DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00799R000100290004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 3, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Seeftt--
Directorate of
Intelligence
Developments in Afghanistan
3 July 1987
Copy 2 0 9
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Developments in Afghanistan I 25X1
1 Perspective-USSR-Afghanistan: International Impact of Soviet-Afghan Peace
seen as an East-West issue.
Building methodically on the "peace" proposals made by their Afghan clients in
January 1987, the Soviets are seeking to promote the growth of Kabul's
international legitimacy. We believe the Soviets have concluded that the campaign
is softening foreign support for the insurgents and is helping to make the war be
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Resistance Underground Developing in Kabul
likely to have a significant impact.
Because better security measures by Soviet and Afghan regime forces have
impeded resistance infiltration into Kabul, some insurgent organizations have
created underground organizations to sustain activity there. These neophyte
clandestine groups must strengthen their operational capabilities before they are
gloom.
Until Gorbachev and glasnost, the Soviets behaved as though they could conceal
the extent of the egregious errors made by the political high command in 1979 re-
garding Afghanistan. The conventional line-that the Soviet position on Afghani-
stan was necessary, is desirable, and will be successful-remains dominant, but
there have recently been signs of change, including a turn toward candor and
Top Secret
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General Secretary Najib is unlikely to strengthen his hold on either the Parcham
faction or the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan as the result of the
Central Committee plenum held on 10 June. His personal fortunes, in fact, are
likely to continue to decline and PDPA factionalism probably will escalate.
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23 Afghanistan: Selected Political Chronology, March-June 1987
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This document is published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments
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Developments in Afghanistan
Perspective USSR-Afghanistan: International Impact of Soviet-Afghan Peace Initiative
Building methodically on the "peace" proposals made by their Afghan clients in
January 1987, the Soviets are seeking to promote the growth of Kabul's
international legitimacy. The Soviets appear to have concluded that the campaign
is softening foreign support for the insurgents and is helping to influence world
public opinion to view the war in Afghanistan as an East-West issue. To further
the peace process, Afghan party chief Najib recently extended Kabul's cease-fire
and national reconciliation program.
Courting International Opinion
Since the peace offensive began in January, the Kabul regime has scored some im-
portant diplomatic successes. Zimbabwe, whose Prime Minister is chairman of the
Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and Cyprus have recognized Kabul, although
neither has accepted an Afghan envoy. Austria is likely to permit Kabul to open an
embassy in Vienna this summer and seems ready-apparently at Riyadh's
urging-to host an Afghan representation in Saudi Arabia. The Afghan regime is
also seeking expanded ties to Algeria, Syria, Nicaragua, Argentina, and Mexico.
In addition, Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil visited New Delhi in February,
Indian Foreign Minister Tiwari visited Kabul in April, and Afghan Prime
Minister Keshtmand visited Baghdad in early June.
The Soviets have intensified efforts to erode support for the Pakistani-sponsored
Soviet officials, seeking to weaken the Organization of Islamic Conference's
publicly hardline, anti-Soviet stance on the war, have been urging OIC members to
show flexibility in their next resolution on Afghanistan to help the USSR
withdraw with "honor." Officials of Kuwait, which is the OIC chairman until
1989, have told US diplomats they will ask Islamabad to be more responsive to So-
viet proposals for ending the war. US diplomatic reporting indicates that Iran,
Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are worried that the recent Iraq-Afghanistan coopera-
tion agreement will have an adverse impact on the OIC members' attitudes toward
the war.
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Kabul's delegations to two NAM conferences in June apparently made some
headway. At the "south-south" cooperation conference in North Korea, the
Afghans elicited praise from the Algerian Foreign Minister for Kabul's national
reconciliation campaign and prompted a hint that Algiers may expand bilateral
ties. The Afghan envoy to the NAM's information ministers conference in
Zimbabwe prevented any mention of Afghanistan in the final communique-
reportedly because of Pakistan's diplomatic ineptness and the lack of moderate
support for Islamabad's position.
These actual and potential diplomatic successes are not, however, solely the result
of Kabul's peace plan. Moscow has long used various forms of leverage-weapons,
economic aid, and diplomatic support-on nonaligned states, and Kuwait and Iraq
may now be particularly susceptible. But the peace proposals also give those who
have been resisting Soviet lobbying efforts a plausible pretext for distancing
themselves from the insurgents.
Making the War an East-West Matter
Moscow and Kabul have paralleled their peace offensive with intensified public
relations efforts to identify Washington as the main obstacle to a political
settlement. Moscow has repeatedly asserted that the United States is escalating
and prolonging the war-seeking to "bleed" the USSR-by providing increasingly
sophisticated weapons to the insurgents.
Soviet claims of "interference" by the United States in Afghanistan probably are
attracting attention in Western Europe and having some impact in the Third
World and the Middle East, especially in the wake of US arms sales to Iran and
the increased US naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Moscow has used Washing-
ton's stated policy of limiting Soviet influence in the Gulf to lend credence to its
claim that the United States' Afghan policy is animated only by anti-Soviet
motives. Any increase in the tendency of Third World and Islamic capitals to view
the Afghan war as another insoluble East-West issue is likely to reduce their
willingness to attribute sole responsibility for the continuing war to the USSR, as
well as weaken their resistance to recognizing Najib's regime.
Prospects
Moscow may soon propose, as rumored in the media, the first direct talks among
Moscow, Kabul, the resistance, Pakistan, and the United States. Even if these
maneuvers are merely negotiating tactics, Moscow probably believes they will win
public relations points because the resistance and its backers are unlikely to call
the Soviet bluff. Furthermore, Moscow almost certainly expects the peace proposal
to ensure less international criticism of a continued or even somewhat increased
Soviet presence in Afghanistan should the Geneva process fail to produce a
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Helms
Airfield
Province-level boundary
Road
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Top Secret
Recent fighting around Qandahar has cost Mohammad Yunus Khalis' faction of the
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party) one of its best commanders. Lala Malang (not to be con-
fused with Suleiman Mohammad-known as Mullah Malang-another well-known
Khalis commander in Qandahar Province) was killed on 3 June when a shell hit his
headquarters, according to a resistance press statement. Malang was defending
insurgent positions in the Darya-ye Arghandab, northeast of Qandahar city, against
an offensive by Soviet and regime forces at the time of his death.
Although Malang directly commanded only about 100 men,
he cooperated with other resistance commanders to launch
ambushed Soviet convoys, and rocketed Qandahar airport,
Malang, a native of the region, was captured by the regime in 1984 and ex-
changed in February 1986 for a Soviet prisoner held by the resistance. He later
recounted sharing cells in Kabul's Pol-e Charkhi prison with Khalqi former cabinet
ministers, some of whom have since been released. Malang was 27 at the time of his
death.
A number of insurgent commanders in Takhar Province report that the region's food
situation has deteriorated because of successive years of low rainfall, intermittent
bombing of agricultural infrastructure, and the intentional destruction of harvested
crops by Soviet forces. According to the US Consulate in Peshawar, Jamiat-i-Islami
commanders say foodstuffs from Pakistan are appearing in the bazaars in Takhar
because of the unavailability of local products. A further result of the poor
agricultural situation is the steep climb in food prices since 1978; the price of wheat-
a staple of the Afghan diet-has increased more than 400 percent since 1978.
Because of the critical food situation, a number of residents were ready to flee to Pa-
kistan in late 1986, insurgent leaders told the US Consulate in Peshawar. Most,
however, obeyed the order of commander Masood and remained in Takhar. A
number of commanders are now supporting the local civilian population by sharing
foodstuffs brought in from Pakistan in insurgent supply convoys.
Supporting the local population will increase the financial and logistic burden on
resistance groups in Takhar. There was probably adequate precipitation this spring
for at least an average crop, although it is too early to estimate the total size.
does not confirm insurgent
reports of widespread deliberate damage to crops or agricultural infrastructure.
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Resistance Underground
Developing in Kabul
Because better security measures by Soviet and Af-
ghan regime forces have impeded resistance infiltra-
tion into Kabul, some insurgent organizations have
created underground organizations to sustain activity
there. These neophyte clandestine groups must
strengthen their operational capabilities before they
are likely to have a significant impact.
A Tougher Nut To Crack
To constrain insurgent activity in the Afghan capital,
Soviet and Afghan regime forces have gradually
increased security measures over the past several
years. These include periodic sweep operations by
ground forces on the outskirts of the city and some air
patrols, including attack helicopter escorts for arriv-
ing and departing aircraft at Kabul International
Airport. Both Soviet and Afghan soldiers man numer-
ous security outposts positioned on the perimeter of
Kabul to inhibit infiltration.
Within Kabul, the Soviets and the Afghan regime
have increased sentries at government offices and
public buildings and established numerous check-
points, To reduce
vulnerability of their installations to attack, Soviet
military forces in Kabul have erected barbed wire
fences and dug barrier trenches.
These measures have made it more difficult for
insurgent forces to infiltrate Kabul and carry out
operations. Jamiat-i-Islami commander Mullah Iza-
tullah has underscored the restraining effect of the
expansion of the belt of security posts around Kabul.
He also reported that his forces suffered heavy casual-
ties from Soviet counterbattery fire in mid-1986 when
they initiated a rocket attack on Kabul
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Sympathizers in the
government, including Khalqi party members, also
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Working Within Confines
A number of insurgent commanders in the Kabul
area, concerned about more restricted infiltration
opportunities and recognizing the value of more effec-
tive urban operations, have begun forming urban
cells.
The urban underground employed by these groups is
typically composed of three-to-seven-man cells. Cell
members frequently either serve in the government or
possess counterfeit documents identifying them as
government emnlovees. army veterans. students. or
secret police.
Cell networks have a rear support
ase in the moun-
tains outside Kabul, where meetings, planning ses-
sions, training, and logistic activity occur. By using
undercover insurgents and false documentation, cell
members are able to acquire transportation to smug-
gle weapons and fighters into the city.
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The Role of Urban Networks in Nonurban
Insurgencies
Urban networks or infrastructures often play a criti-
cal role in rural-based insurgencies, such as in
Af-
ghanistan. This role varies greatly depending on the
historical origin and the pattern of development of
each insurgency. Generally, urban networks play a
major role in most foco movements and politically
organized insurgencies but have a more minor role in
traditionally organized insurgencies
The role of urban networks in rural-based insurgen-
cies can involve any of the following activities:
? Recruitment. Urban networks sometimes are a ma-
jor source of manpower for rural organizations,
especially for skilled or educated cadres.
? Intelligence. Urban networks are frequently the
major source of intelligence on the government and
the military high command.
? Liaison with urban political groups. Urban cadres
are the primary links of rural-based groups to
urban political, labor, and student organizations. It
is often through the urban networks that various
national political groups are infiltrated.
? Logistic support. Urban networks sometimes are the
major logistic base of support for rural movements.
? Financing. Some rural-based insurgencies rely
mainly on urban areas for financing, especially
during the initial phases of the insurgency.
? Terrorism. Without an urban network, rural insur-
gents cannot successfully engage in terrorism in the
cities.
? Sanctuary. Urban networks sometimes become ref-
uges for the remnants of defeated rural cadres, who
use the time to regroup and plan their next move.
? Diversionary campaigns. Urban networks can divert
the attention of security forces from rural areas
through terrorism or agitation.
? Facilitating military attacks. Urban networks can
aid military attacks against urban areas, especially
during the final stages of a rural guerrilla war
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Critical Gaps
The resistance's urban infrastructure lacks several
important components of successful long-term under-
grounds. Its support network has a high rate of
Moreover, most commanders from the major resis-
tance parties apparently do not place much emphasis
on propaganda, disinformation, or psychological oper-
ations against the regime.
Of particular significance is the fact that the resis-
tance cells are not self-sustaining. The reliance on
financial and material assistance from the resistance
parties in Pakistan sometimes has a dampening effect
on activity levels.
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Outlook
Building an effective underground has not been easy
for most Afghan insurgent groups because of the tight
discipline and elaborate organization required. In the
near term, continued heavy combat activity, increas- 25X1
ingly stringent security measures around the country's 25X1
main cities, and the preference of the rural-based
insurgents for nonurban military operations are likely
to slow efforts to develop a strong urban underground.
Nonetheless, the insurgent leadership's growing rec-
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i op necrer
More Second Thoughts
on Afghanista
One day history may judge the Soviet record in
Afghanistan as the USSR's sorriest extended perfor-
mance in the international arena since the Winter
War against Finland in 1939. The serious mistakes
made by the political high command in Moscow in
1979 numb the analytical sensibilities of anyone not
actively involved in the policymaking process at the
time. Until Gorbachev and glasnost, the regime acted
as if the extent of these egregious mistakes could
somehow be concealed. The conventional line-that
the Soviet position on Afghanistan was necessary, is
desirable, and will be successful-remains dominant,
but there have recently been signs of change, includ-
ing a turn toward candor and gloom.
Major Mistakes
It is difficult to imagine any important error in
judgment the Brezhnev Politburo did not make in
1979 regarding Afghanistan. Probably assuming that
victory would come relatively quickly and easily,
Soviet leaders:
? Completely misjudged the time it would take to win
the war or at least gain effective control over most
of the country and its inhabitants.
? Badly underrated the hatred of the Afghan people
and the will, skill, and staying power of the
resistance.
? Grossly miscalculated the costs of the war in rubles,
arms and equipment, diversion of resources, and,
above all, casualties.
? Greatly underestimated the significance and extent
of adverse reactions to the war within the USSR.
? Were much too optimistic about their Afghan allies'
ability to attract support and their capacity to
govern and fight.
* This article was prepared by a contractor who relied exclusively
on unclassified literature. It was not coordinated within this
Agency. The views expressed are those of the author
? Seriously misapprehended the extent and durability
of international opprobrium over their role in Af-
ghanistan and the willingness of outside powers-
especially the United States-to support the resis-
tance.
A Turn Toward Candor and Gloom
Gorbachev set the tone in 1986 when he referred to
Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound"-hardly a reas-
suring metaphor. Since then, the press has written
about Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan who have fought
(and implicitly died). Letters of complaints about the
Afghan war have been regularly printed in Soviet
papers. More surprising, a few Soviet writers, encour-
aged by high-level calls for fearless journalism, have
begun to treat Afghanistan almost as a failure of
national policy or a venture gone awry:
? What was once described as a limited action against
regional "bandits" has since been called by TASS a
"protracted fratricidal war." This statement implies
Soviet involvement in a foreign civil war for which
there is as yet no foreseeable outcome.
? The Soviet allies in this conflict are seen in some
commentaries as weak, divided, and as running a
sorely troubled enterprise. A television report on
Afghanistan broadcast in February 1987 noted,
"The dissensions, feuds, and the bloody clashes
within the ruling party have weakened the new
government and helped the internal and external
counterrevolution."
? It is now admitted publicly that the enemy is much
stronger than the official portrayal had traditionally
allowed. A Soviet radio spokesman conceded in
March that the forces of the counterrevolution were
an enormous army, well-armed and well-trained.
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? The United States, it is now said, is able to exploit
Soviet policy toward Afghanistan for its own
purposes.
? One senior Soviet journalist has even tacitly admit-
ted that the USSR, despite years of trying and the
deaths of thousands of Soviet soldiers, has failed to
pacify Afghanistan.
Puzzling Approach
This inclination in the Soviet media toward greater
honesty and pessimism concerning Afghanistan prob-
ably reflects a fairly widespread body of Soviet opin-
ion, particularly among the intelligentsia. But it also
suggests an effort by the Gorbachev leadership to
acquaint the public gradually with the truth about
Afghanistan for reasons of its own.
On the surface, this openness is puzzling, for it is
likely to increase popular opposition to the war. The
message inherent in the new approach appears to be
devastating: the USSR intervened-on the basis of
serious misjudgments-in a full-scale "fratricidal
war" on the side of a movement seriously weakened
by internal strife and is combating-so far with
uncertain results-a force of substantial strength that
is effectively supported by a superpower adversary.
* This article was prepared by a contractor who relied exclusively
on unclassified literature. It was not coordinated within this
Agency. The views expressed are those of the author
Top Secret
Interpreted in this manner, the new message may be
that the Soviet Union should soon withdraw from
Afghanistan. The message consists, moreover, of
damning specifics (Kabul's weaknesses and the insur-
gents' strengths, for example), against which are
arrayed old generalities (internationalist duty, imperi-
alist aggression, and fraternal revolution).
The regime may be only testing the waters, trying to
gauge the temper of the public, and, perhaps, seeking
to move the people into support of a more active and
conciliatory search for a solution. The new message
has been put forward in bits and pieces, has not been
advanced with any great frequency, and still could be
withdrawn, probably without much effort or major
repercussions.
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i vp occrei
Najib's Post-Plenum
Factional Blues
PDPA factionalism is likely to escalate.
General Secretary Najib is unlikely to strengthen his
hold on either the Parcham faction or the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) as a result
of the Central Committee plenum held on 10 June.
Najib continued his purge of pro-Babrak Karmal
loyalists from the Politburo and government but was
forced by political realities, and perhaps Soviet pres-
sure, to promote Minister of the Interior Gulabzoi-
leader of the Khalq faction and a potential candidate
to become the general secretary-to full Politburo
membership. For the foreseeable future, Najib's per-
sonal fortunes are likely to continue declining, and
Mohammad Baryalai to a less important party post.
Ratebzad from the Politburo under the guise of
retirement and shunted Karmal's younger brother
Purging Karmal Loyalists
Najib's principal purpose in conducting the short
plenum-the meeting was adjourned before lunch on
the day it started-was to continue his purge of
Parchamis loyal to former party chief Karmal. Najib
began the removals in the spring of 1987 by firing the
Ministers of Public Health and Agriculture and the
head of the State Committee on Radio, Television,
and Cinema. He continued cleaning house in May
1987 by arranging for Karmal to travel to Moscow for
"medical treatment" after the ex-leader repeatedly
refused to support Kabul's peace initiative or volun-
tarily accept exile. In the recent plenum, Najib
arranged to remove longtime Karmal loyalist Anahita
Najib also promoted several of his own
Politburo.
supporters-including Najmuddin Kawiani and Niaz
Mohammad Mohand, both secretaries of the PDPA
Central Committee-to be candidate members of the
None of these moves is likely to strengthen Najib's
grasp on his own Parcham faction. So long as Rateb-
zad and Baryalai remain in Kabul, they will symbol-
ize Babrak Karmal's enduring popularity and could
potentially serve as a focal point for Najib's oppo-
nents.
Moreover, Najib's recently promoted loyalists lack
the status and political experience to make the Polit-
buro and Central Committee reliable instruments of
the General Secretary's will.
Rising Khalqi Power
Najib's lack of control over the PDPA probably was
also worsened by the plenum's nomination of Gulab-
zoi to full Politburo membership. Gulabzoi has signif-
icantly improved his standing in Kabul's pecking
order during the past year largely because of his
ability to win the loyalty of disparate groups of
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disarray of the Parcham faction spawned by Najib-
Karmal tensions and the domestic failure of Kabul's
peace initiative. Gulabzoi's command of the Interior
Ministry's paramilitary organization-the Saran-
doi-has also given him an independent power base
with which his party rivals must reckon.
Gulabzoi and the Khalqis have been particulary bold
since the failure of Najib's peace plan. In April,
according to US Embassy
reporting, the Khalqis demanded an equal share of
ministerial portfolios, the return of several prominent
Khalqis from exile in diplomatic posts abroad, and the
release of some Amin-era Khalqis imprisoned since
1979. Najib initially refused but eventually yielded to
Soviet pressure and released a dozen prominent Khal-
qis from Pol-e Charkhi prison.
Najib probably hoped that the
released Khalqis would challenge Gulabzoi's hold on
the faction because he had tried to oust several of the
men from ministerial posts they held in the 1970s.
According to the US Embassy, however, the freed
Khalqis have sided with Gulabzoi, thereby maintain-
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Gulabzoi's rapidly rising star also suggests that the
Soviets may look to him as a potential successor to
Najib. The US Embassy in Kabul reports that the
Soviets may have recently brought the Khalgi leader
to Moscow for private discussions. Moreover, Gulab-
zoi recently ignored the wishes of Najib and the
Soviets by trying to arrest the troublesome but influ-
ential leader of a pro-regime tribal militia in Kabul,
Gulabzoi does
not seem to have been upbraided for this; in fact, he
was made a full member of the Politburo shortly after
the incident. Finally, the Chinese press has recently
carried several articles contending that Gulabzoi-
with the assistance of Soviet advisers-has methodi-
cally replaced most Parchami district secretaries in
the Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan with Khal-
qis loyal to him. There is no evidence that the Soviets
are planning to dump Najib in the near future, but
Moscow is cultivating Gulabzoi and carefully keeping
open its options.
Outlook
Parchami factionalism is likely to remain problematic
for Najib and could be exacerbated if
Karmal is returned to Kabul
shortly before the six-month anniversary of the peace
initiative. Moscow's failure to remove Ratebzad and
Baryalai from the scene also suggests that the Soviets
may be mulling over the idea of replacing Najib either
with Karmal or some combination of pro-Karmal
Parchamis and the Gulabzoi-led Khalqis. Moreover,
Moscow's recent appeasement of Khalqi demands, the
Soviets' acquiescence in the rise of Gulabzoi's person-
al power, and Gulabzoi's recent trip to the USSR also
may indicate that the Soviets have not ruled out the
possibility of dumping the Parcham faction altogether
and giving the Khalqis another shot at power.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100290004-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100290004-7
Afghanistan: Selected Political Chronology
Cyprus agreed to open relations with the Kabul regime, according to Kabul media
reports. Sarwar Mangal, the Afghan Ambassador to Hungary, was reportedly
designated nonresident Ambassador to Cyprus.
Najib released 13 prominent members of the Khalqi faction jailed since the Soviet
invasion. the former prisoners included
Abdul Hakim Jauzjani, former Minister of Justice and Attorney General; Abdul
Ghorbandi, former Minister of Commerce; and Dr. Adbar Shahwali, former
Politburo member and Deputy Prime Minister.
Pravda reported that Afghan insurgents rocketed a town in the Tajik SSR in early
March, killing one and wounding two. This was the first public Soviet acknowled-
gement of cross-border attacks by Afghan insurgents.
6 April The Kabul regime participated for the first time in a United Arab Emirates trade
fair at the invitation of the Emir of Sharjah.
25 April Foreign Minister Wakil met with Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders while in
Cuba for a session of the Group of 77.
27 April Ninth anniversary ceremonies commemorating the Saur Revolution were inter-
rupted by supporters of former Afghan leader Karmal.
F. N. Tiwari became the first Indian Foreign Minister to visit Kabul since the So-
viet invasion of Afghanistan. Tiwari publicly praised Kabul's national reconcilia-
tion program and dismissed the Afghan threat to Pakistan as "imaginary."
4 May TASS reported erstwhile Afghan leader Babrak Karmal's arrival in Moscow for
"medical treatment."
A series of bombings in Kabul-including one at City Polytechnic University in
which a PDPA official was killed-probably were protests of Karmal's forced
departure from Afghanistan, according to the US Embassy in Kabul.
Yunis Khalis began a six-month term as resistance alliance spokesman. He is the
first to serve a second term in the position, previously occupied for three-month
stints.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100290004-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100290004-7
Top Secret
The International Trade Center (ITC) reportedly told US Embassy officials that it
will permanently close its Kabul office in June. Western donors to the ITC-which
serves as the local executing agency for the UN Conference on Trade and
Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-claimed its
presence helped legitimize the Kabul regime.
Mohammedullah Safi Subhani, Afghan Ambassador to the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen since January 1986 and a Khalq-faction member, was recalled
to Kabul.
International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) officials broke off prison visits in
Kabul following a dispute with the Kabul regime over access to prisoners. Work on
an ICRC orthopedic center in Kabul-earlier tied to prison visits-is reportedly
slowed but continuing.
Afghan Foreign Minister Wakil visited Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and
Moscow to discuss Afghan-East European trade and "cultural ties," according to
the Kabul regime press.
In an interview with the Italian magazine L'Express, Soviet leader Gorbachev
strongly hinted at a role for Zahir Shah in a post-Soviet Afghan government.
Najib announced the extension of the regime's unilateral "cease-fire," due to
expire 4 July.
Prime Minister Keshtmand led an official delegation to Baghdad.
The "June" plenum of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan was convened, following numerous postponements.
Amanullah, the chairman of the Qandahar National Reconciliation Council, was
killed by the resistance.
Mourners at funerals in Kabul for Afghan military officers and soldiers killed in
action in Qandahar and Paktia clashed with police, according to US Embassy
reporting.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100290004-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100290004-7
Top Secret
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/30: CIA-RDP88T00799R000100290004-7