THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS MILITARY COMMITMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004000150002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 13, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

COPY NO. 18 Ll
FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S
ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS
MILITARY COMMITMENTS
This document bas bo-en
approved for release through
the HUM= I d PRO 2 of
the Central Intelligence Agcy.
bate
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NO CHANGE
096ECLASS!
Class. CHANGED
DDA Mem ,
Auth: DDA RE 77
Date:
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U.S. Officials Only
TS S
Apr 77
763
BRP
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tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS
MILITARY COMMITMENTS
1. The Commitments.
Britain's overseas military commitments in-
clude: (1) the defense of its dependent terri-
tories from external aggression and internal
disorder; (2) obligations set forth in treaties
and agreements; (3) obligations implicit in
Britain's Commonwealth and general defense
policies; and (4) occupational responsibilities.
2. The Possibility of their Abandonment.
The British Government has at present no
intention of giving up any of its overseas mili-
tary commitments, and there is no reason to
believe that economic stringency will force it
to do so; certainly not in the near future.
Various readjustments of overseas forces will
doubtless be made from time to time for stra-
tegic reasons; these will, if important, be car-
ried out in consultation with the US.
Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air
Force have concurred in this report. It is a revision of ORE 93-49, and contains infor-
mation available to CIA as of 20 September 1950.
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THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN'S ABANDONMENT OF OVERSEAS
MILITARY COMMITMENTS
1. Britain's Current Overseas Military Com-
mitments.
The overseas military commitments of the
UK, some burdensome and some only poten-
tially costly, are of several types :
(a) Those natural to a modern colonial
power : the defense. of its dependent territories
from external aggression and internal dis-
order;
(b) Those set forth explicitly in treaties or
agreements, involving defense guarantees, the
supply of arms and/or training missions;
(c) Those implicit in Britain's Common-'
wealth and general defense policies; and
(d) Occupational responsibilities.
Within these general types there is over-
lapping. For example, by treaty the UK is
bound to defend Egypt and enjoys the right to
maintain troops and bases there; but a com-
mitment to defend the Middle East from exter-
nal aggression, to maintain a condition of
stability there, and to control the Mediter-
ranean-Suez Canal-Red Sea "life-line" is im-
plicit in Britain's Commonwealth and general
defense policies. Similar considerations ap-
ply to Iraq. As another example, Gibraltar
would be defended as a dependent territory,
but it would also be defended for reasons im-
plicit in the Commonwealth and defense poli-
cies. It is apparent, therefore, that although
for convenience and organization British com-
mitments can be broken down into categories,
many of them fit more than one.
A commitment, it should be made clear, is
a fixed military policy or principle embedded
in the national strategy, involving an inten-
tion to carry out a given mission; it need not
include a precisely specified number of troops,
ships, or aircraft. A commitment remains
operative regardless of fluctuations in the
strength of the forces on the spot, so long as
policy is unchanged. Until policy is altered,
therefore, any such fluctuations affect only the
adequacy of the forces to fulfill the mission
and, in the case of a defense obligation, meas-
ure only the size of the risk accepted.
To service the present commitments of the
UK, British forces (including colonial troops)
are disposed across the world* according to
British "Estimates of the Situation" and the
availability of bases.
a. The Dependent Territories.
Britain's defense commitments include all
the parts of the widespread dependent Em-
pire. The majority of these parts, however,
require no positive defense efforts or only
token forces (for example, the colonies in the
Western Hemisphere, the Pacific Islands,
Aden).
Some British dependencies, though inter-
nally stable and not in immediate jeopardy
from aggression, are strategically situated;
they must be kept prepared for defense and
maintained as air, naval, and/or army bases.
In some cases their local economies must be
supported by annual grants-in-aid (subsidies).
Their installations must be serviced, developed,
and manned. Included in this group are Gi-
braltar, Malta, Cyprus, and Singapore; and
Kenya as the site of a large supply depot. The
British military investment in each of these in-
stallations is heavy.
Two dependencies at present require rela-.
tively large commitments. Some 40,000 army
troops (including colonial troops) are dis-
posed in Malaya on active operations, together
with supporting air and naval forces, to put
down insurrection. Some 20,000 troops, in-
cluding supporting air and naval elements,
are disposed at Hong Kong to cope with the
Chinese Communist threat to that colony.
b. Treaties and Agreements.
Britain's treaty obligations (and advan-
tages) are numerous. Some are costly; some
only potentially so. Some are overlapping.
*See Appendix for the present disposition of UK
forces.
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(1) The North Atlantic Treaty (1949).
By the terms of this pact the UK is com-
mitted militarily according to the following
terms:
Article V. The Parties agree that an armed
attack against one or more of them in Europe
or North America shall be considered an at-
tack against them all and consequently they
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,
each of them, in exercise of the right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
will assist the party or parties so attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the other parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all
measures taken as a result thereof shall imme-
diately be reported to the Security Council.
Such measures shall be terminated when the
Security Council has taken the measures neces-
sary to restore and maintain international
peace and security.
The explication of Britain's obligations un-
der the NAT is still in progress. It may be
notable, however, that of the five regional
planning groups set up, the UK is a full and
permanent member of four-more than any
other state. (The US is a permanent member
of only two of them at present, though it is
associated with each of the other three in a
non-member role.)
In this connection, though antedating the
NAT organization, the UK has maintained
two large military staffs in the US apart from
the service attaches. One, still in existence,
is known as the British Joint Services Mis-
sion; the other, abolished in 1949, supported
the British element of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff.
(2) Five-Power Treaty of Western Union
(Brussels Treaty) (1948).
Britain is committed militarily according to
the following terms:
Article IV. If any of the high contracting par-
ties should be the object of an armed attack in
Europe, the other high contracting parties will,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations, afford
the party so attacked all the military and other
aid and assistance in their power.
Under the terms of the Treaty the UK has
committed itself to a centralized supreme com-
mand, to an integrated staff organization, to
the defense of a line east of France and the
Benelux countries, to increased production of
military equipment, and to other cooperative
measures involving equipment, training, and
the assumption of the major share of adminis-
trative costs of the organization in London
and Fontainebleau.
(3) The United Nations Charter (1945).
According to the charter the UK is com-
mitted militarily under the following articles
of Chapter VII:
Article 43. 1. All members of the United Na-
tions, in order to contribute to the maintenance
of international peace and security, undertake
to make available to the Security Council, on
its call and in accordance with a special agree-
ment or agreements, armed forces assistance,
and facilities, including rights of passage, neces-
sary for the purpose of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements, shall govern
the numbers and types of forces, their degree of
readiness and general location, and the nature
of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be nego-
tiated as soon as possible on the initiative of
the Security Council. They shall be concluded
between the Security Council and member
states or between the Security Council and
groups of member states and shall be subject
to ratification by the signatory states in ac-
cordance with their constitutional processes.
Article 45. In order to enable the United Na-
tions to take urgent military measures, mem-
bers shall hold immediately available national
air force contingents for combined interna-
tional enforcement action. The strength and
degree of readiness of these contingents and
plans for their combined action shall be de-
termined, within the limits laid down in the
special agreement or agreements referred to
in Article 43, by the Security Council with the
assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
No explication of these articles has yet been
agreed on among the concerned powers,
though the UK continues to maintain its ele-
ment of the Military Staff Committee and may
be presumed to be prepared to accept a suit-
able obligation according to the stated terms,
if general agreement can be achieved.
Under Article 43 the UK has committed
naval and ground forces to the defense of
South Korea.
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(4) The Anglo-French Treaty of Dunkirk
(1947).
This pact commits the UK and France to
take such action as necessary to put an end
to any threat to the security of either of them
"arising from the adoption by Germany of a
policy of aggression or from action by Ger-
many to facilitate such a policy."
(5) Anglo-Portuguese Treaties.
There are eight treaties and a Secret Decla-
ration covering a period from 1373 to 1899,
the most important being:
(a) The Treaty of 1661, which binds His'
Majesty to "take the interest of Portugal and
all its dominions to heart, defending the same
with his utmost power by sea and land, even
as England itself," and further to send troops
for the purpose and ships also.
Though an annexed Secret Article binds
His Majesty to "defend and protect all con-
quests or colonies belonging to the Crown of
Portugal against all his enemies, as well future
as present," it is expected that the UK will re-
fuse to defend Portuguese Macao in the event
of attack on the latter by the Chinese Com-
munists. A threat to the African or Atlantic
Ocean colonies of Portugal would be another
matter, however.
(b) The Secret Declaration of 1899 in which
both parties confirm the Secret Article of 1661.
(6) The Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance
(1942).
Britain's military obligations under this
treaty are as follows :
Article IV. Should either of the high contract-
ing parties during the post-war period become
involved in hostilities with Germany (or any
of the states associated with her in acts of
aggression in Europe), in consequence of the
attack of that state against that party, the
other high contracting party will at once give
to the contracting party so involved in hostili-
ties all military and other support and assist-
ance in his power.
This treaty binds both parties not to con-
clude any alliance or take part in any coali-
tion directed against the other (Article VII),
and not to seek territorial aggrandizement or
interfere in the internal affairs of other states
(Article V). Thus, either the UK or the USSR
could at any time make a case for breach of
treaty against the other; and the UK Govern-
ment as recently as July 1948 declared its view
that the treaty is "still technically operative."
As a practical matter, however, neither this
treaty nor the one with Poland (see below)
figures in Britain's strategic planning.
(7) The Anglo-Polish Treaty (1939).
The UK is committed militarily in the fol-
lowing terms :
Article I. Should one of the Contracting Par-
ties become engaged in hostilities with a Euro-
pean Power in consequences of aggression by
the latter against that Contracting Party, the
other Contracting Party will at once give the
Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the
support and assistance in its power.
Article II. (1) The provisions of Article 1 will
also apply in the event of any action by a Euro-
pean Power which clearly threatened, directly
or indirectly, the independence of one of the
Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature
that the Party in question considered it vital
to resist it with its armed forces.
(2) Should one of the Contracting Parties be-
come engaged in hostilities with a European
Power in consequence of action by that Power
which threatened the independence or neutral-
ity of another European state in such a way
as to constitute a clear menace to the security
of that Contracting Party, the provisions of
Article I will apply, without prejudice, how-
ever, to the rights of the other European State
concerned.
(8) The Anglo-Jordan Treaty (1948).
In substance this treaty commits the two
parties to the following:
(a) Should either party become engaged in
war, the other party will immediately come to
its aid. In the event of imminent menace of
hostilities, the parties will immediately con-
cert together the necessary measures of de-
fense.
(b) In event of either party being engaged
in war or menaced by hostilities, each will in-
vite the other to bring to his territory, or ter-
ritory controlled by him, the necessary forces
of all arms.
(c) The. King of Jordan will safeguard,
maintain, and develop as necessary the air-
fields, ports, roads, and lines of communica-
tion in and across Jordan as may be required
for the purposes of this treaty and will call
upon the British for any necessary assistance
to this end.
SE T
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(d) The King of Jordan invites the British
to maintain units of the Royal Air Force at
Amman and Mafrak airfields, and he will pro-
vide all necessary facilities.. The UK, however,
will reimburse the King of Jordan for all ex-
penditures incurred in (c) and (d).
(e) The King of Jordan will afford, on re-
quest, all necessary facilities for the move-
ment of UK armed force units across Jordan
on the same financial terms applied to his own
forces; the King of Jordan will also permit
British navy ships to visit Jordan ports at any
time upon notification.
(f) An Anglo-Jordanian Joint Defense
Board is set up to formulate agreed, strategic
plans, to coordinate measures for the imple-
mentation of (c) above, to consult on training
and equipment, and to consider, if necessary,
the location of UK forces at places other than
(d) above.
(g) In view of the desirability of identity
in training and methods of the Jordan and
British forces, the UK:
i. offers appropriate facilities in Britain or
its territories for training the armed forces of
Jordan;
ii. makes available operational units of its
armed forces for joint training;
iii. provides on request any British service
personnel required to ensure the efficiency of
Jordanian forces;
iv. affords military instruction in British
schools for Jordanian officers; -provides arms,
ammunition, equipment, aircraft, and other
war material.
(h) As long as the treaty is in force Brit-
ain will, in accordance with arrangements to
be agreed upon annually, afford financial as-
sistance to Jordan to enable it to carry out
obligations undertaken.
For the British fiscal year ending on 31
March 1950, this financial assistance amounted
to ?3.5 million. The ruler of Jordan is a vir-
tual puppet of the British and, in a practical
sense, the UK has almost unlimited military
rights there.
Since the conclusion of the treaty it has been
extended to cover that part of Palestine under
the control of Jordan.
In conjunction with the Egyptian and Iraqi
Treaties (see below) and an anticipated agree-
ment with Cyrenaica, this treaty enables Brit-
ain to plan a defense-in-depth of the Suez
Canal Zone and to count on uninterrupted
land communications from North Africa to at
least the border of Iran in case of war (pro-
vided an arrangement can be made with Israel
for transit rights in the southern Negeb).
(9) The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936).
In substance this treaty commits the two
parties to the following:
(a) Should either party become engaged in
war, the other will immediately come to his
aid in the capacity of an ally.
(b) The aid of the King of Egypt, in event
of imminent menace of war or apprehended
international emergency, will consist in fur-
nishing the UK on Egyptian territory all facili-
ties and assistance in his power, including use
of ports, aerodromes, and mean of communi-
cation.
(c) Until such time as the parties agree that
the Egyptian Army is in position to protect the
Suez Canal, the King of Egypt authorizes the
UK to station forces in specified zones around
the Canal.
(d) Without prejudice to (a) above, UK
troops in the Canal Zone may not exceed
10,000* land forces and 400 pilots together
with necessary ancillary personnel for admin-
istrative and technical duties. These num-
bers do not include civilian personnel.
(e) The Egyptians will provide, when nec-
essary, reasonable means of communication
and access to and from localities where Brit-
ish forces are situated and will also accord
facilities at Port Said and Suez for landing and
storage of materials and supplies for. British
forces, including maintenance of a small de-
tachment of British forces in those ports to
handle and guard this material and these sup-
plies in transit.
Though Egypt has denounced this treaty,
the UK considers it still in effect and remains
hopeful that a new treaty containing terms
reasonably satisfactory to British require-
ments will eventually be' concluded when
Egypt's postwar xenophobia has died down.
An RAF training mission continues to be ac-
tive with the Royal Egyptian Air Force.
*British troops in Egypt in fact far exceed this
stipulated maximum; see tabulation of army dis-
position on page 13.
i-;/CRET
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(10) The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930, effec-
tive 1932).
In substance the provisions of this treaty
are as follows:
(a) Should either party become engaged
in war, the other party will immediately come
to its aid in the capacity of an ally, and in
the event of an imminent menace of war the
parties will immediately concert together the
necessary measures of defense. The aid of
the King of Iraq will consist in furnishing to
the UK on Iraq territory all facilities and
assistance in his power including the use of
railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes, and means
of communication.
(b) The King of Iraq will grant the UK
sites for air bases at or in the vicinity of Basra
(Shaiba) and for an air base to the west
of the Euphrates (Habbaniya), and further
authorizes the UK to maintain forces on Iraq
territory at the above localities. The strength
of these forces shall be determined by the
UK from time to time after consultation with
the King of Iraq.
(c) The UK undertakes to grant, whenever
may be required by the King of Iraq, all pos-
sible facilities in the following matters, cost
of which will be met by the King of Iraq:
i. naval, military, and aeronautical instruc-
tion to Iraqi officers in the UK;
ii. provision of arms, ammunitions, equip-
ment, ships and aeroplanes of latest available
pattern for forces of Iraq;
iii. provision of British naval, military, and
air force officers to serve in advisory capacity
to the forces of Iraq.
(d) In view of the desirability of identity in
training and methods between the Iraq and
British armies, the King of Iraq undertakes
that :
i. if necessary to have recourse to foreign
military instructors, these shall be chosen
from amongst British subjects;
ii. any personnel of his forces sent abroad
for military training will be sent to the terri-
tories of the UK, and only to another country
when British facilities are not available;
iii. the armament and essential equipment
of his forces shall not differ in type from those
of the UK forces.
(11) The Treaty of Mutual Assistance be-
tween Britain,, France and Turkey (1939).
In substance the provisions of this treaty
are as follows:
(a) In the event of Turkey being involved
in hostilities with a European power because
of aggression of that power against Turkey,
Britain and France will cooperate effectively
with Turkey and will lend it all aid and assist-
ance in their power.
(b) In the event of an act of aggression by
a European power leading to war in the Med-
iterranean area in which France and the UK
are involved, Turkey will cooperate effectively
with France and the UK and will lend them
all aid and assistance in her power. In the
event of an act of aggression in the Mediter-
ranean in which Turkey is involved, France
and the UK will collaborate effectively with
Turkey.
(c) In the event of France and the UK be-
ing involved in hostilities with a European
power in consequence of aggression committed
by that power against those powers in an area
other than the Mediterranean, the parties will
immediately consult together. Nevertheless,
it is agreed that in such eventuality Turkey
will observe at least a benevolent neutrality
toward France and the UK.
(d) In the event of: (1) aggression by a
European power against another European
state whose government one of the parties had,
with the approval of that state, undertaken to
assist in maintaining independence or neu-
trality against such aggression; or (2) aggres-
sion by a European power which, while di-
rected against another European state, consti-
tuted in the opinion of one of the governments
of the parties a menace to its own security,
the parties will immediately consult together
with a view to such common action as might
be considered effective.
(12) The Anglo-Greek Agreement (1944)
The presence of British troops in Greece was
first formalized by the above agreement. An
invitation to the British forces to continue in
Greece 'has been reaffirmed by succeeding
Greek governments. However, the last Brit-
ish combat unit - an infantry brigade num-
bering some 3,000 men - was withdrawn in
late 1949 and early 1950. The British main-
S ET
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8 SE
tain three service missions in Greece-mili-
tary, air, and naval-engaged in training and
re-equipping the armed forces. (The British
also maintain a Police and Prisons Mission
for training purposes.) Since the American
Military Aid to Greece mission began to oper-
ate in 1947, the US and UK missions have
worked jointly and closely.
(13) The Treaty of the Trucial Chiefs of
Oman (1853).
This treaty mediated by the British, estab-
lished that the UK would watch over and in-
sure the peace agreed to among themselves by
the Chiefs of the Arabian Coast, and that, in
case of aggression by one of the parties on
another, the UK would obtain reparations for
the injured party.
(14) The Anglo-Bahrein Convention (1861).
By the terms of this agreement between the
Sheikh of Bahrein and the British Govern-
ment the UK agreed to maintain the security
of the former's possessions against war, piracy,
and slavery on the part of "the Chiefs and
tribes of this (the Persian) Gulf," and to ob-
tain reparations for the Sheikh for any such
acts. Usage and precedent, however, have es-
tablished that Britain has expanded its obliga-
tions to include the protection of Bahrein from
aggressive acts regardless of their source.
(15) The Anglo-Kuwait Understanding
(1914).
In this understanding, documented by offi-
cial letter, the British Government recognized
the Sheikdom of Kuwait as "an independent
Government under British protection."
(16) The Anglo-Qatar Treaty (1916).
This treaty provides in substance for the
British defense of Qatar against all aggressive
actions and the exaction of reparations, unless
Qatar itself provoked the aggressive actions.
(17) The Anglo-Burmese Defense Agree-
ment (1947).
This agreement provides for:
(a) the evacuation of all British troops from
Burma immediately after Burma becomes in-
dependent (January 1948) ;
(b) the transfer to Burma of airfields, naval
vessels, fixed Army and RAF establishments
and initial equipment for the Burmese Army;
(c) the establishment of a Naval, Military,
and Air Force Mission for instructional and
advisory purposes with the condition that the
government of Burma will not accept such a
mission from any government outside of the
British Commonwealth;
(d) a British contribution of financial and
technical assistance in maintaining specified
airfields;
(e) the extending of all reasonable British
facilities for purchase by the government of
Burma of war material;
(f) ships of either navy to have the right of
entry into ports of the other party upon direct
notification between their respective naval au-
thorities on the spot;
(g) military aircraft of either party to have
the right, upon customary peacetime direct
notification between the respective air authori-
ties, to fly over the territories of the other,
and to enjoy staging facilities at airfields
agreed upon;
(h) the government of Burma to afford all
reasonable assistance including facilities of
access and entry into Burma by air, land, and
sea, to British forces bringing help and sup-
port to Burma by agreement with the govern-
ment of Burma or to any part of the Com-
monwealth by agreement with the govern-
ment of Burma and with the government of
that part of the Commonwealth;
(i) the opening of fresh negotiations by
either party with the other on any matter
within the defense sphere, such negotiations,
except by agreement, not to affect obligations
under this agreement.
As from 4 January 1951, this agreement can
be terminated subject to twelve months' no-
tice on either side.
(18) The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement
(1944).
This was to be a temporary agreement for
the regulation of mutual relations during the
remainder of the war, but its replacement by
a permanent treaty has been delayed pending
the disposition of the Italian colonies. Article
VI provides that the UK will make available to
Ethiopia a British Military Mission whose head
shall be responsible to the Ethiopian Minister
of War for the organization, training, and
administration of the Ethiopian Army. The
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mission may be withdrawn upon three months'
notice by either party.
(19) Anglo-Thai Military Relations.
There is no formal military agreement be-
tween Thailand and the UK. Britain enjoys,
however, especially close relations with Thai-
land and provides special facilities to the
Thais such as the training of Thai officers in
the UK and Malaya, and the provision of arms
and supplies. The British Military Attache in
Bangkok serves as military adviser to the Thai
Army. Local agreements have been con-
cluded between Thai and Malayan authorities
permitting the passage of border patrols over
the national boundary and providing for ex-
change of information in efforts to deal with
disorders in the Malaya-Thailand border area.
(20) Anglo-Saudi Arabian Military Rela-
tions.
The UK maintains a Military Training Mis-
sion in Saudi Arabia. In addition it provides
a Civil Air Training Mission, and the RAF
has shown interest in surveying the area for
airfield sites.
c. Commonwealth and General Defense
Policies.
(1) Commonwealth Policies.
Britain's Commonwealth and general de-
fense policies contain implied military com-
mitments not expressed in contractual or
treaty relations (except in the case of
Ceylon') .
So far as the Commonwealth is concerned,
it may be assumed that the UK would partici-
pate in the defense of any of the Dominions
'The Anglo-Ceylonese Defense Agreement (1947)
provides that (1) the two governments will give
each other such military assistance for the security
of their territories, for defense against external ag-
gression, and for the protection of essential commu-
nications as it may be in their mutual interest to
provide; (2) the UK may base such naval and air
forces, and maintain such land forces in Ceylon
as may be required for these purposes and as may
be mutually agreed; (3) the Government of Ceylon
will grant the UK all the necessary facilities... .
These ... will include the use of naval and air
bases and ports and military establishments and
the use of telecommunications facilities; (4) the
UK will aid in training and development of Ceylon-
ese armed forces; (5) joint administrative machin-
ery will be established to implement this coopera-
tion and to coordinate the defense requirements.
made the object of aggression by a non-Com-
monwealth power. Though varying in de-
gree, Dominion by,Dominion, the UK's mili-
tary and strategic relations with the other
Commonwealth nations are close. There is
interchange of certain intelligence, and in
some cases a division of intelligence work.
The UK is the source of much of the others'
equipment and doctrine, and provides tech-
nical and general training facilities and ad-
visory services. Two of Britain's major naval
bases, Trincomalee (Ceylon) and Simonstown
(South Africa) are leased from the Dominions
and maintained by the Royal Navy. British
officers serve in and advise the Indian and the
Pakistan forces on contract; New Zealand
looks to the UK for technical military guid-
ance. Canada and Australia are on the most
intimate military terms with the British
forces, and the UK is carrying out joint re-
search and development projects with each.'
Since the war, the UK has encouraged the
Dominions to enlarge their armed services and
assume greater defense responsibilities, to re-
duce the size of the burden on itself of the
imperial defenses. Britain has to that end
freely provided all the indoctrination, advice,
and training desired. It has provided all
manner of military equipment, often at nomi-
nal prices and sometimes without charge.
(2) General Defense Policies.
Britain's over-all defense policies also con-
tain implied military commitments, based on
the mission of the armed forces, i.e., to insure
the security of the UK, the dependent empire,
and British interests overseas; and to take
the leading part in insuring the security of
imperial communications. The Middle East,
in British thinking, falls within these terms.
As the locus of gigantic British investments
the Middle East is the source of essential oil
supplies, a center of imperial communications,
and the sole Eurasian-African land bridge; the
British are determined to defend it against ag-
gression by an external power. (The British
have encouraged US participation in Middle
East defense planning.) Britain's strategic
planners subordinate the area only to the
'Progress is being made in improving military
relations with South Africa, which recently have not
been as cordial as in the past.
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V
home defense zone; they view a Soviet menace
to the Middle East as a threat to Britain's
national security virtually as dangerous as any
similar threat to Western Europe; they con-
sider that the loss of the Middle East would
endanger the independence of Pakistan, India,
Ceylon, and Southeast Asia and would prob-
ably permanently affect the world balance of
power between the USSR and the West. The
British would, therefore, react vigorously to
any threat to this area, regardless of whether
a treaty relationship existed requiring action.
Also a part of Britain's defense policies is
the giving of military aid and advice to na-
tions expected to be allies in event of war.
It follows from this that the UK has special
relations, not always reflected in explicit
treaties or general agreements, with the nu-
merous countries which use British Tables of
Organization, equipment, and doctrine.
Special technical missions to these countries
have been fairly frequent, and their specialists
attend military schools in the UK. Apart
from the Commonwealth, several countries of
Western Europe and Scandinavia were the
beneficiaries after the war of surplus British
equipment, including ships, aircraft, and army
supplies. All the countries of the Middle East
periodically seek military favors from the UK
and minor potentates have for long received
politico-military subventions. Thailand and
Burma are likewise applicants for military
favors. Argentina's purchase of British air-
craft led to the establishment in Argentina of
a technical advisory mission, reportedly on
a two-year contract.
d. Occupational Responsibilities.
British forces have occupational missions in
Germany, Austria, Trieste, and the Italian
colonies. About 20 percent of the British
Army forces are so committed.
(1) Germany.
The UK occupies and administers an area
of 33,700 square miles in northwest Germany
in accordance with the agreement reached by
the European Advisory Commission (a body
set up at the Moscow Conference of 1943 and
originally including representatives of the US,
the USSR, and the UK) and approved by the
governments in 1945. No limit was set on
the numbers of troops, and though the later
Potsdam agreement set out the main purposes
of the occupation of Germany, it made no pro-
vision for its termination.
(2) Austria.
The UK occupies and administers the South-
ern Zone of Austria in accordance with the
agreement reached by the European Advisory
Commission, which in 1945 included France,
and approved by the four governments in
1945. No limit was set on the numbers of
troops. The termination of the occupation
depends on the terms of the Austrian State
Treaty. Though the treaty is still under ne-
gotiation, one agreed article specifies the with-
drawal of troops within 90 days after ratifica-
tion by the occupation governments.
(3) Trieste.
The Italian Peace Treaty called for a short-
term military occupation of the Free Territory
of Trieste until the appointment of a governor
under the UN Security Council. The treaty
provides that troops in the FTT shall not
exceed 5,000 each for the UK, US, and Yugo-
slavia. When a governor is appointed, these
troops shall be at his disposal for a period of
90 days after his assumption of office, after
which they will cease to be at his disposal and
will be withdrawn within a further period of
45 days, unless the governor advises the Se-
curity Council that some or all of the troops
should not be withdrawn, in which case the
troops required may remain until not later
than 45 days after the governor has advised
the Security Council that the troops are no
longer needed for internal security.
.(4) The ex-Italian Colonies.
The UK occupies and administers the ex-
Italian colonies of Libya (excepting the prov-
ince of Fezzan) and Eritrea by the terms of
the Italian Peace Treaty, pending their final
disposal according to UN General Assembly
decisions. The British will retain their re-
sponsibilities in Libya until it becomes an in-
dependent power on 1 January 1952, and in
Eritrea until some disposition is made by the
1950 session of the General Assembly.
The civil administration of these areas has
been a financial burden to the British. They
have wished for some time to relinquish their
responsibilities in Eritrea and the Libyan prov-
ince of Tripolitania. The province of Cyre-
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naica plays a part in the pattern of Britain's
strategic planning for Middle East defense, al-
though it is secondary in importance to the
role of Egypt. The British expect to have con-
cluded a satisfactory defense treaty with its
ruler when Libya becomes independent, en-
abling the permanent retention of bases in
Cyrenaica. Meanwhile, they have an under-
standing with the Emir, and already have
begun substantial constructional work.
2. The Likelihood of Abandonment of Com-
mitments.
The British Government has at present, no
intention of giving up any of its overseas mili-
tary commitments. There is no reason to
believe that economic stringency will force it
to do so unless some striking change takes
place in the trend of world events. The Brit-
ish economic situation is for the time being
improved, and is apt to remain so at least as
long as the US and NATO rearmament pro-
gram ensures a high level of economic activity
throughout most of the Western world. There
will be no purely economic compulsion in the
foreseeable future for the British to reduce
military appropriations below those of FY
1950.
Indeed, in the new state of affairs following
the invasion of South Korea the British have
already planned an increase, over the next
three years, of about 45 percent in their mili-
tary budget and have extended the term of
conscription from 18 to 24 months. It is, how-
ever, doubtful whether in the present condi-
tions of greatly increased world tension, the
entire structure of British overseas commit-
ments can continue to be adequately main-
tained-whether the margin of risk can be
held constant-even by such an accelerated
military effort as the British intend to put
forth. Because dangers have increased in
most parts of the world, the forces required
to meet these dangers need also to be in-
creased. It is especially plain that a much
larger number of NATO forces is required
upon the European continent, and pressure
has already been put upon the British Govern-
ment to increase its contingents there. In
theory, it is possible that the British might
abandon some of their more distant overseas
commitments in order to strengthen their
forces in Western Europe; actually, it is un-
likely that they would do so.
Under present world conditions, therefore,
no abandonment of British overseas commit-
ments is to be expected. Readjustments of
one sort or another (such as the temporary
weakening of Hong Kong in order to reinforce
UN troops in Korea), dictated by strategic con-
siderations, will certainly be made from time
to time. It is probable that here and there
in the world the discrepancy between the mili-
tary force required to fulfill a commitment
and the force actually present-the degree
of calculated risk-will increase. These pos-
sible weaknesses, and the readjustments
needed to deal with them, are strategic prob-
lems which will generally be solved in full
consultation with the US.
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S T 13
APPENDIX
BRITISH ARMY AND BRITISH COLONIALS:
ESTIMATED DISPOSITION AS OF
1 SEPTEMBER 1950
Area
UK Troops Colonials
Although some of these are undergoing refit,
or are in reserve, the following are operational:
Home Waters
1 battleship
United Kingdom
228,000
3 aircraft carriers
Germany
47,000
3 light aircraft carriers
Austria
4,900
3 light cruisers
Trieste
4,300
31 destroyers
Malta
1,500
1,500
21 submarines
Gibraltar
2,700
150
14 escorts
Greece
200
7 fleet minesweepers
Cyprus
1,900
Mediterranean
Libya
9,000
1,700
1 light aircraft carrier
Egypt
24,000
8,700
4 light cruisers
Sudan and Eritrea
2,300
9 destroyers
East Africa
3,500
15,800
5 submarines
West Africa
1,500
14,800
7 escorts
Aden
120
700
4 fleet minesweepers
Jordan
1,000
South Atlantic
Malaya
17,000
23,000
1 light cruiser
Ceylon
150
350
2 escorts
Hong Kong
12,500
750
Caribbean
.
1,100
700
America and West Indies
India
230
350
1 light cruiser
Pakistan
350
1 destroyer
Korea
1,500
1 submarine
Miscellaneous
2,250
2 escorts
East Indies
367,000*
68,500
2 light cruisers *
5 es
rt
co
s
1 fleet minesweeper
Pacific
THE ROYAL NAVY: DISPOSITION AS OF
1 JULY 1950
The British fleet is currently composed of
5 battleships, 6 aircraft carriers, 6 light air-
craft carriers, no heavy cruisers, 24 light cruis-
ers, 110 destroyers, 57 submarines, 168 escorts,
68 fleet minesweepers and auxiliary vessels.
1 light fleet carrier
3 light cruisers
7 destroyers
11 escorts
2 submarines
*One light carrier due in Pacific in September.
* *Since 1 July one cruiser has left to relieve a cruiser
in the Pacific.
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THE ROYAL AIR FORCE: DISPOSITION AS REPORTED ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1950
Type
Number of Squadrons
United Kingdom
Medium Bomber
(assigned and available)
19 2 detached to Malaya
Light Bomber
2
Night Fighter
6
Day Fighter
38* (34 half strength)
Reconnaissance
11 1 operating in East Africa
Transport
10
Germany
Light Bomber
4
Day Fighter
51/2
1 detached to Hong Kong
Reconnaissance
Light Bomber
Night Fighter
1 detached to Malaya
1 Aden
1 Iraq (detached to Malaya)
Egypt
Day Fighter
4 Egypt
1 Cyprus
Reconnaissance
Transport
1 Malta
1 Egypt
2 Malta
Egypt
* Includes 20 Royal Auxiliary Air
mand Groups.
Far East
Light Bomber
Day Fighter
Transport
i
T
Malaya
1 Hong Kong
1 Malaya
3 Malaya
1 Hong Kong
1 Fit Ceylon
Malaya
Sub-Total of Tactical Units in the. UK
Tactical units
Aircraft in Tactical Units
MB LB FTR
17 2 24
136 16 229
RCN TRANS TOTAL
10 10 63
86 80 547
Sub-Total of Tactical Units Outside UK
Tactical Units
Aircraft in Tactical Units
MB
2
16
LB
7
57
FTR
141/2
226
RCN TRANS TOTAL
71/2+ 1 Flt. 8 39+1 Flt.
68 64 431
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Grand Total of Tactical Units
MB
LB
FTR
RCN TRANS
TOTAL
Tactical Units
19
.9
381/2
171/2+1 Flt. 18
102 +8 Flts.
Aircraft in Tactical Units
152
73
455
154 144
978
ROYAL NAVAL AVIATION: DISPOSITION AS REPORTED 15 SEPTEMBER 1950.
Home Based
Fighter Squadrons 4
Attack Squadrons 4
Mediterranean
Fighter Squadrons 1
Attack Squadrons 1
Pacific
Fighter Squadrons 1
Attack Squadrons 1
ROYAL NAVAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTH AND TYPES
Recon-
Attack Fighter naissance Liaison Training Misc Total
Number in tactical units 76 73 .. .. .. 149
Total number of aircraft 890 842 76 18 435 68 2,329
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OCI 17 11 35 pH'S0
OPUS
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