INDEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000200250004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: MISC

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INDEX
Talking Point Overview
Map
Chronology of Events Since July
Suriname Situation Reports
Pros and Cons of Bouterse
TAB
A
Surinamese Military Forces and Capabilities
Threat to Political Moderates in Suriname
Threat to the Dutch in Suriname
Surinamese Reaction to Intervention
Public
Spruritv ForrPc
Latin American Reactions
Brazil
Venezuel a
Cuba
Ni caragua
A Look at the Post-Bouterse Government
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18 December 1986
Talking Points on Suriname for DDCI and DDI
Suriname Developments
After hurriedly implementing a number of cosmetic moves to stave off a
rumored French invasion and to build domestic support for his regime, Bouterse
over the past week apparently has regained confidence in his ability to
control the domestic situation.
According to the US Embassy in Paramaribo, Bouterse last week in an
emergency meeting of his supreme advisory council--the
Topberaad--uncharacteristically asked political party leaders to advise
him on measures to be taken to stem the perceived invasion.
-- The Surinamese leader reportedly agreed to a revised electoral
timetable, based on the Topberaad's advice that such a move might deter
an intervention.
leaders of Suriname's traditional
political parties seem jubilant over the role they played in
encouraging Bouterse to announce the timetable but seem to not realize
that it actually lengthens by a year the original schedule for
restoring democracy and lends some legitimacy to the regime.
- Bouterse apparently has ordered 4 temporary halt to counterinsurgency
operations in eastern Suriname.
-- Although press reports last week indicated Bouterse might approach the
UN Security Council to consider reports of a French invasion, the
Embassy believes this is a political ploy and doubts that he will
follow through.
Although Bouterse appears to be removing any justification that would
prompt an immediate invasion, we have no evidence that he has altered his
objectives or methods in any significant way, and he remains capable of
lashing out at suspected enemies.
-- Although Bouterse has backed off earlier threats to use the insurgency
to indefinitely postpone the return to democracy, the US Embassy
believes the current electoral timetable is a ploy that Bouterse would
disregard if he defeats the insurgents.
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-- We believe death squads manned by Surinamese military personnel may be
still operating in Paramaribo.
rumors are circulating that preparations
are underway for largescale arrests of business and political leaders,
including some cabinet members.
- Bouterse is unlikely to leave voluntarily, and the insurgents probably
have the capability and resolve to continue their activities
indefinitely.
As long as Bouterse is unable to defeat the rebels militarily, the
likelihood will grow that he will succumb to offers of assistance from Libya
and other radical states.
-- In response to reports of recent sightings of Libyans in eastern
Suriname, the presence of 2-10 Libyan
soldiers L.
10,611.J.)11.11Go
Despite Bouterse's much publicized recent moves toward democracy, we
believe that Prime Minister Radhakishun continues to expect outside help and
that key democratic groups in Suriname would welcome direct intervention by a
Western power.
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-- Probably out of fear, Prime Minister Radhakishun continues to publicly
display loyalty to Bouterse and the military regime.
- Radhakishun's request for help probably was partially motivated by the
need to restore an economy devastated by hostilities between the
government and rebels. The insurgents most likely will continue
attacks on economic targets, at least as long as Bouterse retains
power.
We have no evidence that other Surinamese political leaders are seeking
outside help. Most party leaders probably are too afraid of Bouterse's
almost certain violent reaction should they be discovered and may be
casting their lot with Bouterse out of fear of a takeover by
Brunswijk's exile-supported forces.
We have no evidence that the Surinamese military has taken extraordinary
security precautions to stave off an invasion'
-- On 16 December,
precautions had been taken by
the military.
scare of an invasion to build
no extra security
the regime may be trying to use the
political support for the regime.
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7
The city of Paramaribo is one of nine ad-
ministrative districts and is also the COpits/ Of
Suriname Administrative District. Information
identifying the capitol of Pero Administrative
District is not available at this time.
vi
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Base 56831 4-68
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Chronology of Rebel Insurgency
July
22 Rebels attack Army posts at Albina and Stolkersvilijt; eight
soldiers kidnapped and weapons stolen.
August
mid
Bouterse asks Brazil, France, and US for helicopter to aid in
search for rebels.
21 Rebels ambush government commando unit in eastern Suriname and
inflict heavy casualties.
late Rebel leader Brunswijk orders Bouterse to step down or face
attack on Paramaribo.
late Bouterse instructs Army to employ whatever force necessary to
defeat rebels.
late Libyan delegation visits Suriname reportedly to offer military
aid and $50 million in cash in return for cultural and economic
presence.
September
early Surinamese Army company commander reportedly defects after
being captured by rebels.
early Rebels shoot down Brazilian civilian helicopter leased to
Surinamese forces.
mid Surinamese Army reportedly receives 100 AK-47 rifles paid for
by Libya and shipped from Nicaragua via Cuba.
mid Rebels reportedly ambush military convoy in eastern Suriname
with 15-30 casualties.
October
early Government reports Surinamese forces repel rebel attack on
Zanderij Airfield, 36 km outside capital.
early Hindustani and Creole party leaders in Suriname reject
cooperation with exiles or rebels. Party leaders state that
best hope for democracy lies in agreement with military.
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mid
11-13
18
20
November
early
early
19
23
late
late
December
Rebels burn government oil plantation at Patamacca and schools
near Moengo. Insurgents drop propaganda leaflets in Moengo and
commandeer private vehicles.
Rebels attack bridges and government outposts in eastern
Suriname.
Insurgents hijack government-owned passenger aircraft. All
flights to the interior halted.
Prime Minister Radhakishun requests US help in encouraging
Bouterse to leave.
Growing presence of armed soldiers and militia in Paramaribo.
Murders of Bush Negroes around capital reportedly conducted by
Bouterse henchmen.
Brazil and the Netherlands renounce further aid to Bouterse.
Food shortages prompt Surinamese request for US food aid after
Brazil rejected earlier request.
Libyan People's Bureau in Caracas reportedly pays for half of
helicopter purchased by Surinamese government from a Venezuelan
firm. Reportedly flown by two private Americans under contract
with the Surinamese government.
Two North Korean helicopter pilots arrive in Suriname awaiting
delivery of two helicopters.
Rebels block access to SURALCO bauxite operation in Moengo and
lay siege to Albina.
Bouterse rejects call by Suriname Council of Churches for
negotiated end to insurgency.
early
Rebels damage electrical transmission tower near SURALCO
alumina refinery.
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early Government troops claim to have retaken Albina and
Moengo. Growing evidence of attacks on civilian Bush Negroes.
early Bouterse reimposes state of emergency.
8 Dutch request US help in resolving situation in Suriname.
8 Bouterse warns advisory council of imminent French invasion.
12 Bouterse agrees to election timetable. According to press
reports, counterinsurgency efforts are halted.
12 An estimated 1,500 demonstrate in Paramaribo in support of
democratization and against foreign intervention. Government
formally protests Dutch tolerance of anti-regime activities and
Foreign Minister Herrenberg threatens to break diplomatic
relations.
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SURINAME SITUATION REPORT #1
As of 0730 hours
12 December 1986
Surinamese Developments
The government is trying to build domestic support and
appears to be taking steps to prepare public opinion for
significant civilian deaths in the campaign against the
rebels.
Government spokesmen yesterday unveiled a plan to
restore democracy and hold free elections.
According to press reports, the plan has three
stages; a new constitution within three months, a
referendum on the draft six months later, and
elections in early 1988. The officials warned that
foreign interference could postpone implementation
of the plan, however.
According to the US Embassy, government officials
are publicly claiming that civilian casualties are
likely in any anti-insurgency effort. The domestic
press contains only passing references to non-
military victims, but current estimates of civilian
deaths already range from 30 to as many as 150.
Meanwhile, press reports indicate that Suriname's
traditional political parties are planning a joint
demonstration today. Speakers reportedly will discuss the
invasion threat and the plans for a transition to democracy.
On the diplomatic front, Paramaribo also is going on
the offensive.
The government has lodged a formal protest note with
the Dutch, accusing The Hague of turning a blind eye
to insurgent activity.
Regime officials at the UN circulated a previously
released letter alleging attempts to "destabilize
the government from abroad." US officials at the UN
report that Paramaribo has not yet requested a
security council meeting, however.
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On the military front, there is no further reporting on
yesterday's press reports that Bouterse might be diverting
troops from fighting the rebels to protect the capital.
There are no reports indicating that the 216 Americans
in Suriname--estimated by the US Embassy--are in any danger.
Dutch Developments
The Hague continues to be very concerned about the
safety of its citizens in Suriname and is taking steps to
ensure their protection.
Dutch officials fear that Bouterse may use the 6,000
Dutch citizens in Suriname, or part of them, as
hostages to make demands, particularly economic
ones, on the Netherlands. The Dutch suspended
annual aid payments of $150 million in 1982.
The Dutch now believe that more than 120 citizens
have been massacred in Suriname by government
forces. The Netherlands initiated demarches to the
United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Venezuela, and Brazil, asking them to approach the
United Nations and the Organization of American
States about sending a mission to Suriname to
negotiate an end to the hostilities.
Rumors of a possible invasion of Suriname have now
appeared in the Dutch press.
According to the Algemeen Dagblad--a leading Dutch
newspaper--the US Ambassador in Paramaribo allegedly
hinted that a foreign invasion could not be ruled
out if there were no prospects of general elections
being held.
-- A pro-Bouterse group in the Netherlands has accused
the Dutch, French, and Americans of plotting to
invade Suriname from French Guiana.
Other Developments
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SURINAME SITUATION REPORT 12
As of 1600 hours
12 December 1986
Surinamese Developments
in conjunction with the state of
emergency, all foreign missions in the capital have been asked to
reaister firearms with the military authority.
-- As far as we know, the bulk of the Surinamese armed
forces are still deployed in the east.
Unconfirmed reports of Libyan soldiers fighting with the
government continue to circulate.
We have no word on the turnout out at demonstrations
reportedly organized by Suriname's traditional political parties
in support of the regime. ,
Surinamese Chief of Cabinet Heidweiller apparently is in the
midst of a trip designed to gain international and regional
support for the government's plight.
Venezuelan President
Lusinchi recently received Heidweiller. Heidwiller did
not ask for military aid, but did ask for Venezuelan
assistance in explaining Suriname's situation and
intention to democratize in international fora and with
other Latin republics.
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Other Developments
The French are following the situation in Suriname closely
and will almost certainly continue to accept refugees from the
country; they seem disinclined to take any military action.
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-- French Guiana is housing and feeding some 2,500 refugees.
The buildup of French troops on the French Guiana-
Surinamese border may be French efforts to help with the
refugee flow and the possibility of an eventual Dutch
evacuation.
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SURINAME SITUATION REPORT 113
As of 0700 hours
13 December 1986
Surinamese Developments
Domestic
Press reports of 15,000 people attending a government
organized rally in Paramaribo yesterday appear to be exaggerated.
Embassy reporting indicates the turnout was probably
closer to several hundred. According to the Embassy, the
rally was held in a small square, probably to make the
turnout seem larger than it was. The Ambassador reports
there were only about a hundred vocal pro-Bouterse
supporters, and that given the pre-rally publicity, the
turnout was unimpressive.
At the rally, Bouterse admitted civilians had been killed
in an Army offensive in the east, but said local
inhabitants had been warned to leave the area. He gave
no estimates of casualties. Bouterse said the
Netherlands was "hypocritical" in denouncing civilian
deaths when support for the "terrorists" is being
organized from Dutch territory.
The military may not be completely convinced of an imminent
invasion threat from the French.
The Ambassador reports that leaders of Suriname's traditional
political parties seem jubiliant over the role they played in
encouraging Bouterse to announce an elections timetable. The
Ambassador, however, does not share the party leaders'
enthusiasm.
-- The Ambassador commented that his meeting with party
leaders had an air of sad unreality. Bouterse's
timetable in fact lengthens his original schedule for
restoring democracy by a year, while providing him with
greater legitimacy through the clear public support of
the three parties.
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Our Embassy has also recently updated consular records on the
numbers and locations of American, Canadian and British citizens
in Suriname.
Confirmed numbers: 204 private Americans and 35 official
Americans, 18 Canadians, 31 British. Registered but
unable to contact: 66 Americans, 37 Canadians, and 8
British. Embassy estimates that at any given time there
are 10 transit tourists or officials in the country.
According to the Embassy, nearly all of these people are
located in Paramaribo. About five people are still in
the Moengo area and two people are in the Raleigh Falls
area.
On the economic front, Suralco, a wholly owned subsidary of
Alcoa, appears prepared to prop up at least temporarily the
bauxite industry, which accounts for 80 percent of Suriname's
export earnings. Because of hostilities near Moengo, site of
Suralco's mining operations, mining has ceased. It had been
estimated that only a two-week supply of ore remained at
Suralco's refinery in Parnam.
-- According to Embassy reporting, Suralco intends to import
ore to maintain its markets, but expects concessionary
import duties from the government, and wants to take the
500-600 miners who are now unemployed off its payroll.
Foreign Developments
The Surinamese government continues to try to build
international support by dispatching high-level emissaries to
world capitals.
-- Chief of Cabinet Heidweiller is next due to visit
Brasilia.
-- Suriname has not yet requested a meeting of the UN
Security Council to discuss French invasion plans.
Other Developments
The French newspaper Le Monde reported in its December 12
edition that France is following a policy of "strict neutrality"
in the Surinamese civil war and that there were no plans to
involve French troops there. A Quai official made the same
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points to our Embassy in Paris and indicated French
reinforcements along the border with Suriname are only to control
the flood of refugees into French Guiana.
-- The French expect a new influx of refugees into French
Guiana, according to the US Consulate in Martinique.
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SURINAME SITUATION REPORT #4
As of 1630 hours
14 December 1986
Surinamese Developments
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Our Embassy also reports that rebel leader Brunswijk appears
to be gaining political legitimacy both with Dutch voters and
with the Surinamese exiles. Brunswijk's supposed alliance with
exiles leaders such as former Prime Minister Chin a Sen is
receiving wide publicity.
--?Brunswijk's
-1.1.for the Du
etioev,4" ability to
Brunswijk
,Jan
Officials
outerse. They
aracter o
ding is potentially troublesome
fer grudging respect for his
ave little respect for either
litical ability. The Dutch
probably hope t a runswijk will play only a secondary
role to more respectable anti-Bouterse leaders --
especially Chin a Sen, who is well regarded in T
-in any new government.
Ha ue-
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ILLEGIB
Brunswijk's role is becoming increasingly important in
the propaganda war over Suriname. Special envoy Udenhout
made a point of castigating Brunswijk as a "common
criminal" in discussions with US officials. Udenhout
scorned claims by exiles that they could restore
democracy to Suriname, and called on the US to support
"moderate" elements in the current government. He
especially asked the US not to follow the Dutch lead in
believing atrocity stories or in viewing the political
situation in Paramaribo.
Other Developments
-- Nothing of significance to report.
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SURINAME SITUATION REPORT #5
As of 0730 hours
15 December 1986
Surinamese Developments
Nothing of significance to report since 14 December. At
that time:
According to the US Embassy in The Hague, the Dutch media
and politicians across the political spectrum are calling
for a more active Dutch role in stabilizing Suriname.
Our Embassy also reports that rebel leader Brunswijk
appears to be gaining political legitimacy both with
Dutch voters and with the Surinamese exiles. Brunswijk's
supposed alliance with exile leaders such as former Prime
Minister Chin a Sen is receiving wide publicity.
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SURINAME SITUATION REPORT 17
As of 1600 hours
17 December 1986
Surinamese Developments
Bouterse's frustration over his inability to end the
insurgency may be driving him to seek additional aid from radical
states.
Information on Surinamese military deployments remains
fragmentary. We have recently learned the following, however.
Zanderij Airport
has only one quad-50 anti-aircraft machine gun located in
the northwest corner of the complex. The Surinamese Air
Force reportedly does not have radar capable of working
in conjunction with the quad-50s. The remaining three
quads are in the following locations in the capital: one
at Ft. Zeelandia, one at Zoor en Hoop Airfield and one at
the city's naval base. All four could be easily
transported
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Signs of dissent within the Group of 16, Bouterse's inner
circle, continue to surface.
Sgm. Roy Tolud, a Group of 16 member now
assigned to G3 duties, is very upset about the recent
atrocities committed by the military in eastern Suriname.
soldiers participating in the
clean up the participating area
- even if it meant killina
offensive were told to
regardless of the cost
women and children.
troop morale is low,
despite rumors to the
coTary.
another
uroup ot lb memper, sgm. Tjen a Kwoei, is very disturbed
by the killings, and may be on the verge of a nervous
breakdown.
Members of the military police might be the most likely
element of the Army to offer resistance in the event of an
invasion.
MP Commander Zeeuw, who is a
group of 16 member, might lead such a resistance.
Another source of resistance might be those who have
blood on their hands, e.g. those directly responsible for
the 1982 murders, and those more recently involved in
death squad activities.
L. Other Developments
Nothing to report at this time.
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Distribution for SURINAME SITUATION REPORT
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EXTERNAL COPIES TO BE DELIVERED TO OPS CENTER FOR Ming
16 - Dr. Alton G. Keel, Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
17 Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
18 - Michael H Armacost, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
19 - Morton I. Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence/Research
20 Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
ISA
21 Lt. General John Moellering, Assistant to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
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Pros and Cons of Bouterse
Head of State Desire Bouterse's six-year record as Suriname's leader makes
him a known quantity with several positive traits from the standpoint of US
interests.
Until the insurgency in July, the Surinamese strongman had presided
over a relatively stable political situation as he consolidated his
power in the past two years.
Internationally, the regime maintains a nonaligned foreign policy
and favors all "progressive" Third World causes, but Bouterse's
principal foreign objective has been to secure foreign economic and
military aid.
The steady deterioration in the economy since the Dutch canceled aid
in 1982 has prompted him in recent years to try to improve relations
with the US, the Netherlands, and several Latin American countries.
Meanwhile, relations between Havana and Paramaribo remain cool since
Bouterse, fearing a Grenada-type US invasion, in October 1983
ordered that the Cubans reduce their official presence in Suriname;
Havana responded by closing its Embassy and probably would want
guarantees that Bouterse was becoming more leftist and that it would
not be kicked out again before ever considering any warming of
relations with the regime.
Although the Bouterse government has publicly charged that the
French and Dutch governments are lending support to Surinamese
rebels and exile leaders, the regime has avoided direct official and
media attacks against the United States.
These tentative pluses are outweighed by the darker side of Bouterse's
erratic personality and brutal leadership, which clearly show his willingness
to use any means--including murder--to stay in power.
-- Under stress, Bouterse's extreme suspiciousness mounts, and he is
apt to give vent to brutal violence; this is best illustrated by the events of
December 1982, in which he ordered the execution of 15 leading political
opponents and--according to newspaper accounts--personally shot his most vocal
opponent.
-- At the same time, US officials describe Bouterse as shy, insecure
and very much wanting popular support while being out of touch with the
people.
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The reaction to the invasion among key Latin American players would be
unlikely to go much beyond verbal support or condemnation.
Although Havana would express public outrage, Castro--who considers
Bouterse a cowardly opportunist--probably would privately not be
disappointed over the Surinamese leader's ouster.
The Nicaraguans, perceiving any Dutch invasion as serving US
Interests, would be Quick to condemn the attack regardless of the
outcome.
The Dutch probably would install a transitional civilian government and
assign it the task of drafting a constitution and preparing for elections.
This government would most likely be made up of more moderate
current cabinet members or draw upon a broader base that includes
members of traditional political parties and such special interest
groups as labor, rebel, and exile representatives.
Small numbers of leftists, who lack popular support, would not play
a significant role under a democratic system.
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-- The Bouterse regime lacks legitimacy; its narrow base of support has
been limited to the military and a smattering of radical leftists.
-- Although Bouterse is not an ideologue, he has been openly
sympathetic to radical leftist regimes; his embryonic radical political
party--the 25 February Movement--apparently is based on the Cuban model.
- Bouterse's tentative steps toward democratization are tactical, and
formidable barriers remain to a return to democracy as long as Bouterse holds
power; before relinquishing power, Bouterse reportedly wants assurances that a
civilian government would not repeal the amnesty granted to the military for
its involvement in the 1982 murders--a guarantee that would be unlikely to be
forthcoming.
-- Although Bouterse remains suspicious of Tripoli's intentions, he has
permitted a gradual warming of relations with Libya in order to obtain the
economic and military aid needed to bolster his regime.
-- Credible evidence of high-level official involvement in corruption,
including drug trafficking, have further tarnished the regime's image. The
probability that Bouterse is directly involved could weaken his critical
support in the military
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Surinamese Military Forces and Capabilities
The small, poorly-trained, inadequately equipped Surinamese armed forces
would have difficulty defending against an assault from any sizable,
well-trained professional force.'
1. Ground Forces*
-- 2,000-man infantry battalion;
-- 450-man military police brigade;
-- 200-man commando company (Echo Company); rebels ambushed commando
unit during summer inflicting heavy casualties, unit commander.
reportedly defected to rebels.
2. Navy*
-- 200-man element that is subordinate to national Army.
3. Air Force*
-- 64-man element subordinate to Army Chief of Staff.
4. Paramilitary Forces
1,000-man civilian police force subordinate to military
authority; lingering mistrust between military and this force.
1,000-man People's Militia--poorly trained and leftist-leaning--
recently armed by Bouterse to aid defense of capital if need
arises.
7) - . ?
5. Major Airfields
,
Zandertj/Airfield : country's principal air
FaiiIfiy. Located Jo KM soutn ot capital, country's only
international airport. Can accommodate C-130, C-141, and
C-5A aircraft. li_e_efilequipped with ,50 caliber quad
?Antiaircraft machinegun.
?
k_
* Manpower figures reflect pre-hostility data.
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Nieuw Nickerie : secondary importance, poor to
fair condition, limited or no facilities.
Wageningen secondary importance, poor to fair
condition, limited or no facilities.
Zorg en Hoop : small partially paved airstrip in
southern part of capital. In poor condition, but sometimes used
by military. Reportedly equipped with .50 caliber quad
antiaircraft machinegun:*
6. Weapons and Equipment
Although the Surinamese Army still has a large quantity of old Dutch
equipment is has been modernized with Brazilian equipment. The new equipment
is in good shape, but will deteriorate rapidly unless maintenance improves.
Much of the Dutch equipment is broken down and the ammunition stocks for Dutch
weapons have drastically deteriorated. The inventory of the main weapons and
equipment of the armed services is as follows:
Equipment Type
Quantity
AK-47 rifles
100
Armored Vehicle, 90-mm gun, EE-9 Cascavel
6
Armored Personnel Carrier, 7.62-mm MG, EE-11 Urutu
15
Armored Personnel Carrier, .50-cal. MG, YP-408
9
Coastal Patrol Boats
3
Recoilless Gun, 57-mm, light
17
Recoilless Gun, 75-mm
2
Helicopter
1
High-seas Patrol Boats
3
Howitzer, 75-mm
Unk
Mortar, 2-inch
17
Mortar, 81-mm
5
Machinegun, .50-cal., M@-HB, heavy
14
Machinegun, .303-cal., Bren
105
Machinegun, .30-cal., M1919A4
6
Submachinegun, 9-mm, Taurus
400
Submachinegun, 9-mm, Uzi
323
Rifle, .30-cal., M-1
2,918
Rifle, 7.62-mm, M964 FAL
2,000
Pistol, 9-mm Browning
510
* Fort Zeelandia in Paramaribo reportedly also has an antiaircraft gun.
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500
4
5
Pistol, 9-mm, PT-92 Taurus
Antiair Machinegun, .50-cal., M-55 quad
Light Transport Aircraft
Truck, 3/4-ton, EE-34 Engesa
34
Truck, 3/4-ton, EE-34 Engesa Prisoner Transport
6
Truck, 3/4-5n EE-34 Engesa Ambulance
5
Truck, 1 1/2-ton EE-15, Engesa
Unk
Truck, 2 1/2-ton EE-25, Engesa
15
Truck, 3-5on, DAF YA-314, 4x4
9
VW Van Ambulance
6
Other Vehicles (Sedans, Pickups, Buses)
274
Motorcycles (BMW and Honda)
40
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Threat to Political Moderates in Suriname
Bouterse has so far failed to act against those political
moderates in his government gently pushing for democratization,
probably because he perceives their nominal participation lends
his regime some legitimacy.
He could react violently if he were presented with
strong evidence that any of these political leaders
were cooperating with Western governments against
him. This would be particularly true in a scenario in
which an invasion was not initially successful, and
Bouterse wanted to take revenge and to discourage
further "betrayals."
Bouterse has reportedly warned that he will go down
fighting, and intends to bring many others with him.
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Surinamese Reaction to Intervention
Public
The civilian response to a Dutch invasion, assuming it is
successful, most likely would be highly popular.
The populace, cowed by the 1982 murders, has only
passively accepted the regime fearing that overt
opposition could provoke the military to a renewed
round of violence.
Both organized labor and the country's formerly
prosperous business community have complained bitterly
about the regime's economic mismanagement and probably
would hope that a Dutch invasion would bring the quick
infusion of generous foreign economic aid.
Leaders of Suriname's traditional parties and some
labor unions have publicly supported Bouterse during
the present crisis, partly out of fear and probably
their reluctance to share power with the rebels or
exile leaders, but the populace has not rallied behind
the Surinamese leader.
The military has alienated many Bush Negroes, who have
become openly hostile to the government.
the general public,
although wary of rebel leader Brunswijk's intentions,
secretly is glad to see Bouterse put on the defensive
by the insurgents.
Security Forces
The civilian police, disarmed by Bouterse in 1980,
probably would be neutral at worst.
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Reports of growing desertions and the reluctance of
some draftees to go into dense jungle areas of eastern
Suriname to weed out the insurgents suggest that the
military rank and file probably would offer relatively
little resistance.
The militia might make a stand in isolated groups but
would find it difficult to coordinate their activities.
Those elements most closely associated with civilian
atrocities--Suriname's intelligence and security
services and remnants of the Group of 16 that seized
power in 1980--probably would offer the stiffest
resistance or would attempt to escape.
Even so, flagging military morale, insufficient
military equipment, and incompetent military leadership
would severely hamper the ability of military
hardliners to muster the wherewithal needed to make a
strong stand.
The possible continuing deployment of a large chunk of
the military for the recent major offensive in isolated
areas of eastern Suriname would further work against a
quick and effective military response to an invasion.
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Cuba
Although Havana would provide a show of outrage--at least
for international consumption and as a demonstration of
solidarity with its Marxist allies--over Dutch intervention in
Suriname, privately, the Castro regime would not be disappointed
over Bouterse's ouster and might even welcome an opportunity to
work with a new transition government.
Although Cuba and Suriname still maintain diplomatic
relations, President Fidel Castro remains furious at Bouterse
over the events of October 1983 and considers him to be a
cowardly opportunist.
Even before this debacle, the Cubans had been
shouldered out by Brazilian offers of aid to Bouterse,
who apparently believed this carried fewer risks than
help from Havana and worried about Castro undermining
his power.
During the more than three years since the closing of the
Cuban mission in Paramaribo, there have been sporadic reports of
renewed cooperation between the two governments.
- None of the reported contacts between Surinamese and
Cuban officials, or reported Surinamese offers to allow
Havana to reopen its embassy in Paramaribo, have
apparently borne any fruit, however.
- Even if Castro had swallowed his pride by responding to
such initiatives just to get his foot in the door, it
surely would have been aimed at promoting a shift to
the left in Surinamese policy rather than at
solidifying Bouterse's grip on power.
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Since the setback Havana suffered as a result of Grenada--
the loss of a valuable military base and political ally--Cuba has
been trying to slowly rebuild its influence in the eastern
Caribbean.
Although the Cubans shifted their base of operations to
Guyana after Grenada, that relationship has been at a
standstill since the death of Guyanese President
Burnham.
As demonstrated by its intensive courtship of the
Bouterse government during the early 1980s, Havana
clearly views Suriname as a potentially valuable base
for extending its military and political power in the
region.
If the Dutch were to stumble in their attempt to neutralize
the Surinamese military and Bouterse called upon Castro for help,
we see little that the Cubans could do to save him.
-- Nonetheless, there is a slim possibility that the
Cubans might risk a clandestine airdrop of arms and
advisers, or the even riskier act of sneaking them
across the border from Guyana, to help the beleaguered
Surinamese,
The reprecussions of being discovered in these acts,
however, almost surely would dissuade Havana from
undertaking such a risky venture.
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Nicaragua
Because the Sandinista would be likely to see any Dutch
invasion as serving US interests, Managua would be quick to
condemn the attack regardless of the outcome.
The regime-controlled domestic press probably would
paint Bouterse as a victim of US "agression," and
Sandinista representatives at the UN and OAS probably
would follow suit.
Managua also would use the invasion as ammunition in
its current propaganda offensive against the US,
following Honduran air raids against Nicaragua over the
weekend. In particular, Managua might try to use the
incident to build international backing for a recent
proposal by the UN and OAS Secretaries General to help
implement a regional peace agreement by using UN
personnel as border observers.
The regime has few--if any--contacts among Surinamese
exiles and would be unlikely to recognize an interim
_g_o_v_e_rmaP_mi?astablished in the wake of an invasion.
Nicaragua's reaction to the invasion would be unlikely to go
beyond rhetoric, however.
The Sandinistas, despite recent efforts to enhance ties
with Caribbean countries, have limited diplomatic
relations with Suriname. For example, Managua's
nonresident ambassador to Suriname was accredited just
eight months ago.
/Nicaraguan military support for Bouterse also
has been minimal. '
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A Look at the Post-Bouterse Government
We would expect the Dutch to install a transitional civilian government that would be
tasked with drafting a constitution and preparing for elections.
-- The Dutch may choose to retain Prime Minister Radhakishun and many members of
this civilian cabinet; Dutch officials have told Embassy officers that they could
cooperate closely with Prime Minister Radhakishun if Bouterse suddenly left the
scene.
Cabinet members closely associated with Bouterse such as vehemently anti-Dutch
Foreign Minister Herrenberg, would probably be ousted, if they had not already
resigned, fled the country, or joined any remaining pro-Bouterse forces.
The Dutch might decide to set up a more broadly based provisional government in
which the traditional political parties, labor and other interest groups, exile leaders
and Brunswijk's forces would be represented. We doubt that the Dutch, however,
would want Brunswijk himself to play a significant role in any post-Bouterse
government.
Creation of such an umbrella group carries some risks, however, the traditional
parties and labor unions that recently won some political concessions from
Bouterse, for example, would be wary of cooperating with exiles, who lack internal
support.
-- Beyond the transition period, one of the traditional moderate ethnically based
political parties would probably form a new government, and would almost certainly
pursue a pro-West course.
-- We would not expect the remnants of any of the small leftist-oriented political
parties, which lack popular support, to play a significant role under a democratic
system.
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