BACKGROUND ON THE PROGRAM:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00184R000100010007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/19: CIA-RDP90B00184R000100010007-1
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BACKGROUND ON THE PROGRAM:
In 1954, Mr. Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson of Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation presented a drawing board version of the U-2 Aircraf'c, to the
'U.S. Government for their consideration of the vehicle as a reconnaissance
collection aircraft. Mr. Johnson pointed out that the aircraft would be
excellent for this type of work because of its high altitude and long
range capabilities. Headquarters and the USAF, impressed with the potential
employment of the aircraft, sought apnropriate approvals for the program
and subsequently embarked on a joint Headquarters-USAF:project. It was
agreed Project Headquarters would generally run the program with logistical.
and technical support furnished by the USAF in accordance with the joint
policy guidance. For purposes of administering and controlling the project,
Project Headquarters created a separate staff to contract for the deployment
of the aircraft, monitor the development activity, administer all personnel
involved, establish operational policies and procedures; and provide a tightly
controlled and secure program. Simultaneous with the creation of a mechanism
for monitoring development and operational use of the aircraft, steps were
taken to establish an intelligence community effort for identification Of
intelligence requirements and processing, interpretation and distribution of
the final product by the most expeditious and secure means.
Initial development activities began at Lockheed and subsequently
expanded to a test site facility within the Atomic Energy Commission testing
facility in Nevada. This site was used for flight testing the vehicle,
equipment checkout and pilot transition and training.
In anticipation of overseas deployment; where the U-2 detachment would
require USAF support, the program was surfaced as a NASA-Air Weather Service
research program engaged in the collection of upper air weather and air
turbulence data. Additidnally, the proiert leJA identified in classified
circles . NASA was chosen as one of program sponsers in order to give the activity a civilian, non-offensive.
appearance. The introduction of Air Weather Service into the picture was
necessary to explain the use of USAF facilities overseas and, at the same
time, further tag the program as a scientific Undertaking.
As soon as the initial U-2 became Operationally ready, plans were made
for the deployment of one unit to a forward overseas location.
ORGINS OF WRSP TV
In May 1956 the first U-2 unit, designated Weather Recpnnalqqance
Squadron (Provisional) 1st, deployed This
was then, WRSP-I. Due to the political climate in the host country at that
time, the unit was subsequently Moved to Wiesbaden AB, Germany from which
location overflights began with the first overflight on 20 J4n_1956-4
In August of 1956, a second unit was deployed to Adana, Turkey (IPIRSP-,II).
In February of 1957 a similar detachment was sent to Atsugi, Japan (WRSP-III).
In September 1956, WRSP-I. at Weisbaden moved where it
remained until November 1957 at which time the unit was moved back to the U.S.
The Adana detachment remained at that location until the fall of 1960 when
the major part of the detachment returned to the U.S., in the fall of 1960.
The returning detachments were located at Edwards AF. These plus the
remainder of personnel and equipment that had been moved from the AEC test site
) in Nevada to Edwards AFB in June of 1957 to become :ASP-IV.
In
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Initially it was thought that overflights would be conducted direct
from the overseas U-2 bases as were the first flights from Weisbaden 25X1
and isolated flights from Adana and Atsugi. Subsequently, it ZOA
was decided that the best coverage could be obtained by staring from other
bases closer to the target areas. The locations used_on these staging
operations were Alaska, Pakistan, Phillipine Islands, and Thailand. 25X1
Frol- these staging locations and overseas bases themselves, fifty-two (52)
flights were made over Sino-Soviet bloc countries. Numerous other periphery
flights were made as well as Middle East and Southeast Asia coverage. .
As well the flights mentioned above, which were Mainly photo-reconnaissance
and ELINT flights, many training flights were conducted including legitimate
weather reconnaissance Specialized missions 25X1
were flown from Japan to photograph typhoons, 25X1
These proved to be of value to the Air Weather Service typhoon monitoring
program and likewise to the Japanese Meteorological Society. Other by-products
of the program were the development of more sophisticated collection equip-
ment and electronic countermeasures mechanisms which continued concurrently
with the preformance of the primary mission.
THE 1 MAY INCIDENT
In the early part of May 1960, the U-2 Program, up to this point a
covert intelligence program, became a topic of conversation in every corner
of the world. NBC described thier television expose "White Paper" of the
U-2 incident as the most widely listened to docuementary program of 1960.
U-2 became a household word and Francis Gary Powers) a more widely known
individual than many heads of state.
Little did Mr. Powers know that he would obtain such notoriety when he 1
joined the program in 1956. Prior to this, he had been a USAF pilot at
Turner AFB in Albany, Georgia. Mr. Powers resigned from 25X1
the USAF and went to work for Lockheed 10d-craft Corporation. He was trained
to fly the new aircraft at the AEC covet location and exibited great skill
in the mechanics of flying and navigation.
Prier to the 1 May Flight, Mr. Powers was briefed on his flight plan
-which ran from Peshawar,Pakistan to Bodo, Norway. After his briefing, Mr.
Powers took off and proceeded along his prOgrammed course Until he reached
Sverdlovsk where he experienced difficulties. The Soviet Union claimed that
a direct hit from one of their ground to air missiles" was responsible for the
aircrafts initial descent from altitude and the following crash. Many theories
have been advanced for the explanation of what occured at Sverdlovsk. The
most recent and widely publicized answer comes from Col. Oleg Penkovskiy
who is know popularly :as "The Spy in the Kremlin": Col. Penkovskiy claims he
released Russian intelligence information in order to alert American and
British people to the danger of Khrushchev's "adventurist tactics". Col.
Penkovskiy stated that 14 missiles were fired at the plane. It was not a
direct hit but rather the shock wave that caused the aircraft to disintegrate.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE U-2 PROGRAM
Before the beginning of the program the United States had organized
against the threat of suprise attack by the Soviet Union. U.S. sources and
analysis had given us a.great deal of knowledge concerning the Capabilities
of the Soviet Union.
Classical intelligence sources often deal in information which is hard
to verify and difficult to interpret. These sources showed that the Soviet
Union. was developing considerable nilitary power,
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There' remained many questions concerning the level which the Soyiets had
reached. The rate at which the Soviets were increasing their power and
their ultimateairAs for its use was an unanswered question. Half knowledge
of the Soviet Union and uncertainity of its true power position posed
tremendous problemsfor the United States. The United States was faced with
the constant risk of exposing ourselves to enemy attack or of needlessly
expending a great?deal Of money and effort on military preparations of our
own, which would become obsolete before they were needed.
In order to meet this situation, it was determined that the U-2 program
was the answer. The U-2 would give the United Statea'a firm foundation of
hard information on which to make intelligence judgments. The program, has .
.covered a large part of the most important areas in the Soviet Union and
has provided information on a great variety of subjects important to the
evaluation of the Soviet power position. The main emphasis however, was
directed against three critical problems; namely the Soviet bomber force, the
Soviet atomic energy programs and the Soviet migqile nrogram.
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