HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE PROGRAM IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030027-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: August 26, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
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SUBJECT:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
SI-AT NOTE FOR:
STAT
30 August 1988
Public Affairs Office
Rm. 1016 Ames Bldg.
Mary Evelyn,
Attached is a copy of the DDCI's
address at Harvard University's JFK
School of Government on 26 August 1988,
along with your package.
Thanks.
Attachments
fa 3/ o -JR
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HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
EXECUTIVE PROGRAM IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECUR:TY
26 AUGUST 1988
OPPORTUNITY UNFULFILLED
THE USE AND PERCEPTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE AT THE WHITE HCUSE
ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
A SEARCH OF PRESIDENTIAL MEMOIRS AND THOSE OF PRINCIPAL
ASSISTANTS OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS OR SO TURNS UP REMARKABLY
LITTLE DISCUSSION OR PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE PLAYED BY
DIRECTORS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI) OR INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION IN PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
WHY THIS DEARTH OF FIRST?HAND REFLECTION AND EVALUATION IN
A MAJOR AREA OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL SECURITY HISTORY?
THERE ARE DOUBTLESS SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS, BUT I BELIEVE
THAT THIS VOID IN THE EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENTS, INTELLIGENCE
AND DECISIONMAKING -- APART FROM COVERT ACTION -- IS EXPLAINED
IN SOME MEASURE BY FACTORS THAT CONTINUE TO DOMINATE THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND THE CIA AND INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY: INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ASSESSMENT ARE A BLACK
HOLE FOR MOST PRESIDENTS AND THEIR KEY ADVISERS, NEITHER
ADEQUATELY UNDERSTOOD NOR ADEQUATELY EXPLOITED. FOR
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, PRESIDENTIAL AND SENIOR LEVEL VIEWS OF
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INTELLIGENCE THEY RECEIVE AND HOW THEY USE IT (OR NOT) ARE
JJST AS UNFAMILIAR, GIVING RISE TO PERCEPT:ONS DOMINATED BY
W:SHFUL THINKING AND EVEN CONCEIT. IN MY OPINION, OVER THE
vEARS, BOTH THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CIA HAVE FA:_ED TO TAKE
MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY FOR BE-TER INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT AND DECISIONMAKING. THIS SITUATION
IS NOT PECULIAR TO ANY SINGLE ADMINISTRATION OR PARTICULAR VIEW
CF: THE CIA, BUT RATHER A PROBLEM OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS,
BUREAUCRATIC CULTURES, AND THE POLICY PROCESS ITSELF.
WHAT THE PRESIDENT GETS
THE PRESIDENT ROUTINELY RECEIVES ONLY ONE INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCT THAT IS NOT SUMMARIZED OR COMMENTED UPON BY SOMEONE
CJTSIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY
BRIEF. HE RECEIVES THIS EVERY MORNING, ALONG W:TH A FEW STATE
AND CIA CABLES OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE. THROUGH THE COURSE OF
THE DAY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER KEEPS THE PRESIDENT
APPRISED OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS OVERSEAS. IN A CRISIS,
THE FLOW OF INFORMATION INCREASES.
NATURALLY, THE PRESIDENT RECEIVES INFORMATION THROUGH
CHANNELS OTHER THAN THE EARLY MORNING FOLDER AND THE OCCASIONAL
CABLE DURING THE DAY -- REPORTS IN MEETINGS, THE KEY JUDGMENTS
C= IMPORTANT NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, AND OTHER
INTELLIGENCE AS WELL, FROM THE DCI OR THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER.
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NEVERTHELESS, EACH OF THE FOUR PRESIDENTS I HAVE OBSERVED
HAS RECEIVED ONLY A FRACTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND
ANALYSIS SPECIFICALLY COLLECTED AND PREPARED FOR SENIOR
POLICYMAKERS. THIS HAS PLACED A PREMIUM ON THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF, ON THE WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY OF THE DCI TO GIVE
IMPORTANT ASSESSMENTS DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT, AND ON THE
WILLINGNESS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER TO FORWARD
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO THE PRESIDENT, DISINTEREST OR
RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF A DCI (OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER)
TO TAKE AN ACTIVIST, EVEN AGGRESSIVE ROLE IN THIS RESPECT IS A
SEVERE -- EVEN IRREPARABLE -- HANDICAP TO ENSURING THAT
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS REACH THE PRESIDENT,
I BELIEVE THE NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE OF MOST
PRESIDENTS AND THEIR SENIOR ADVISERS WHILE IN OFFICE OR
AFTERWARD ARE DUE TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS. IMPORTANT AMONG THEM
ARE THE FOLLOWING:
THE FIRST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT IS FAILURE. WHETHER
NIXON'S UNHAPPINESS OVER MISESTIMATES OF PLANNED SOVIET
ICBM DEPLOYMENTS OR CARTER'S OVER FAILURE TO FORECAST
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION OR UNTIMELY UPWARD REVISIONS OF
NORTH KOREAN TROOP STRENGTH, THESE PRESIDENTS AND THEIR
ADVISERS -- WITH JUSTIFICATION -- BELIEVED CIA
ASSESSMENTS EITHER CONTRIBUTED IMPORTANTLY TO POLICY
DISASTERS OR MADE THEM VULNERABLE TO LATER CRITICISM.
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FURTHER, PRESIDENTS WANT THE KIND OF TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE THAT INFORMS AND FACILITATES DAY?TO?DAY
DECISIONMAKING AND WHERE TIMELY AND ACCURATE
INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE IS HARDEST,
SECOND, PRESIDENTS DO NOT LIKE CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND THEY LIKE IT EVEN _ESS WHEN IT
BECOMES PUBLIC. NOR DO PRESIDENTS WELCOmE DEBATE OVER
BASIC FACTS ONCE THEY HAVE MADE A DECIS::DN. WHETHER
THE ISSUE IS TROUBLESOME ASSESSMENTS ON VIETNAM
(JOHNSON), THE PUBLIC DISPUTE BETWEEN CIA AND
DEFENSE ON WHETHER THE SS-9 WAS A MRV CR MIRV (NIXON),
ENERGY ESTIMATES (CARTER), OR THE SOVIET GAS PIPELINE
(REAGAN), THESE AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE DEBATES OVER
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, VERIFICATION OF ARvS CONTROL,
SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING, SOVIET WEAPONS IROGRAMS AND
MANY MORE HAVE CAUSED CONTROVERSY AND WEAKENED SUPPORT
FOR POLICY.
THIRD, PRESIDENTS DO NOT WELCOME NEW INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSMENTS UNDERCUTTING POLICIES BASED ON EARLIER
ASSESSMENTS. WHEN NEW INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS RESULTS
IN CHANGING THE STATISTICAL BASIS FOR TrE US POSITION
IN MBFR, SUBSTANTIALLY ELEVATING ESTIMATES OF NORTH
KOREAN FORCES AT A TIME WHEN THE PRESIDENT IS PRESSING
TO REDUCE US FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA, OR "DISCOVERING" A
SOVIET BRIGADE IN CUBA, IT IS NO REVELATION TO OBSERVE
THAT PRESIDENTS REGARD US LESS THAN FONDLY.
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FOURTH, SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE GENERALLY
REGARDED WITH SKEPTICISM THE GROWING DIRECT
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND US INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES ABOVE AND BEYOND THE ACTUAL OVERSIGHT
PROCESS. IN RECENT YEARS, THE PROVISION OF GREAT
QUANTITIES OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS
TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THEIR STAFFS HAS LARGELY
ELIMINATED THE EXECUTIVE'S LONGSTANDING ADVANTAGE OF A
NEAR MONOPOLY OF INFORMATION ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
DEFENSE.
FINALLY, I BELIEVE PRESIDENTS AND THEIR NATIONAL
SECURITY TEAMS USUALLY ARE ILL?INFORMED ABOUT
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AND THEREFORE HAVE
UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS OF WHAT INTELLIGENCE CAN DO
FOR THEM, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY SEE THE GENUINELY
EXTRAORDINARY CAPABILITIES OF US INTELLIGENCE FOR
COLLECTING AND PROCESSING INFORMATION. POLICYMAKERS
USUALLY LEARN THE HARD WAY THAT WHILE INTELLIGENCE CAN
TELL THEM A GREAT DEAL, IT ONLY RARELY -- AND USUALLY
IN CRISES INVOLVING MILITARY FORCES -- PROVIDES THE
KIND OF UNAMBIGUOUS AND TIMELY INFORMATION THAT CAN
MAKE DAY?TO?DAY DECISIONMAKING SIMPLER AND LESS RISKY.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OCCASIONALLY ENCOURAGE SUCH
EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS BY PRETENDING A CONFIDENCE IN
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-HEIR JUDGMENTS THEY CANNOT REASONABLY JLSTIFY AND BY
cAILING TO BE CANDID ABOUT THE QUALITY AND RELIABILITY
OF THEIR INFORMATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER
OUTCOMES. ONCE BITTEN BY AN ERRONEOUS CR MISLEADING
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT, MOST WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS --
INCLUDING PRESIDENTS -- WILL BE TWICE-SHY ABOUT RELYING
ON OR ACCEPTING UNQUESTIONINGLY A SECOND.
A CASE STUDY ILLUSTRATES THE CONTRIBUTION OF
INTELLIGENCE TO A PRESIDENT'S POLICYMAKING AND
SIMULTANEOUSLY THE PROBLEMS IT CAN BRING -- INF.
CAPABILITY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE TO MONITOR DEPLOYED INF
WEAPONS AND OTHER TREATY PROVISIONS MADE THE TREATY
POSSIBLE IN THE FIRST PLACE. BUT OUR UNCERTAINTIES IN
SOME AREAS, DISAGREEMENT WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ON THE NUMBER OF NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES,
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THESE DISAGREEMENTS AND
EXPLOITATION OF THEM IN DEBATE PRESENTED PROBLEMS TO
THE EXECUTIVE. FOR THE WHITE HOUSE, ON THIS ISSUE --
AND SO MANY OTHERS -- INTELLIGENCE WAS A BITTERSWEET
PLAYER.
OF-EN, STAFF AT THE WHITE HOUSE DO NOT KNOW -'OW TO USE
EFFECTIJELY THE VAST SYSTEM THEY DIRECT -- AND, TOO OFTEN, AN
INTELLIGENCE BUREAUCRACY THAT DOES NOT WANT SUCH DIRECTION
OFFERS _ITTLE HELP. THERE IS A LONGSTANDING PERCEPTION AT THE
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WHITE HOUSE THAT CHANGING THE WAY THE INTELLIGENCE
BUREAUCRACIES DO BUSINESS -- FOR EXAMPLE, EVEN THE PRESENTATION
OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE PRESIDENT -- IS JUST TOO
HARD, TAKES TOO MUCH TIME AND ENERGY, AND ULTIMATELY YIE_DS
LITTLE.
A LACK OF FEEDBACK AND, MORE BROADLY, INTELLIGENCE POLICY
GUIDANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT (AND OTHER SENIOR OFICIALS) HAS
BEEN A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO IMPROVED AND MORE RESPONSIVE
INTELLIGENCE PERFORMANCE. THE LACK OF RECEPTIV:TY ON THE PART
OF SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS ON THOSE INFREQUENT OCCASIONS
WHEN GUIDANCE, ADVICE OR FEEDBACK HAS BEEN OFFERED IS EQUALLY
TO BLAME. EVEN SO, IF EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND ESPECIALLY WHITE
HOUSE OFFICIALS VIEW CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE ON INTELLIGENCE
STRATEGY, PRIORITIES AND INVESTMENT AS EXCESSIVE, IT IS IN PART
BECAUSE SENIOR POLICYMAKERS IN SUCCESSIVE ADMIN:STRATIONS HAVE
NOT NEGLECTED THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITIES IN THESE AREAS.
A PRESIDENT AND HIS NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM (THE SECRETARIES
OF STATE AND DEFENSE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADV:SER) SHOULD
VIEW INTELLIGENCE AS AN IMPORTANT ASSET IN FOREIGN POLICY4AKING
AND SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DEVOTE THE TIME AND ENERGY TO wORKING
WITH THE DCI TO PROVIDE USEFUL GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION TO -HE
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS EFFORTS OF CIA AND THE REST OF US
INTELLIGENCE. CONTRARY TO THE VIEW OF THOSE WHO ARE
APPREHENSIVE OVER A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICYMAKERS AND
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INTELLIGENCE, I BELIEVE IT IS NOT CLOSE ENOUGH -- THAT MORE
INTERACTION, FEEDBACK AND DIRECTION AS TO STRATEGY, PRIORITIES
AND REQUIREMENTS IS CRITICAL TO BETTER PERFORMANCE, AND THAT
THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE INDEPENDENCE
AND INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS AND JUDGMENTS.
THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN THE LAST TEN YEARS, EVEN THOUGH
MUCH MORE CAN BE DONE. THE CARTER AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS
HAVE WORKED CONSTRUCTIVELY AT A HIGH LEVEL TO INFORM CIA OF THE
ANALYTICAL NEEDS OF THE PRESIDENT AND TO ADVISE THE AGENCY OF
PERCEIVED SHORTCOMINGS IN COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS.
AFTER THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, THE CARTER WHITE HOUSE TOOK
SEVERAL STEPS TO ENSURE BETTER COMMUNICATION OF INTELLIGENCE
NEEDS. A POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE WORKING GROUP (THE DEPUTY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
AND LATER THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY), WAS
ESTABLISHED AT THE WHITE HOUSE. THE GROUP INTERPRETED ITS
CHARTER BROADLY AND ALSO WORKED TO IMPROVE AND 3ETTER FOCUS
FIELD REPORTING BY STATE, CIA AND ATTACHES. THIS AND OTHER
RELATED EFFORTS HAD A SALUTARY EFFECT IN IMPROVING
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE WHITE
HOUSE AND THUS IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE PRESIDENT.
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A MAJOR INNOVATION OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IN THIS
REGARD WAS THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN 1981 THAT HIS
PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF SHOULD BE PROVIDED EACH DAY ALSO TO THE
VICE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER AND LATER THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, PRIMARILY FOR SECURITY
REASONS, THE PDB WAS TO BE DELIVERED TO THESE PR:NCIPALS IN
PERSON BY A SENIOR ANALYTICAL OFFICER OF THE CIA, WHO WOULD SIT
WITH THE PRINCIPAL AND THEN CARRY THE DOCUMENT BACK TO THE
CIA. THESE ARRANGEMENTS PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY UNIQUE IN US
INTELLIGENCE HISTORY FOR INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS TO GET
IMMEDIATE, INFORMED FEEDBACK FROM PRINCIPALS AND A SENSE OF THE
PRIORITIES AND CONCERNS OF THE TOP OFFICIALS IN GOVERNMENT.
THE DAY TO DAY DIALOGUE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND
POLICYMAKERS AT ALL LEVELS HAS INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY IN
RECENT YEARS. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE
IN THIS REGARD AND POLICYMAKERS MORE RECEPTIVE. ROUTINE WEEKLY
MEETINGS BETWEEN THE DCI AND, SEPARATELY, THE SECRETARIES OF
STATE AND DEFENSE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO IMPROVED RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS OF
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. THE NSC STAFF AND SEVERAL REAGAN NSC
ADVISERS WORKED WITH INTELLIGENCE MANAGERS TO IMPROVE
RESPONSIVENESS TO PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE NEEDS AND TO REMEDY
SHORTCOMINGS IN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.
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IN SUM, THE DIALOGUE ESSENTIAL TO BETTER INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT HAS IMPROVED, BUT SUCH PROGRESS IS HIGHLY PERISHABLE
WITH THE ROUTINE TURNOVER IN SENIOR OFFICIALS. MOREOVER, THIS
IMPROVED DIALOGUE UNTIL ONLY RECENTLY HAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE OR CRISIS?RELATED SUBJECTS. MUCH REMAINS
TO BE DONE IN INSTITUTIONALIZING IMPROVED WHITE HOUSE
INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE POLICY, ATTENTION TO REQUIREMENTS,
INVESTMENT, AND DIALOGUE ON STRATEGY AND LONGER?RANGE ISSUES.
NEARLY ALL PRESIDENTIAL COMMENTS ON THE QUALITY OF
INTELLIGENCE ARE CRITICAL -- PROMPTED BY OUR FAILURE TO MEET
EXPECTATIONS. INDEED, PRESIDENTS OFTEN CONSIDER INTELLIGENCE
AS MUCH ANOTHER PROBLEM BUREAUCRACY AS A SOURCE OF HELPFUL
INFORMATION, INSIGHT AND SUPPORT.
THIS POINT IS PERHAPS MOST GRAPHICALLY ILLUSTRATED BY A
STORY INVOLVING PRESIDENT JOHNSON. AS RECOUNTED BY FORMER DCI
RICHARD HELMS, AT A PRIVATE DINNER IN THE WHITE HOUSE FAMILY
QUARTERS DURING JOHNSON'S TERM, THE PRESIDENT ENGAGED JOHN J.
MCCLOY IN A DISCUSSION ABOUT INTELLIGENCE -- WITHIN EARSHOT OF
HELMS. JOHNSON TOLD MCCLOY THINGS WERE GOING WELL IN
INTELLIGENCE, AND THEN CONTINUED: "BUT LET ME TELL YOU ABOUT
THESE INTELLIGENCE GUYS. WHEN I WAS GROWING UP IN TEXAS WE HAD
A COW NAMED BESSIE. I'D GO OUT EARLY AND MILK HER. I'D GET
HER IN THE STANCHION, SEAT MYSELF AND SQUEEZE OUT A PAIL OF
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FRESH MILK. ONE DAY I'D WORKED HARD AND GOTTEN A FULL PAIL OF
MILK, BUT I WASN'T PAYING ATTENTION, AND OLD BES:E SWEPT HER
SHIT-SMEARED TAIL THROUGH THAT BUCKET OF MILK. NOW, YOU KNOW,
THAT'S WHAT THESE INTELLIGENCE GUYS DO. YOU WORK HARD AND GET
A GOOD PROGRAM OR POLICY GOING, AND THEY SWEEP A SHIT-SMEARED
TAIL THROUGH IT."
ALTHOUGH THE ROUTINE ORDER OF BUSINESS AND :NTERNAL
ORGANIZATION MAY VARY FROM ADMINISTRATION TO ADNISTRATION, I
SUGGEST SEVERAL APPROACHES TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT. NONE IS NEW. EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO CARRY
OUT MOST OF THE SUGGESTIONS BUT THEY HAVE BEEN -APHAZARD,
TRANSITORY OR OBSTRUCTED BY BUREAUCRATIC, CULTURAL OR
ATTITUDINAL PROBLEMS. THIS MUST CHANGE.
SENIOR INTELLIGENCE, STATE, DEFENSE AND NSC OFFICERS
MUST ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN PERSONAL CON-ACT TO ENSURE
THAT INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ARE WELL INFORMED AS TO THE
ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE PRESIDENT; POL:CY MATTERS
UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WHICH INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CAN
MAKE A CONTRIBUTION; AND THE OVERALL FOREIGN AND
DEFENSE AFFAIRS AGENDA SO THAT THE PRES:DENT'S NEEDS
CAN BE BETTER ANTICIPATED.
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DCI AGGRESSIVENESS IN GETTING SUBSTANT: E MATTERS
BEFORE THE PRESIDENT IS ESSENTIAL, BUT, ALONG WITH
ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT, HAS VARIED GREATLY. THIS
UNDERTAKING IS CENTRAL TO THE DCI'S ROLE AS THE
PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE ADVISER. MOREOVER,
THE DCI SHOULD ASSUME A SIMILAR ROLE WI-H THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER -- PERHAPS THE BEST SC.,RCE OF
INFORMATION ON ISSUES OF TOPICAL INTEREST TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE AGENDA.
FINALLY, THE IMPORTANCE OF FEEDBACK FRC m THE PRESIDENT
AND HIS NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM IS CRITICAL. CONTRARY
TO THE VIEWS OF SOME, WE CANNOT PROPER.2 DO OUR WORK IN
SPLENDID ISOLATION -- AND SHOULD NOT. -IMELINESS,
RELEVANCE AND OBJECTIVITY ARE NOT INCOMDATIBLE.
THE PRESIDENT AND HIS SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY TEAM
MUST TAKE SERIOUSLY THEIR RESPONSIBILI-v FOR THE
QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT THEY GET. THEY MUST BE
WILLING TO MAKE TIME TO UNDERSTAND INTELIGENCE
CAPABILITIES, THE IMPACT OF COMPETING --)RIORITIES FCR
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, AND MAJOR INVESTMENT
DECISIONS. AND, THEY MUST BE WILLING -0 PLAY AN ACTIVE
ROLE IN GUIDING INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY AND DETERMINING
PRIORITIES.
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STEPS ALSO CAN AND HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO M:TIGA-E THE E:FECTS
OF SOME OF THE CAUSES OF PRESIDENTIAL DISPLEASURE WITH
INTELLIGENCE -- SUPPORT TO CONGRESS, REVISED ASSESSMENTS THAT
HAVE POLICY IMPLICATIONS, SURPRISES, AND PCLITICA__Y
DISAGREEABLE ASSESSMENTS. MORE CAN BE DONE. FOR EXAMPLE:
INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS SHOULD TAKE T-E INITIATIVE
TO LET POLICYMAKERS KNOW WHEN AN ESTIMATE OR OTHER FORM
OF ANALYSIS WILL REVISE EARLIER ASSESSMP.-S AND HAVE A
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE PRESIDENT'S PO_:CIES. THERE
IS, OF COURSE, A RISK THAT SOMEONE WILL TRY TO CHANGE
OR STOP PUBLICATION OF AN UNWELCOME OR EMBARRASSING
ESTIMATE. HERE THE DCI MUST STAND HIS GROUND TO
PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE ASSESSMENT AND THE PROCESS.
INTELLIGENCE NEEDS TO DEVELOP A MECHANISM FOR BETTER
INFORMING THE WHITE HOUSE ABOUT SUPPORT DROVIDED TO THE
CONGRESS. THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ARE DART OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH. IT IS NOT IMPROPER OR :NAPPROPRIATE
FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO KEEP --E PRESIDENT'S
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONGRESSIONAL AP-7AIRS STAFF ADVISED
OF PAPERS PROVIDED TO THE CONGRESS, DOSS:KY
CONTROVERSIAL TESTIMONY OR BRIEFINGS.
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FINALLY, GROUND RULES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR THE
DISCLOSURE OF DECLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE. THE CURRENT
LACK OF A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH CONTRIBUTES TO LEAKS; TO
WHITE HOUSE SUSPICION OF OBSTRUCTIONISM, BUREAUCRATIC
GAMES OR PURSUIT OF A CONTRARY POLICY AGENDA BY
INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS; AND CONCERN ON THE PART OF
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OVER THE APPEARANCE (AND
SOMETIMES THE REALITY) OF POLITICIZATION OF
INTELLIGENCE BY WHITE HOUSE OR OTHER
POLICYMAKER?DIRECTED DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.
THE USEFULNESS OF THE CIA TO PRESIDENTS IN THAT AREA FOR
WHICH THE CIA WAS PRIMARILY ESTABLISHED -- COLLECTION,
REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION -- HAS
SUFFERED BECAUSE OF SELF?IMPOSED ISOLATION BY CIA AND THE LACK
OF SUSTAINED INTEREST, UNDERSTANDING AND INVOLVEMENT BY
PRESIDENTS AND THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY TEAMS. LACK OF WHITE
HOUSE INVOLVEMENT HAS OFTEN LEFT INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS
ADRIFT AND UNCERTAIN AMID CONFLICTING PRIORITIES AND
REQUIREMENTS, WITH THE INEVITABLE PRICE IN RELEVANCE AND
TIMELINESS,
CIA AND THE OTHER US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES REPRESENT AN
EXTRAORDINARY NATIONAL ASSET. THE REBUILDING OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OVER THE PAST DECADE HAS VASTLY
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AUGMENTED OUR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS CAPABILITIES AND
SHARPENED OUR SKILLS. CONGRESS HAS GREATLY ENHANCED ITS
UNDERSTANDING OF INTELLIGENCE AND SHOWN A WILLINGNESS -- EVEN
DETERMINATION -- TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION, AS WELL AS
FUNDING. I BELIEVE THE WHITE HOUSE SHOULD ASSERT MORE
AGGRESSIVELY ITS PROPER INTELLIGENCE POLICY DIRECTION AND
GUIDANCE ROLE, AND THAT CIA SHOULD WELCOME THIS ROLE.
COMMUNICATION AND DIALOGUE MUST BE FURTHER IMPROVED. ONLY THUS
CAN WE SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND, CONCOMITANTLY, BETTER SERVE THE POLICYMAKING
PROCESS.
15
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STAT
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-
' Orig. - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/PAO
1 - PAO
STAT 1 -
1-
1 - AO Ames
1 - MED(Subject)
1 - Jean
1 - DCI Security
PAO 88-0290
23 August 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William M. Baker
Director, Public Affairs Office
SUBJECT:
Address of the Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Executive Program in
National and International Security
1. This is background information for your address of the dinner meeting
of the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government Executive
Program in National and International Security on Friday, 26 August from
6:00 - 8:00 p.m. The dinner meeting will be held at the Kennedy School of
Government, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Phone: [phone]
or 1389. Although the participants will be in casual dress, you and the two
professors are asked to wear coat and tie. Since the press will not be
present, a member of the Public Affairs Office will not accompany you unless
you request it.
2. Arrangements for the Dinner Meeting and Address of the John F. Kennedy
School of Government Program for Senior Executives in National and
International Security: You are asked to be at room #110 in the Belfer
section of the Kennedy School at 6:00 p.m. where you will be met by Director
of National Security Programs Robert J. Murray and Professor Ernest R. May who
will escort you to the Penthouse on the fourth floor for dinner. (See tab for
biographies.) You will be seated between Professor May and Professor Murray
and three of the participants -not designated at this time- will be at your
table. Your remarks are scheduled to begin at approximately 6:45 p.m. and
Robert Murray will introduce you. The suggested format is 15-20 minutes of
remarks followed by 40 minutes of questions and answers. The meeting is
off-the-record and unclassified. Adjournment is at 8:00 p.m.
A podium and microphone will be located near your table. DCI Security
will tape your remarks for our historical files. The school does not plan to
publish your address or to record any part of the program. Still photographs
will be taken for publication in the school's brochure at the beginning of
your speech and at the end of the program.
3. Audience: You can expect an audience of approximately 100 senior
officials iThtional security including two star flag officers,
FOR OF I ONLY
S7-316-ir
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
senior grade civilians from defense and intelligence agencies, and
representatives from the defense industry. Staff members of the Senate and
House Armed Services Committees, House and Senate Intelligence Committees, and
eight CIA officers will attend. (See tab for list of participants.)
4. Media: The media will not cover the meeting. Previously a member of
the media has participated in the program, but none is registered for this
session.
5. Background: The Kennedy School's National Security Program organizes
and directs three programs on public management and national security, and has
developed an active research and case study program on national security
topics. You will be addressing the eleven-year-old program for Senior
Executives in National and International Security which is held once a year.
The program is intended to meet the special needs of people who are in -or
moving into- posts where their personal decisions or recommendations can
critically affect the political, economic, or military interests of the United
States.
Participants are executives who make or influence strategic decisions
within their organizations or are called upon to implement major policies.
Using the case method, the Program provides participants with experiences in a
wide range of managerial situations. Many of the studies were developed by
the School of Government. (See tab for schedule.) The cases, supplemented by
lectures and seminars, cover a wide range of important security-related issues
including:
? Global economic forces and the determinants of national economic policy
? Regional problems such as Latin America
? Political management
? Uses and misuses of history in formulating current policy
? Executive-legislative, government-press, and civilian-military relations
? Interplay between foreign and domestic policy
? Political assessment of foreign governments
? Weapons acquisition
(For further information see brochures in front pocket.)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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STAT
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The program's faculty members include Graham Allison, Ernest May, Joseph
Rye, and Robert Murray. (See tab for faculty.) Outside speakers for the 1988
program are the following:
Vice Admiral Bobby Bell (USN)
Norman Augustine
Charles Zraket_
Reverend J. Bryan Hehir
Vice Director, Strategic Target Planning
Topic: Military Considerations and the
INF Treaty
CEO, Martin Marietta
Topic: Tunnel at the End of the Light
CEO, MITRE
Topic: START and Verification
US Catholic Bishops Conference
Topic: Ethics and Strategy:
The State of the Debate
Arkady Schevchenko Topic unknown
William M. Baker
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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ruK urriuim. U3C UNLI
3:45 p.m.
5:00 p.m.
6:00 p.m.
SCHEDULE OF EVENTS/CONTACTS
Trip to Boston, Massachusetts
To Address Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Executive Program in National and International Security
Friday, 26 August 1988
Depart, National Airport
transportation via Lear Jet
Arrive, Hanscom Air Force Base
Bedford, Massachusetts
Arrive, John F. Kennedy School of Government
Room #110
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Met by Robert J. Murray, Director, National Security Programs
Professor Ernest R. May
Phone: [phone]
6:05 p.m. Dinner, Penthouse of JFK School
6:45 p.m.
Introduction, Robert J. Murray
Address by The Honorable Robert M. Gates
15-20 minutes of remarks, 40 minutes questions and answers
8:00 p.m. Adjournment
8:30 p.m. Depart, Hanscom Air Force Base
Bedford, Massachusetts
9:45 p.m. Arrive, National Airport
Contacts: , Mark Cancian [phone]
Helen Clougherty [phone]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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