WEEKLY SUMMARY #94

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 17, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

fl
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
D SE
?coP?'NOs 8
WEEKLY SUMMARY
IDs zet F.O. 001
no G-.1=7G:; 13 class. ~i
Glees. C :: :: TD: ;S 3 0
DDA F-=o, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA PYG. 771'.763
Date: 3I-t-10. Ay:.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~'caM v f.~fi #Fr l~roA Cec SE RET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3 3 $d~
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : 6IA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32. as amended.
.Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
 n
Page
1
,,WESTERN' EUROPE ,. 2
EASTERN EUROPE ,...,, 5
NEAR EAST m AFRICA ............ 7
FAR EAST .., .10
'.WESTERN HEMISPHERE..,...,,.,.11
ARTICLES
Current Soviet Tactics in Germany . , ... , , , , . 13
Tibet Invasion. Prospects 0 .... , . .. , , , . , ,15'
e.
O SECRET
M
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
a
a
H I G H L I G H T S
Kremlin optimism concerning the Soviet power
position in. the world is reflected both in the tone of the
recent pre -election speeches and in current Soviet tactics
in Germany. This increased confidence appears to be
basedvan a Kremlin estimate that the "consolidated"
peoples democracies are gaining strength, on recent
Soviet atomic achievements, and on the Communist vic-
tory in the Far East (see page 5). In Germany, this con. .
fidence has recently been evidenced by an uncompromis-
ing designation of the East German regime as the sole
focal point of German unity and by Soviet insistence upon
y~{ making political progress toward the establishment of
a Peoples Democracy in East Germany (see page 13).
The USSR is unlikely at present to go`so far as to con-
clude a separate peace treaty with the East German Gov-
ernment unless the Western Powers make a separate
agreement with West Germany.
Prospects appear to be decreasing at present that
India and Pakistan will come to armed conflict over the
Bengal situation (see page 8). Although the area will con-
tinue to be a source of disturbance, both sides appear to
be fully aware of the grave military and political conse-
quences which would result from armed hostilities. Mean-
while, Prime Minister Nehru's conduct of India's affairs
appears to be meeting with strong opposition both within
and without the Government (see page 7). Shaken in his
o hope that,hi.s leadership would be accepted both in India-
and throughout Asia, Nehru may eventually be persuaded
by his powerful political opposition to adopt a more real-
istic and possible pro-Western policy.
a
a -1-
a
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
 ri
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
NATO Prospects Some. strengthening of the still embryonic
.North Atlantic Treaty Organization-(NATO)
may soon take place as a result of the widespread desire, at
both public and governmental levels, for greater Western
.unity 'in the face of increased Soviet aggressiveness. UK
Foreign, Minister Bevin, for example, feels that immediate
consideration should be given. to creating amore effective and
coordinated organization. Most European countries strongly
favor strengthening the NATO as a means both of committing
the US more fully to support of Western Europe and of assuring
the continuation of US military and even economic aid.
The trend will probably be toward the use of the NATO
as the focal point for stressing the close inter-relationship
within the Atlantic community and its common interests in
the cold war. The sphere of NATO activities could be readily
expanded from primarily military to political and economic
cooperation. The high-level NAT Council, composed of the
.foreign ministers of -NAT signatory nations, will probably
be used increasingly as a forum for coordination of Western
cold war policies; and new groups may be formed within
.the NATO to deal with common problems.
.Trade Control. Evasion Western attempts to control trade
between West Germany and the
.East German. republic (GDR) are being evaded by West
.German industrial interests, who simply fail to channel
.transactions through.the interzonal. trade office. Although
 the moratorium on licenses for steel shipments to the
Soviet zone is in force, a brisk trade,, estimated. to be
more than the value of the trade agreement in this cate-
gory, is being carried on through private arrangements
with the GDR. For example, the moratorium has not
deterred West German steel interests from granting
a private credit account of at least 15 million deutsche
marks to the GDR, and manufacturers are reportedly
underbidding each other in efforts to obtain steel orders
from the Soviet zone. A major reason for this evasion
of trade controls seems to be the manufacturers' desire,
to develop and expand existing markets in the GDR and
the Soviet bloc countries. Markets for the bulk of all.
:West German steel shipments to the GDR could have
been found outside the Soviet orbit.
At present there seems to be no desire on the
part of the West German government authorities to put
a halt to these extra-legal transactions. The continuation
of this trade control evasion will contribute to the weaken-
ing of other controls over strategic goods moving to the
east and will also remove a strong Western bargaining
point for dealing with the USSR on matters concerning
access to Berlin.
Tension Eased The danger of government collapse
has been temporarily reduced by the
passage of the anti-sabotage bill and the gradual sub-
siding of the current strike wave. Although Communist
threats to spread social disorder and to sabotage-MDAP
have momentarily unified the government, controversial
SECRET
rl
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
 Ii
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
SECRET
FRANCE
D domestic issues will soon arise in Parliament and prob-
ably cause renewed disagreement among the members
of the present coalition. The Communist threat. has
made. the Socialists and Radical Socialists reluctant to be
responsible for the fall of the government, but. their re-
cent, defection from the Cabinet has left Bidault with an
unstable minority government. Moreover, the conditional
O support given Bid'ault by the Socialists could lead to a
political crisis without warning. The Radical Socialists
could also refuse to support the government on a wage-
price issue, but. the party will probably hesitate to take
,this step prior to the reform of the present electoral
law.
BELGIUM
Leopold Issue The critical split in the Belgian Cabinet
and the sharp dissension in Parliament
resulting from King Leopold's faililre to receive a sub-
stantial majority in the recent "popular consultation" will
uu make a final settlement of the Leopold issue most diffi-
cult. Although 57 percent of the total vote favored Leopold's
return, he was decisively defeated in Brussels and in the
highly important industrial Walloon provinces. In addition
.to strong Socialist and Communist opposition, certain
Catholic and Liberal Ministers within the Government are
against the King's return.' If Premier Eyskens' resigns
as he has threatened to do if Leopold returns,:-the pro-
Leopold forces would have extreme difficulty in forming
a stable Cabinet.. Although the easiest solution would be
for Leopold to abdicate voluntarily, the King's stand has
been unyielding during the past five years of bitter con-
troversy and he will probably be most reluctant to abdicate
during the present controversy.
a
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
 a
Cold War The tone of pre-election speeches of Polit-
buro members indicates a hardening of
the Kremlin's attitude toward the West. The Soviet
attitude is apparently based on the Kremlin.'s estimate
of the increased strength of the "consolidated" peoples
democracies, Soviet atomic achievements, and the
tremendously changed situation' in the Far East. The
Kremlin is also apparently convinced that the "economic
crisis" which it believes began in the US in October 1948
is growing steadily worse. Molotov stated in his speech
that the fate of peoples is being determined in the first
place by the economic development of the state and that
the economy of the US is rolling toward a precipice. The
pre-election, speeches also indicate that the USSR will
continue to exploit any weakness in the Western economies
in order to hasten the day of Western economic collapse.
Moreover, as the Soviet orbit economies become stronger;
the USSR will prosecute the cold war with increased vigor.
Farm Control Further measures to increase the Soviet
war potential by securing complete state
control over agriculture may be instituted soon. The most
important Soviet measures will probably bring about drastic
reductions in private use of the land and individual owner
ship of livestock. The results of increased state control
over land and livestock would assure a better supply of
food to the industrial population and armed forces by forc-
ing Soviet farmers to spend virtually all their time. on
collective farm production.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
 Centrist Coalition The proposed centrist coalition govern-
ment under the 63 -year old Republican
revolutionary hero, General Plastiras, is encountering per-
sistent opposition from rightist circles. Apparently assured
of the support of some 55-60 percent of the new'Parliament,
the three center leaders (Venizelos, Papandreou, and Plastiras)
have agreed on a moderate program which specifically recog-
nizes the constitutional position of the Crown and-promises
a continuation of a firm pro-Western and anti-Communist
policy. These guarantees, however, have not modified rightist
and Palace objections to Plastiras. The King has already made
unsuccessful attempts to enlist US support in splitting the new ?;%
centrist bloc, and he may well try to delay the appointment of
a Plastiras government as long as possible in the hope that
the center bloc can be at least: weakened, if not broken up,-in
the meantime. Although eventually the King would probably
be forced to name a Plastiras government, the new centrist
coalition would remain vulnerable to opposition pressures.
The wage-price issue, which might well furnish the
government's first real test in view of the recent sharp rise
in inflationary tendencies, provides a particularly good
opportunity for a joint onslaught on the government by the
right wing, which dominates the top trade union leadership,
and the ultra-leftists in the Chamber. The failure of a centrist
government under'this or any other of the numerous post-
election stresses would almost certainly leave Greece without
any other workable governmental combination within the press
ent Parliament. New elections would then be an imminent
probability, this time under a majority system of voting so
that a "strong" government could more easily be formed.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
 Nehru Under Fire Prime Minister Nehru's conduct of .
India's affairs is'encountering strong
opposition from both. within and without the government.
Deputy Prime Minister Patel, supported by a majority of
the Cabinet, has become sharply'critical of several'major
aspects of current: Indian. policy; reportedly charging that..
Nehru has: (1) tossed away the potential benefits of closer
ties with the US and UK in the unrealistic hope that India
might achieve lasting friendship with Communist China and
the USSR as well; (2) failed to make a sufficiently deter-
mined effort to come to terms with Pakistan; and (3) fright-
ened away foreign and domestic investors with the spectre
of socialism at, a time when India has urgent need of private
investments above and beyond the funds the government
itself can. obtain. Meanwhile, Nehru is being pressed to
take a more belligerent attitude toward Pakistan by extrem-
ist anti-Moslem elements; notably in West: Bengal and among
the Sikh and Punjabi. refugees.
This double attack on. Nehru's policies has un-
doubtedly shaken his hope that his leadership would be
accepted within. India and throughout: Asia. His current
mood is apparently one of frustration and indecision:
although he privately concedes Patel's contention that India
has no real friends, he stubbornly refuses to change his
foreign policy, and although he asserts that capital has noth-
ing to fear from his government, he fails to support legis-
lation which would make those assurances convincing.
The fact that a powerful group in the Cabinet favors
a more realistic policy, ?a view which evidently stems from
the sober fears of the business community about continuing.
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
SECRET
political and economic tension, shows promise that a
more stable and more pro-Western India may develop.
Until Nehru can be persuaded to come to terms with
Patel's group, however, the present intra -governmental
dissenstion will dissipate the energies of India's leaders
and will make the government more vulnerable to pres-
sure from those opposing any compromise with Pakistan.
Bengal Situation The possibility of armed conflict
between India and Pakistan over the
Bengal situation seems to be decreasing for the moment.
Although India has sent additional troops into the Calcutta
area, the Indian Government is thoroughly aware of the
grave military and international consequences which an
invasion of Pakistan would entail. Pakistan, for its part,
realizes that it would have little chance of winning any
war with India.
The situation in East and West Bengal, however,.
will remain. a source of continued disturbances. Over-
population, the existence of large religious minorittes in
both provinces, and the effects of economic warfare be-
tween India and Pakistan provide a strong basis for social
unrest. In addition, the Bengalis are a people noted for .
a volatile temperament and predisposition toward violence.
Thus far, the persecution. of Hindus In West Bengal has
apparently been more widespread than the maltreatment
-of the Moslem minority across the border, and resentment
is strongest among the West Bengal Hindus. The principal
danger, consequently, is that new anti-Hindu outbreaks in
East Pakistan may not only provoke retaliation in West
Bengal but also enable the Bengali, leaders and various
reactionary Hindu groups to bring strong pressure for
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
 f
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
SECRET;
a
intervention on the part of the Indian Government. A
number of West Bengali groups would welcome such an
opportunity to press for action for the reincorporation
of East Bengal into India.
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
Pro-US Sentiment Increased French sensitivity to any
indication of US influence on. Arab
activities is becoming more apparent as North African
nationalists make outspoken bids for US support. The
French feel that the US attitude toward North African
colonial countries is unrealistic and that the Atlantic
Charter has encouraged unrealizable ambitions among
North African natives. The North Africans, for their
part, believe the US policy of avoiding friction with the
French does not take into consideration the importance
of the Arab attitude in case of war with the East. Arab
nationalists say that they are not yet committed to either
the West or the Soviet sphere and that they are open to
persuasion by concrete examples of US friendship.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617AO02300200001-3
 Ho's Orientation Although Moscow-trained Ho Chi
Minh has never been proven to be
eithera Tito-like nationalist-or a Moscow -dominated
Communist, recent developments may indicate his sub-
servience to the Kremlin. Broadcasts from the Ho-
coritr
olled radio. in Indochina have reportedly attacked
Tito and failed to mention the diplomatic recognition
.extended by the Yugoslav Government to the Ho regime.
French authorities have also reported that Ho is on his
way to'Peiping and Moscow to sign treaties of alliance
with Mao Tse Tung and Stalin. Ho's brief flirtation with
Yugoslavia regarding recongition may have been the
result of. a mistake by his Bangkok representative, who
made the initial approach to Tito along with a general
invitation to all nations.
Election Issue President Rhee's supporters in. the
Korean National Assembly have de-
feated a strong movement to reduce the powers of the
executive and establish a "responsible Cabinet." The
move to reduce executive powers began with the conser-
vative, wealthy, and relatively talented Hankook-Democratic
Party but drew support from all factions in, the Assembly,
which has been increasingly critical of administration in-
efficiency and police intimidation. Little cooperation can
now be expected between the Assembly and the President
.until after the next Assembly elections, scheduled for late
spring. It is apparent that, despite this victory, $$hee has
lost much of his former strong support in. the Assembly.
If:Rhee permits a "free atmosphere" during the coming
elections, the Hankooks may well win sufficient seats to
reintroduce and pass the disputed bill.
`I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
SECRET
Improved Stability Prospects for greater stability, in the
Caribbean have improved, as a result
of the report and recommendations of the Organization of
American States (OAS) investigating committee, which has
been studying the far-reaching and complex factors contri-
buting to unrest in that area. Although ill feeling still exists
among the Caribbean countries--the Dominican Republic,
for example, has reportedly threatened to break relations
with Cuba--the work of the committee has already alleviated
tension. If the Council of the OAS, as expected, approves
the recommendations, a further contribution toward restor-
ing tranquility to the Caribbean will be made. Three of the
four countries involved in the controversies which gave rise
to the investigation, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and
Guatemala, were found to have been implicated in activities
aimed at unseating other governments. The fact that the
'committee's frank report and recommendations are to be
made public should have a salutary effect on the govern-
ments concerned and will probably cause them to hesitate
in the future before indulging in hostile activities against
their neighbors,
Anti-US Feeling Acceptance by Colonel Jacobo Arbenz
of extreme leftist labor and political
support in his campaign for the presidency will immediately
increase the influence of pro-Communist and anti-US ele-
ments in. Guatemala. Recent nationalist anti-US agitation
r,r
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
 n.
which has already damaged US prestige includes attacks
against the US-sponsored Institute of Inter-American
Affairs and the calculated insult to the US at the recent
Caribbean Olympic Games. This growing anti-US senti-
ment, which may become a threat to US interests in the
area, will be further aggravated, by the recent leftist
alignment of Arbenz, whose political commitments will
provide anti-US and pro-Communist agitators with a
measure of protection during the forthcoming presidential
campaign,
CUBA
Communist Strength The Communists, whose political
isolation during recent years had
limited their influence in Cuba, have now considerably
improved their political position through their recent align-
ment with moderate conservative parties in support of the
Grau-Batista candidate for mayor of Havana, This align-
ment may even result in victory for some minor Commu-
nist candidates, and the Communist Party will almost
certainly gain votes. Even more important, by using the
electoral campaign for propaganda purposes, the Commu-
nists will probably be able to win support on certain key
issues from their temporary allies,
SECRET
F1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
 Current Soviet tactics in Germany reflect both
the Kremlin's growing optimism regarding its improved
world power position and its increased confidence in
gaining eventual control over all of Germany on Soviet
terms, These tactics are characterized by an. un.compro-
mising designation of the East German regime as the sole
focal point of German. unity and by Soviet insistence upon
political progress toward the establishment of a Peoples
Democracy in. East Germany. This Soviet attitude is evi-
dent in.: (1) the demand for absolute acceptance of the
National Front policy of German. unity through friendship
with the USSR; (2) consistent reiteration by East German
political officials that the Oder-Neisse boundary is per-
manent, and their acceptance of the recent; Polish decision
to evict the German minority; and (3) the purge of the
bourgeois parties in. East Germany. The USSR is unlikely
to change its present tactics as long as the Kremlin does
not foresee participation of West Germany in an effective
political and military Western bloc.
The USSR is unlikely to conclude a separate peace
treaty with the East German Government (GDR) in the
near future unless the Western Powers sign a separate
peace agreement with West Germany. The USSR could,
however, take action short of a formal peace treaty, such
as a declared termination of the state of war. Ariy ad-
vantages accruing to the USSR from a separate peace
treaty at this time would be limited to propaganda and the
enhancement of the prestige of the National Front and the
GDR. Moreover, the conclusion by the USSR of a separate
treaty with . East Germany would weaken the Soviet claim,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300200001-3
 n.
C.
based on the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, to a voice in
West Germany and the Ruhr. The Kremlin may also be
reluctant to conclude a separate peace treaty in the belief
that it would lead to the alignment of West Germany with
a Western political and military bloc.
Continuation of present Soviet tactics in Germany
will lead to further political consolidation in East Germany
resulting, for all practfcal. purposes, in a one-party system
by the time of the scheduled October 1950 elections. At the
same time, continued efforts will be made to expand and
strengthen the East German internal security force. The
USSR is unlikely to undertake actual troop withdrawal or
rectification of the Oder-Neisse line, in order to enhance
Soviet-Communist appeal in Germany. The current Soviet
attitude toward the German problem, combined with con-
tinued harassing actions in Berlin, also reduces the like.- .
hood of an early Soviet offer to reopen Four Power nego-
tiations on Germany. The city of Berlin will remain a
"special situation" for the USSR and will probably be sub-
jected to increased economic and political pressure in the
near future.
 76 78 so 82 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 100 102 104 106
NINGSIA
K A an
B
Yarkand
38
Kar hal' arkhlik -. N I N G S A
Chieh.m Wu*ei
K
'
un8
Kho Napa T ae
36
/000
36
1VT
7'
00
K o o
Cs /~