THE HELMAND WATERS DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130005-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 29, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
To ?
The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes
Research Memorandum
RNA-21, June 29, 1964
Subject: The Helmand Waters Dispute Between Iran and Afghanistan
The Iranian government recently proposed to the Afghan government
that the long-standing dispute over usage rights to the waters of the
Helmand river be formally considered in the near future; the Afghans
accepted this initiative and preliminary discussions are now underway.
At the request of the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs we
have reviewed the geographical, historical and diplomatic aspects of
this problem.
ABSTRACT
The Helmand river question has agitated Afghan-Iranian relations
periodically since 1872 in periods of drought or great flood. British
arbitration established in 1905 that Iran was entitled to one-third of
the Helmand's flow as it nears the Iranian border, but Iran has never
accepted this award on the ground that it is insufficient to its needs.
After a long lull, Iranian interest in the problem mounted as a result
of Afghan plans to develop the upper Helmand Valley by constructing two
water storage dams and extensive irrigation works.
The United States became involved because of American interest in
settling the only serious obstacle to close Iranian-Afghan relationsland
the fact that the Afghan government had hired an American company to build
the dams and canals of the Helmand Valley development scheme. The American
GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
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initiative resulted in a detailed study of the problem in 1949 and 1950
by neutral irrigation and hydrology experts. Although the findings were
to be regarded only as the engineering basis for u future accord, Iran
found the study unacceptable because by implication it set Iran's share
at an amount similar to that awarded in the 1905 arbitration. Both
countries have discussed the question periodically since 1950, but until
recently no substantial progress had been made. Preliminary discussions
are being held in Kabul, and because both sides have shown flexibility,
there appears to be more reason now to hope for a settlement than there
has been for many years.
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Introduction
Iran and Afghanistan have contended over usage rights to the waters
of the Helmand river since 1872 when a British arbitrator placed the major
portion of the river delta within Iran and the river proper in Afghanistan.
He did not, however, rule on the question of apportionment, except to say
that a "requisite" supply of water should be made available for Iran's
purposes. In normal years no problems have arisen, but years of drought
have usually been followed by Iranian complaints and renewed attempts to
seek a fixed share for Iran. Interest in a settlement usually subsided
when water again became plentiful. While this pattern has continued until
the present, interest in solving this question permanently has increased
since 1945 because of Iranian concern that Afghan construction of water
storage dams and continuing development of irrigation facilities in the
upper Helmand Valley would eventually deprive the Iranian delta area of
needed water. In addition, there has been a growing desire in both
countries to eliminate the only serious obstacle to closer relations.
In May 1963 the Shah's mediation of the Pakistan-Afghan dispute
resulted in the re-establishment of diplomatic and trade relations between
the two countries after an 18 months rupture. This success has led to a
steady improvement in Irano-Afghan relations and increased the hope that
the long-standing Helmand waters problem would be solved. The Iranians
recently proposed that the issua be discussed anew and the Afghan reaction
has been favorable. Although discussions of this subject have often moved
in slow motion and delays are likely, it now appears that serious discussions
will be held sometime during 1964.
Geovaphical and Technical Background
The Helmand river flows nearly its entire length of 300 miles in
Afghanistan before it empties into a great depression which straddles the
Iranian-Afghan border. . Until it reaches this depression, which in fact
constitutes a land locked delta, it flows in a generally southwesterly
direction as it passes through the upper Helmand Valley. After it leaves
the upper Helmand area it gradually bends in a more westerly direction
until it is about 25 miles on a direct line from the Iranian border at which
time it turns sharply northward. Near this turn is Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, a
point about 35 miles from the Sistan river, the first, and for irrigation
purposes, most important, branch of the main channel which flows into Iran.
Bandar-i-Kamal Khan is significant because it is the place at which the
division of water between Iran and Afghanistan has traditionally been
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made. 2:-/ About three-fourths of the delta land that is currently irrigable
lies in Iran and accordingly approximately the same proportion of the total
water utilized for irrigation has been used by the Iranians. In normal
years the amount of water reaching the delta area is surplus to the
irrigation needs of both countries. In such years it flows into basins
in the northern and the lowest end of the delta making large, shallow
saline lakes on both sides of the border. In years of extreme flood it
overflows the lakes located in the north and spills over into a low lying
area west of Zabol in Iran. In exceptionally severe flood years Zabol
may be completely surrounded by water, and huge areas of arable land
in both Iran and Afghanistan are inundated. These great saline lakes
contract and expand according to the rate of inflow but despite a very
rapid evaporation rate due to scorching heat and a searing three month hot
wind they have apparently never dried up completely.
The Sistan basin, which receives only about two inches of rain each
year, is entirely dependent on the Helmand and following very low precipi-
tation in the mountains of Afghanistan, drought ensues. Severe drought
has been quite infrequent, however, apparently averaging less than about
once every 20 years since 1873. The last severe drought year was 1947,
and although there have been years of low river flow since then, they do
not appear to have caused real suffering in the delta area. Droughts
have affected both countries more or less equally, but the canals furthest
downstream, most of which are Afghan, are naturally the first to dry up.
The local inhabitants have traditionally dreaded an excess of water more
than drought, since the relatively frequent spring floods cause fur
greater damage to the delta farm lands than drought.
2../ The measurement and division of the water was made on the basis of
ad hoc agreements. In August 1947 the Iranian members of the joint
Irano-Afghan commission insisted that the measurement and division should
actually take place at Band-i-Kamal Khan, a place they said was 35 miles
further upstream. Subsequent investigations leave no doubt that Bandar-i-
Kemal Khan and Band-i-Kamal Khan are one and the same place and in fact
both spellings have been used on maps. British documents showed that
the division point is about 35 miles upstream from where the Helmand
first enters Iran. In 1947 the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
provided a map purporting to show a Band-i-Kamal Khan about 70 miles
.upatream from the Sistan river, but no maps issued prior to that date
reveal any such place name at that location and the Embassy noted that
the word "Band-i-Kamal Khan" had apparently been handwritten on the map.
It is not known if Iran still disputes the location of the division point,
but the question apparently has not entered the discussions in recent
years. If this issue. were revived by the Iranians in future negotiations
It would almost certainly have an adverse effect; the Afghans regard it
as an artless deception.
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The Helmand is normally low in late August and early September
and rises gradually toward the end of the year. Abundant water is uoualiy
available from January to May, the planting-harvesting cycle.
? The Afghan cultivators require relatively less water in the fall.
and spring and more in the early summer than the Iranians. The basic
crops are winter cereals, wheat and barley, which are planted in the fall
and harvested in the spring. The severe climatic conditions which prevail
durinlg the summer, especially the searing 120pday winds, probably will
prevent any significant change in the fall to spring growing cycle on
both sides of the border.
The available information on the water supply in the delta is not
exhaustive but it has been judged by the neutral Helmand River Delta
Commission to be sufficient to conclude that the lowest total runoff
for the most severe drought year was considerably more than one million
acre feet, or considerably more than is ever needed for actual irrigation
in the Sistan basin. The problem therefore is essentially one of the
better utilization of available water resources rather than a struggle
for more water. The main problems are (i) the continued lowering of the
river channel, which makes it progressively harder to make the required
diversions from the main channel into the irrigation canals; (2) the
movement of loose sand across the delta 'caused by the very strong winds
In the area, especially during summer; and (3) the poor irrigation methods
prevailing in the area coupled with the lack of cooperation between farmers
on both sides of the border.
The waters of the Helmand have traditionally flowed substantially
unimpeded from the upper river, through the southern desert of Afghanistan
and thence into the Sistan delta-basin. The only interference with the
stream flow until quite recently was the construction of temporary brush
and mud dams by both sides to divert water into the irrigation canals
and side channels running off the main channel into both countries.
The construction of permanent Afghan and Iranian water control
works on the Helmand since the Second World War has altered this situation.
By far the more important are the Afghan works. They include two major
storage dams, one on the Helmand and the other on the Arghandab, a major
tributary, and greatly expanded irrigation facilities in the upper Helmand
valley. These projects, the key works in the ambitious American-assisted
Helmand Valley development scheme, were brought into partial operation in
1952-53. The Iranians constructed two dams on the Sistan river primarily
to divert flood water into Afghanistan. The Afghan dams, particularly
the one on the Helmand, have resulted in a material reduction of the magnitude
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of the floods and the length of the flooding time in the Sistan basin
and have appreciably increased the flow during the summer, the low
water period. Despite this important advance, in times of exceptional
flood they are of limited value because once the reservoirs are filled,
the overflow pours through the overflow gates, ultimately inundating the
Sistan delta. According to information from Italconsult, an Italian
firm which has done extensive hydrological work for the Iranians in the
Sistan basin, the Iranian dams have limited value to Iran because they
can only divert water into Afghanistan during times of high flow, rather
than storing it for future use. These dams have apparently had some
success in diverting flood waters, however.
Arbitration Efforts
Goldsmid Award:
The Goldsmid award of 1870-2 is the basis of the Helmand river
disputRisince it divided the Helmand basin area between Afghanistan and
Iran. !V For about 125 years prior to the 1860's the entire Sistan delta
had been under Afghan control, although during much of the 19th century
this control had been only nominal. When an internecine struggle for the
throne weakened Afghan military power in the early 1860's, Persian troops
occupied most of the region. This challenge was not met until 1868 when
Emir Sher Ali consolidated, his power in Kabul and sent troops to oust the
Persians. The Afghans won initial successes and the Persians appealed
to the British; Goldsmid's mission was the British response. His demarca-
tion of the border had virtually the rorce or u dictat because ofAiritish
hegemony in the region.
There is no question but that the British border demarcation favored
the Persians because, in effect, it legitimized the greater part of the
Persian military occupation of the Sistan six years earlier. The British
were motivated by the desire to use Persia as a bulwark against Czarist
expansion and the award was intended to win Persian cooperation. Since
--Afghanistan was in no position to challenge British authority, the,G91dsmid
award was accepted. Afghanistan has never officially raised the question
of the loss of Sistan in connection with the water dispute or in any other
way, but memories of these events may contribute to Afghan resentment of
Irani claims that its water rights have been violated by the Afghan government..
In the final paragraph of the award Goldsmid specified that "no works
are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the
requisite supply of water for irrigation on the banks of the Helmand." In
1873 the Britistl Foreign Secretary, in an interpretation of the Goldsmid
;'g
1/ British General Sir Frederic Goldsmid actually demarcated the border in 1870-2,
but the award was not confirmed by the British Foreign Officeuntil'1873.
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award given after consulting with General Goldsmid, ruled out that this
clause did not apply to new works, provided that the requisite supply of
water for irrigation was not diminished. Goidsmid did not spell out the
amount of water that was "requisite" and this point remains the heart of
the Helmand waters problem today.
McMahon Award:
For 30 years following the Goldsmid award disputes between Afglolnis-
tan and Iran over water use in the Helmand delta were apparently settled
locally without the intervention of either central government. However,
in 1902, two events combined to underline the lack of any agreement over
the apportionment of the water reaching the delta area: because of a
flood the river shifted its course altering the border, and subsequently
a severe drought occurred. The Iranians requested British assistance in
delimiting the border and determining the requisite water supply. After
three years of work, most of it devoted to a study of hydrographic data
on the scene, Colonel A. H. McMahon ruled in 1905 that Iranian require-
ments were one-third of the water reaching Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.
Both Afghanistan and Iran accepted the minor readjustment in the
border and Afghanistan also acceded to the apportionment of the Helmand
waters. However, Iran has never accepted McMahon's ruling on the division
of the water. MdMahon stressed two other points in making apportionment
of the water: (1) floods cause "far more" damage to land and crops year
after year, "than is caused by want of water"; (2) in the rare cases of
deficiency of water in the Sistan, "Afghan Sistun has suffered equally
with Persian Sistan."
1905 to the Post World War II Period
Between 1905 and the middle 1930's the question of the Helmand
waters division was settled yearly by a joint commission appointed by
the twg/countries to measure and apportion the flow at Bandar-i-Kamal
Khan. .2./
In 1933 King Nadir Shah of Afghanistan offered Iran a one-half share
of the Helmand water reaching Bandar-i-Kamal Khan and negotiations began
in that year. In 1936 a joint protocol incorporating the Afghan offer
was signed and led to a temporary agreement in 1937. In December 1936
a permanent agreement was signed by the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs
and the Iranian AMbassador. However, the Afghan National Assembly refused
to accept an Iranian declaration annexed to the agreement that the Afghan
government would not interfere with the "share of Iran from Bandar-i-Kamal
Khan", arguing that it would be superfluous in view of the agreement itself
3/ Since there were no severe drought years in this period the work of
this joint commission appears to have been primarily academic.
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h/
and therefore a reflection on Afghan sincerity. ? This is the closest
the two countries have ever been to an overall settlement.
Between 1.545 and 1947 the Afghan government submitted three counter-
proposals to the Iranian annex. These proposals were rejected by the
Iranians presumably because they added a stipulation reserving the Afghan
right to use the Helmap4 waters in the upper Helmand valley for agri-
cultural development. Y For their part, the Iranians demonstrated
increased interest in the problem during the immediate post-war years
because of Afghan initiation of upstream development projects and the
coincidence of a low water year in 1946 and a serious drought in 1947.
Althouth the development projects were just beginning to get underway at
this time, the Iranians charged that the Afghans had willfully deprived
them of water. Investigation on the scene by American officials veri-
fied that these charges were false and that the drought was felt through-
out the entire Helmand basin. Nevertheless Iranian fears that upstream
development would deprive them of needed water were genuine and it
appeared at the time that these fears might have some basis in fact.
American involvement and the Neutral Commission
In the context of continuing Iranian and Afghan willingness to
discuss this problem despite several previous failures, the United States
offered its good offices in October 1947 to expedite an agreement.
American interest in the controversy was heightened by the fact that an
American company, Morrison-Knudson, had been hired by the Afghan govern-
ment to build the dams and canals of the Helmand Valley development
scheme. Both sides accepted the American initiative in principle almost
immediately but owing to technical differences and diminished interest
with the onset of a good water flow, it was not until September 1950 that
a preliminary accord was reached. At that time both countries accepted
an American proposal calling for the formation of a neutral commission of
internationally known hylmlogy and irrigation experts to study the
technical aspects of the problem. It was mutually agreed that the
commission's purpose would be fact finding only with a view to "establish
an engineering basis', for mutual accord. prior to the departure of the
4/ Sections 2 and 8 of the 1938 agreement appear to substantiate the
National Assembly's position. They stipulate that: (a) the Afghan Govern-
ment agrees not to build any new canals downstream from Bandar-i-Kamal
Khan to where the river branches into Iran; and (b) both parties will
refrain from actions in this area which "may reduce the share of water of,
or cause damage to, either party."
V Ths development area is approximately 175 miles upstream from Baudar-
r-Kamal Khan; this is the Helmand Valley authority (HVA) region of which
the two large storage and diversion dams are the key element.
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commission, an American engineer was appointed as fact-finder to prepareri
a study of the Helmand problem on the spot in both Iran and Afghanistan./
This study was completed in August 191;0 and ii .)/October the neutral
commission departed for Iran and Afghanistan.if
The commission completed its work in _December 1950 and published ite
report in February 1951. The report recommended that an interim accord
be reached on the basis of the traditional water requirements of both
countries, to run for a period of not less than five years, pending the
collection by both countries oC more complete hydrographic data. The
Commission reiterated the McMahon award's position that the core problem
in the delta was actually the proper use of available water, since even
the "most severe drought year" provided about twice as much water as was
needed for actual irrigation but that poorly constructed irrigation canals
and unscientific diversion of available water caused tremendous wastage
and resulted in the infrequent crop failures.
The Afghan government expressed satisfaction with the report almost
immediately after its publication, but waited until 1952 before official-
ly offering to negotiate a settlement on the basis of this report. Since
the Commission's conclusions did not differ substantially from those of
the McMahon award, Iran implicitly rejected the report by ignoring it
officially until 1954. In November of that year Iran asked that negoti-
ations be reopened, but only on the condition that the framework for
future discussions be set by all available documents and data, rather
than the commission report alone. After fruitless preliminary discussion
the Afghans acceded to Iran's condition in the fall of 1955, but despite
several exchanges no progress was made.
Iran's position on the report is not known in detail, hut it seems
clear that it objected primarily to the neutral commission 's endorsement
of an acreage figure for irrigated land in the Sistan similar to that
used by McMahon in making his award. Much of the data which the Iranian
government furnished to the neutral commission is contradictory and
unconvincing. The most important 'Iranian report was compiled by the
Independent Irrigation Administration of Iran in 1950 and entitled
?Irrigation Water Required Annually in Sistan.H The fact-finder found
the Iranian report exaggerated, to say the least. He estimated that the
report provided for the continual diversion of 2 cubic meters per second
of The fact-finder was Mr. Malcolm Jones, who spent from !larch to
Tuust 1950 in the area studying the Helmand problem. His report
supplied much of the data on which the neutral commission based its report.
7/ The members of the commission were internationally known irrigation
alid hydrology experts; Christopher E. Webb of Canada, Robert L. Lowry of
the United States and Francisco J. Dominguez of Chile.
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for human and livestock consumption totalling 45,630,000 gallons per day,
an amount which would provide 100 gallons per day per individual in he
area (200,000), and more than 25,000,000 gallons per day for livestock.
The engineering report observed that "these rates are far p) exces:, of
any past or present consumption rates in the Sistan area.u.tY Data
supplied by other official Iranian sources differ substantially from the
data in the official report. The disparity can be seen most clearly in
the acreage figures: The government's report gave annual acreage irri-
gated as 157,800 for the average dry year and 217,000 for the average
rainfall year; representatives of the six administrative districts of
Iranian Sistan informed the neutral commission in 1950 that the acreage
figure is 150,700; and American officials who visited Sistan in 1955 and
1960 were given substantiallx/different figures for the same years by
different Iranian officials.Z!
The distinction between "dry" and ',average rainfall,' years which
appears to account, at least in part, for the larger figures in the
official report does not appear in any other available estimates, includ-
ing others provided by Iran. It seems probable that the Independent
Irrigation Administration's report is a projection of the acreage Iran
believes can be irrigated in the future rather than the amount actually
under present cultivation. Information Italconsult provided to an
American official in 1960 tends to support this conclusion. The
Italconsult engineers said that the area currently irrigable is about
247-,I00 acres, of which one half or lesa1A4 actually cultivated during
any given year due to the fallow system._' This figure is considerably
In excess of other estimates probably because it was arrived at from
studying aerial photographs of the Sistan basin. Therefore it is likely
to be an estimate of the potential land in the Sistan which could be
brought into production in the foreseeable future as part of a develop-
ment program in the area.
ti/ Actual animal requirements per heads Sheep - about 1 gallon per day;
"Cattle - about 10 gallons per day.
9/ The Iranian Director of Agriculture and irrigation for Sistan,
Ilingineer Manavi, told an American official that about 185,325 acres were
under cultivation for the 1959-60 season. The Governor of Sistan told
the same official that the figure for the same period was 148,260 acres.
rIV6'-This figure should be comf:ared with that of iv),./ 00 acres under
altivation furnished in 10 to the neutral commission by the Iranian
jbfficials representing each of the six administrative districts of
Iranian Sistan. Available evidence does not point to any appreciable
increase in the amount of cultivated acreage since 19')0.
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The most important consequence of the neutral commission's report
has been its effect on the frame of reference for apportionment. Mille
Iran has refused to accept the commission's definition of the
"traditional" annual use of Helmand waters as being 530,000 acre feet
for Iranian Sistan and 160,000 for Afghan Sistan, both parties now use
the acre feet method instead of a peryptage of total flow in determining
their position of the Helmand waters.-2
Specifically, they have both converted their estimates of needed
acre feet of water based upon their estimates of agricultural lands in
the delta to cubic meters per second (or most often ucusecu in hydro-
logical shorthand). This means simply that, following the commission
report, Iran and Afghanistan have measured their claim in terms of the
amount of water that passes a given point (in this case Bandar-i-Kamal
Khan) in one second. The cusec totals, using the figures arrived at by
the coiJ,ssion report, are 20.73 for the Iranians and for the Afghans
6.26. ?
International Law and the Helmand Dispute
From the point of view of international law the Iranian position
appears weak. As the upper riparian nation, Afghanistan is free to
utilize the waters of the Helmand in any manner it deems fit so long as
it assures Iran the share of the water to which it is entitled through
previous agreement or arbitral award. This amount was set by the
mcmahon award to be one-third of the total reaching Pandar-i-Kamal Khan
and there is no convincing evidence that Afghanistan has ever deprived
Iran of the stipulated share. Iran's position has been that the one-
third share is insufficient for its needs, but ander international law
it cannot unilaterally denounce the mcmahon Award. Differences over
this award should be worked out between both parties or be resubmitted
to international arbitration.
The Afghan position, by contrast, appears strong. Afghanistan has
officially recognized Iran's claims to an equitable share of the Helmand
waters ever since the Goldsmid Award and it has cooperated with Iran
since 1905 in the measurement of the division of the water. Moreover,
consensus of engineering and other informed opinion has been that the
upstream Afghan projects have benefited both countries. Finally, as
11/ Biased on-the figure of 1149,000 acres for Iranian Sistan and 41,000
Fares for Afghan Sistan or, as it is sometimes referred to, Chakhansur.
12/ Figures.: Iran: 530,000 acre feet x 1,233.5 cubic meters (one acre
Mot) = 653,7,000 cubic meters, divided by. 31,536,000 (seconds in a
year) = 20.73. Afghanistan: 160,000 acre feet x 1,233.5 cubic meters =
197,360,000, divided by 31,536,000 = 6,26.
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recognized by McMahon and the neutral commission, lack of water in the
delta area affects both the Iranian and Afghan cultivators and since
most of the irrigable Afghan delta land is downstream from that of Iran,
the Afghans suffer first.
The Iranians have contended that Afghanistan is obliged to consult
with Iran or give it the opportunity to participate in any upstream
development on the Helmand on the grounds that such development might
interfere with Iran's prior water rights. This issue was a burning one
in the /ate forties and early fifties when Afghanistan was developing
the upper' Helmand valley and Iran has apparently never abandoned this
principle. The United States attitude on this question is apparent in
a note of January 5, 1950 in which it informed Iran that:
',This Government is not aware of any condition under
international law whereby a state undertaking develop-
rent of water resources is legally obliged to consult
with or give the opportunity to participate in such
development to another state provided that in the
development the upper state assures the lower state
the quantity of water to which the later is entitled
through previous agreement to arbitral award."
The Iranian government has also insisted that Iran is entitled to
a share of any waters stored in dams along the Helmand and has cited
the Mexican-American dispute over the Rio Grande in support of this
thesis. The United States does not accept the Iranian interpretation
because: (1) although Mexico was charged for some of the cost of the
Imperial Dam because it used water stored there, it did not possess the
right to the impounded water merely because it paid for some of the cost
of the dam; (2) prior appropriation creates a right which, under the
conditions prevailing during the Lreaty negotiations between the US and
Mexico, would have led an arbitration board to allocate Mexico 1.8
million acre feet rather than the 1.5 million acre feet specified by the
Treaty of 1944; (3) the treaty :;ave OS protection against future
Mexican claims to more water .tiithout regard to the subsequent con-
struction Of new storage dams in the US.
The Current Afghan and Iranian Positions
The exact details of the present Iranian position are not known,
but the irapian Foreign Minister has stated in confidence that [ran is
prepared to accept 30 cuSecs. Since Iran at one time wanted w cusecs,
there is good reason to believe that the Iranian government has recog-
nized the unrealistic nature of some of its contentious. The 'Afghan
government reportedly has agreed to offer 27 cuseco, apparently bringing
the two countries closer together than at any time since 1938.
plg;REr/No FOREION DISSIT1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130005-4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130005-4
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSill
-11-
The official Afghan position since ilarch 19'..)9 has been 26 cusecs,
a figure Which is considered generous in Kabul because the data compiled
by the neutral commission works out to 20.73 cusecs for Iran. So far
there has been no information from Afghan sources that the Afgnans are
prepared to increase their offer, but Afghan-Iranian relations are now
very good and the Afghans, mindful of their recent serious difficulties
with Pakistan, appear most anxious to settle the Helmand problem
The Iranian government has been very forthcoming toward Afgnanistan's
desires to maintain an active transit route through Iran as an alterna-
tive to that in Pakistan. Iran's constructive approach probably owes
something to its desire to elicit a favorable settlement of the Helmand
question. In the past the Iranian government has discussed with the
Afghan authorities the possibility of offering a "package deal', in an
effort to improve relations. During the 18 month period when the Afghan-
Pakistan border was sealed, Iran suggested that it might help Afghanistan
by: (1) facilitating Afghan trade through Meshed; (2) supplying
increased amounts of petroleum products; (3) taking more Afghan exports;
and (4) offering free access to the Iranian port of Chahbahar. This
gesture was welcomed in Kabul during a difficult period and, in fact, the
first two proposals have been partially implemented.
Past experience, especially the unsuccessful efforts of the neutral
commission, suggests that even preliminary overall agreement on the
Helmand dispute may be hard to achieve. The best results in the current
negotiations are likely to be obtained if both sides put aside their
dispute over the "correctness" of their respective positions and work
towards a technical agreement in a quit atmosphere.
One of the most thorny problems is likely to be the monthly
apportionment or the water flow. This question would not necessarily be
solved by any given cusec agreement since the normal yearly total flow
into Iran is already well above the present Iranian position of 30 cusecs.
The problem is in the dryer months-from July to November in normal years -
or throughout the year in exceedingly low water years.
The Iranian Ambassador in Kabul recently stated that Sistaa needs
proportionately more water during June and July, a claim which is
contradicted by all available figures, including those in the official
Iranian report of 1950. As the Ambassador must have been aware of this
situation, his statement probably was intended to suggest that beginning
in June the amount of water available in the delta area diminishes to
the point where extensive cropping is rendered difficult. This is
certainly the case; there is never adequate water in the late summer for
more than small areas on both sides of the border. If the Iranian
Ambassador's concern points to the Iranian government's desire to
increase summer cropping and Iran intends to insist on a guaranteed
summer flow of about 30 cusecs then the discussions appear unlikely to
succeed.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130005-4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130005-4
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DiSSEM
- 12 -
The Afghans have been firmly opposed to any such guarantees on the
ground that drought periods are infrequent and during such periods no
one can guarantee the delta area a minimum flaw. On the other hand, the
Afghan government will probably be prepared to make a minimum guarantee
for normal flow years. The definition of a "normal" flow could lead to
an interminable dispute involving a-mass of technical data mucll of which
Iran has already implicitly rejected. The only alternative to this
sterile approach likely to be acceptable to the Afghans and Iranians
alike might be to tie a guaranteed flow during drought years to a slid-
ing scale based on the inflow into the Kajkai and Arghandab dams.
Because these two dams have already reduced the chances of a really
severe drought year, the Iranian government might agree to this stipu-
lation, particularly if the agreement were accompanied by plans to build
jointly a multiple purpose dam in the lower Helmand just upstream from
Bandar-i-Kamal Khan. such a dam is desirable for the delta area as a
whole and a joint project might serve to assuage deeply felt Iranian
fears that the Afghans, if they build such a dam alone, might design it
to divert water away from Iran.
Conclusion
In the climate of improving Iranian-Afghan relations, a settlement
of the Helmand waters dispute seems a distinct possibility. The
advantages to both sides are important and obvious. Moreover, the
technical problems involved are not very difficult, primarily because
the Helmand almost always has enough water for both the Afghan and ?
Iranian users. Like other similar disputes, however, matters of national
honor and prestige have become involved, requiring face-saving as well as
technically feasible solutions.
The Afghans, perhaps because of feelings of inferiority, have often
given the impression that their duty lay in preventing the devious Ira-
raw from outsmarting them. The Iranians on their part have sometimes
behaved as if the Helmand river were a spigot which the Afghans delight
in turning on and off just to spite Iran. Nevertheless, there now
exists an atmosphere of confidence which augurs well for an eventual
settlement of this thorny problem.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130005-4
PROVISIONAL EDITION
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP08001297R000100130005-4
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