PLO LEADERSHIP AFTER ARAFAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000100060003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
I hil, A' Oa T E R F k ILI C
1 00 NOT DIVE 0
OR MARK ON
PLO Leadership After Arafat
NESA 86-10006
Februan' 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Uj; Intelligence
PLO Leadership After Arafat
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with contributions from Office of
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Central Reference, and
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Office of Global Issues. It was
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 86-10006
February 1986
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PLO Leadership After Arafat
Key Judgments PLO Chairman Arafat's dialogue with King Hussein of Jordan on peace in
Information available the Middle East makes Arafat a prime target for a coup or assassination.
as of 2 January 1986 His demise would throw the PLO into disarray because it has no
was used in this report.
established procedure for succession and Arafat has not designated a
second in command.
In the event of Arafat's demise, leaders from the eight PLO factions
probably would try to assert their authority over the PLO and vie for
support from Arab governments. Syria would exploit the rivalries within
the various groups to increase its influence over the organization and foster
a leadership more sympathetic to its interests.
Arafat's successor most likely would come from Fatah, the largest of the
PLO component groups-in particular from within the small cadre of
Fatah leaders active since the early 1960s. Arafat and his Fatah colleagues
have not groomed a younger generation of Palestinians to assume leader-
ship positions.
The two main Fatah contenders for the PLO chairmanship, in our view,
would be Khalil Wazir, Arafat's military commander, and Salah Khalaf, a
senior security official. Both are founding members of Fatah and have
close ties to Arafat, although they differ with Arafat and between
themselves on relations with Syria and strategy toward resolving the
Palestinian problem.
Khalaf-unlike Wazir-has maintained contacts with Syria despite the
estrangement between Arafat and President Assad and, in our view, would
have a good chance to reunite Fatah with the Syrian-backed Palestinian
groups and thereby bridge the gap between the PLO and Syria.
The most likely candidates from radical Palestinian ranks would be George
Habbash, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and
Nayif Hawatmah, head of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine.
abbash and Hawatmah, as leaders of the second- and third-
largest PLO factions and with ties to both Syria and the Soviet Union,
would be in a strong position to work for reunification of the PLO if they
combined forces, as they did in 1984 in the Democratic Alliance.
Secret
NESA 86-10006
February 1986
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We cannot rule out the possibility that radicals from the Syrian-backed
Palestine National Salvation Front might successfully challenge Fatah for
the PLO chairmanship. Six of the eight PLO groups are currently aligned
with Syria and would have strong support from Damascus for assuming
control of the organization.
No matter what the succession outcome, the PLO leadership after Arafat
almost certainly will be even more inflexible than the current PLO
chairman on how the Palestinian problem should be solved. Most PLO
factions already advocate a return to armed struggle and would be likely to
take advantage of the post-Arafat disarray within the organization to step
up terrorist operations against Israel. These groups will be strengthened in
their actions by their close ties to Syria.
Efforts to move the PLO toward peace negotiations with Israel after
Arafat's demise thus will become even more difficult. Arafat's successor
would be preoccupied with consolidating his position-not a quick or easy
task. In our view, Arafat's most likely successors believe his diplomatic
strategy already has failed and would prove no more successful if
attempted again.
Barring an unlikely reversal of the 1974 Rabat Arab summit decision-
recognizing the PLO as the Palestinians' "sole legitimate representative"-
the PLO will retain a veto over moves toward peace negotiations. The PLO
retains the support of most Palestinians because it has kept the Palestinian
national spirit alive and therefore is unlikely to be threatened by West
Bank leaders seeking to enter peace negotiations without PLO backing.
Moreover, the terrorist capabilities of the PLO's component groups and
their ability to cause regional and internal troubles for Arab regimes will
ensure its survival as a major factor in the Middle East.
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Key Judgments
Candidates From Palestinian Radical Groups
4
Implications for the United States
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Argfat's Tribulations, August 1982-November 1985
August 1982 Arafat forced to leave Beirut with
his troops; refuge taken in nine
Arab countries.
April 1983 Arafat's most loyal deputies
within moderate Fatah faction re-
pudiate tentative agreement with
King Hussein to enter peace
negotiations.
A significant portion of Fatah in September 1985
revolt against Arafat's
leadership.
Fall 1983 Arafat battles against dissident
Palestinian forces aided by the
Syrian military in Tripoli, Leba-
non, and is finally forced to evac- October 1985
uate in December.
December 1983 Arafat faces new condemnation
from Palestinian leaders, includ-
ing many Fatah loyalists, for
meeting with President Mubarak
in Cairo after departure from
Tripoli.
Spring 1984 Fatah fails to reconcile with the
Popular and Democratic Fronts
for the Liberation of Palestine,
pushing the two fronts closer to
Syria.
November 1984 Arafat convenes Palestine Na-
tional Council in Amman, over
Syrian and radical Palestinian
objections. At Council meetings,
he replaces pro-Syrian officials
with loyalists.
Arafat signs PLO-Jordanian
framework accord calling for
joint action for entering peace
negotiations.
Arafat proposes seven Palestinian
candidates-most of whom are
clearly tied to the PLO-for US-
Jordanian-Palestinian meeting.
Assassination of three Israeli
yachtsmen in Larnaca, Cyprus,
by Fatah Force 17, Arafat's per-
sonal security guard. For the first
time in over 10 years, Arafat
loyalists were clearly linked to
terrorist operations outside Israel
and the Occupied Territories.
Israeli raid on PLO headquarters
in Tunis.
Hijacking of Achille Lauro, an
Italian cruise ship, by members of
the Palestine Liberation Front.
Cancellation of joint PLO-Jorda-
nian delegation meeting with
British officials because PLO rep-
resentatives refuse to endorse
statement explicitly accepting UN
Security Council Resolution 242
and renouncing terrorism.
Arafat issues Cairo declaration
renouncing PLO involvement in
terrorist operations outside Israel
and the Occupied Territories.
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PLO Leadership After Arafat
Arafat's leadership of the PLO has been severely
tested since Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The
PLO's expulsion from Lebanon eliminated the organi-
zation's most important base of operations against
Israel and weakened Arafat's control by dispersing
PLO fighters throughout the Middle East.
The Lebanese disaster also sparked new opposition to
Arafat's freewheeling leadership style and his willing-
ness to toy with a political as well as military/ terrorist
approach to solving the Palestinian problem. Arafat
has long faced opposition from PLO radicals to his
diplomatic maneuvering, but he had not previously
been confronted with a direct challenge from within
Fatah. The Fatah rebellion in 1983 split the organiza-
tion into pro- and anti-Arafat camps.
Arafat nevertheless continues to demonstrate a re-
markable ability to survive setbacks and to play both
ends against the middle. He convened the Palestine
National Council in Amman in November 1984,
despite vociferous Syrian and radical Palestinian op-
position. On 11 February 1985 he signed an agree-
ment with King Hussein calling for joint action in
seeking peace negotiations with Israel and has since
continued his dialogue with the King despite the
objections of close Fatah aides. Arafat also has tried
to recoup the PLO's loss of international prestige and
salvage moderate Arab backing after the Achille
Lauro hijacking by publicly reaffirming the PLO's
renunciation of terrorism outside Israel and the Occu-
pied Territories. Arafat, however, carefully worded
his "Cairo declaration" to allow the various PLO
groups to interpret it as they see fit. In this way he
hoped to appease those favoring increased terrorist
operations against Israel and the United States in
retaliation for the raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis
and the interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers.
Arafat I (could head the
PLO for an indefinite period- if it were not for growing
opposition to his leadership style and decisions. He is
likely to be confronted with more serious challenges if
he continues his dialogue with King Hussein and at
some point tries to win PLO support for concessions
on controversial issues, such as acceptance of UN
Security Council Resolution 242. In our view, Arafat
would then be a prime target for a coup or assassina-
tion by Palestinian radicals, who continue to advocate
using armed struggle to establishing a democratic,
secular state encompassing all of present-day Israel.
The radicals are determined to stop Arafat's political/
diplomatic tack, regardless of whether he is serious or
not, and will use violence to do so.
pro-Syrian Palestinian operatives
have attacked Arafat loyalists over the last two years.
The Abu Nidal group, for example, assassinated two
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moreover, acknowledge that Arafat-who himself is
certainly no "moderate"-has become the symbol of
Palestinian nationalism and that he is largely respon-
sible for the broad popular support the PLO com-
mands in Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian
diaspora. We believe Arafat, for his part, wants to
avoid another split within Fatah that would risk
driving key figures into the Syrian camp. He has thus
been careful not to make any commitments in his
dialogue with Hussein that would split Fatah further.
key PLO pragmatists during this period: Issam
Sartawi in April 1983 and PLO Executive Committee
member Fuad Qawasmah in December 1984.
The Succession Process
Arafat's death would leave vacant the chairmanships
of both the PLO Executive and Fatah Central Com-
mittees. There is no formally designated successor in
The procedures for selecting a successor are poorly
defined. Shaykh Abd
al-Hamid Sayih, chairman of the Palestine National
Council, would assume the responsibilities of the PLO
Executive Committee chairmanship until the Nation-
al Council elected a new Executive Committee. The
new committee in turn would elect its own chairman.
the decision
We believe members of Arafat's Fatah organization
would be more likely to try to force him out of office
than assassinate him to end his leadership. Two of his
strongest opponents are Salah Khalaf, Fatah Central
Committee member and head of the Unified Security
Organization, and Faruq Qaddumi, the PLO's "for-
eign minister" and a member of both the PLO
Executive and Fatah Central Committees. These men
have considerable influence in Fatah. They are found-
ing members of Fatah along with Arafat, and they
have helped Arafat build the PLO into an internation-
al force.
on ra at s successor as Fatah Central Committee
chairman would be made by the committee itself and
then formally endorsed by the Fatah General Con-
Fatah's predominance
within the PLO probably would enable the new Fatah
Central Committee chairman to win election as PLO
Executive Committee leader. Fatah is by far the
largest of the PLO factions and is the most financially
secure group despite the PLO's current money trou-
bles.' US Embassy officials believe Fatah leaders
continue to dominate the organization's decisionmak-
ing process and its day-to-day operations. Fatah mem-
bers provide the majority of PLO functionaries and
For now, Arafat and Fatah hardliners like Khalaf and
Qaddumi seem to have worked out a modus vivendi.
We believe each recognizes that he needs the other to
keep the Palestinian movement alive. The hardliners,
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Groups Within the
Palestine Liberation Organization
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) Abd al
-Rahim Ahmad
Baghdad
300 to 500 in Iraq
Front for the Liberation of Palestine Muham
(FLP).
mad Abbas (Abu a
l-Abbas)
Tunis
50 to 100
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Nayif
Palestine (DFLP)
Hawatmah
Front for the Liberation of Palestine Taalat
(FLP) a
Yacub
Popular Front for the Liberation George
of Palestine (PFLP)
Habbash
PFLP-General Command Ahmad
(PFLP-GC)
Jibril
Damascus
800 to 1,000, mostly in
Syria and Lebanon
Saiqa Issam
Qadi
Damascus
500 to 1,000
Popular Struggle Front (PSF) Shamir
Ghawshah
200 to 300 scattered
Front for the Liberation of Abd al
Palestine (FLP) a
-Fattah Ghanim
Damascus
Appoximately 150
Damascus
500, mostly in Syria and
Lebanon
and economic activities.
believes that the Fatah Central
Committee would revert initially to collegial rule after
Arafat's demise and that it would take some time for
one individual to assert his authority.
until the mid-1970s Arafat was no
1960s. Arafat and his senior aides have not groomed a
younger generation of Palestinians to assume control.
more than one of a 10-member committee governing
Fatah. A return to collegial rule is one of the main
demands of the Fatah rebels and is broadly supported
within the Palestinian diaspora.
US Embassy officers
Khalil Wazir (Abu Jihad) and Salah Khalaf (Abu
lyad) as the two main contenders for the leadership of
Fatah. Both are founding members of the organiza-
tion and have maintained close ties to Arafat over the
We believe Arafat's successor most likely would come
from the small cadre of Fatah leaders who have been
active in the Palestinian movement since the early
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years. The two men differ, however, in their views of
Syria and strategy toward the Palestinian problem.
Wazir's main power base is the military; he heads
Fatah's Western Sector Department, which oversees
operations against Israel. Palestinian contacts of US
Embassy officials say Wazir has been Arafat's closest
adviser for the past 10 years.
he does not have the international
connections or political clout enjoyed by other senior
Fatah officials, but he has gained respect within the
Fatah bureaucracy as a result of his hard work and
desire to stay out of the limelight. His wife also is
active in political and social affairs for Palestinian
women. US Embassy officers believe Wazir generally
supports Arafat's efforts to work with Jordan on an
Other individuals within the Fatah hierarchy also
might compete in the succession struggle, but we
believe they are less likely to succeed. This group
would include PLO notables such as Khalid Hasan
and Faruq Qaddumi, two other founding members of
Fatah. Hasan has long served as a senior counselor to
Arafat and, in our view, is one of the strongest
proponents of a diplomatic approach to the Palestin-
ian problem. He is well known internationally, but he
does not have a strong following within Fatah, accord-
ing to US Embassy officers, and probably could not
withstand challenges from the Fatah left. Qaddumi is
a member of the PLO Executive Committee and has
long served as the PLO's "foreign minister." US
Embassy officials say that in recent years he has sided
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approach to peace negotiations with Israel.
Salah Khalaf is best known for his leadership of the
Black September Organization, a Fatah terrorist
group active in the early 1970s. He currently is head
of the PLO's Unified Security Organization. Khalaf is
Arafat's most prominent critic within Fatah. He has
been identified consistently with the radical left of
Fatah and has frequently challenged the policies of
Arafat and his supporters, according to US Embassy
reporting. Palestinian contacts of US Embassy offi-
cials say he opposes negotiations with Israel, rejects
PLO-Jordanian cooperation, and advocates a return
to international terrorism.
Khalaf-unlike Wazir-has maintained contacts with
Syria despite the estrangement between Arafat and
President Assad and, in our view, would have a good
chance to reunite Fatah with the Syrian-backed Pal-
estinian groups and thereby bridge the gap between
the PLO and Syria.
Candidates From Palestinian Radical Groups
Despite Fatah's strength within the PLO, Syrian-
backed Palestinian radicals might ultimately gain
control of the organization. Six of the eight PLO
groups are currently aligned with Syria and probably
would receive support from Damascus for taking over
the organization. Two groups-the Popular and Dem-
ocratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine-repre-
sent the largest PLO factions after Fatah, although
their combined strength is less than that of Fatah. F_
The most likely candidates from among radical Pales-
tinian ranks, in our view, are Popular Front head
George Habbash and Democratic Front leader Nayif
Hawatmah. Habbash was one of the founders of the
Arab Nationalist Movement in the early 1950s. That
organization later split because of ideological differ-
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Salah Khalaf Nayif Hawatmah, and Khalil
Wazir at Palestine National Council meeting
Although Democratic Front leader Hawatmah has
aligned himself with some of the more radical PLO
elements, he also has supported mainstream PLO
policies, including the idea of a politically negotiated
settlement to the Palestinian issue. He, however, has
publicly opposed Arafat's dialogue with King Hus-
Hawatmah has close ties to the USSR, and many
In our view, Habbash and Hawatmah may conclude
that the most effective way of asserting their author-
ity over the organization is to combine forces, as they
did in 1984 in the Democratic Alliance. Their cooper-
ation has usually been short lived because of ideologi-
cal differences, but they potentially could wield con-
siderable influence over PLO policy if they set aside
their differences for a time. As leaders of the second-
and third-largest PLO factions and with ties to both
Syria and the Soviet Union, they would be in a strong
position to work for reunification of the PLO.
Another possible successor-although a less likely
one, we believe-is Ahmad Jibril, head of the Popular
mand.
Jibril as Syria's first choice among Palestinian radi-
cals for PLO chairman. His ties to Damascus date
from the 1950s when he served in the Syrian Army.
Jibril is considered by many Western military observ-
ers to be the best military tactician in Palestinian
ranks and has a reputation for skill and resourceful-
ness in sabotage operations.
We do not view leaders of the Fatah dissidents as
potential candidates to succeed Arafat. Although
rebel leaders Said Muragha (Abu Musa) and Muham-
mad Salih (Abu Salih) initially won broad Palestinian
support, they apparently have discredited themselves
since their mutiny in May 1983.
a darkhorse
candidate mi t assume the PLO chairmanship. Two
possibilities, are Khalid al-
Fahum, chairman of the Syrian-backed Palestine
National Salvation Front but better known for his
long tenure as Palestine National Council chairman,
and Ahmad Sidqi Dajani, an independent member of
the Palestine National Council.
only if Fatah collapsed.
A New Direction for the PLO?
Under Arafat's leadership, the PLO in recent years
has pursued a two-track policy, adding diplomacy to
terrorism. From the 1960s, Arafat has used terrorism
against a wide range of Israeli and Western targets to
gain recognition for the Palestinian cause and to
consolidate his leadership.' Once international
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notoriety for his organization had been achieved,
Arafat focused PLO terrorism on Israeli targets
(though not exclusively) and opportunistically also
began to pursue a diplomatic strategy to strengthen
the PLO's international prestige. The PLO Chairman
continued to give general approval for terrorist opera-
tions against Israeli targets-within Israel and West-
ern Europe-to burnish the organization's revolution-
ary credentials and to mollify Palestinian hardliners.
Arafat also countenanced strikes against Syrian inter-
ests, to retali-
ate for Syrian attacks on PLO "moderates."
US Embassy officials) (report
key figures within both Fatah and Syrian-backed
Palestinian factions have long urged Arafat to aban-
don his diplomatic efforts in the belief that political
compromise will not bring about a Palestinian state.
In our view, this attitude has become more prevalent
in recent years as Palestinian leaders have grown
increasingly discouraged over the prospects for a
negotiated settlement. Arafat's public statements over
the last several months suggest that he also has come
to believe the diplomatic approach is failing and that
the PLO again must step up terrorist operations to
demonstrate that it is still an effective national libera-
tion movement with which Israel and the United
States must reckon.
The PLO leadership after Arafat, in our view, will be
even more inflexible than the current tactically oppor-
tunistic PLO Chairman and probably will rely almost
exclusively on terrorism to advance Palestinian goals.
The six PLO factions in the Syrian-supported Pales-
tine National Salvation Front already espouse a radi-
cal approach and probably would take advantage of
the post-Arafat disarray within the organization to
step up terrorist operations against Israel and possibly
US interests. These groups undoubtedly would be
strengthened by Syria, which wants to foster a PLO
leadership sympathetic to Syrian aims. We believe
Arafat's successor in Fatah may explore closer ties to
Syria as well, particularly if he concludes that Syrian
backing is vital to the survival of the PLO as an
organization.
Improved Fatah-Syrian relations probably would help
reunify the various PLO factions, but some radical
Palestinian splinter groups might remain obdurate
and choose instead to break with Damascus. In
particular, some members of the Palestine National
Salvation Front-which already have established con-
tacts with Libya-might relocate their base of opera-
tions to that country. The Abu Nidal organization-
although not included in the formal PLO structure-
has established closer ties to Libya during the last
year. Its apparent involvement in the bombing of the
El Al airline counters in Rome and Vienna last
December demonstrates that the movement of Pales-
tinian groups to Libya would significantly increase
the opportunities for Libyan-sponsored terrorism in
the region.
We believe the Soviets would welcome a Fatah-Syrian
rapprochement. Moscow's influence in the region
would be greatly enhanced, in our view, if it estab-
lished good relations with both Damascus and Pales-
tinians previously identified as Arafat loyalists.
The moderate Arab states probably would be the
greatest losers in the event of a pro-Syrian reorienta-
tion within the PLO after Arafat. Jordan and Egypt
might hold out hope that closer Fatah-Syrian rela-
tions would help move all parties toward peace negoti-
ations with Israel. But they would be more likely to
see the end to PLO cooperation toward broader peace
talks unless they were on Syria's terms.
The Peace Process
We believe that efforts to move the PLO toward peace
negotiations with Israel after Arafat's demise will
become even more difficult. It will take an extended
period for any successor to assert his authority over
the organization and to consolidate his position with
the various PLO factions and with other Arab govern-
ments. Moreover, Arafat's potential successors, in our
view, will be even less receptive than the obdurate
Arafat to the idea of the PLO's making concessions
on key issues-including acceptance of UN Security
Council Resolution 242 and renunciation of terror-
ism-to pave the way for the PLO to enter peace
talks.
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The new PLO leadership would probably insist on an
independent Palestinian state rather than a state in
confederation with Jordan, as Arafat agreed to in the
1985 PLO-Jordanian accord. The accord itself almost
certainly would wither away if it were not formally
abrogated by the PLO Executive Committee.
The post-Arafat PLO leadership also would be deter-
mined to prevent any other party from representing
the Palestinians in peace negotiations. Arafat's suc-
cessors would be most watchful of King Hussein and
West Bank Palestinians, both of whom US Embassy
officers say have toyed with the idea of entering
negotiations without the PLO. We believe PLO lead-
ers would not hesitate to order selective assassinations
to discourage Jordanian and West Bank leaders from
challenging the PLO's mandate as the "sole legiti-
mate representative of the Palestinian people."
Continued stalemate in diplomatic efforts to end the
Israeli occupation is likely to encourage young Pales-
tinians in the West Bank and Gaza to engage in
bolder, more violent opposition to Israeli control. US
Consulate officers report that West Bank activists
have closely monitored the Shia resistance against the
Israelis in southern Lebanon and may be persuaded to
try similar measures in the West Bank. F-
An Alternative Scenario. Some Arab academics argue
that the end of Arafat's leadership over the PLO
would work in favor of Arab moderates who want to
enter peace negotiations with Israel. In their view,
King Hussein would be particularly encouraged to
take advantage of the chaos within the PLO following
Arafat's demise to expand Jordan's influence over the
Palestinians. To this end, Hussein might seek a
reversal of the 1974 Rabat Arab League summit
decision that the PLO is the sole legitimate represen-
tative of the Palestinian people. Egyptian and other
Arab moderate leaders might agree to the Palestin-
ians being represented by Hussein since the majority
of Jordan's population is Palestinian.
Hussein also might be able over time to convince
West Bank leaders that they should abandon support
of the PLO and organize themselves as an alternative
leadership. West Bankers have been unwilling to
challenge the PLO's authority in the past, but fighting
within the PLO after Arafat's demise might discredit
the organization in the eyes of the West Bank popula-
tion.
Implications for the United States
Whether Arafat is around or not, the United States
will be increasingly vulnerable to terrorist attacks by
the various PLO factions as they engage more fre-
quently in armed attacks against Israeli interests.
PLO leaders are likely to argue in favor of strikes
against US interests as a means of getting Washing-
ton to press Israel for concessions.
US citizens and facilities would be even more vulnera-
ble if Arafat were assassinated. The PLO leader is
convinced that Washington plotted with Israel to kill
him during the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in
Tunis in October. Senior Arafat aides would be likely
to suspect US-Israeli collusion in the event Arafat
met a violent end-regardless of the evidence-and
seek revenge for the loss of their leader.
Some Arab observers believe the PLO will wither and
die without Arafat's leadership or at least disintegrate
into several small factions without any central control.
The PLO's organizational structure is likely to change
after Arafat, but we believe the PLO will continue to
be accepted by the Palestinians and the Arab states as
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people. It therefore will continue to influence moves in
the peace process
The PLO's ability to be a spoiler in the Middle East
will remain strong, in our judgment. Whatever the
PLO's strength as a political force, the terrorist
capabilities of its component groups and their ability
to cause trouble for Arab regimes, independently or as
agents of their patrons, will ensure that the Palestin-
ian issue remains a key factor in Middle East politics.
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Moreover, Palestinian nationalism will remain a ma-
jor force in the Middle East after Arafat's departure
from the scene. In our view, the potential for Palestin-
ian nationalism to contribute to regional instability
and to complicate US diplomacy almost certainly will
increase as more Palestinians conclude that chances
of establishing a homeland in the West Bank and
Gaza are vanishing. Moderate Arab leaders will then
face an even more difficult task in balancing their
need for US aid against the possibility that the
Palestinian issue, if left unresolved, will pose the most
serious long-term threat to the stability of their
regimes.
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