NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 24 SEPTEMBER 1981

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83T00296R000400020098-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 98
• Publication Date: September 24, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
'f A&
nl Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
24 September 1981
Top Secret
24 September 1981
COPY 2 2 9
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Nicaragua: Additional Garrisons Built . . . . . . . . . . 3
Japan: Extraordinary Session of the Diet . . . . . . . . . 5
PLO-Japan: Arafat Likely To Visit Tokyo . . . . . . . . . 7
West Germany - USSR: Energy Deliberations . . . . . . . . 8
Kampuchea: Food Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Zambia: Unions Plan Work Slowdown . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Special Analysis
Kenya-US: Visit by President Moi . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
24 September 1981
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Soviets Maintain Pressure, Hint at Economic Sanctions
The latest letter from Soviet factory workers to
their Polish counterparts contained a suggestion of pos-
sible Soviet economic sanctions. The message, from a
metallurgical combine, pointedly juxtaposed indignation
over the "wave of anti-Sovietism" in Poland with refer-
ences to the quantity of metal products and technical
assistance sent by the plant to Poland each year.
Meanwhile, Soviet criticism of the Polish regime
continues, despite efforts by Warsaw to appear responsive
and gestures by the regime and Solidarity to reduce ten-
sion. Moscow apparently intends to continue voicing its
displeasure, at least until satisfied that moderates have
regained control within the union and that the regime will
oppose a resurgence by the militants.
--continued
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24 September 1981
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ILLEGIB
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Top Secret
Foreign Minister Gromyko apparently lectured Foreign
Minister Czyrek about Warsaw's shortcomings in a meeting
at the UN on Tuesday. He and Czyrek expressed "mutual
striving" to develop bilateral cooperation and strengthen
the Warsaw Pact. The unusual formulation suggests dis-
agreement over how to achieve these goals. TASS, mean-
while, again charged Polish authorities with failing to
rebuff "counterrevolutionary" leaders of Solidarity and
with allowing the continued publication of "anti-Soviet"
material.
A Leningrad lecturer on Sunday warned his audience
that events in Poland are now affecting what Moscow has
consistently claimed to be vital strategic interests. He
asserted that pro-Solidarity sentiment is affecting the
ability of the Polish military to carry out its obliga-
tions under the Warsaw Pact and charged that the US, by
interfering in Poland on Solidarity's behalf, is seeking
to weaken the Soviet-led alliance.
Comment From Romania
Bucharest yesterday issued its harshest public at-
tack on Solidarity since last fall. The Romanians, who
generally have refrained from open criticism of the Poles,
condemned the union for launching "virulent attacks"
against the "socialist system" and for seeking to seize
political power. The commentary, which appeared in the
party newspaper, called on the Polish party to take "firm
measures" and expressed some confidence in its ability 25X1
The Hungarians have also stepped up the pressure
campaign against Warsaw. Party leader Kadar reportedly
sent a private letter to the Polish leadership urging it
to use decisive action to keep Solidarity in check.
24 September 1 1
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ILLEGIB
ILLEGIB
(under construction)
El
Salvador
1 20
Kilometers
N 1 c A-r
o de l
Nicaragua
?., Major military base
:. Fighter airfield
under construction
'Armored battalion
0 - 100
Nicaraguan, Military Installations
Boundary representation is
not ne drily authoritative
ILLEGIB
l anaO a
Caribbean
Sea
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The Nicaraguan military establishment is building additional
garrison areas to support its continued expansion.
Recent photography shows that rapid progress is being
made in constructing a barracks area at El Tempisque to
house the armored battalion recently equipped with about
25 T-54 or T-55 tanks. In addition, two other garrisons
are under construction in the Managua area. The ground
plans are similar to existing infantry battalion barracks
that show a strong Cuban-Soviet influence.
The completion of these facilities will give the
Nicaraguan armed forces more than a dozen major military
installations, most of them built within the last two
years. The Nicaraguan armed forces have an estimated
22,000 to 27,000 men on active duty, plus an equal number
of organized reservists. In addition to the new tanks,
their arsenal includes at least 12 Soviet 152-mm howit-
zers, large numbers of Soviet antiaircraft guns and SA-7
surface-to-air missiles, and several small aircraft and
patrol boats.
Given present goals and expansion patterns, together
with a continuation of current levels of external supply,
the armed forces probably will reach some 35,000 to 40,000
men within the next year or so. An equal number of trained
reservists probably will also be available, along with
substantial numbers of less-well-trained militia.
The arsenal next year should include additional tanks
and armored vehicles, MIG fighter aircraft, and more
sophisticated air defense weapons and naval ships. These
forces will be much larger and stronger than those of any
of Nicaragua's Central American neighbors. 25X1
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JAPAN: Extraordinary Session of the Diet
The special Diet session, which opens today, probably will
approve Prime Minister Suzuki's controversial administrative reform
program, on which he is staking his political career.
The program is designed to reduce Japan's massive
deficit spending and trim the bureaucracy. It is to be
in effect through fiscal year 1984, when the government
hopes to balance the budget. Debate on the reform pro-
gram will highlight the need for fiscal austerity and thus
reduce the chances of significant increases in defense
spending and foreign aid in the budget for fiscal year
1982, now under consideration. 25X1
Suzuki has carefully prepared for this Diet
session--the first on which he will be able to put his
own mark--by building support for the reform program,
but it remains controversial even within his own party.
The reforms would reduce the pork-barrel spending on
which the Liberal Democratic Party has depended for its
majority for 25 years. Opposition parties object to
proposed cutbacks in social services and in the number
of government employees.
The opposition parties will be noisy but generally
ineffective. They may attempt to use delaying tactics,
however, which could prevent Suzuki from addressing
other urgent issues, including a reorganization of the
cabinet.
If Suzuki is successful in shepherding the adminis-
tration reform bill through the Diet, he will renew con-
fidence in his leadership, which was called into question
during a series of crises last spring, and improve his
chances of retaining the prime ministership beyond
November 1982.
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PLO-JAPAN: Arafat Likely To Visit Tokyo
The long-delayed trip of PLO head Arafat to Japan
probably will begin in early October, according to a
Japanese Foreign Ministry official. The invitation to
Arafat was issued last December by a nonpartisan group
of Japanese Dietmen, and Tokyo does not regard this as
an official visit. Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign
Minister Sonoda, however, reportedly will be receiving
Arafat "in their government capacity" instead of pri-
vately as was previously planned. The apparent conces-
sion by Tokyo probably is an attempt to cultivate the
good will of oil-exporting countries friendly toward the
PLO. In addition, the Japanese Government believes that
the PLO must participate in the resolution of the Pales-
tinian issue to make long-term stability possible in the
Middle East.
To reduce US unhappiness over the visit, the
Japanese have refused Arafat's demands that they recog-
nize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestin-
ian people and grant the organization's Tokyo office
full diplomatic privileges. Arafat, nevertheless, will
see the visit as a success for his campaign to win wider
diplomatic recognition for the PLO. Although he has
also met unofficially with some heads of government in
Western Europe, the Tokyo visit will mark the first time
he has met with a prime minister of one of the larger
non-Communist countries.
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WEST GERMANY - USSR: Energy Deliberations
The talks in Moscow this week on a Siberian synthetic
fuels project reflect West Germany's continued strong in-
terest in expanding its commercial relations with the
USSR. Bonn probably will eventually offer a demonstration
plant in return for Siberian natural gas or possibly
synthetic fuels. The Soviets have been seeking Western
help to develop, the capability to convert part of their
vast Siberian coal reserves into more widely usable
liquid fuels. Economics Minister Lambsdorff, who leads
the German delegation in these regular bilateral economic
discussions, is likely to use the visit to reiterate
Bonn's support for the gas pipeline. Both sides would
like to announce agreement on the pipeline during
Brezhnev's visit to Bonn this November. The current
talks also are expected to produce a new Soviet - West
German energy commission tasked with formulating and
coordinating other joint projects.
Kampuchean refugees arriving at the Thai border
report food shortages and crop failures in much of the
Kam uchean county side.
the gravity of the situation also is indicated
by People s Republic of Kampuchea Head of State Heng
Samrin's unprecedented appeal to international organi-
zations to continue their aid.
The People's Republic of Kampuchea Vice Minister
of Agriculture has indicated that 10 percent of the rice
planted through late August and 19 percent of other crops
such as corn, cassava, and vegetables have been destroyed
by the drought and flooding. These losses will reduce
overall planting to levels below those achieved at the
same time last year. Phnom Penh, however, has attempted
to place the current planting effort in a good light by
comparing it favorably to the disastrous crop in 1979
that resulted in an exodus of refugees to the area of
the Thai border.
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ZAMBIA: Unions Plan Work Slowdown
Zambia's powerful trade union movement reportedly
will stage a general work slowdown next week in an attempt
to force President Kaunda to release four labor leaders
detained since July. The government will have several
advantages in dealing with the slowdowns. Many labor
officials have been intimidated by the arrests of their
leaders, and major walkouts in January and July depleted
union strike funds. The detained leaders remain popular
with the union rank and file, however, and government
overreaction to the work actions could lead to more
serious labor unrest. Kaunda has handled labor problems
adroitly in the past, but he is scheduled to be in Aus-
tralia for the Commonwealth Conference at the time of the
slowdowns.
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KENYA-US: Visit by President Moi
President Moi is seeking commitments of greater US military
and economic aid during his talks in Washington tomorrow. He
views the US as Kenya's principal protector and wants to alleviate
Moi will cite the recent alliance between Libya,
Ethiopia, and South Yemen as evidence that Kenya may now
be a target for Libyan and Soviet interference. The
Kenyans have prepared a military shopping list that in-
cludes C-130 aircraft, antiaircraft missile systems,
armored personnel carriers, and missile patrol boats.
The Kenyan President believes his acceptance of the
military access agreement with Washington obliges the US
to help Kenya. Although the agreement has generated
little criticism in Kenya, Moi wants to avoid publicity
about it. He probably will approve proposals for further
US military use of Kenyan facilities under the agreement
so long as they do not attract international press atten-
~ r v w
As chairman of the OAU, Moi will raise issues of
general African concern. He is trying to give the ap-
pearance that his government is in tune with the OAU
majority and the Third World, but he shuns controversy
and does not plan an activist role in issues such as the
Chad and Western Sahara disputes.
In an effort to strengthen his standing as a non-
aligned leader, Moi has criticized Western and US policy,
particularly with regard to South Africa and Namibia.
Although the Kenyans are genuinely troubled about what
they see as US support for South Africa, relations
between Nairobi and Washington remain good, and Kenyan
officials have privately urged the US not to be ove y
concerned about occasional criticism from Nairobi.
--continued
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Relations With Somalia and Ethiopia
Kenya's security concerns and economic needs are
causing Moi to develop better ties with Somalia--long
strained over Mogadishu's irredentist designs on north-
eastern Kenya, which is inhabited by ethnic Somalis.
Progress on a rapprochement will be slow at best because
of lingering mutual suspicions. Both Moi and President
Siad favor closer ties, however, in part because they
are hoping for new aid from the US and Saudi Arabia,
which are encouraging the reconciliation.
If relations with Somalia continue to improve, Moi
may become less interested in military cooperation with
Ethiopia. Ties with Addis Ababa are based on concern
over Somali irredentism, and many Kenyans are concluding
that Ethiopia, with its Soviet and Libyan allies, is the
more serious long-term security threat.
Economic Decline
Kenya's economic problems stem primarily from de-
clining revenues for coffee, the drought, and increasing
imports of food and oil. Even with more aid, Moi would
have difficulty maintaining his development plan, which
is based on the unlikely assumption that world demand
for coffee is going to rebound sharply.
The government's inaction has contributed to the
economic slide. It has neglected the agricultural sec-
tor and has done little to try to reduce Kenya's popula-
tion growth rate of 4 percent--one of the highest in the
world. Moi realizes that the population growth is a
burden on the economy and could cause further social un-
rest, but he has been unwilling to risk alienating the
many Kenyans who put a high value on large families.
Although Moi enjoys strong grass-roots support and
has no serious challengers, the recurrent food shortages,
rivalries among Moi's subordinates, and tribal tensions
could become more troublesome, particularly if the eco-
nomic slide continues. Moi is likely, however, to
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complete his present term and will stand a good chance
to win reelection in 1984, if he can keep dissent about
the economy within bounds.
If adverse developments should cost Moi the confi-
dence of his usual supporters--including the apolitical
military--and he were to depart, there probably would
be little immediate change in Kenya's economic system
or pro-Western foreign policy, which has the support
of his leading potential successors and almost all the
Kenya leadership.
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