ADDITIONAL ITEMS FOR YOUR BREAKFST WITH THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000400070010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: July 6, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCA 88-2273
6 July 1988
VX11ORANDU? FOR: The Director
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Additional Item. for your breakfast with the
House Foreign Affairs Committee
1. At the insistence of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee staff, this afternoon we picked uF a draft copy.of
the Con.r. i ttee's report on H.P. 3622, the Stokes Bill on
oversight Legislation. We have attached a copy of the draft
report which might be worth a few minutes of your time to
review before your breakfast tomorrow with the Foreign Affairs
Comr.i ttee.
2. Predictably the report takes the opportunity to
address the often heard complaint that even though the Foreign
Affairs Committee has jurisdiction over the consideration of
foreign policy matters, the Committee is not adequately
informed on covert action activities in support of U.S.
foreign policy. The report contends that both House rules and
Hughes-Ryan specifically include the Foreign Affairs Committee
as one of the committees which should be informed in a timely
fashion as to a description and scope of the covert activity.
3. On the page of the report identified as 19A (see
clip) the Committee says that it expects and understands that
the HPSCI will consult with members of the Foreign Affairs
Corcr.ittee about the policy objectives and national security of
the United States in accordance with the rules of the House.
In order to enhance communication and information sharing
between the two Committees, "the Committee will, in
cooperation with the Select Committee, propose the establish-
ment of a formal intercomm:ittee group which would be tasked to
ensure that all appropriate information relevant to the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the posession of the Select
Cor.r.i ttee be made ava i lab-le to the Corr r i ttee on Foreign
Affairs."
4. In your testimony before the Foreign Affairs
Committee on the Stokes Bill, you said that the Foreign
Affairs Committee has a legitimate need for intelligence
UNCLASSIFIED
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information. You can agree that the Committee should have
access to information to ensure that no covert action is
undertaken which would be inconsistent with foreign policy
objectives, but the mechanisrr. established to ensure that this
exchange between two committees of Congress takes place is the
responsibility of the House leadership, not the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Joh~n . He aerson
Attachment:
As stated
UNCLASSIFIED
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5 July 1988
JUDGE:
RE: Your proposed remarks at breakfast with the
House Committtee on Foreign Affairs
7 July 1988 8:30 a.m.
2200 Rayburn House Office Building
You are scheduled to have breakfast with the members and staff of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). At the request of the Office of
Congressional Affairs, we have prepared unclassified talking points and
background information for you. The talking points are unclassified because
staffers holding no clearances may be present at the breakfast. Dick Kerr's
staff has provided unclassified updates on key world hotspots that are also
attached.
The breakfast will be held in the Committee's hearing room, 2200 Rayburn
House Office Building. Because the breakfast follows the Fourth of July
holiday, attendance is hard to estimate. It is possible that as many as 50
congressmen and staff may attend. John Helgerson and of OCA.will
accompany you. The House Foreign Affairs Committee regularly has breakfast
meetings with Cabinet members, visiting heads of state, and other'h-igh-level
officials to informally discuss matters of mutual interest.
This will be your second dealing with HFAC. On 14 June you testified
before the full committee on H.R. 3822, the Intelligence Oversight Act of
1988. Your testimony covered the general merits of such legislation and
specifically addressed the bill's proposal that the President notify Congress
within 48 hours of authorizing a covert action. Because this was your first
appearance before HFAC, you also addressed the committee's access to
intelligence information and the role of covert action in U.S. foreign
policy. Following your testimony., you entertained questions on the
congressional oversight process, including the constitutionality and
practicality of 48-hour notification, the risk of unauthorized disclosures due
to congressional notification, and the bill's definition of covert action.
You may be asked to make some brief remarks at the upcoming breakfast.
Two items are of key interest to the committee: their access to intelligence
information on world events and covert actions, and the authority and
activities of the Security Evaluation Office (SEO). Your proposed talking
points on the first issue focus on the support the..Agency provides. Your
proposed talking points on SEO are based on the OGC opinion rendered on 20
June, as well as pertinent correspondence between you, the Secretary of State,
the White House, and the Hill. A chronology of these communications is
attached.
VV6
Attachments:
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DCI/PAO/WMB
Distribution:-
Orig. - DCI
1 - D/PAO
1
1-
1 - PAO Registry
1 - Jean
1 - Ames (Hold)
1 - (Chrono) ,r5
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TALKING POINTS
HFAC-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RELATIONS
IN MID-JUNE I TESTIFIED BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON THE
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT, AND I BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE WAYS IN WHICH CIA AND
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAN SUPPORT THE COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES. THIS
BREAKFAST GIVES ME ANOTHER WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE WAYS
IN WHICH WE WORK TOGETHER.
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES ON SIGNIFICANT WORLD 'DEVELOPMENTS "ARE ESSENTIAL- TO U.S
FOREIGN POLICY DELIBERATIONS. I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH ANALYSES WOULD BE
IMPORTANT TO THIS COMMITTEE, AND I BELIEVE THAT CIA HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE.
-- FROM 1986 TO THE PRESENT, CIA HAS PROVIDED 68 BRIEFINGS TO COMMITTEE
MEMBERS AND 48 BRIEFINGS TO COMMITTEE STAFF. DURING THIS PERIOD, CIA
OFFICIALS HAVE MADE 14 APPEARANCES BEFORE THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE TO
GIVE FORMAL TESTIMONY.
-- THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CIA HAS VARIED FROM PRE-TRIP BRIEFINGS ON
PARTICULAR COUNTRIES AND REGIONS, TO FORMAL TESTIMONY ON PROPOSED
LEGISLATION, TO BRIEFINGS FOR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS ON SPECIFIC TOPICS.
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-- WE ALSO MAKE A VARIETY OF INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE TO THE
COMMITTEE, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY AND OUR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1988, CIA PROVIDED
A TOTAL OF 324 INTELLIGENCE, PUBLICATIONS TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND STAFF.
FRANKLY, WE SEE A LOT OF SOME OF YOU, AND TOO LITTLE OF OTHERS. WE IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE A WEALTH OF INFORMATION THAT WE ARE EAGER AND
PROUD TO SHARE. GIVE ME A CALL IF WE CAN BE HELPFUL.
SECURITY 'EVALUATION OFFICE (SEO)
I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT SOME COMMITTEE MEMBERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECURITY EVALUATION OFFICE. THEY BELIEVE IT MAY INFRINGE
UPON THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S AUTHORITY TO MANAGE U.S. EMBASSIES AND MISSIONS
ABROAD, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE OMNIBUS DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND ANTITERRORISM
ACT OF 1982.
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THE SECURITY EVALUATION OFFICE IS TO PERFORM AN INDEPENDENT AUDIT FUNCTION.
-- ITS PURPOSE IS TO SET SECURITY STANDARDS TO PROTECT U.S. DIPLOMATIC
ESTABLISHMENTS FROM FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY AND TO MONITOR
COMPLIANCE WITH THOSE STANDARDS.
-- IT WILL REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, BY DIRECTION OF
THE PRESIDENT, AND WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE DCI
WILL THEN REPORT PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR HIS ACTION.
IT IS THE DCI'S RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO ACHIEVE
IMPROVEMENTS IN SECURITY ABROAD.
-- AS DCI, I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. PROTECTING
OUR FOREIGN MISSIONS FROM PENETRATION BY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IS
A FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROBLEM.
-- I AM ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING THE NATIONAL FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, THIS INCLUDES EFFECTIVELY SAFEGUARDING INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES, METHODS, AND INFORMATION.
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-- THE PROGRAMS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO DO THIS
CAN ASSIST THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HIS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE EMBASSY
SECURITY.
MY GENERAL COUNSEL AND I BELIEVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECURITY EVALUATION
OFFICE FITS WITHIN EXISTING LEGISLATION, AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES.
CURRENT EVENTS
YOUR COMMITTEE IS WELL INFORMED ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE VARIOUS TROUBLE
SPOTS AROUND THE WORLD, SO I WILL NOT GET INTO ANY OF THOSE IN DETAIL IN THE
BRIEF TIME AVAILABLE FOR THESE REMARKS THIS MORNING. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU,
HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE PROVIDING OUR BEST INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS TO U.S.
POLICYMAKERS -- INCLUDING THE CONGRESS -- AS WE GRAPPLE WITH THESE ISSUES.
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OUR PRIORITIES IN THE RECENT PAST, AND AT THE PRESENT, HAVE INCLUDED SUCH
-- ARMS CONTROL MONITORING
-- GENERAL NORIEGA IN PANAMA
-- THE WAR AND ASSOCIATED TENSIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
-- THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
-- THE PROBLEM OF NICARAGUA, AND
-- LAST WEEK'S SOVIET PARTY CONFERENCE
WITH CHALLENGES SUCH AS THESE, WE BOTH HAVE OUR PLATES FULL. I KNOW THE
AGENCY WILL CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL TO THE COMMITTEE, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR
INVITING ME TO JOIN YOU THIS MORNING.
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Security Evaluation Office (SEO): A Chronology
3 Aug 87 Letter from the Secretary of State and DCI to the President.
Recommended actions to,.increase-security at Embassy Moscow and at all U.S.
missions abroad. One recommendation-was to establish a unit responsible to
the DCI to set standards for protecting embassies from penetration by foreign
intelligence activities.and to monitor. conformity with those standards.
22 Oct 87 Letter from the President's Deputy Assistant for National
Security Affairs to the Secretary of State and DCI.
Stated that the President agreed with their recommendation to establish a unit
to set security standards for U.S. embassies and to monitor conformity with
those standards. The President directed that the unit be responsible to the
DCI, who would report problems and recommendations to the Secretary of State
for his action.
10 Jun 88 Letter from the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations to the
Secretary of State.
Stated that the formation of --SEY may--be in 'conflict with. the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.
13 Jun 88 Briefing by the Director of SEO and the Assistant Secretary for
Diplomatic Security to HFAC staff.
Discussed the aims and activities of SEO.
16 Jun 88 Question by Congressman Chester G. Atkins to DCI during HFAC
hearing on H.R. 3822, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988.
Question concerned the statutory and budget authority for SEO.
20 Jun 88 Office of General Counsel opinion on SEO.
Stated that SEO's mission was "entirely consistent" with the 1986 Omnibus
Security Act.
27 Jun 88 Letter from the Secretary of State to the DCI.
Maintained that SEO should advise State on setting security standards.
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Iq
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NESA/PG/I
TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
Trends in the Iran-Iraq War
5 July 1988
In the first half of this year, Iraq has regained the
initiative in its war with Iran. Baghdad has achieved a series
of battlefield victories and has recaptured a significant amount
of Iraqi territory once held by Iran.
The war of the cities that began in February marked a
turning point in Baghdad's fortunes. Using an extended
range missile, Iraq was able to hit targets deep in
Iran for the first time in the war, firing some 200
missiles at several major cities. Iran could not
respond in-kind and Iranian morale began to suffer.
-- Apparently severe problems with supplies and manpower
forced Iran to postpone a major offensive along the
southern front this past year. Instead, Tehran
launched an attack in northeastern Iraq and captured a
large amount of relatively unimportant territory. The
Iraqi leadership believed it had achieved a victory by
deterring a major Iranian onslaught in the south.
-- In mid-April, the Iraqi Army launched its first major
offensive since 1981 and retook the Al Faw Peninsula.
The ease of that victory encouraged Baghdad to launch
an offensive in May to recapture land east of the city
of Al Basrah, and success at Al Basrah emboldened the
Iraqis to regain the Majnoon Islands late last month.
-- The ease with which Iraq has been able to recapture
occupied territory can be attributed to its more
aggressive strategy, dictating when and where combat
will occur; declining Iranian morale on the
battlefield; and Iraq's use of chemical weapons against
troops that have little chemical defense capabilities.
STAT
STAT
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Baghdad will undoubtedly attempt to regain even more
occupied territory in the weeks ahead. Further success will
likely encourage Baghdad to step up its air attacks against
Iranian economic targets and possibly even to try to provoke Iran
to resume the war of the cities as a way to increase the pressure
on Tehran to end the war.
2
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TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI
The Iran Air Shootdown
5 July 1988
Iran is exploiting the US downing of the Iranian civilian
airliner to raise questions about the US presence in the Gulf and
rally support for the war with Iraq. Tehran probably will not
try to retaliate right away because doing so now would undermine
the propaganda windfall Iran hopes to realize, but the risk of
clashes with US forces remains high under the expanded US
protection program.
Iranian officials in Tehran and elsewhere are holding
interviews and press conferences to focus publicity on
the "savage crime" committed by the US and are
portraying the presence of US forces in the Gulf as the
source of instability there. Iran's Foreign Minister
has asked the UN Security Council to condemn the US
shootdown.
Iranian naval forces are likely to maintain normal
activity levels over the next few weeks, and more
unplanned confrontations between Iranian naval forces
and US warships and aircraft could occur. The risks
will be particularly high when Iranian small boats, in
retaliation for Iraqi ship attacks, strike at
unescorted shipping and that shipping requests US
assistance. Iranian small boat crews probably will
view any US unit operating nearby as a threat and might
try and get the first shot.
The shootdown of the airliner probably will strengthen,
hardliners in the Iranian leadership who favor a more
aggressive stance toward the US as a way of undermining
US resolve. If a more aggressive approach is decided
upon, Iran more than likely would favor a "hidden hand"
approach over direct military confrontation to minimize
the chances of massive US retaliation.
3
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5 July 1988
Lieutenant General Namphy, having consolidated the military's hold on power
in Haiti, appears set to govern with little in the way of a political agenda
beyond self-preservation and rewarding his supporters. He has ruled out
elections and has reinstated a number of allegedly corrupt cronies and
Duvalierists to government jobs they had lost after President tlanigat assumed
office in February. Nevertheless, the political opposition and public at large
have reacted ambivalently or silently to the coup, indicating widespread
resignation to the political predominance of the military.
The coup that toppled Manigat on 19 June appears to have been a largely
spontaneous response to his decision to shake up the military. The Army closed
ranks against the President apparently because it perceived he was trying to
divide and weaken the institution the same way Francois Duvalier had done after
being elected president in 1957. Press reports suggest that Manigat's attempt to
reassign Colonel Prosper Avril from the Presidential Guard to an innocuous desk
job helped trigger the coup. Avril, a powerful behind-the-scenes adviser to
former President Jean-Claude Duvalier and to Namphy during the ruling council's
tenure, is thought to have engineered the coup and is widely regarded as the
guiding force in the new regime.
Regardless of whether Namphy emerges as an active leader or figurehead
President, or even is quickly toppled as a result of divisive jockeying in the
high command, the military is firmly entrenched politically. The Army's deep
distrust of civilian political leaders, moreover, is likely to persist for some
time. The military's experience with Manigat--who appears to have lacked any
real support independent of the Army--has made the military wary of bestowing the
presidency on any civilian, no matter how malleable.
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S July 1988
Despite the sustained economic and political pressures on the Panamanian
regime over the last year, Defense Chief Manuel Noriega has been able to
further consolidate his support base, and he remains firmly entrenched in
power. Noriega has kept the ruling coalition intact and, crucial to his
survival, has maintained the continued support of the Panamanian Defense.
Forces. Following the March coup attempt, Noriega purged opponents and placed
his loyal cronies in key command positions. The recent creation of the
Strategic Military Council, tasked to advise Noriega and the General Staff on
national security issues and dominated by Noriega's loyalists, has further
tightened the Defense Chief's hold on the military. (U)
Noriega's position has been further bolstered by the failure of either
the domestic opposition or Latin American leaders to mount sustained pressure
on the regime. Government repression, internal disunity, and a continued
refusal to confront regime shows of force have rendered anti-Noriega forces
impotent to challenge the Defense Chief. Various efforts by Latin American
leaders to mediate a resolution to the crisis have stalled because they fear
that Noriega is in too strong a position to commit himself to serious
negotiations. An increasing number of countries have opted to return to
"business as usual", recognizing the Solis Palma regime and thus bolstering
its international credibility. (U)
Noriega's future plans remain unclear but he is keeping all his
political options open. In order to divert attention from the issue of his
tenure, he is trying to focus domestic debate on the presidential elections
now scheduled for spring 1989. Although he has publicly appealed to the
political parties to begin planning for the elections, he also is considering
holding a national plebiscite to seek a delay in the voting. Noriega probably
calculates that such a delay would give him more time to develop a sufficient
power base either to launch a run for the presidency or ensure his preselected
candidate wins. (U)
Nevertheless, Noriega is facing growing economic problems. Although
private banks' liquidity has improved and the public is accepting government
checks as a de facto currency, the regime appears to be operating on a day-to-
day basis financially and is unsure how future payrolls will be met. The
government is considering harsh austerity measures--including massive layoffs
of public employees--to address its deepening budget crisis. Additionally, the
regime is increasing its efforts to circumvent US economic sanctions and
collect taxes from US-owned firms. US pressure has dissuaded most prospective
donors from providing much beyond humanitarian aid, although Taiwan is
considering investing in an all-Taiwanese export zone. (U)
In summary, Noriega's hold on power appears firm and he faces no near-
term threats, but Panama's deteriorating economy and the government's severe
financial problems will confront the regime with an increasingly serious
challenge to longer term stability. (U)
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A r i r.u
5 July 1988
Nicaragua: The Current Situation
War Winding Down
Over the past six months, the focus of the conflict in Nicaragua
has shifted from the battlefield to the negotiating table. If
hostilities resume, however, the regime will have significant military
advantages.
-- The rebel military position has weakened steadily since the US
lethal aid cutoff, and over 11,000 insurgent fighters--nearly
two-thirds of the rebel force--have sought sanctuary in Honduras.
-- Infighting among rebel leaders has undercut leadership unity and
caused confusion and morale problems in the field.
-- Recent efforts by some rebels to return to Nicaragua have been
hampered by ammunition shortages, logistical difficulties, and
uncertainty over future US and Honduran support.
-- Meanwhile, the Sandinistas have used the cease-fire to rest and
refit their troops, track rebel movements, and lure a few
insurgents to lay down their arms through a persistent amnesty
campaign.
Stringing Out the "Peace Process"
The Sandinistas, who consider the Sapoa Peace accord only a
timetable for rebel disarmament, have sought to prolong the cease-fire
talks. They appear confident that time is on their side.
-- The Sandinistas have consistently resisted making fundamental
political reforms, offering only to discuss political issues in
an ongoing dialogue with internal opposition parties.
-- The failure of the rebels to forge an alliance with the internal
opposition--weakened by infighting, ideological differences, and
selective Sandinista repression--has enhanced the regime's
ability to deflect demands for change.
-- Eager to deny Washington any pretext for renewing lethal aid to
the rebels, the Sandinistas again have extended the fragile truce
and called for a new round of talks later this month.
Economic Troubles Intensifying
Despite the regime's strong position in cease-fire talks and on
the battlefield, the Sandinistas face serious economic challenges.
-- Inflation--running at a 16,500 percent annual rate during the
quarter ending in May--and consumer shortages have fostered
widespread popular discontent.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Sandinista moves to trim the huge budget deficit, including the
layoff of at least 8,000 government workers, have had little
impact so far.
Soviet Bloc and Cuban economic aid, currently running at more
than $500 million annually, has not been sufficient to meet.
Sandinista needs.
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Unclassified
TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI 5 July 1988
RESULTS OF THE SOVIET PARTY CONFERENCE
General Secretary Gorbachev scored an apparent victory as the party conference
approved all of the six draft resolutions--and a seventh, which he proposed at the last
minute, to accelerate political reform. This success, however, was offset by his failure to
secure changes in the Central Committee or agreement that the conference resolutions
were authoritative party decisions. The conference also provided party conservatives with
a nationwide forum to air their views--views that were generally well-received and that
were reflected in the resolutions. Moreover, the conference marks a watershed because
of the extraordinarily open debate, which will set new parameters for future party deliber-
ations.
The conference resolutions--although vaguely-worded and ambiguous in places--gener-
ally approved the major initiatives contained in Gorbachev's report.
o The conference approved Gorbachev's most controversial proposals--to
combine party and state leadership posts and to limit all officials to two five-
year terms in office. It also called for future midterm conferences that would
be empowered to change up to 20% of the Central Committee.
o Despite rancorous debate over the limits of criticism, the resolution on glas-
nost was a strong endorsement for the policy of openness, calling for . its
"consistent expansion" and "legal guarantees" to ensure its continuation.
o The resolution on ethnic relations endorsed balancing maximum autonomy
for local nationalities with the interests of "the country as a whole," stopping
far short of proposing a specific solution to the country's ethnic difficulties.
Gorbachev recognizes that he faces a difficult test in getting the conference's proposals
implemented.
o He will probably use a Central Committee plenum, scheduled for the end of
the month, to press for implementation; he could also make some personnel
changes that would strengthen his position in the leadership.
o Despite the intention of the seventh resolution to speed up political reform, it
calls for local elections to begin in two months--probably longer than Gor-
bachev would like to wait.
0 Gorbachev should assume the presidency during elections to the Supreme
Soviet next April, giving him constitutional authority to quicken the pace of
reform. In the meantime, however, opponents of reform could drag out dis-
cussion of certain issues indefinitely.
Gorbachev is using the proposed institutional changes to his own political advantage. In
the process, however, he is also making changes that could genuinely limit the party's
power over the system and lead to the structural transformation of the Soviet Union.
Unclassified
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 vawunwaC AQV
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NESA/SO/A
Talking Points for the DCI on Afghanistan
5 July 1988
AFGHANISTAN
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan appears to be proceeding in
accordance with the schedule envisaged by the Geneva agreements. These
call for half of the Soviet troops in country to be withdrawn by August
15 and remaining troops to be gone by February 15.
--The Soviets have now withdrawn more than 20,000 troops from
Afghanistan and have vacated most of the eastern provinces that
border Pakistan (U)
The Kabul regime continues to be pressed militarily on several
fronts.
--Kabul has pulled back some its forces around the major cities in
the eastern and southern provinces to better utilize its already
weak armed forces and defend against insurgent attacks. (U)
Insurgents are conducting attacks against the regime in many
provinces countrywide. At least six district centers and twenty regime
military posts--under heavy pressure from guerrillas--have recently
fallen.
--According to press reports the resistance has set up governments
in eleven of the northern provinces. (U)
The regime is making a considerable effort to blame Pakistan for
violating the Geneva Accords, filing over 38 official protests with the
UNGOMAP*observer force in Afghanistan.
--Kabul has accused Islamabad of over 200 violations of the Accords
since they were implemented on 15 May. Pakistan denies the
charges.
--Regime officials have also been dispatched to several Arab
countries to make the case that Kabul is upholding the agreements
despite Pakistan's alleged violations. (U)
* United Nations Good Offices Mission to
Afghanistan and Pakistan
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP90M00005R000400070010-5