
believe that this would deflect any possible
Japanese move 'award a more neutral posi-
tion between the two Koreas.
Suspicions about Tokyo's motives, as well as
more emotional anti-Japanese sentiment, were no
doubt heightened by what Seoul regarded as a
callous initial reaction in Tokyo to the assassina-
tion incident. While Se~~ul was accusing Nortli
Korea of having a hand in the affair, Japanese
officials made a number of ill-timed public state-
ments, such as that of Foreign Minister Kimura
discounting the "threat from the North." This
statement-when qualified as ;t later was--did not
deviate from established Japanese policy, but it
appeared in Seoul to reflect at best insensitivity
to South Korean interests, and perhaps deliberate
attempts by Tokyo to put some distance between
itself and the Pak regime. 25X1 25X1
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the Japanese
have Keen considering a minor improvement in
ties with No!?th Korea later this year s~:ch as the
exchange of trade missions, but thai the current
tension between Tokyo and Seoul has caused this
to be deferred. Pak's diplomatic pressurz against
Tokyo has been far from an unqua'ified success,
however. As the crisis deepened this week,
Japanese diplomats began privately discussing the
possibility of economic sanctions against South
Korea and the need to reconsider their support of
Seoul's position when the Korean question is
debated in the UN General Assembly this fall.
The immediate interest of the Tanaka government
throughout the recent crisis seems to have been to
prevent the matter from eroding the Prime Min-
ister's narrow margin of political support at home
and to keep diplomatic options open on matters
pertaining to the two Koreas.
Even if the immediate impasse is resolved,
Seoul-Tokyo difficulties will continue since they
are part of a continuing process of adjustment by
two close allies of the United States to the
changing environment in East Asia. To some
extent, the events reflect South Korean fears of
abandonment in an era of detente and, in Tokyo,
Japan's increasingly ambivalent attitude toward
the South in its competition wit? the
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I I
NEW ZEALAND: NEW LEADERSHIP
The New Zealand Labor Party's selection
last week of Wallace Rowling as prime minister
will ease the party's feeling of being cast adrift by
the sudden end of Norman Kirk's ten-year domi-
nance. Rowling is intelligent and capable, and
projects confidence-gpalities that will stand him
in good stead in filling the leadership gap left by
Kirk's unexpected death. .As a conservative
Laborite, Rowling did not have trada union back-
ing for the prime ministership, but he is never-
theless widely accepted in the party, which will
help him to consolidate his hold.
Rowling will be a strong standard-bearer in
the general election that the party anticipates is
still over a year away. A seasoned and wily poli-
tician, he is probably the Laborite most able to
match the aggressive style of Robert Muldoon,
the new head of the opposition National Party.
The opposition already looks like it is campaign-
ing, even though-in view of Labor s stronS ;,old
on parliament-it has no hope of forcing early
elections.
Rowling has been friendly toward the US.
He recently signaled his interest in maintaining
New Zealand's cordial relationship with the US
by giving first place to the US ambassador in the
courtesy calls normally tendered a new head of
government. Rowling's only stand that might
affect US interests has been his advocacy of strict
controls on investment in New Zealand by
multinational companies. The new Prime Minister
has no record in foreign policy, but his decision
to handle foreign affairs himself was intended '.o
demonstrate that there mill be no break with the
Kirk gc.~vernment's policies.
Tt~e selection of leftist-leaning Robert Tizard
as deputy prime minister strikes an ideological
balance to Rowling that is important in the
diverse Labor Party. Tizard held the health and
public service portfolios under Kirk, and his
handling o. these two important jobs established
his reputation in new Zealand's welfare-oriented
government. In the new administration, Tizard
takes over Rowling's old joy a: minister of fi-
nance.
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MOZAMBIQUE: INDEPENDENCE SET
Lisbon and the black insurgent '~ront for the
Liberation of Mozambique signed an reement in
Lusaka, Zambia, last weekend providing for the
independence of Mozambique next June and the
immediate installation of a joint Front-Portuguese
transitional government. The signing provoked a
short-lived rebellion by dissident whites demand-
ing that all of Mozambique's political groups be
represented in the interim regime.
The dissidents seized two radio stations in
Lourenco Marques and temporarily occupied the
airport. Although Lisbon ordered reinforcements
from northern Mozambique into the capital, mili-
tary forces acted with restraint in order to avoid
violence. Nevertheless, demonstrations both sup-
porting and opposing the rebellion brcke out in
Lourenco ('Jlarques and in the port city of Beira
during which as many as 100 persons were killed
or injured. The white dissidents finally agreed to
give up in order to avoid further bloodshed. The
rebellion sparked a black backlash in the suburbs
of Lourenco Marques, where it was interpreted as
an attempt by white separatists to seizE control of
the government. Local authorities in Lourenco
Marques declared martial law in order to stem a
wave of vandalism, looting, and arson.
Discouraging protest
During their incipient rebellion, the dissi-
dents met with two special representatives sent by
President Spinola to hear their grievances. Al-
though they may havE .eceived some encourage-
ment that their demands would be considered by
Lisbon, it seems unlikely that they gained any
concessions. Lisbon cannot revoke its agreement
with the Front, and the Front is not likely to
consider modifying the agreement to allow its
political enemies a role in the transitional
government.
The dissidents were able to publicize the
unrepresentative nature of the interim govern-
ment, however, and it appears that their action
attracted considerable sympathy, if little active
backing, from numerous political organizations in
the territory. These organizations-made up of
whites, blacks, and mulattoes-adamantly oppose
a Front "take-over" and may be encouraged to
make another attempt to derail the transitional
government.
The transitional pericJ legally took effect
upon 'the signing of the Lusaka agreement on
September 7. Front officials announced on Sep-
tember 9 that they will be ready to ~r~ove into
Lourenco (~1arques next week to begin setting up
the transitional government. Under terms of the
agreement, the Front will appoint a prime minis-
ter and two thirds of anine-member cabinet. The
Portuguese will be represented by a high co~,ii-
mi~sioner and the remaining cabinet membo?s.
The two sides will establish a joint military coi~n-
mission, with equal representation, to deal with
security problems. The Front, with only about
3,000 armed troops, would be hard-pressed to
quell any disorders without active Portuguese
assistance.
guese technical expertise if they are to be readv
Even without further dissidence, the transi-
tional government faces a broad array of prob-
lems. Front leaders have been living in exile
throughout their insurgency and are not ac-
quainted with the complex economic structure
and social naeds of Mozambique. For some time
to come, they will need to rely heavily on Portu-
to assume full power next June.
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EGYPT: NUDGING THE PLO
In an effort to bring the Palestinians to a
long-delayed decision to commit thernselves to
peace negotiations in concert with Jordan, Presi-
der?~t Sadat has adopted atwo-pronged approach
with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The Egyptians are vigorously supporting a
PLO-initiated strategy to bring the Palestinian
problem to :~.reater world attention by raising the
issue as an agenda item at the UN General As-
sembly session that begins next week. Hoping
that this backing will convince the PLO of con-
tinued `gyptian support for Palestinian interests
in later peace talks, Cairo is pressing a harder line
in private councils. TFre Egyptians have made it
clear that their patience with PLO indecision and
delay is wearing thin, and they have threatened to
leave the Palestinians to their own devices in the
peace settlemeirt process unless the PLO soon
moves toward an understanding with Jordan.
At the UN, the PLO is seeking tyre ricP.t to
address the General Assembly, as well as .. ~solu-
tion focusing on the Palestinian situation as a
separate political issue rather than as a refugee
problem solely of humanitarian concern. Presi-
dent Sadat apparently sees support for the PLO's
UN effort as a relatively painless tradeoff for his
demand that the organization acquiesce, as Sadat
has done, in Jordan's right to negotiate for the
return of the Israeli-occupied West Bank.
Although the Arabs have not yet developed
their UN strategy, the broad outlines set out in a
staternent of policy by the Arab League last v~~eek
envision a UN resciuticn confirming the basic
political rights of the Palestinian people, par-
ticularly that of self-determination. From the
Egyptian viewpoint, the promise of self-deter-
mination, backed by the UN assembly, would give
the Palestinians hope of establishing a future
separate sta?e on the West Bank after Jordanian-
Israeli negotiations for the territory.
Sadat is undoubtedly counting on this to
ease Palestinian inhibitions about participating in
those negotiations, as an interested party if not
Sadat and Arafat
initially as a principal. The Egyptians have started
canvassing for support of the resolution from key
UN members. 25X1
The Egyptian-Syrian-PLO meeting has been
scheduled and rescheduled repeatedly over the
past two mo~~ths hecause of the Palestinians'
refusal to attend. Cairo may not carry through
with its threat, but it probably calculates that the
fear of being abandoned will be sufficient to bring
a reluctant PLO around. So far, this has not
proved true; the PLO reportedly reiterated its
refusal to attend the meeting during an executive
committee session early this week. ~
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IR/~N-IRAQ: THE KURt~ISH PROBLEM
The ground and air offensive that began last
month has dealt a serious blow to the rebel
Kurdish forces. The Iraqi army's deep penetra-
tions into Kurdish-held territory have prompted
increased intervention by Iran.
Iraq has now committed over half of its
army to the campaign against the Kurds. This
force, numbering over 50,000 men, is driving to-
ward two major objectives: to split the Kurdish
for:.e.; so that they can be dealt with piecemeal,
and to cut off supplies from Iran.
Despite recent setbacks, Kurdish morale
appears good. There are more volunteers ready to
join u than there ply them.
the rebels
are more uni ~ed tnan ever; large numbers of
jucated Kurds, who in the past have been coo!
to Barzani's conservative leadership, now are
reported to be joining the rebel forces. Even with
poor equipment, the Kurds are likely to fight on.
They fought the last war against the Iraqis in
1970 despite severe supply deficiencies.
Last month, the Iraqis drove a wedgy be-
tween Kurdish units in the north and those in the
northeast by seizing Rawanduz, some 25 miles
from AI Hajj Umran, the headquarters of Kurdish
rebel leader Mulla PJlustapha Barzani. in a drive
from As Sulaymaniyah, the Iraqis also took Qalat
Dizah as part of their apparent strategy to estab-
lish afortified line parallel to the Iranian border.
~fhe Kurds' strategy recently has been to
stage delaying actions along the front while
/~ 8eku
`,; l
,x
~~ CAfiP14N
~~.
DA6HDAD
`, ~
R A,Q,~?.
!RAN
maintaining a series of harassing attacks in the
rear of the main battle areas. Kurdish guerrilla
actions behind the lines are intended to disperse
the Iraqi forces.
For some time, Iran has provided the Kurds
with equipment, munitions, any military advisers.
Tehran also provides food, r,-redicine, and money,
and maintains refugee camps for Kurds who flee
the fighting. The Iranians admit only their
humanitarian aid, claiming that current fighting
has pushed the refugee total to over 7C,000.
Iraq's recent successes have prompted the Kurds
to ask for increased support, and Tehran has
made a positive but limited response.
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Unless the Shah reverses himself, the likeli-
hood of direct clashes between I ~~q and Iran
increases as Baghdad's troops push closer to the
border. The Shah may deepen Iran's involvement
if he ~~oncludes that this is the only alternative to
a crushing defeat of the Kurds. Bari ing a sudden
collapse of the Kurdish resistance, Iran's most
likely course is to intensi`y what it is already
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d Hejj m
~Re~ ndui
(L'Delet Riot;
AS Sulaymey~e
SYR~A
Sep 1 a, 74
TEKAAN
~Khafremehed
1
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doing, particularly with regard to artillery sup-
port. The Iraqi bombing on September 6 of two
Iranian villages near Piran Shahr-the main su;~ply
depot for the Kurds-prompted Teleran to lodge a
protest at the UN. It could also be used by
Tehran to justify launching a limited military
action along the border.
open intervention in strength by Iranian
ground forces seems unlikely, however, as this
would force Arab governments to choose between
Iran-a fellow Arab state-and Iran. Moreover,
Iran has been making efforts to strengthen ties
with neighbors who already are apprehensive
about its growing military power.
Who's for Rapprochement?
The Shah believes his interests are Nell
served by Baghdad's preoccupation with ?he
Kurdish problem and by Iraq's isolation in tide
Arab worlc+. He therefore wishes to keep Kurdish
resistance alive, and shows little interest in a
rapprochement with Iraq. The Iranians believe the
greatest threat to their goals in the Persian gulf is
the ryrowth ~f radicalis,n, and Iraq is seen as its
chief sponsor.
Iraq, on the other hand, is under pressure
from several Arab countries to seek an ac-
commodation with Iran as a prerequisite for
resolving the Kurdish problem. There have been
some signs over recent months that the Iraqis
were seeking an understanding with Iran. Baghdad
took the lead, for example, in starting preliminary
bila':eral talks in Istanbul last month on a range of
outstanding issues, including border demarcation.
After two weeks, the talks r: nded ir,ronclusively,
but the Iraqis are trying tc~ get the Iranians to
resume the discussions at the foreign ministers'
level later this montl, at the UN General
Assembly.
The Iraqi air strike near Piran Shahr was
apparently intended in pars as a warning to the
Shah not to step up deliveries of military equip-
ment io the Kurds or to increase the involvement
of the Iranian army on the side of the rebels. The
1; agis, however, are aware of the risks involved in
carrying out air strik~;s against Iranian territory.
With a large par` of their ground forces tied down
against the Kurds, the Iraqis are not able to
engage in major ground actions against Iran and
will seek to avoid a confrontation.
Implications for Iraq
The unending war with the Kurds cculd
become an increasingly onerous political liability
for the regime. If the err-.y gets bogged down
later this year, there could be an open power
struggle at the top between President Bakr and
Beath party strong man Tikriti, who have been at
odds for some time. When the fighting began in
March, Tikriti put his reputation on ~;~e line by
promisi;~g the Beath party that the vvar would be
over in September. Nevertheless, his position
remains strong; he controls the party security
apparatus, which gives him early warning of
potential troub'amakers within either the party or
the -.rmy.
Even if the two leaders amain united, there
may be a move against 'them by Beath party
critics acting with army support, or an independ-
ent move by the army. In the past two months,
there ha~~a been signs of increasing military dis-
satisfaction with the prolonged, incon~.iusive war.
If the Iraqi regime were overthrown, there
probably would be no sudden shifts in domestic
or foreign policy-except perhaps for the handling
of the Kurdish question. The. Iraqis are so hea;~ily
dependent on the SOVIPt l!nion for deliveries of
sophistir,ated weapons that any regime that takes
power is unlike~~ to loosen the country's ties with
MOSCOW.
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By removing Emperor Haile Selassie on
September 12, the Armed Forces Coordinating
Committee teas further strengthened its control of
the government. The committee-formally
designating itself the Provisional Military Goverr-
^ieni-also named General Aman, who has been
defe~~se minister, as chairman of the provisional
government and prime minister. Amon is popular
v ith the military and has been taking on in-
creasing importance in the government in recent
weeks. He is believed to be working with the
more rrrc4crate forces on tFre committee. Other
cabinet changes are likely. The committee has
been worl~ing through the facade of a civilian
prirrre minister ar~d a largely civilian cabinet for
several months.
fn ocher moves, the committee dissolved
parliament, suspended the constitution, ba~ined
strikes and demonstrations, and imposed a
curfew. It plans to set up a military tribunal to
try government officials charged with corruption.
Haile Selassie's ailing son, 57-year-old Crown
Prince Asfa Wossen, was chosen t~ succeed to the
throne, but the co;nmittee stated that he would
be a "figurehead" and would carry the title of
"kiny," a step below an emperor in Ethiopia's
royal hierarchy. Since early 1973 the Crown
Prince has been living in Europe vdhere he has
been slowly recovering from a stroke that left him
seriously incapacitated. An unassertive person
when he vras well, he would be easily mar~palatcd
by the committee. -
favor the establishment of a constitutional
monarchy and reconciliation of the disparate ele-
men~s in Ethiopian society apparently still have
the upper hand.
The forced removal of Haile Selassie appears
to have been carefully prepared, and the com-
mittee may be able to continue to guide the
revolution in a generally bloodless manner. So far,
there have been no reports of unrest or dem~n-
strations of support for Haile Selassie in the rural
areas, once his stronghold. Moderate members of
'the committee, hov~.~~~~~r, may have difficulty con-
trolling radical students and military elements
who are demanding that the measured pace of the
revolution be intensified.
Prospects for avoiding violence may depend
on what happens to Haile Selassie, vrho is being
detained at 4th Division headquarters `.n Addis
Ababa along with other nobles rounded up
earlier. Anti-monarchist sentiment is running high
in Addis Ababa, and radicals on the committee
have been pressing for Haile Selassie's trio! and
possible execution. Moderates appear to be in
favor of allowing the 82-year-old deposed mon-
arch to Live out his years at one of his countryside
palaces. At present, the committee is apparently
concentrating en overcoming Haile Selassie's re-
ported resistance to its demands that he yield his
Overseas assets.
Asfa bVossen may be unwilling t~ return,
however. He may be frightened of` by the treat-
ment meted out to his father, thr: recent arrests of
ottrer close rElatives, and the military committee's
harsh public statements against the entire royal
family.
In that event, the military may turn to Asfa
Wossen's 21-year-old son, Prince Zara Yacob, or it
may take the occasion to abolish the monarchy
and establish a republic. Radicals in the com-
m~ttee have been pushing hard for such a move.
As of now, moderate committee members who
The cc~rrmittee will probably be preoccupied
for some time with domestic matters, and the
removal of Haile Selassie is unlikely to bring any
immediate shift in the government's foreign
policy. Although there have been some reports
that the government lies L~een looking for Soviet
arn;s, it has generally retained its ties to the 1Nest.
Following the removal of the Emperor, some
preliminary foreign policy guidelines were issued.
They provide that the government will maintain a
"nonaligned" Foreign policv, respect Ethiopia's
international obligatigns, gnu strengthen ties with
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