MIDDLE EAST: IMPACT OF GORBACHEV'S INITIATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000600870001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
SUBJECT: Middle East: Impact of Gorbachev's
NESA M 87-20022
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Initiatives
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 March 1987
Middle East: Impact of Gorbachev's Initiatives
Summary
Efforts by the Gorbachev regime to capitalize on
stagnation in the Arab-Israeli peace process and to
upgrade relations with key US allies in the Middle
East--Egypt and Israel--are having some limited
success.
Most Arab states have supported the Soviet proposal
for a preparatory committee meeting to precede an
international peace conference. The initiative serves
the interests of moderate Arab states by maintaining
the illusion of movement, bolsters Moscow's goal of
being an active participant in the process, and puts
pressure on the United States and Israel to demonstrate
their own commitment to the peace process.
The Soviets have raised the possibility of improved
relationships with Israel and Egypt by increasing
contacts and conveying an impression of flexibility.
Nothing tangible has been accomplished thus far, but
the Israelis almost certainly would upgrade relations
if Moscow makes concessions with respect to Jewish
emigration, and Egypt will likely expand ties if Mosaow
sets aside the unresolved question of the military
debt. The Soviets would use incremental gains in
relations with these key US allies to further the
perception that the US position in the region is
This memorandum was prepared by Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of 6 March 1987
was used in its preparation. Questions and comments should be
addressed to Chief, Issues and Applications Division
NESA M 87-20022
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eroding and that their own position is being enhanced.
Since coming to power in March 1985, the Gorbachev regime has
undertaken a number of initiatives to improve the USSR's
international standing. A new flexibility in Soviet foreign
policy became particularly apparent after Foreign Minister
Gromyko was elected to the Presidency in July 1985. In the
Middle East, Moscow's principal initiatives have been to revive
and modify the earlier Soviet call for an international
conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute and to make overtures to
both Israel and Egypt.* The Soviets apparently hope to enhance
their credibility and influence with all parties to the
Arab-Israeli dispute, to lessen suspicions of their intentions,
and to improve their overall position in the region relative to
that of the United States.
Soviet leaders probably do not expect rapid or dramatic
returns from their efforts. They may anticipate, however, that,
by projecting an image of vitality and flexibility, they will be
able to benefit from a continuing decline in the US position.
Any erosion of US credibility is, in itself, a net gain from the
Soviet point of view. Any corresponding enhancement of their own
image or improvement in their bilateral relationships would be a
bonus.
We believe that Moscow's efforts to project itself as a
legitimate mediator and force for stability is one facet of a
broader two-track policy. Its most successful tactic, the
provision of military support to its Arab clients that oppose
Israel, has given it the capability to put military pressure on
Israel and to undermine peace talks as well as credibility as an
Arab ally. This tactic has also given the Soviets reason to
prefer continued tension in the region and to oppose negotiations
from which they are excluded. The inherent contradiction between
this reality and the other facet of Moscow's dual policy--its
efforts to be part of any viable peace process--has not prevented
the Soviets from pursuing both approaches. The peace process has
never progressed far enough for Moscow to have to face this
*Other recent Soviet gestures in the region have been a call to
declare the Mediterranean a nuclear weapons free zone, Moscow's
first offer to pay its share for support of UNIFIL forces in
southern Lebanon, and efforts to improve relations with moderate
Persian Gulf states.
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dilemma. In 1973, when they were part of the process, the
Soviets did try to play a constructive role, however, and they
probably would do so again if the alternative was exclusion from
what appeared to be a productive and successful endeavor.
The Peace Process
During the past year, the Soviets have tried to exploit the
stagnation that has beset the peace process since King Hussein
abrogated his accord with PLO leader Arafat in February 1986.
Recently they have sought to capitalize on moderate Arab
unhappiness with US arms sales to Iran. For example, the Soviet
press has highlighted the negative Arab commentary which greeted
US envoy Richard Murphy during his January 1987 visit to the
Middle East. Both Hussein and Egyptian President Mubarak
criticized US policy in the wake of the visit, charging that the
United States had lost credibility in the region. Both
subsequently have indicated that they will not proceed with
planned visits to the United States because of unhappiness with
US policy.
When the Soviets renewed their call in July 1986 for an
international conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute,
they added the suggestion that such a conference be preceded by a
meeting of a preparatory committee composed of the permanent
members of the UN Security Council.* Moscow's proposal plays to
the need of the moderate Arab states--particularly Egypt and
Jordan--to maintain at least the illusion of momentum in the
peace process and to put pressure on the United States and Israel
to be more flexible. The proposal has been endorsed by most Arab
states as well as the PLO. It was included in the annual UN
resolution calling for a peace conference on the Middle East,
which passed in December 1986 with only three negative votes.
Egypt successfully sponsored a similar proposal at the Islamic
summit in Kuwait in January 1987.
We believe that the Soviet proposal is intended to
demonstrate that Moscow is a dynamic, positive actor in the
region and that the United States is obstructionist. Moscow must
be pleased by evidence of Israeli differences over possible
*Moscow previously had favored involvement of the Security
Council's permanent members only to guarantee any agreements--an
arrangement that would limit Chinese involvement. Its new
proposal may reflect, in part, its current efforts to improve
relations with Beijing.
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approaches to a conference* as well as by apparent USS-Israeli
differences which surfaced during Prime Minister Shamir's visit
to Washington in February 1987, when Shamir dismissed the idea of
an international conference as a Soviet tactic.
Broad Arab endorsement of Moscow's idea, the support for a
conference expressed by the European Community's foreign
ministers in February 1987, and the attendant favorable
publicity, as well as the isolation of Israel and the United
States in opposition to the proposal constitute a success for
Soviet policy. But the Soviet initiative remains rhetorical and
Moscow's utility to the peace process limited. Moscow's clients
have endorsed the concept, but there is little prospect that the
Soviets could prevail upon Damascus to come to the negotiating
table unless the Golan Heights is on the agenda. Similarly,
there is little reason to expect that Moscow could win a seat at
the table for the PLO or persuade the latter to endorse a
conference from which it is excluded. But rhetoric and the
appearance of movement have their uses and, to the extent that
these complement and serve Arab interests, Moscow's image as an
active player is being bolstered.
The Israeli Connection
The absence of diplomatic relations with Israel since 1967
has made it difficult for Moscow to claim a legitimate role in
the peace process
For the Soviets, however, several
constraints remain to re-establishing relations--their own
repeated assertions that relations will not be restored until
Israel has withdrawn from the occupied territories,* the risk of
*Former Prime Minister Peres endorsed the concept of an
international framework for the peace process in his speech to
the UN in the fall of 1985. In September 1986, he and Mubarak
agreed on the desirability of an international conference. But
he coupled it with demands that Moscow increase Jewish emigration
and resume diplomatic relations with Israel, and he probably
considers the conference a rhetorical and political device rather
than a genuine policy. Both Labor and Likud remain committed to
the idea of direct talks between Israel and its Arab adversaries,
but both Peres and Shamir have expressed a willingness to allow
the Soviets into the process if they resume diplomatic relations
and increase Jewish emigration.
*Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov told a press
conference on 7 January 1987 that conditions for restoring
diplomatic relations would appear when the causes that had
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losing credibility with Arab clients, security concerns that
would be raised by an Israeli embassy in Moscow, and disagreement
with Israel over such issues as Jewish emigration from the Soviet
Union.
Despite these complications, the Gorbachev regime began
exploring an expansion of ties to Israel in the summer of 1985,
with contacts between the Soviet and Israeli ambassadors to
France in Paris. Since then, they have given a number of signals
that they are interested in upgrading the relationship. They
rhave intensified bilateral contacts, have
expressed an interest in exploring consular matters with Israel,
and must have given their approval the establishment of interests
sections by Israel and Poland in 1986.
It is not clear how far the Soviets intend to go in their
overtures to Israel, but they probably hope to upgrade relations
enough to demonstrate their legitimacy and relevance to the peace
process and to lessen some aspects of anti-Soviet opinion in the
United States--without paying the costs of full diplomatic
relations.
We believe that it is possible, but less likely, that Moscow
is prepared to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel
and is simply seeking a face-saving formula which would include
Israel's agreement to an international conference. A third
possibility, which we also believe is unlikely, is that the
Soviets have no intention of upgrading relations and are only
trying to demonstrate flexibility while putting the onus for lack
of progress on Israel and the United States. Soviet policy has
gone far beyond the rhetoric which would be the basis of such a
strategy and has included modest but viable proposals which
Israel is fully capable of accepting.
If the Soviets' objective is indeed a modest expansion of
ties, they have been frustrated to date by Israel's insistence on
dealing up front with the issues of Jewish emigration and
establishment of full diplomatic relations. In the spring of
1986, the Soviets proposed a
Soviet-Israeli meeting to discuss issuing Soviet passports to
former Soviet citizens residing in Israel and resolving the
brought about their rupture were removed. On 16 January, a
Soviet foreign ministry official repeated these conditions in a
meeting with a US embassy official.
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status of real estate in Israel still owned by the Orthodox
Church and the Soviet government. Israel agreed to a meeting in
Helsinki in August 1986, but put on its a enda the question of
Jewish emigration from the USSR.
In early 1987, the Israeli and Soviet Ambassadors in
Washington met several times and discussed the questions of
upgrading relations and increasing Jewish emigration from the
USSR. They agreed that the number of Soviet Jews who emigrate to
the United States is too high, and the Israeli press subsequently
reported that Israel was asking Soviet authorities to allow Jews
leaving the USSR to fly directly to Israel.
Soviet spokesmen recently have indicated plans to increase
the flow of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union. Such a
policy would be consistent with Moscow's current human rights
campaign, would complement efforts to court public opinion in the
United States and Europe, and probably would produce a favorable
response from Israel. The Israeli representative at the UN
indicated in early March that Aviv is now ready to allow the
consular visit the Soviets have been seeking; they are also
probably prepared to increase contact and consultation if Jewish
emigration does, in fact, increase. This improvement in
relations would reinforce the Soviet Union's image as a dynamic
regional actor and a relevant participant in the peace process.
Courtship of Egypt
As the Gorbachev regime looked for ways to improve its
position in the Middle East, upgrading relations with the
moderate Arab states must have looked tempting. Egypt was a
particularly attractive target of opportunity because its gradual
move back into the Arab fold was consistent with Moscow's
long-term goal of encouraging a united Arab approach to the
conflict with Israel.
Under Egyptian President Mubarak, there has been only
glacial improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations; Mubarak has
continued to see Egypt's interests best served by close ties to
the United States and is aware that to go beyond flirtation with
Moscow could damage his relations with Washington. Moscow does,
however, provide a useful counter for Egypt in bargaining with
the United States. When the peace process stagnates, Cairo can
use Soviet initiatives to prod the United States into action.
Similarly, when Egyptian-US debt negotiations are going poorly,
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Cairo can remind Washington that the USSR may prove more
flexible.
The main obstacle to improved Soviet-Egyptian relations has
been disagreement over repayment terms for Egypt's large military
debt to the USSR. Egypt has refused to make payments on the
debt, and Moscow has made such payments a precondition to
delivery of spare parts for Soviet-made military equipment and to
improved commercial relations. Forgiving the debt, as Egypt has
demanded, is not an attractive option for Moscow because of the
money involved (over $2.5 billion), the precedent it would set
for other debtor nations, and the uncertainty over how much
bilateral relations would subsequently improve.
The Soviets began making overtures to improve the climate of
relations with Egypt in the fall of 1985, and, during the next
year, there were numerous exchanges of visits and messages of
good will. The appointment of a high-level foreign trade
official as Ambassador to Egypt in September 1986 gave new
impetus to the search for a solution to the debt obstacle. In
his first press conference in Cairo, Ambassador Zhuravlev
affirmed the high priority Moscow accorded economic issues, and
immediately initiated a series of visits with Egyptian economic
officials. In late November, a high-level economic delegation
headed by the President of the Soviet State Bank visited Cairo
for negotiations which lasted three weeks. Despite apparently
intense talks, the only officially announced result was the
signing of a trade protocol, and
differences over the debt issue remain.
*In January 1987, however, the Egyptain magazine Al-Musawwar
reported that Egypt and the USSR had reached agreement on the
basic outlines for resolving the debt problem. The magazine
claimed there would be a six-year grace period on repayment
followed by a 19-year repayment schedule. It said that the
Soviets had agreed to the old interest rate of 2 percent, but
that Egyptian President Mubarak had asked that Moscow consider
eliminating interest completely. The magazine claimed that the
Soviets were currently considering that request and studying an
Egyptian proposal that 75 percent of the accumulated Egyptian
trade surplus be used to pay part of the military debt with the
remainder to be settled in cash. We believe that this account
reflects internal Egyptian debate over the best way to approach
Egypt's severe economic problems, which include the issues of
repayment of both US and Soviet debts. Indicating that the
Soviet debt problem is about to be resolved may be a way of
putting pressure on the United States.
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The Soviets are continuing efforts to appear flexible and
to separate other economic issues from the question of the debt.
In late December, the Chairman of the Egyptian Iron and Steel
Industrial Board reported that the Soviets had agreed to help
modernize the iron and steel industries in Egypt. In
mid-January, press reporting indicated that Mubarak had received
a message from Soviet leaders indicating that Moscow was willing
to replace old turbines at the Soviet-built Aswan dam and to send
experts to supervise that process if Egypt agreed./
Cairo has used the initiatives to its own advantage by
permitting enough improvement in the atmosphere to increase its
leverage with the United States. In early February 1987, the
Egyptian Foreign Minister announced that the Egypt-USSR
Friendship Society would resume relations shortly. He said that
Egypt and the USSR were united by their efforts to achieve
universal peace and by their shared view of the need to convene
an international conference on the Middle East.
Beyond the atmospherics, however, the economically hard-
pressed Egyptians seem unlikely to move much farther in their
ties with Moscow until the Soviets make significant concessions
on the debt issue.
We believe that Egypt-Soviet ties will remain limited by
Mubarak's conviction that Egyptian interests are best served by
strong ties to the United States. But any enhancement of the
relationship would serve Soviet interests and suggest a weakening
of the US position. Should Moscow prove willing to offer
significant concessions on the debt or to ignore the debt and
offer generous military or economic assistance, Cairo would
probably be prepared to increase the Soviet presence in Egypt and
to step up economic and military contacts. It is possible, for
example, that Cairo would agree to an exchange of military
attaches as Moscow has requested.
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SUBJECT: Middle East: Impact of Gorbachev's Initiatives
NESA M 87-20022
External Distribution:
Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
Room 381, OEB
Mr. Robert Oakley
Special Assistant to the President
Senior Director for Near East and
South Asian Affairs
National Security Council
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International Security Affairs
Department of Defense
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