YOUR BREAKFAST WITH REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT KASTENMEIER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000400070007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 11, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCA 88-2297
11 July 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Your Breakfast with Representative Robert W.
Kastenmeier (D., WI)
1. On Tuesday, 12 July at 8:00 a.m. you are scheduled to
host a breakfast in your Dining Room for Representative Robert
Kastenmeier. Also in attendance will be Bob Gates, Dick Kerr,
Dick Stolz, and myself.
2. Mr. Kastenmeier was appointed to the House Intelligence
Committee in 1985 as the most senior of the group of six
Democrats who joined the Committee at that time. He is also
the third ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee.
He appears to put most of his energy into that Committee,
where he chairs a key Subcommittee on civil rights.
3. He is regarded as a leading thinker among House
liberals. His ideological liberalism, however, is accompanied
by a conservative personal style. He does not enjoy
confrontations and actively seeks to avoid them.
4. Mr. Kastenmeier attends most House Intelligence
Committee hearings--budget, covert action, and the Tuesday
morning briefings (current intelligence updates), finding them
generally informative and interesting. He is an active
questioner, usually trying to get at the legal or political
rationale behind the actions under discussion. In the past he
has indicated that he does not read many of the Agency's
products, not even the National Intelligence Daily.
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6. Mr. Kastenmeier would welcome your comments on develop-
ments in the world's hot spots, including the Iran airliner
shootdown, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan.
7. Our interest is to expose Kastenmeier to senior Agency
managers and establish a stronger relationship to prepare for
his likely nomination to the Committee chairmanship next
January. He would serve a two-year term. In fact,
Kastenmeier 's selection is not at all certain--Beilenson and
former Member McCurdy could also make a strong claim.
Attachments
John . Helgerson
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BIOGRAPHY
Name (including party/state:) Rep Robert (Bob) Kastenmeier (D., WI)
University of Wisconsin
District: Wisconsin 2 - Madison; rural areas famous for cheese &
Wisconsin dells
First elected: 1958 Up for re-election: 1988 Winning %: 56%
Past service on intelligence committee: Yes: No: x
Current service on intelligence committee: Yes: x NO:
Term on intelligence committee expires: 1991
Other committee assignments: Judiciary - 3rd Ranking Democrat,
chairs Subcmte on Courts and Civil Liberties
Major intelligence/legislative interests: Covert action reporting
procedures; quality of analysis; and is sensitive to issues
involving individual liberties
STAT
Visits to CIA facilities:
Last contact with DCl/DDCI: House Intelligence breakfast on
21 April 1988
Recent correspondence:
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?
Wisconsin .! 2nd District
e
2 Robert W.
Kastenmeier (D)
Of Sun Prairie ? Elected 1958
Born: Jan. /4. 1924. Beaver Dam, Wis.
Education: U. of Wisconsin, LL.B. 1952.
Military Career. Army. 1943-46.
Occupation: Lawyer.
Family: Wife. Dorothy Chambers; three children.
Religion: Unspecified.
Political Career: Democratic nominee for U.S. House,
1956.
Capitol Office: 2328 Rayburn Bldg. 20515; 225-2906.
In Washington: Kastenmeier has not
changed much ideologically during his long
House career ? he is as solid in his commit-
ment to equal rights and civil liberties as he
was when he arrived nearly 30 years ago. But
his role has changed enormously. Kastenmeier
has evolved from a crusader into a technician.
Kastenmeier is as conservative in his per-
sonal style as he is liberal in outlook. A dull
speaker with a distaste for flamboyance, he is
often overshadowed on Judiciary by members
who express their views more militantly.
While other Judiciary Committee Demo-
crats have used their senior positions to stake
out rhetorical opposition to Reagan priorities,
Kastenmeier has said relatively little in public.
Instead, during unfavorable times for liberal
initiatives, he has busied himself in the com-
plexities of patent law and court administra-
tion, using his Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and Administration of Justice to push
through a wide variety of technical but impor-
tant pieces of legislation.
Kastenmeier devoted much of the 1970s to
working on the intricacies of copyright law.
producing the first comprehensive revision in
that field in more than 60 years and guiding it
through nearly a decade of debate.
Since then, advances in technology have
presented Kastenmeier and his subcommittee
with a myriad of new copyright and patent
issues to delve into. One successful Kasten-
meier bill in the 98th Congress gave 10 years of
copyright protection to the makers of
microchips by categorizing the mask works on
the chips as a new type of "writing."
Less successful, so far at least, has been
Kastenmeier's bill to make liable for patent
infringement anyone who imports, sells or uses
products made abroad by a process patented in
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the United States. The measure, the result of
four years' work by the subcommittee. failed U.-
clear Congress in 1986.
In the 99th Congress, Kastenmeier worked
to extend privacy guarantees for telephone con-
versations to messages transmitted and stored
in computers. known as "electronic mail." Hi
legislation attracted a coalition of suppor,
ranging from business groups to the American
Civil Liberties Union; that helped persuade a
reluctant Justice Department to come aboard.
The bill was signed by President Reagan irt
October 1986.
Kastenmeier's subcommittee also handle
the federal courts, and he played a major role in
changing the bankruptcy court system, which
had been left in limbo by a 1982 Supreme
Court decision. He fought a plan, pushed by
Judiciary Chairman Peter W. Rodino Jr., which
would have created a new system of 227 judger
with special constitutional standing. Under
that standing, the judges would have had life
tenure and salaries that could not be reduced
by Congress. "If we err," Kastenmeier said. let
us err on the side of caution."
Kastenmeier insisted that the new judge-
ships were not needed to handle bankruptry
cases. In the end, Congress agreed. Overall
authority over bankruptcy matters was eventu-
ally given to federal district court judges, with
bankruptcy judges adjuncts to those courts.
In 1986. Kastenmeier's chairmanship
forced him to public attention in one of the
more extraordinary events to occur in Congrew
in many years: the impeachment and trial of a
federal judge.
U.S. District Judge Harry E. Claiborne of
Nevada was serving a two-year sentence for tat
evasion but refused to resign and continued to
receive his $78,700 annual salary. Kasten-
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Wisconsin 2
Republicans have most of the land in
the 2nd. and Democrats have most of the
voters. While the district covers a sizable
portion of southern Wisconsin's Republi-
can-voting rural areas. its centerpiece is the
traditionally Democratic city of Madison in
Dane County.
The 1980 election serves as an example
of GOP frustration. Even though Kasten-
meier lost every county except Dane. his 3-
lo-2 edge there was sufficient to lift him to
viclor\.
Madison. the state capital and second
largest city in Wisconsin, has its share of
industry: meat processor Oscar Mayer, for
example. employs more than 2.450 in its
Madison plant. But the city's personality is
dominated by its white-collar sector ? the
bureaucrats who work in local and state
government, the 2,200 educators and 45.000
students at the University of Wisconsin.
and the large number of insurance company
home offices, so many that Madison calls
itself a Midwestern Hartford.
Madison boasts a tradition of political
liberalism. Since 1924, when Robert M. La
Follette carried Dane County as the Pro-
gressive Party's presidential candidate.
Democrats nearly always have won here.
Walter F. Mondale won the county by more
South ?
Madison
than 20.000 votes in 1984. and in 1986.
Democratic Senate nominee Ed Garvey
took 58 percent of the Dane vote while
losing statewide.
Outside the Madison area, agriculture
and tourism sustain the district's economy.
Dairying is important, and there is some
beef production, although many livestock
farmers have switched in recent years to
raising corn as a cash crop.
In New Glarus (Green County). which
was founded by the Swiss. the downtown
area has been redone to resemble a village in
the mother country. Wisconsin Dells (Co-
lumbia County) lures big-city tourists to
view the steep ridges and high plateaus
along the Wisconsin River.
The majority of farmers and small-
town people in the district are conservative.
and they chafe at Madison's dominance of
district politics. In 1986. GOP House nomi-
nee Ann Haney won 9 of the 10 predomi-
nantly rural counties in the 2nd. But has-
tenmeier's 60 percent tally in Dane County
gave him a comfortable overall victory mar-
gin.
Population: 523,011. White 509.003 (97%). Black
6,051 (1%), Other 4,986 0%1 Spanish origin 4.233
(1%). 18 and over 383.086 (73%). 65 and over 55.870
(11%). Median age: 29.
meier's panel approved four articles of im-
peachment and sent them to the full Judiciary
Committee, which approved them 35-0.
Once the committee sent the impeachment
resolution to the House, Kastenmeier showed
.his characteristic distaste for the spotlight.
Before the House chose the nine managers, or
prosecutors, for the Senate's impeachment
trial. Kastenmeier said he did not intend to
seek his own appointment. "I feel my work is
done once we have concluded on the House
floor." he said. Kastenmeier nevertheless was
selected as one of five Democrats to serve as
managers in the Senate trial, which resulted in
Claiborne's removal from office.
Kastenmeier's subcommittee also has ju-
risdiction over some of the most sensitive social
issues of the 1980s. but he serves his liberal
principles on those subjects by taking as little
action as possible. He fights any legislation to
strip federal courts of jurisdiction over busing.
school prayer or abortion. He has held hearings
on some of these bills at various times in recent
years. but he has never come close to schedul-
ing any action on them. "These bills are merely
a form of chastisement," he has said while
sitting on several of them.
Kastenmeier came to Congress as one of
the small cadre of 1950s peace activists. He
complained about the anti-communist "witch
hunts" of his state's former GOP senator, Jo-
seph R. McCarthy. and said the -military-
industrial complex" was out of control. With
two former campaign aides, Marcus Raskin and
Arthur Waskow, now well-known leftist writ-
ers, he set out to produce a manifesto to
influence American foreign policy in the 1960s.
They began the Liberal Project and at-
tracted 17 other congressmen who wanted to
publish position papers on liberal issues. The
1960 election was not kind to them; 16 of the 18
were defeated. But Kastenmeier continued as
head of the redrawn "Liberal Group" and a few
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Wisconsin 2nd District
years later published the Liberal Papers, call-
ing for disarmament, admission of mainland
China to the United Nations and an end to the
draft. Republicans labeled them "apostles of
appeasement" and most Democrats ignored the
work. Since then, Kastenmeier has kept a lower
profile both inside the House and out. But
many of the ideas were accepted eventually.
His timing has been unusual. His opposi-
tion to the Vietnam War was so far ahead of
public opinion that by the time the anti-war
fervor reached its peak. Kastenmeier had been
through it already. He was consistent in his
support Tor the anti-war movement, but he was
never a national leader in it.
Early- in his career, Kastenmeier and his
allies in the Liberal Group ? Don Edwards
and Phillip Burton of California ? worked on
efforts to democratize House procedure. But
here too, Kastenmeier did not play a leading
role when the changes were actually made a
decade later. By then, he had turned his atten-
tion to legal work on Judiciary. He supported
the procedural reforms but was not publicly
associated with them by most members.
Kastenmeier admits that he and other
House liberals have modified the approach of
20 years ago. "We are less pretentious," he has
said. "We don't presume to accomplish as
much. We, in the context of the House of
Representatives, ought to try to be reasonably
effective. We feel we ought to be the cutting
edge of American liberalism in the body politic,
yet there is even a limitation to that."
At Home: It is no longer possible for
Kastenmeier to win re-election easily on the
mere strength of his opposition to the Vietnam
War or his support for the impeachment of
President Nixon. He has to take campaigning
almost as seriously as he did in the early years
of his career. But his seat seems secure for now.
After dropping to 54 percent of the vote in
1980 and losing every county in the district
except Dane, home of the University of Wis-
consin, he bounced back in his next two elec-
tions, taking more than 61 percent. Against a
strong candidate in 1986, he slipped back to 56
percent.
Although Kastenmeier never has seemed
very comfortable campaigning, he now does the
things that endangered Democrats have been
doing for years. In 1980 be hired a professional
campaign manager for the first time.
The son of an elected minor official from
Dodge County, Kastenmeier took only a lim-
ited interest in politics until he was nearly 30
yearS old. Then he became the Democratic
chairman of the second-smallest county in the
district,-and three years later, in 1956, decided
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to run for the seat left open by Republic:at
Glenn R. Davis, who ran for the Senate. Ka,
tenmeier lost to GOP nominee Donald E
Tewes by a 55-45 margin. But in 1958. with to,
of Wisconsin's most popular Democrats ? wit
ham Proxmire and Gaylord Nelson
on the statewide ticket, many Republicans as?
the 2nd stayed home and Kastenmeier won.
Kastenmeier's first three elections
hotly contested affairs that included a
tions that the Democrat was sympathetic *is
communists. ln his first successful campaign.
1958, he was helped by farm discontent
the policies of the Eisenhower administration
After 1964 redistricting removed Milwau?
kee's suburban Waukesha County from us.
district, Kastenmeier's percentages shot up in
1970, when the old charges were updated tr,
include criticism that Kastenmeier was "soft or,
radical students," the incumbent won bv
highest percentage ever.
Kastenmeier had few problems for a fist
decade after that. But in 1980, his refusal ts,
back away from any of his liberal views opens,
him to Republican assault as being out of step
with the new fiscal conservatism. Thos.t at
tacks, made by his challenger, former yo-yr,
manufacturer James A. Wright, had particular
appeal in the farming communities that sur
round Madison. Only Kastenmeier's strong
support in the Madison university communits
allowed him to survive the 1980 contest. in
which Nelson went down to defeat at the
statewide level.
In 1982, Republicans nominated a more
moderate candidate, tax consultant Jim John?
son. who tried to appeal to Madison and
avoided the Reagan-style rhetoric that Wright
had used. But the, issues were moving back in
Kastenmeier's direction. Much of the anti-gov-
ernment feeling of the previous election had
subsided, and the issue with the strongest ernr,
tional appeal was the nuclear freeze. Wisconsin
voted overwhelmingly for the freeze, and Kw
tenmeier was one of its most vocal supporters
The GOP did not give Kastenmeier much
trouble in 1984, but two years later found an
attractive challenger in Ann Haney, a moderate
Republican who served in the Cabinet of for-
mer GOP Gov. Lee Sherman Dreyfus. Haney. a
vivacious campaigner, tried to win support in
Dane County by challenging Kastenmeier's ef-
fectiveness more than his ideology. She argued
that Kastenmeier should have spent less time
on copyright and patent law and more time at
matters important to the 2nd District, such as
agriculture.
But if Kastenmeier's style and legislative
interests did not stir enthusiasm at home.
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". Haney still had difficulty overcoming the loyal
following he had built during almost three
decades in the House. She was further ham-
Robort W. Kastenmei?r, D-Wig.
pered shortly before the election when an ill-
ness in her family forced her off the campaign
trail for more than a week.
Committees
Judiciery (3rd 01 21 Democrats)
Courts, CM Liberties and the Administration of Justice
(chairman); Civil and Constitutional Rights.
Select Intelligence (4th of 11 Democrats)
Legislation; Program and Budget Authorization.
Elections
1186 General
Robert W. Kasienmeier (D)
Ann J. Haney (R)
1914 Sews!
Robert W. Kastenmeier (D)
Albert E Wiley Jr. (R)
106.919 (56%)
65.156 (44%)
159.987 (64%)
91.345 (36%)
Previous Virmning Percentages: 1062 (61%) 1910 (54%)
1178 (58%) 1076 (66%) 1674 (65%) 1972 (68%)
1170 (69%) 1968 (60%) 1166 (58%) 1064 (64%)
1e62 (53%) 1960 (53%) 1958 (52%)
District Vote For President
1864 USD 1976
^ 127.626 (50%) 0 124,236 (47%) D 124.106 (51%)
R 124,014 (49%) R 106,003 (40%) R 109.405 (45%)
I 25,513 (10%)
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Cut federal subsidy for water projects (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1986)
Cut back public housing construction (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Impose textile import limits over Reagan veto (1986)
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Impose South African sanctions over Reagan veto (1986)
Campaign Finance
Receipts Expend-
Receipts from PACs itures
1916
Kastenmeier (D)
Haney (R)
1184
Kastenmeier (D)
Wiley (11)
Year
1886
11165
1964
1963
1082
1161
6348.293 6106.730 (31%) 6385.947
6272.390 674,318 (27%) f271.077
S218.356 S71.912
$96.072
(33%) i206.040
517.925 (19%) $96.156
Voting Studies
Presidential Party Conservative
Support Unity Coalition
6 0 s 0 6 0
16 81 92 5 0 92
16 80 91 4 5 93
25 73 90 6 8 92
11 82 90 6 8 91
26 74 89 10 12 SE
22 75 89 11 5 95
S ? Support 0 = Opposition
t Not eligible for all recorded votes.
Year
1086
lees
11114
1983
1982
1081
Interest Group Ratings
ADA ACU
100 0
100 5
95 0
95 9
90 0
95 7
AFL-CIO CCUS
86 17
94 24
77 25
100 20
100 20
99 5
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Talking Points for the DCI
Iranian Reaction to the Airliner Shootdown
8 July 1988
Iran: Reaction to the Shootdown
Iranian officials worldwide are trying to portray the incident as proof
that the US presence in the Gulf is the cause of instability there.
-- Iran has officially asked the UN Security Council to condemn the US
and to call for the withdrawal of US forces from the Gulf. Iranian
officials realize that the Council is unlikely to condemn the US, but
probably calculate they will gain from renewed debate over the US
role in the Gulf.
-- Tehran is also usin the incident to rekindl so. ar support for the
war against Iraq.
We believe that the emotions generated by the shootdown and the Iranian
perception that the US action was part of a Washington-led effort to undermine
the Islamic Republic make it almost certain Tehran will eventually seek to
retaliate for the US action. A US offer to compensate the victims of the
shootdown is not likely to change Tehran's view that US goals and actions in the
region threaten vital Iranian interests.
-- Iran is unlikely to retaliate immediately because it will want to
.avoid jeopardizing the propaganda gains it hopes to realize from the
US action. Rafsanjani appeared to reflect this stance in a speech on
Tuesday in which he suggested that hasty retaliation could be
counter-productive.
In considering its options for responding, we believe Tehran would favor
striking at US interests through terrorism or laying mines in the Gulf, over
direct military confrontation, in order to minimize the chances of massive US
retaliation.
-- Iran is likely to use surrogate groups like Hizballah to carry out
terrorism in order to maintain the appearance of plausible
deniability.
Since the accidental downing on Sunday, we have noted a numhpr nf warninnc
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Naval Operations
Iran probably will confine itself to routine naval operations in the near
term to avoid taking attention away from the airliner tragedy.
-- No unusual naval activity has been noted since 3 July.
-- The risk of unplanned confrontations may be greater now, however, because
Iran cannot maintain complete control over its speedboats at sea, and
Iranian sailors are more likely to view nearby US forces--particularly
aircraft--as threats and try to shoot first.
The Ground War
Baghdad has firmly established its superiority over a troubled Iran and is
likely to continue pressing Tehran with more air and ground attacks. Tehran
appears to be hunkering down for a long--and possibly painful--period of
reorganization and preparation for its next attempt to recapture the initiative.
-- Iraq will continue to launch ground attacks of various sizes to try
to regain lost territory, damage Iranian morale, and wear down
Iranian forces. A major Iraqi offensive against Iran's last
significant salient in the Halabja area in the north is likely this
summer.
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TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
PANAMA
Political Developments
ALA/SCD
8 July 1988
The Panamanian regime withdrew its members from the Board of
Directors of the Canal Commission this week, charging that
Washington has turned management of the Canal into a weapon of
economic coercion.
The regime declared that US withholding of Canal payments
violates the 1977 Canal Treaties and that US obstruction
of Panama's participation in the Canal's administration
compelled the regime's decision. Specifically, Panama
objects to Washington's unilateral decision to move the
site of the meeting and US refusal to recognize the new
Panamanian board member.
The regime criticized Washington's refusal to include on
the meeting's agenda the "illegal retention" of monies
owed to Panama, and the obstruction of the Panamanian
delegation's technical staff from traveling to the US.
Acting Foreign Minister Ritter stated that Panama would
not recognize decisions made by the commission in
Panama's absence.
-- Panama indicated that it does not want to renegotiate the
treaties and would push for their enforcement in
international forums.
Panama's withdrawal from the commission is probably the
beginning of a campaign to counter US pressures by making the
administration of the waterway a major political issue.
-- The regime will try to avoid actions that would reduce
Canal earnings or give Washington a pretext to break the
treaties.
Nonetheless, Panama probably calculates that a propaganda
campaign in such organizations as the UN and the World
Court that raises questions about Washington's commitment
to honor the treaties would deal a significant setback to
US policy objectives.
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Economic Developments
Panama continues to take steps to lower its government
payroll, raise taxes, and search for foreign financial support,
but the regime's financial problems remain critical.
Panama received the fourth and final $4.9 million
installment of the $19.6 million Libyan loan last
Tuesday; additional assistance from Tripoli is unlikely
unless Noriega agrees to significant political
concessions, such as giving Qadhafi a freer hand to use
Panama as a base for terrorist activities.
-- The regime is trying to sell or mortgage government
assets to Taiwanese and Spanish investors to raise cash,
and is even considering putting up its interest in the
Trans-Panama oil pipeline as collateral to obtain short-
term loans.
Regime officials are groping for solutions to Panama's
economic problems. They reportedly believe that the most
immediate solution to Panama's economic problems could
Medellin drug
result from Colombians, specifically the
cartel, buying Panamanian assets.
Military Developments
We have no indications of flight activity between Cuba and
Panama
Although the majority of Nicaraguan military aircraft are
of Soviet origin, both the Sandinista Air Force and the
Panamanian Air Force have CASA-212 short-range
transports, as well as two or three other utility or
transport aircraft.
Apart from placing the Panama Defense forces on a higher
state of readiness over the fourth of July weekend, the
regime has conducted no unusual military activities
during the past two weeks.
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8 July 1988
TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
Nicaragua: The Current Situation
The bulk of rebel forces--some 10,000 out of an estimated
15,700-16,700 total--are currently in Honduras. Although the
rebels began reinfiltrating fighters into Nicaragua last week, in
part to allay Honduran concerns and persuade Tegucigalpa to release
rebel arms and munitions it controls, their efforts have been
hampered by supply shortages and uncertainty over future US
support.
In late June, some 1,300 combatants reportedly left the
Las Vegas salient to return to Nicaragua, and we believe
nearly 500 already have crossed the border.
We do not know the current objectives of these returning
fighters, but if hostilities resume they probably will
limit their actions to small-scale harassment and sabotage.
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Despite Managua's extension of the cease-fire until the end of
July, the sporadic fighting of recent weeks is likely to increase
as the insurgents reinfiltrate men from Honduras and the
Sandinistas try to block them and deal with rebel units inside
Nicaragua.
-- Sandinista counterinsurgency battalions are already
becoming more active in northern and central Nicaragua.
One battalion is moving to join an infantry brigade
opposite rebel positions in the Las Vegas salient.
Ow. .11
On 4 July, according to Sandinista
press, five soldiers and seven civilians were killed when
two government vehicles apparently were blown up by an
anti-tank mine in the area.
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On the diplomatic front, cease-fire negotiations are on hold.
Despite President Ortega's claim that the Sandinistas are
losing patience with the rebels, Managua appears willing to
allow the process to drag on. The Sandinistas probably
calculate that they are gaining propaganda mileage out of the
rebels' refusal to meet, and that shortages of ammunition and
other supplies will make the rebels more likely to sign a
final accord on Managua's terms.
Rebel leaders, after rejecting recent Sandinista offers to
resume negotiations, now are publicly expressing optimism
following a personal invitation from President Ortega to meet
in Managua on 28 July. The rebels are insisting that Ortega
head future government delegations and that talks be held
outside Nicaragua. They told US officials they plan to wait
until after the 7 August summit of Central American presidents
before meeting again with the regime.
At home, the Sandinistas are proceeding with minimal political
reforms designed to foster an image of increasing democratization
without jeopardizing their hold on power.
-- President Ortega submitted a draft electoral law to the
National Assembly last week, a major step toward holding local
elections.
The electoral reforms do not meet major rebel demands to limit
reelection and, if enacted as currently drafted, would bar
political parties from receiving foreign donations.
The regime may delay discussions of the legislation to entice
rebel political leaders to return home to negotiate changes in
the law.
-- Meanwhile, although the internal opposition has been largely
inactive since labor leaders ended a hunger strike in early
May, representatives from 14 opposition parties plan to meet
with Costa Rican President Arias on Tuesday [7/12] to ?ress
him to intensify international pressure on the regime.
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8 July 1988
TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
Progress of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
Although the Soviets have not evacuated any major garrisons since
June 23, they have continued preparations for the withdrawal of their
forces from northeastern and western Afghanistan.
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While the Soviets have been making preparations for the
withdrawal of units in northeastern and western Afghanistan, there
seems to have been a decrease in their withdrawal activity along the
main withdrawal route between Pol-e Khomri and Kholm. There are also
indications that the withdrawal of some Soviet personnel in western
Afghanistan may be delayed.
Doubts about the competence of regime forces may lead the Soviets
to consider delaying the withdrawal of some technical personnel and
perhaps advisors from the west. If significant numbers of troops are
delayed, it will be difficult for the Soviets to have half of their
troops out of Afghanistan by August 15 as the Geneva accords require.
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We now estimate that close to 25,000 Soviet troops have
permanently left their garrisons in Afghanistan. Of these, we
estimate 15,000 have returned to the USSR, and the rest are either
enroute to the / bord!r nr hava rnncnlidatad with thair narant imitc tn be withdrawn later. 25X1
(Most recently, on 7 July, Yuli Vorontsov,
a Soviet deputy foreign minister, said publicly that about 23,000
troops had been withdrawn.) Although the Soviet figure could be
somewhat inflated, the difference between it and our estimate probably
stems from collection limitations.
Reports of "thinning" out of units, the movement of troops
from unidentified units, and the withdrawal of some forces by
air are making it increasingly difficult to get an accurate
troop count of Soviet forces leaving Afghanistan.
Regime and Insurgent Activity
Although regime forces are maintaining control of Kabul, security
within a thirty kilometer radius around the capital continues to
deteriorate, according to a variety of reports:
Insurgents are strengthening their forces in the southern and
western sections of Kabol province and in Lowgar province,
seizing additional district centers and capturing small regime
outposts. Afghan army defections appear to be rising.
Soviet and regime forces reportedly are conducting raids in
cities near Kabul that the insurgents had temporarily
occupied. US embassy sources claim these attacks are
reprisals against civilians.
Insurgent bombings and rocket attacks the last couple of days in
Kabul are the most intense ever experienced
-- The stepped up attacks probably reflect insurgent efforts to
show UN negotiator Cordovez--who arrived in Kabul this week--
that his plan for a ceasefire and coalition government have
little chance of succeeding.
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SI
Withdrawal Update, 7 July 1 988
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