CUBA: A REVOLUTION'S DISCONTENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Directorate of
Intelligence
I MASTH FU F POPY
00 NOT GIVE OUT
OR ttl4Y ON
Cuba:
A Revolution's Discontent
PROJDCT NUMBER i 4 O ' 7~ k' .
I W M&K
N
DISSII"i DATE Q / / (m UU
EXTRA COPIES c 57 a 8 7
PAGE NUMBERS 13
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES 3(o Q
R=FD CER a ~~ " 3 5
JOB NL R
Secret
Secret
ALA 86-10023
May 1986
Copy 2 5 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cuba:
A Revolution's Discontent
A Research Paper
Caribbean Division, ALA
This paper was prepared byl the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Middle America-
Secret
ALA 86-10023
May 1986
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Cuba:
A Revolution's Discontent
Key Judgments We believe Cuba is entering a new era in which the Castro regime will face
Information available increased popular discontent. A new generation of Cubans with high
as of 15 April 1986 expectations is reaching maturity at a time when the country's economic
was used in this report.
difficulties are mounting. Simultaneously, a series of foreign policy
setbacks, most notably Grenada, have raised public doubts about the skill
of the leadership. At minimum, Castro will have to see growing signs of
dissatisfaction as an indication that Cuba is losing its revolutionary fervor,
a troublesome development at-this point in his life and one that may
provide policy opportunities for the United States.
There is considerable evidence, 25X1
of dissatisfaction and disillusionment in Cuba, particularly among 25X1
the generation born since Fidel Castro came to power:
? The Cuban media have reported widespread worker apathy that seriously
hampers productivity.
? The government is publicly concerned about the postrevolution genera-
tion and the problem of secondary students dropping out of school and
turning to crime.
? Reporting from the regime's media, indicates 25X1
that crime has risen dramatically.
? The regime's own statistics show that unemployment has nearly tripled
since 1981.F____-] 25X1
Grumbling within the military, evolving from the debilitating struggle in
Angola and sharply accelerated by the trauma of defeat in Grenada, is
likely to worsen, in our view, as Cuba's Angolan venture drags on and
economic necessity pushes the regime to look for ways to reduce military
expenditures. As it is,
? Officers, most of whom have already served one or two tours in Angola,
are weary of such onerous service and want no further duty there.
? The desertion rate is high, and the regime is concerned that deserters are
being protected by their families and friends.
? A party ideological study released last year indicates that the public has
lost faith in the military establishment, apparently as a result of the
prolonged war in Angola.
Discontent, however, is not likely to result in broad active resistance to the
regime. There is no nucleus of organized opposition around which Cuba's
disillusioned can gather to exert pressure on the leadership to secure policy
Secret
ALA 86-10023
May 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
changes and improve their lot. Moreover, Cubans have a healthy respect
for the internal security forces, and the knowledge that anything resem-
bling "counterrevolutionary activity" receives quick and harsh treatment
tends to discourage initiative.
Thus, while we doubt that the present levels of discontent will result in any
direct resistance to the regime, they will cause Castro problems in
numerous ways. We believe the cumulative effect of collective apathy, for
example, will make it difficult for Havana to attain the political, social,
and economic goals it set out for the 1986-90 period. Reduction in funding
for social programs, housing construction, and school repair could be
particularly severe and in turn risk sparking even more disgruntlement on
the island.
Castro is aware of the dimming of revolutionary zeal. To prepare for the
difficult times ahead, Havana has already begun to take several precau-
tionary measures:
? Greater regimentation of society is well under way.
? The propaganda apparatus is being strengthened to provide more effec-
tive indoctrination.
? The alleged threat of direct US military intervention is being used to
arouse patriotism and a willingness to endure personal sacrifices.
These steps do not address the roots of discontent. Castro's costly efforts to
strengthen his ideological apparatus, in fact, reveal a vulnerability that we
believe is likely to grow with austerity. He clearly feels the attraction that
news and entertainment broadcasts from abroad have had for the Cuban
people, especially in the past few years, and has moved quickly to meet the
challenge. His response, however, appears to be misguided and in our
opinion is likely to prove ineffective. Indeed, we expect Cubans to turn
more to foreign broadcasts as their faith in the Cuban media continues to
erode.
Looking ahead, internal Cuban disillusionment could manifest itself in the
international arena. Increased domestic dissatisfaction may well spur
Castro to seek new "victories" abroad to boost morale and provide
symbolic evidence that increased sacrifices can pay political dividends for
Cuba. For example, even though Castro's Angolan policy is one of the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12: CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
major causes of dissatisfaction, he acknowledged at the Third Party
Congress in February that he had augmented Cuba's military presence in
Angola.
If internal circumstances push Castro into a corner, we believe he might
try to provoke a limited clash with the United States to convince his people
that the external threat is genuine. If he does not produce a credible
external threat to blame for his failures, if shortages and mismanagement
increase, and particularly if casualties abroad mount, discontent could
become more disruptive, forcing the regime to use stronger repressive
actions. Such a turn of events could undermine the credibility of Castro's
revolution even more, both at home and abroad.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Contents
Key Judgments
Scope Note
Economic Problems 1
Pressures at Home 2
Complicating Factors 3
The Cuban Worker 8
Grumbling in the Military 9
Looking Over the Horizon 11
Economic Pressures on the Rise 11
Government Reactions 11
Cuban Vulnerabilities and Implications for the United States 12
1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
Scope Note Cuba is entering a period of heightened economic stress that is likely to last
for more than a decade.
paper focuses on the between economic austerity and popular discon-
tent in Cuba, examines the evidence of dissatisfaction, assesses the regime's
efforts to defuse it, and discusses Havana's likely actions as greater
austerity promotes further disillusionment. This paper also assesses the
implications of these trends for the United States.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
Cuba:
A Revolution's Discontent
In the late 1970s, signs of a breakdown in social
discipline began to appear in Cuba that hinted at
growing popular disenchantment with the govern-
ment. Corruption on a large scale also began to
surface, and there was a dramatic rise in street
crime-much of it attributed to young Cubans. Emi-
gration pressure increased markedly and Cubans be-
gan taking desperate measures to get out of the
country, for example, seizing diplomatic missions in
Havana at gunpoint. Grumbling about military ser-
vice overseas could be heard openly on Havana street-
corners. F__~
All of these phenomena had appeared at various times
during the earlier years of the Castro regime, but
their occurrence did not suggest a fundamental loss of
faith in the revolutionary system. A handful of cor-
rupt officials was ousted in the 1960s, for example, in
what came to be known as the "dolce vita" purges,
but the political impact of the affair was negligible.
The emigration wave during the Varadero-Miami
airlift from 1965 to 1973 consisted not of dissatisfied
revolutionaries but largely of older Cubans and their
families who could not adapt to the radical change
from the Batista era to the age of revolution.
The trend begun in the late 1970s appears much more
broadly based, reaches high up into the leadership
itself, and appears open-ended. The scope of this trend
clearly has Havana worried. Numerous countermea-
sures have been adopted-so far with little effect. It is
against this backdrop that this study examines evi-
dence of dissatisfaction in Cuba, its causes, and its
likely impact on the Castro regime. Special attention
is devoted to the generational problem that has devel-
oped between the group that has ruled Cuba since
1959 and the 50 percent of the population that has
been born since the revolution.
We believe there is a variety of reasons for what
appears to be widespread disillusionment and dissatis-
faction in Cuba today. Most damaging has been
Cuba's economic malaise.' In addition, what seems to
many Cubans an interminable war in Angola has
helped undermine the credibility of the Cuban mili-
tary establishment. A review of
press and diplomatic material, suggests that corrup-
tion, incompetence at high levels, and a stultifying
bureaucracy have sapped confidence in the leadership
and fostered nationwide apathy.
Economic Problems
Cuba's difficult economic plight is the result of a
number of factors, as reported by the US Interests
Section in Havana
World sugar prices have remained so low in recent
years that sugar, by far the country's most important
export for decades, has given way to reexported Soviet
oil as Cuba's prime earner of hard currency. More-
over, Soviet economic assistance has leveled off as
Moscow tries to come to grips with its own internal
problems.' Trade with Western countries has suffered
from Havana's need to refinance its external debt.
Natural disasters (Hurricane Kate in late 1985 was
particularly destructive) have also dealt serious blows
to the economy.
More damaging, in our view, are several subjective
internal factors. President Fidel Castro's longstanding
practice of concentrating the government's efforts on
economic interchange over the 1986-90 period a ar to provide
little or no relief for the Cuban consumer
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
addressing a few key problem areas, the so-called
guerrilla approach, has usually resulted in an imbal-
ance of priorities and a misallocation of resources that
have a detrimental impact on other sectors of the
economy. The futile drives to produce 10 million tons
of sugar in 1970 and to build 100,000 homes per year
by 1975 are cases in point.
In addition, Castro has concentrated virtually all
authority in his own hands, which has helped stifle
individual initiative and foster administrative inflexi-
bility, which diminishes the economic structure's abil-
ity to adjust to rapidly changing conditions. For
ideological reasons, Castro has made a conscious
policy decision, reiterated in public statements, not to
create a "consumer society."
the resulting lack of consumer goods has
undercut worker incentive and, judging from accounts
in the regime's own media, has engendered wide-
spread apathy. He also has a penchant for investing in
costly showcase projects that fill propaganda needs or
satisfy foreign policy goals but, at best, are of ques-
tionable economic merit. His refusal to accept con-
structive criticism
has intimidated his advis-
ers; few, if any, economists in Cuba are willing to risk
challenging his views once he has decided on a
particular course of action. C
Pressures at Home
In our judgment, these factors have led to the develop-
ment of a governmental apparatus that is viewed by
the average Cuban as a system that provides no
worthwhile incentive for extra effort and, according to
refugee reports and the US Interests Section, cannot
even provide work for those who are graduating from
its high schools and universities. According to the US
Interests Section, consumer goods are in very short
supply except for the regime's elite. Moreover, food
and clothing are wanting in quality, quantity, and
variety. Many items are still rationed after 27 years of
revolutionary rule. Although the ration system was
designed to provide a more equitable distribution of
basic items, the process of acquiring rationed goods is
so time consuming that some Cubans, usually pen-
sioners, supplement their income by standing in ration
lines for a fee, according to the US Interests Section.
The housing shortage is especially acute and the
According to the US Interests Section in Havana, the
Castro regime stated in 1960 that the deficit of
adequate housing was approximately 655,000 units.
Data taken from official Cuban statistics show that
from 1959 through 1982, about 330,000 new housing
units were built. This is well below what would have
been necessary to keep pace with population growth
and with the number of houses that become uninhab-
itable each year. Despite housing units "given" to the
state by departing emigrants, the shortage of ade-
quate housing by 1985 was probably well over 1.2
million units. This is twice the 1959 deficit and is
certain to grow with each succeeding year.
regime's half hearted remedial measures suggest a
lack of will to undertake the dramatic changes re-
quired to address the problem realistically. I
Other factors exacerbate the situation. Cuban radio
and television, as well as other forms of entertain-
ment, conform to rigid ideological guidelines and, as a
result, have little popular appeal
United States' Radio Marti, Havana has taken impor-
tant steps to overhaul the media and make its enter-
tainment industry turn out a more appealing product,
but much remains to be done before it can compete
successfully with the foreign media. Young people
especially chafe at the lack of adequate opportunities
for amusement; juvenile delinquency and even gang
warfare have become a police problem. F__1
Opportunities for advancement, even through the
party, are diminishing. For example, many Cubans
have sought to enhance their chances for party mem-
bership or advancement in government by volunteer-
ing for duty in one of the many Cuban military or
civilian contingents serving in more than a dozen
Third World countries. These recruitments were en-
couraged by promises from the regime that the volun-
teers' civilian jobs would be held open until they
25X1
25X1
25X1
75X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 I-1 H
1 11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
The sharp rise in crime and Juvenile delinquency since the late
1970s has resulted in the formation of several unique police units,
according to open sources. The one pictured above is
the Special Battalion of the National Revolutionary Police. It was
organized in December 1982 to handle large crowds that form on
returned and that soldiers would receive special con-
sideration for enrollment in the universities at the end
of their overseas tours. Although service abroad-
judging from the sharp growth in the size of the party
and its youth arm since 1975-did pave the way for
party and Young Communist League membership for
many returnees, the regime reneged on many of its
other promises. Cubans coming home with high ex-
pectations found little reward for their years of hard-
ship, according to Cubans whose disenchantment led
them to defect. In our view, so many Cubans have
served overseas (over 200,000 in Angola alone, ac-
cording to a public statement by Fidel Castro himself)
that the pledge of special privileges could not possibly
be honored. F__1
special occasions such as festivals and sporting events. In addition,
new equipment was imported and personnel were brought in from
eastern Cuba to beef up police in Havana where street crime had
soared.n
Complicating Factors
The coincidence of certain events has compounded
Havana's dilemma. For example,
2FYI
25X1
2.5X1
e 25X1
Cuban leadership was stunned at the level of popular
disillusionment revealed in April 1980 when over
10,000 Cubans sought asylum in the Peruvian Embas-
sy compound in the 72 hours following the removal of
Cuban guards from the Embassy's gates. This inci-
dent quickly grew into the Mariel refugee boatlift in
which over 125,000 Cubans fled before Castro halted
the exodus five months later. While the Mariel exodus
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
was under way, events surrounding the development
of the organization Solidarity in Poland attracted
considerable attention at all levels in Cuba, from the
man in the street to the party and government elite,
according to reporting from the US Interests Section.
Having experienced the shock of Mariel and fearful
that the Solidarity experiment might spark a similar
movement in Cuba, President Castro made a major
effort to bring new faces into the leadership during
the Second Party Congress, held in December 1980.
The 100-member Central Committee, which had un-
dergone little change since its formation 15 years
earlier, was expanded to 144 full members and 77
alternates, and the heads of the mass organizations
were all appointed to the Politburo as alternates,
leading Castro to boast, presumably with Poland in
mind, that there was no gap between the leadership
and the people in Cuba. Less than a year after his
boast, however, Castro admitted to a visiting US
official that 500,000 Cubans, some 5 percent of the
entire population, would emigrate if given the oppor-
tunity
Castro's fears began to materialize in 1982 when a
group of workers in the Havana area, emboldened by
Solidarity's example, attempted to form their own
union independent of the government's mass organi-
zation for labor, the Central Organization of Cuban
Workers (CTC). According to diplomatic and press
reports, the effort was savagely quashed; its five
leaders were initially sentenced to death, according to
press reports, but their sentences were later reduced to
30 years in prison. The crushing of the Solidarity-
inspired union leaked out to the Western media,
however, and apparently prompted the regime to back
off somewhat. For example, when small groups of
workers within the CTC structure carried out several
scattered wildcat strikes,
they succeeded in having authorities
tend to their grievances apparently without retalia-
tion. Havana presumably decided it was better to
accommodate a few recalcitrants at the local level
than to risk more adverse publicity.
The Defeat in Grenada. In ordering Cubans to fight to
the death against the invading US forces in Grenada
in October 1983, Castro alarmed much of the Cuban
population,
He also offended the professional military officers
who saw resistance in the one-sided conflict as suicid-
al, The trial,
conviction, and punishment-most were sent off to
Angola as common foot soldiers to redeem themselves
under fire-of virtually all of the 40 to 50 Cuban
military professionals who were in Grenada during
the invasion probably further eroded military morale.
By mid-1984 the leadership's serious view of its
ideological and morale problems was reflected in a
call by the Central Committee plenum in July for a
study "on the party's ideological work." The study,
which was approved at the next plenum in December
but not released to the Cuban press until February
1985, showed that a massive gap had developed
between the population and the military establish-
ment. According to the study, many Cubans viewed
the military as a dumping ground for deviates or an
institution for punishing those guilty of antisocial or
criminal activity. Desertions from the military were at
an unacceptable rate and, according to the study,
deserters, rather than being denounced, were being
warmly received and shielded by family and friends.
Much of the popular distress over military service
almost certainly had been building up since Cuba's
massive intervention in Angola in 1975, but the
Grenada affair, in addition to raising doubts about the
political leadership as well as the armed forces,
seemed to serve as a catalyst that caused this negative
public attitude to gel.F_~
Treatment of Cuban Elite. Leadership perquisites
such as expensive cars, multiple estates with swim-
ming pools, access to Western consumer goods, and
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
Suicides in Cuba, 1970-84
I I I I 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1
unique medical facilities, also stir discontent. While
some Cubans accept this as the expected attributes of
high office, many resent the double standard in what
is purported to be a classless society. A major com-
plaint of Cuban youth,
is the fact that government
officials and high military officers live in an affluent
manner not in keeping with either Communism's
ostensible egalitarianism or their own public profes-
sions of devotion to the simple life.
Judging from the evidence amassed since the late
1970s, discontent in Cuban society has been increas-
ing and, in the eyes of many Cubans, the revolution
has lost much of its luster. Information on the exis-
tence of discontent in Cuba comes through a host of
channels. US officials and foreign visitors have seen
antiregime graffiti and talked to Cubans who ac-
knowledge dissatisfaction and disillusionment among
family and friends. Defectors from all walks of life
have reported personal observations of disgruntle-
ment. Western diplomats have witnessed incidents of
popular dissent and heard of many others. Reporting
de- 25X1
scribes incidents growing out of dissent and measures
taken by the government to suppress them.F__1
In addition, the Cuban media and official statistics
point to a serious erosion of revolutionary zeal. For
example, it was the party newspaper last year that
revealed the study detailing the public's shocking loss
of confidence in the armed forces. The government's
own statistics show that suicides doubled between
1970 and 1980. The labor organization's newspaper
published studies in 1984 and 1985 analyzing perva-
sive worker apathy, and the party's theoretical journal
provided evidence' of the regime's concern over the
public's flagging patriotism and waning support for
the policy of "internationalism," that is, service
abroad. The serious high school dropout problem was
amply covered in 1984 in the party newspaper, and
the Interior Ministry's journal, Moncada, has ac-
knowledged over the past several years that the black 25X1
market is a major industry, street crime has risen
alarmingly, and delinquency and lawbreaking by
young Cubans have become so prevalent that a special
police unit had to be set up to combat their antisocial
activities.
the most disaffected element
25X1
of Cuban society is youth, despite having received the 25X1
lion's share of the benefits (primarily better education
and health care) that the revolution has provided. As
members of the baby boom of the 1960s leave the 25X1
high schools and universities, they are finding few job
opportunities, the nationwide crisis in housing, and
the very real likelihood of being drawn into the
military for duty overseas, according to the US
The journal, for example, described a national conference held in
Havana in May 1985 that devoted the attention of all of its six
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12: CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 wrong with me. " In many instances, individuals who
were 18 or 19 years old had still not acquired a
concept offuture and could only view themselves and
society in day-to-day terms. The Castro regime re-
fused, to come to grips
with the true cause of these problems of adolescents,
preferring to believe that the revolution has been so
successful in eliminating social problems that the
youth had nothing left to fight against, and that it
was enough to try to redirect their natural aggressive
instincts into sports and other activities.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Today's Youth in Cuba
Despite the fact that Cuba's postrevolution genera-
tion has received most of the benefits resulting from
Batista's ouster, it appears to be the most disillu-
sioned element of Cuban society. The formal indoc-
trination that begins in day-care centers and contin-
ues through grade school and high school seems to
have failed to prepare Cuban youth adequately for
coping with the daily problems of a socialist society.
perhaps Cuba's most serious problem is, in-
deed, the apathy and antisocial behavior of adoles-
cents, caused largely by their opposition to the re-
strictions and limitations imposed on them by the
political and social system.
the political and
social system in Cuba is unnatural: adolescents nor-
mally need to set goals for their lives. The lack of
this autonomy in Cuba has led to deformed personal-
ities. The most common manifestations are apathy
and preoccupation with alcohol and sex. These atti-
tudes were prevalent among 70 to 80 percent of those
in the 14-to-19-year-old age group. Common symp-
toms were extremely aggressive behavior, acute frus-
tration, anxiety, and a feeling that "something is
youths entering the job market have
little chance of finding work unless they have strong
personal connections in important places.
Even university graduates,
comp am t a work
in their fields of expertise frequently is not available
and that to subsist they must accept either menial jobs
or jobs where they cannot maintain their skills.
Although doctors graduating from medical school
have no problem finding work, they are routinely sent
to rural areas for a mandatory period of at least five
years, according to the US Interests Section, and can
return to the city only if an opening is available.
Moreover, basic technicians
the greatest dilem-
ma for the psychologist working in the Cuban envi-
ronment was how to deal with behavioral problems
that were the direct result of the social system itself.
A patient, for example, might complain that his
problem was attributable to the number of times he
had to attend meetings because of the demands of the
party or mass organizations. The psychologist might
agree but had no alternative other than to try to
convince the patient that some other, less obvious
factor was to blame. If a patient insisted on blaming
the system and the government, the psychologist
would have no option but to report the patient to the
authorities.
can earn more than college graduates, making many
young people believe that a university education is not
worth the effort.
Young people out of school also have extreme difficul-
ty finding housing. According to official Cuban esti-
mates, the shortage is not likely to be alleviated until
the end of the century. In the meantime, it is com-
monplace for two or three generations to live under
one roof in extremely crowded conditions. The US
Interests Section in May 1984 reported that probably
one of the greatest needs in Cuba as a whole is to find
housing for youths entering the work force.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
the Cuban hierarchy is well aware of the
demographic explosion of the 1960s and its implica-
tions for employment in the 1980s and beyond. While
the government invested heavily in education during
the late 1960s and 1970s to train this new generation,
cyclical world sugar prices prevented the concomitant
investment in the expansion of Cuba's industrial base
to create the necessary jobs.
the economy in general and
its nonagriculture industrial base in particular are not
growing rapidly enough to absorb the new entrants
into the labor force. Rising expectations of the youn-
ger generation have resulted in their refusal to work in
traditional, labor-intensive agriculture. At the same
time, growing government pressure on all ministries to
increase worker productivity has made managers re-
luctant to retire experienced workers and replace
them with inexperienced younger workers. Indeed, the
government itself recently argued against retirement,
publicly admitting it could not provide the annuities if
all those now eligible to retire suddenly did so.
The Castro regime has for several years been aware of
the existence of potentially serious problems of social
unrest and dissatisfaction among Cubans in the 15-to-
30-year-old age group,
the population appeared
to be increasingly divided in its attitude toward the
revolution, with the breakdown based largely on age:
those over 30 had accepted the permanence of the
revolution while those in the 15 to 30 age group
exhibited frustration and apparent dissatisfaction
with the political and social system in Cuba. The
unrest and apparent dissatisfaction were especially
prevalent among those eligible for mandatory military
service or other compulsory duties
band young men were increasingly questioning
why their peers who were the sons of the government
and party elite were not drafted into the service. In
addition,
and discontented
Cubans who, without opportunities to put their new
acquired skills to use, could quickly become restless
one of the reasons Cuba was trying to
expand its international construction projects was t
provide employment for large numbers of young
involved in crime in 1983 were dropouts.
Disenchanted by the poor employment outlook, many
young Cubans who have dropped out of school, ac-
cording to Cuban authorities, turn to crime. The party
newspaper, reporting on a study done in early 1984 by
the National Assembly's Youth Commission, admit-
ted that dropouts had become "a problem of great
social and political connotations." The Interior Minis-
try's journal reported that 30 percent of all minors
25X1
25X1
9 X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Incidents of aggressive behavior by young people have
come to light much more frequently in recent years.
For example, when a foreign rock group held a
concert at the town of Bejucal south of Havana in 25X1
June 1983, youths flocked there in such numbers that 25X1
the police decided to intervene to prevent the situation 25X1
from becoming a "negative" political event 25X1
The police intervention 25X1
was counterproductive, however, precipitating a pro-
test demonstration in which the youths attacked the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 ._... a.. ...._._.. .1"1 . ~~.. .. .~~. w. ....
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
Percentage of 16-Year-Old Dropouts,
by Province, Location, and Sex, in 1981-82
Province
Both Male and Female
Total
Male
Female
Pinar del Rio
31.1
28.8
33.4
22.5
21.2
23.9
38.8
35.8
42.3
Havana
32.7
30.8
34.7
28.6
27.6
29.6
44.3
39.6
49.3
Havana City
17.7
18.0
17.4
17.7
18.0
17.4
Matanzas
26.8
25.3
28.3
22.1
21.7
22.6
41.1
36.0
46.5
Villa Clara
26.8
24.9
28.8
20.6
19.5
21.7
39.8
35.9
44.1
Cienfuegos
31.1
28.3
34.1
25.0
23.0
27.2
46.0
41.3
50.9
29.6
24.8
34.8
24.8
21.2
28.6
39.0
31.8
47.0
Camaguey
25.6
22.0
29.3
20.1
18.1
22.2
39.3
31.7
47.4
Las Tunas
42.6
35.1
50.5
30.5
23.5
37.6
54.0
45.6
63.1
Holguin
38.3
32.1
44.7
26.7
22.5
30.9
49.8
41.3
59.0
Granma
31.7
26.4
37.2
22.3
17.9
26.8
41.1
34.7
47.8
Santiago de Cuba
19.3
17.9
20.7
12.7
12.3
13.1
29.7
26.4
33.2
Guantanamo
29.4
26.5
32.4
19.1
17.6
20.6
40.2
35.4
45.6
Isla de la Juventud a
33.2
30.6
35.8
29.2
27.7
30.8
51.6
44.9
57.7
National total
27.6
24.9
30.4
20.9
19.5
22.4
41.7
36.0
47.8
Source: Resumen del TrabaJo Anual del MINED Ano Escolar
1983-84, Havana, p 248.
police, shouted slogans against the government, and
destroyed the window fronts of nearby commercial
establishments.
The Cuban Worker
Worker apathy is one of the regime's most serious
problems and, on the basis of media coverage 0
25X1
25X1
In mid-1984, Bohemia, Cuba's national news maga-
zine, carried an article that indicated young people in
Havana were staying away from social centers where
dances were held because "antisocial elements" fre-
quented them and started trouble. In late 1984 Mon-
cada, the Interior Ministry's monthly journal, de-
scribed a surge in incidents of drunk and disorderly
young people and criminal conduct at beaches near
Havana. Moncada also indicated that a special police
force, the Vigilance and Protection Corps, had been
formed to patrol and reduce crime at beaches, hotels,
and other areas frequented by tourists.
appears to be growing. Since the late
1960s, it has been a major factor contributing to low
worker productivity and thus far has defied the
regime's efforts to find solutions. Many Cuban emi-
gres have pointed out that in most jobs workers are
paid the same no matter how hard they work or how
much they produce, and thus there is little incentive to
put forth one's best effort. Moreover, the persistent
shortages of consumer goods mean that workers fre-
quently have little to purchase with their salaries, and
the government has at times had to develop special
mechanisms (such as making some goods available at
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
exorbitant prices) to reduce the excess liquidity. Cas-
tro's continuing public refusal to move toward a
consumer society seems to assure the continuation of
the current productivity dilemma
The Cuban media provide some of the most convinc-
ing evidence of problems in the labor force. An article
in the national labor organization's Trabajadores in
March 1984, for example, identified the constant
movement of workers from one factory or enterprise
to another as a serious problem that stemmed directly
from worker dissatisfaction. The article also criticized
managers whose "sole solution was to call for higher
salaries." The author attributed much of the dissatis-
faction to other problems, such as a paucity of
advancement opportunities, promotions based on fa-
voritism, poor supervision on the job, generally unfair
treatment and managerial indifference, in addition to
poor working conditions.
The problem of work force movement was raised
again in September 1984 at a meeting to discuss
young workers in the sugar industry. In addressing
the closing session, a top labor official blamed "the
high rate of departures and work instability among
that work force" for low wages, poor housing condi-
tions, poor transportation, and a lack of opportunities
for sports, culture, and recreation, according to Cu-
ban media reports
More recent evidence of apathy in the work force
surfaced in Trabajadores in late March 1985. An
article describing inspections of 53 factories and work
centers in Havana City Province in mid-January cited
statistics indicating that nearly 4 percent of the
workers did not show up on time and an average of
over one-fifth never showed up at all. In addition, 4
percent were alleged by their supervisors to be work-
ing at some location outside the work center and their
attendance could not be confirmed by the inspectors.
Of the 70 percent or so whose attendance could be
confirmed, nearly a fourth were involved in non-job-
related activities such as "reading magazines, books,
and newspapers; discussing non-work-related prob-
lems; eating at unscheduled times; goofing off; or
sleeping at their desks." The article condemned the
"obvious deterioration in labor discipline brought on
by a lack of supervision, the absence of production
quotas, and failure to apply existing wage legislation
and regulations." To drive home that these conditions
in Havana City Province could be generalized, the
author of the article pointed out that the statistics 25X1
were chosen because they were representative of the
inspections carried out in over 300 work centers
"throughout the country, at both the national and
local levels, particularly in the administrative sector."
Subsequent inspections in May and September 1985
indicated that little had changed, according to Traba-
jadores, and in some categories worker performance
had actually deteriorated. In 12 factories and work
centers in Havana City Province, for example, more
than a third of the workers were absent or not at their
usual place, while in seven work sites in Havana
Province the figure was almost 43 percent. In Octo-
ber, Trabajadores reported that 228 inspections had 25X1
been carried out in these two provinces in the first half
of 1985 and had resulted in the punishment of 98
officers and managers under a decree that provides
for penalties ranging from reprimands to dismissal.
This situation will make it difficult for the regime as
it tries to implement major shifts in economic policy
that will necessitate belt-tightening measures.
Grumbling in the Military
Although the initial success of Cuba's interventions in
Angola and Ethiopia almost certainly caused a surge
in the morale of Cuban armed forces, attitudes appar-
ently began to change as the Angolan insurgency
dragged on. By the end of the 1970s, when reservists
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 . ..._... Il V... ! ..11 . L.. I _- ...1 .. .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
were being called up for a second-and in some
military specialties a third-tour overseas, the glam-
our of war had begun to wear thin. Some young
Cubans fled the country rather than return to Africa,
according to defector reports, while others who had
yet to serve deliberately dropped out of school just
short of graduation to reduce their chances of being
called up.F__1
This reluctance to serve in Angola is apparently
shared widely.
officers see no end to Cuban involvement in Africa
and realize that as professional officers they most
likely will have to serve repeat tours there, a prospect
they do not welcome, particularly in view of what they
believed to be the deteriorating security situation for
Cuban troops in Angola. Such qualms in the officer
corps presumably were greatly exacerbated two
months later when Fidel Castro, during the visit to
Cuba of UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar,
pledged to send "another 200,000" Cubans to Angola
25X1
25X1
grumbling among reservists called up for a
second tour in Angola began to be heard on the streets
The US Interests Section in September 1983 reported
rapidly growing discontent among Cubans at home
over losses in Angola, and that some people had even
mistreated Angolan students in Cuba. Regime leaders
clearly were aware of the problem; the Interests
Section learned from an African diplomat in Havana
that, in his conversations with officials at various
levels, the Cubans had expressed concern about the
growing level of discontent over Cuba's involvement
in Angola.
The experiences in Africa apparently have only
strengthened growing reservations in the Cuban mili-
tary about the regime's Angolan commitment.
if the situation there required it.
In April 1985 the regime promised to carry out a
broad range of actions that seemed designed to ad-
dress the disquiet in military ranks: a military housing
construction plan would be fulfilled; the remodeling of
camps, barracks, messhalls, and facilities for the
troops' rest and recreation would be finished; enter-
tainment for military personnel would be improved, as
would the organization of various recreational activi-
ties for troops on weekends. In our judgment, these
palliative measures will not halt the grumbling in the
ranks nor will they bridge the gap that has developed
between the military and the masses.F___-]
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
After a period of economic austerity in 1982 and
1983, Havana apparently gambled in late 1983 that a
burst of spending on imports and construction would
stimulate economic growth. The leadership probably
hoped that pumping up the economy would increase
employment and eventually improve living standards,
and that this might soothe growing popular discon-
tent. By mid-1984, however, it was apparent that
unfavorable world markets for Cuban commodities
and domestic economic bottlenecks were foiling the
recovery effort. At best, the experiment was produc-
ing moderate short-term economic growth, but at
the cost of rapid expansion of the hard currency
deficit and sharp criticism from Western and Soviet
creditors.
Economic Pressures on the Rise
Since then, Cuba's economic policy has been re-
vamped considerably. As a result of strong Soviet
pressure to get his economic house in order, Castro
has unleashed an "economic war" that places great
stress on energy conservation, import substitution, the
reallocation of budget priorities from social welfare to
the productive sector, and the fulfillment of export
quotas to the USSR and other CEMA countries. This
policy line was instituted in December 1984 and was
strongly reinforced at the Third Party Congress this
February-in both Castro's Main Report and the
party program for 1986-90.F_~
Despite these moves, the short-term economic outlook
is poor. The market for Cuba's primary hard currency
earners (reexported Soviet oil, sugar, and nickel) are
weak and the sugar industry is still reeling from the
effects of last year's drought and Hurricane Kate.
The apparent leveling off of Soviet oil deliveries and
economic aid will be especially harmful as Havana
depends on both to meet its basic investment and
consumption needs. Moreover, the lower priority ac-
corded to social welfare and consumer goods will only
add to labor discontent that is likely to result in
decreased productivity. The unemployment rate will
probably rise as government enterprises try to reduce
their labor costs to improve profits, and as hard
currency shortages make it increasingly difficult to
purchase Western imports needed for production.
Government Reactions
Tangible evidence of the regime's concern over popu-
lar attitudes can be seen in the actions the government
is taking to combat popular dissatisfaction. Judging
from reports in the Cuban media, there has been a
trend over the past year toward greater use of materi-
al incentives, such as salary bonuses, to boost produc-
tivity. Some experimenting with material incentives
occurred in the early 1980s only to run afoul of the
regime's powerful ideological watchdogs. Since then,
however, the hardliners' political fortunes have taken
a downturn with the removal of two of the most
influential proponents of ideological rigidity from the
Politburo.)
Even the Armed Forces Ministry has resorted to
material incentives by allowing soldiers overseas to
purchase some consumer goods not normally available
to the Cuban public.
Moreover, according to
the Cuban military journal Verde Olivo, in September
1985 the Armed Forces Ministry was handing out
cars, motorcycles, and promotions to retiring military
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
In January 1986 the official who heads Cuba's con-
sumer polling apparatus acknowledged to an Interests
Section officer that there was discontent over consum-
er goods being exported to meet Cuba's external
commitments and added that dissatisfaction with the
quality and variety of Cuban-produced items had
resulted in large inventories of unsaleable consumer
goods. Even Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
has admitted there is some retrogression in the revolu-
tion; in discussing Cuba's internal problems with a
Western delegation in January 1986, he acknowl-
edged that "Communism has become a more distant
goal."
Castro's decision to declare "economic war," although
primarily a reaction to Soviet pressure, is itself formal
recognition that internal problems can no longer be
ignored and that the public's complaints about trans-
portation, housing, and consumer goods shortages are
indeed valid. Other indications of the regime's aware-
ness of widespread popular dissatisfaction include:
? The extensive efforts it is making to improve the
effectiveness of its indoctrination apparatus, espe-
cially the media, which suggests it believes the
Cuban population has become more vulnerable to
external sources of information and entertainment
such as the United States' Radio Marti.
? The approval at the Third Party Congress of the
1986-90 party program in draft form only, which is
a tacit admission that the program contains unpopu-
lar measures that must be carefully explained to the
masses rather than thrust upon them as an accom-
plished fact.__~
Cuban Vulnerabilities and Implications
for the United States
No matter how widespread dissatisfaction may be in
Cuba today, there is no sign that malcontents are
organized. Neither is there any institutional structure
through which they can legitimately exert collective
pressure on the regime to seek redress of their griev-
ances. Any effort to organize, such as the ill-fated
attempt to create an independent union in 1982
showed, is immediately suppressed. F__1
Nevertheless, the existence of widespread dissatisfac-
tion in Cuba-and the likelihood that increased aus-
terity will heighten that discontent-leaves Castro
vulnerable to external events that could have an
impact on popular sensitivities. An increase in Cuban
casualties in Angola, especially if the losses received
wide and persistent international press coverage, al-
most certainly would exacerbate popular disillusion-
ment over the regime's involvement in Angola. We
believe increased casualties would also sharpen the
military's perception that Soviet interests often come
first when Cuban foreign policy is being shaped, and
this could help to undermine the officer corps' faith in
the regime's present leadership.
As the impact in Cuba of the Solidarity experience in
Poland showed, Castro is also vulnerable to news from
abroad that provides ideas, tells how people in other
countries are handling similar problems, and suggests
to the Cuban people that there are solutions to their
dilemmas. While some older Cubans clearly have
become resigned to their plight, others, particularly
the young, seem anxious to promote change even at
the risk of confrontation with the regime. Shaken by
the extent of ideological weakness that was exposed as
a result of the Grenada intervention in 1983, Castro
has been making major investments in the mass media
in an effort to restore Cuba's badly eroded credibility.
Unless economic conditions improve, however, we
believe Cubans will increasingly turn to non-Cuban
media to find out what is happening in the world.
Another vulnerability stems from the public percep-
tion of the impact of Cuba's cold relationship with the
United States. Any hints of a warming trend between
Havana and Washington would invariably raise popu-
lar expectations in Cuba that trade will be restored
and, with it, the possibility of an improvement in the
standard of living. By preventing such a trend, Castro
appears to be serving as a stumblingblock to a more
comfortable life for the masses. Moreover, the public
conviction that Washington stood ready to reduce
tensions in some quid pro quo arrangement could, in
our estimation, undercut Castro's alarmist rationale
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
for preparing for a "war of all the people," remove the
justification for the further regimentation of Cuban
society, and leave Castro with no diversionary excuse
for his own economic mismanagement.
If increased austerity causes problems to mount, as we
fully expect, Castro in time may see merit in promot-
ing some artificial crisis with Washington, to deflect
popular frustrations from himself and toward the
United States. Castro proved adept at such activities
in the 1960s and is not above provoking an incident to
waken Cuban patriotism and give substance to his
claims of an imminent US intervention. We believe he
would have in mind a limited crisis, but the chance for
miscalculation would probably be great. We doubt he
would have any intention of sparking a serious con-
frontation unless he believed his domestic problems
signaled a complete unraveling of the revolution.
Short of a manufactured crisis with Washington, he
has few options to quell dissent other than outright
repression. In that event, the regime's internal securi-
ty forces are capable, in our estimation, of handling
any internal threat from the population that does not
have significant support from the military establish-
ment.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP88T00768R000200220001-0