NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 6 MAY 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000200010146-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2014
• Sequence Number: 146
• Publication Date: May 6, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
AiLl,t- 4 Intelligence
C7t
-MY-Secret-
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National Intelligence Daily
Friday
6 May 1983
-TairSecret?
CPAS NM Frl-inziy
6 May 1983 25X1
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Contents
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Japan: Timing of National Election
China: Record Grain Harvest
Lebanon: Christian Areas Shelled
China-South Korea: Response to Hijacking
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2
3
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South Africa-Mozambique: Bilateral Talks
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Western Europe: Conference of Peace Groups
6
Czechoslovakia: Tough Personnel Decisions Ahead
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Cuba-Ethiopia: Possible Cuban Contingency Force
7
North Yemen-South Yemen: Heightened Tensions
7
Burma: Antinarcotics Operation
8
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Special Analysis
Syria-Israel: Prospects for Hostilities
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6 May 1983
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JAPAN: Timing of National Election
The debate over the timing of national elections is continuing,
although it now appears less likely that Prime Minister Nakasone will
call elections for the lower house this summer.
Late last month Nakasone publicly denied any intention to force
elections
Younger members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party
oppose elections this summ r because they believe they would be the
most vulnerable at the polls.
Comment: Nakasone probably is concerned that the Liberal
Democrats would lose some ground but not control of the
government
The press is speculating that Nakasone may make an
announcement at a press conference on Monday, near the end of his
current visit to ASEAN countries. Other observers believe Nakasone
will wait until after his trip to Washington and Williamsburg in late May
because he does not want to represent Japan at the economic
summit as head of a lameduck government.
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CHINA: Record Grain Harvest
Beijing has announced a record grain harvest for 1982, but the
Chinese will still remain active in the international grain market.
The State Statistical Bureau reports grain production during 1982
reached 353 million tons, up 9 percent from 1981 and surpassing the
previous record set in 1979. Total agricultural output for the year rose
11 percent. The Bureau attributes this success to good weather as
well as to new policies linking peasant income to production.
Comment: Agriculture has become the showcase for Beijing's
new economic policies, which have helped peasants produce bumper
harvests over the past four years. The report shows grain production
exceeding the goal for 1982 by 20 million tons and far outstripping
population growth. In contrast, the Bureau reports a lackluster
performance by the rest of the economy.
Beijing's planners appear worried about the possibility of poor
weather and the long-term effects of the liberal policies that have
encouraged large acreages to be shifted to more profitable industrial
crops. They are calling for more acreage to be sown to grain this year.
Despite the record harvest, grain imports in 1983 probably will
approach the record level in 1982 of 14.5 million tons. The US is likely
to remain the largest single supplier.
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34243 5-83
lsrae
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6 May 1983
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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KILOMETERS
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LEBANON: Christian Areas Shelled
Official Lebanese Government sources claim the shelling
yesterday of Christian areas north of Beirut originated in part from
Syrian-occupied Duhur ash Shuwayr. Targets included Al Judaydah,
Ad Dubayyah, Juniyah, and several inland villages of the Kasrawan
district. The US Embassy believes that only Syrian batteries?or
those of Syria's allies such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party?
have the range to hit these areas. The shelling of the coast was
preceded by heavy artillery duels between Druze and Phalange forces
in the Shuf and Alayh districts, which spilled over into East and West
Beirut.
Comment: The extent of Syria's responsibility for the shellings is
unclear, but Damascus could have initiated the incidents to maintain
pressure on the Lebanese. The Syrians reiterated their tough position
in discussions with Foreign Minister Salem on Monday. They may
have decided that a stalemate in the talks is preferable to an
agreement that results in less than a total Israeli withdrawal.
CHINA-SOUTH KOREA: Response to Hijacking
China, in a surprise move yesterday, announced that a delegation
headed by the Director of Civil Aviation will visit Seoul to request the
handing over of the hijackers of a Chinese passenger plane. This will
be the first time a Chinese official has paid a public visit to South
Korea since the Korean war. Seoul has already privately assured
Beijing through the US that it will abide by international conventions,
which require the return of the plane and either the return of the
hijackers or their prosecution. China has requested US as well as
Japanese intervention with South Korea to resolve the matter.
Comment: This is the first successful hijacking in China, although
there were at least two attempts in the past year. Beijing's reaction,
which will annoy P'yongyang, demonstrates its determination to halt
future hijackings. If South Korea decides to keep the hijackers, it
could jeopardize prospects for future bilateral contacts with China
and possibly add a new irritant to Sino-US relations. Seoul
nevertheless will welcome the opportunity to add to its diplomatic
stature by holding discussions with P'yongyang's closest supporter.
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SOUTH AFRICA-MOZAMBIQUE: Bilateral Talks
Pretoria announced yesterday that Foreign Minister Botha was
meeting with Mozambique's Foreign Minister Chissano in the South
African border town of Komatipoort. This is the first meeting between
the two governments since negotiations were held at the ministerial
level last December.
Comment: South Africa's hard line makes it unlikely that these
talks will yield significant results. Pretoria's support for the
Mozambican insurgents far outweighs that which Maputo gives to the
guerrillas of the African National Congress. Although Mozambique
has placed some restrictions on the ANC in recent months, it
probably will not take any additional steps without some
corresponding moves from South Africa.
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WESTERN EUROPE: Conference of Peace Groups
The second European Nuclear Disarmament Conference, which
begins Monday in West Berlin, has been billed in the West German
press as a major planning forum for the West European peace
campaign this fall. Except for the West German Greens and Social
Democrats, however, only minor non-Communist peace groups will
attend.
Comment: Lack of participation by major peace groups does not
indicate the peace movement has lost the strength to mount effective
demonstrations later this year. The conference probably will focus on
theoretical debate, while most decisions on specific protest activities
will be made at the national level. Moreover, disagreements about
Soviet culpability are not likely to keep independent and Soviet-
controlled organizations from joining forces this fall to oppose INF
deployment.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Tough Personnel Decisions Ahead
Premier Strougal has been hospitalized, and the government
advises that he will not resume his duties "for a certain time."
The Embassy
reports there does not yet appear to be a consensus within the
leadership on Strougal's successor. Strougal has been a key
supporter of limited reform to deal with the troubled economy.
Comment: The Premier's illness?along with
the recent death of party presidium member Hula?increases the
need for the leadership to make difficult personnel decisions. It has
appeared reluctant to make any changes within the delicately
balanced presidium until the implications of General Secretary
Andropov's accession become clearer. The choices to fill these
vacancies could demonstrate the degree of political strength of party
secretary Jakes and other reformists and could provide an indication
of whether Moscow intends to encourage reforms elsewhere in
Eastern Europe.
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CUBA-ETHIOPIA: Possible Cuban Contingency Force
A US diplomat in Addis
Ababa recently encountered several Cuban soldiers who identified
themselves as special forces on temporary duty. They claimed their
unit could respond within 48 hours to a call for assistance from
anywhere in Africa.
Comment: The 8,000 Cuban combat troops already in Ethiopia
have performed little except garrison duty for more than four years,
and they probably could be sent elsewhere without weakening the
country's defenses. Mozambique is the country most likely to call for
Cuban military forces. In any major move, the Cubans would need
Soviet transport.
NORTH YEMEN-SOUTH YEMEN: Heightened Tensions
North and South Yemen reportedly have sent additional ground
forces to their common border.
Comment: North Yemen has been trying to consolidate its
control of border territory that it retook in 1982 from dissidents
supported by Aden. Salih also may want to keep tensions high to
obtain aid from Saudi Arabia and to discourage attempts by Arab
states in the Persian Gulf region to moderate Aden's politics with
financial aid. South Yemeni President Hasani probably is responding
to Salih's moves under pressure from those in his government who
opposed withdrawal of Aden's support for the insurgents. Hasani's
policies have heightened tensions in the regime, and his rivals may
seek to reduce his influence during the session of the central
committee of the ruling Socialist Party that began on Monday.
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Government
sweepo}wation
,San Kiang
RANGOON
Gulf
of
Martaban
6?
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Kilometers
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BURMA: Antinarcotics Operation
The Burmese Army, in its first major operation against heroin
refineries in two years, swept the San Kiang area near the Thai border
last month, destroying 10 refineries, a chemical storage site, and
military camps belonging to the Third Chinese Irregular Forces and to
the Shan United Revolutionary Army. Early warning of the operation
enabled the traffickers to move most of the narcotics and refining
chemicals to other areas in Burma and to reduce stocks by lowering
the price of heroin. Burma produced 600 tons of opium last year and
largely determines the amount of heroin exported from Southeast
Asia.
Comment: Since the Thai Government began sending military
units to attack traffickers along the Thai-Burmese border last year,
heroin refineries have been relocated deeper in Burma, and the
Chinese Irregular Forces and Shan United Revolutionary Army have
expanded their operations. The Burmese Government probably will
continue to attack heroin refineries in order to encoura e the US to
provide more support for its narcotics control program.
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Special Analysis
SYRIA-ISRAEL: Prospects for Hostilities
the Syrians are preparing
for renewed hostilities with the Israelis in Lebanon, although military
activity on both sides appears normal. Syria's preparations probably
reflect concerns in Damascus over a possible Israeli-Lebanese
agreement. Syria also may be convinced that Israel will attack Syrian
forces in Lebanon. Although the Syrians are unlikely to attack Israeli
forces, the current charged atmosphere presents a risk of
miscalculation that could precipitate hostilities.
The evident war fever in Syria apparently is designed at least in
part to focus US attention on Syria's interests in any Israeli-Lebanese
agreement. It probably is aimed specifically at influencing Secretary
of State Shultz's current mission.
The Syrians clearly are worried that the Secretary will obtain an
agreement in Lebanon that allows the Israelis a residual presence and
considerable influence in the south. Assad almost certainly will tell the
Secretary he cannot accept such an agreement, and, under such
continued
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circumstances, that he could not pull his troops out of Lebanon.
Assad may claim that he expects the Israelis will attack S rian forces
in Lebanon and that he will have no choice but to fight.
Assad frequently resorts to intimidating military gestures when he
wants to draw attention to his country's interests.
Fear of an Israeli Attack
The Syrians, however, may actually believe the Israelis plan to
launch an attack in the Bekaa Valley. Syrian concerns about a large-
scale Israeli attack, however, are exaggerated?at least in the
immediate future.
Continuing Palestinian raids, however, might provoke punitive
Israeli air and artillery strikes on guerrilla positions behind Syrian
lines. Such actions could develop into a large-scale offensive.
Prospects for a Syrian Offensive
Syria's reported preparations also may indicate that Damascus?
with or without Moscow's backing?intends to launch a limited attack
on Israeli positions in the hope of achieving political gains. This is a
less likely possibility, but Assad almost certainly believes hostilities
would disrupt the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations.
The Syrian leader might even be willing to risk allowing an
expansion of the fighting into Syria. Although he probably recognizes
that a wider conflict would end in another Syrian military defeat, he
may hope it would force the superpowers to arrange a settlement that
included Syria as a principal party.
The USSR wants to maintain tensions in the area in order to
wreck US negotiations on Lebanon and to sidetrack the US peace
initiative. Although the Soviets probably are not pushing Syria to
initiate major hostilities, the Syrians may be mistaking Soviet
propaganda for support and encouragement.
Danger of Miscalculation
Whatever the Syrians' motivation, there is a real and growing risk
of the kind of miscalculation that has so often played a role in Arab-
Israeli hostilities.
continued
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The Israelis are becoming
increasingly concerned that the Syrians have no intention of allowing
a Lebanese agreement to be reached and that their gains of last
summer will be erased by a Syrian-sanctioned Palestinian resurgence
in Lebanon.
Without an agreement that prevents the PLO from reinfiltrating
the bulk of its dispersed forces into the Bekaa Valley and northern
Lebanon, Israeli military action to neutralize them would become
inevitable. The absence of an agreement also means that Assad will
not withdraw his forces, even though he believes their continued
presence in Lebanon is certain to lead to renewed hostilities with
Israel.
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